Thought and social struggle: A history of dialectics. by Scott, Simeon G.
 University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
 
THOUGHT AND SOCIAL STRUGGLE 
A HISTORY OF DIALECTICS 
Simeon Guy Scott 
Submission for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Social and Economic Studies 
University of Bradford 
1999 
Contents 
Introduction: What is the DiaIectic? page 
Chapter 1: Dialectics and Earliest Society page 10 
Problems involved in the study of the thought of earliest society 
Sahlins on the genesis of reified thinking 
Joseph Campbell's Masks of God 
Fronkfort and mythopoeic thinking 
Hamill's Ethno-Logic 
Contrasting perspectives on thought in earliest society 
Sahlins and the contradictions at the core of earliest society 
Gender contradictions in earliest society 
Magic and religion in earliest society 
Radin and social differentiation 
The work of Claude Uvi-Strauss 
Leach's criticisms of structuralism 
Lucian Levy-Bruhl's How Natives Think 
Evans-Pritchard on L6vy-Bruhl 
Levy-Bruhl's final writings 
Robin Horton's Africa article 
Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough 
Mainstream British philosophy and earliest thought 
The cult of the Shaman 
Anthropology and The Invention of4frica 
Concluding remarks on chapter one 
Chapter 2: 
1 
The Ancient World page 60 
The transition from early agricultural society to the ancient mode of production: 
the urban revolution as a temporary resolution, or movement, of contradictions 
The Black Athena debate 
The political economy of Pharaonic Egypt 
The social struggles and dialectical thought of the Egyptian priest class 
Dialectics in ancient China 
The social struggles of ancient India 
Dialectical thought in ancient India 
Jainism and the dialectic 
Buddhism 
Dialectics in ancient Mesopotamia 
An example of ancient Persian dialectics 
Concluding remarks 
Chapter 3: Ancient Greece 
The ancient Greekpolis 
The slavery debate 
Meikle's thesis on Aristotle and political economy 
Dialectical thinking and the first Greek philosophers 
The Pythagoreans 
The Dialectic of Heraclitus and Empedocles 
Parmenides, Zeno and the law of contradiction 
The debate on the Sophists 
Plato and the dialectic 
The secondary literature on Plato's dialectic 
Aristotle's dialectic 
The Stoics 
Epictetus' dialectic of the slave 
The Epicurians 
Conclusion 
page 105 
Chapter 4: Buddhists, Neo-Platonists, Alchemists and Mystics page 159 
Religion and dialectics 
Mahayana Buddhism 
Zen Buddhism 
Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists 
Lucian's dialectic 
7he Hermetica 
Social tensions and the alchemic method 
The medieval dialectic 
Peter Ab elard , 
William of Ockham. and the coming of abstract logic 
Mysticism and the dialectic 
Meister Eckhart 
Mysticism, dialectics and logic 
Sufism. and dialectics 
Ibn'Arabi 
Rumi's dialectic 
Jewish mystical thought 
Concluding remarks ý 
Chapter 5: The Renaissance, the Enlightenment and 
The Beginnings of Capitalism page 214 
The Florentine Renaissance 
Marsillo Ficino 
Pico della Mirandola 
The dialectic of Lorenzo Valla 
Renaissance developments in dialectics, rhetoric and the critique of logic 
Nicholas of Cusa and the "science of the infinite" 
Paracelsus 
Giordano Bruno 
Jacob Boehme 
Renaissance and Enlightenment dialectics and scientific progress 
Descartes' method as the antithesis of dialectics 
The "horrible heresies" of Baruch Spinoza 
Gottfried Leibniz and the sterile synthesis of logic and mathematics 
Isaac Newton's dialectical method of presentation 
Bernard Mandeville's articulation of the contradictions of capitalism 
Rousseau: paradox and alienation 
Diderot and Rameau's Nephew 
Adam Fergusson and the Scottish Enlightenment 
Adam Smith and social forces 
Political economy and 'resolutions' to the contradictions of capital 
William Blake's Dark Satanic Mills 
A note on Fourier's dialectic 
Conclusion 
Chapter 6: German Idealist Philosophy: 
The Dialectic Becomes Conscious of Itself 
page 274 
German history from Kant to Marx: feudal back-water to leading capitalist nation in potential 
Kant's ambivalence towards the dialectic 
Fichte's contribution to dialectics 
The Romantic movement 
Goethe's occult dialectics 
Schelling's leap forward 
Schleiermacher's theological dialectic 
Hegel 
7he Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy 
7he Phenomenology ofMind 
7he Philosophical Propaedeutic 
The Science ofLogic and the Encyclopaedia Logic 
A discussion of some secondary sources on Hegel 
Concluding remarks 
Chapter 7: The Dialectic and the Young Hegelians page 327 
Who were the Young Hegelians? 
David Strauss' dialectical humanist theology 
The practical dialectics of August von Cieszkowski 
Feuerbach's critique of the Hegelian dialectic 
Bruno Bauer 
Arnold Ruge 
The anarchist dialectic: 
1. Edgar Bauer 
2. Mikhail Bakunin 
Max Stirner's critique of Feuerbach 
Moses Hess's critique of Stimer 
Karl Schmidt and the'end of philosophy' 
Kierkegaard and the Christian dialectic 
Conclusion: the influence of the Young Hegefians on Marx and Engels 
Chapter 8: From Marx's Early Critique of Hegel to Engels' Anti-DOring page 366 
A summary of the life of Marx (1818-1883) 
Some preliminary comments on the Hegelian dialectic 
The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State 
On the Jewish Question 
Excerptsfrom James Mill's 'Elements of Political Economy' 
Yhe Paris Manuscripts 
Yhe Holy Family and the use of critique 
Proudhods dialectic 
Mueller accuses Marx 
The discussion of Proudhon's dialectic in 7he Poverty ofPhilosophy 
Yhe German Ideology and the camera obscura 
7he Grundrisse 
A Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical Economy 
Capital 
Engels'life 
Engels' dialectic 
Engels' early writings on Schelling 
The Outlines 
7he Condition of the Working Class in England 
Ludwig Feuerhach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 
7he Dialectics ofNature 
Anti-Dahring 
7he Correspondence 
Concluding remarks 
Chapter 9: Dialectical Materialism as the Metaphysics of the 
Radical Intelligentsia 
The genesis of dialectical materialism as nationalised metaphysics 
Franz Mehring and the "profession of historical materialism" 
Karl Kautsky: ideologist of the radical intelligentsia 
Plekhanov invents dialectical materialism 
Lenin and the dialectical materialism of the revolutionary intelligentsia 
Lenin becomes acquainted with Hegelian dialectics 
Materialism andEmpirio-Criticism 
Lenin becomes acquainted with Hegelian dialectics 
State andRevolution 
Trotsky and dialectical materialism 
Stalin and dialectical materialism 
Mao Tsetung: dialectical materialism is transported to China 
Proletarian Philosophers 
Dialectical polemics: Fred Casey and Tommy Jackson 
Maurice Comforth and the challenge to dialectical materialism 
Dialectical materialism in the post-1945 Leninist and Trotskyist sects 
Trotskyism and dialectical materialism 
John Rees and Yhe Algebra ofRevolution 
Dialectics and the vanguard party 
Russian critics of dogmatic dialectics 
Concluding remarks 
page 432 
Chapter 10: The Revolutionary Dialectic and Western Marxism page 485 
The origins of Western Marxism 
Joseph Dietzgen: the worker dialectician 
Pannekoek's 'West European communism': Geist and the working class 
The debate on Darwinism 
Karl Korsch: dialectic as critique 
Georg LukAcs: from Hegelian dialectics to Leninist orthodoxy 
Antonio Gramsci and the philosophy of praxis 
The publication of Marx's earliest writings 
Jakubowski and the humanist dialectic 
1\4arcuse: the dialectic as the 'historicity of being' 
INvIarcuse and the dialectical vicissitudes of Soviet Marxism 
-]U'be debate on nature and dialectics 
14enri Lefebvre's Critique of Every&ry Life 
:ý artre's Critique ofDialectical Reason 
-Sýociety of the Spectacle 
Vaneigem's Revolution of Everyday Life 
Ikaymond Williams'Marxism and Literature 
Iloward Williams' anthropocentric approach 
ýA note on Fraser's materialist Hegel 
IlAertell Ollman and the three modes of abstraction 
lConclusion page 545 
lUibliography 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my thanks to Brian Burkitt, Terry Dawson, Ed Reiss, the D floor 
computer centre staff, and others too numerous to mention, for their help and encouragement 
with this dissertation. My hope is that the text will make a small contribution to that most 
important aspect of the movement of Geist: workers' intellectual self-confidence. 
Believe in the works, not in the words, words are an empty shell, hut the works show you the 
master, Paracelsus (1988), page 101. 
"at, then, does a rational writer want? "at can he want? Nothing but to intervene in the 
universal andpublic life, and to shape and transform it in his image. If he does not want to 
do that, all his speech is but an empty sound to gratify idle ears, Fichte, quoted in Hegel 
(1964), page 5. 
.. 
he who is not linked by a lie of kinship with the object will not acquire insight through ease 
of apprehension or a good memory; for hasically he does not accept the ohject, as its nature 
isforeign to him, Plato, Letter 7,344a, quoted in Kolakowski (1978), page 16. 
Introduction 
What is the Dialectic? 
A retailer claims that Cleckheaton is becoming a "shoplifters'paradise " because of a lack 
of police officers patrolling the lawn centre on foot .. Inspector Paul Linden, of Cleckheaton 
police station, told the meeting he did not have the resources to have community constables 
patrolling the streets as often as the traders wanted. But he said police were tackling the 
shoplifting problem by arresting people for &wgs offences - as many of them stole fton; the 
shops to feed their habits. Insp. Linden said closed circuit television cameras in the town 
centre, as in neighbouring towns such as Dewsbury, were the best solution to the problem. 
This report, from the Telegraph and Argus (10th July 1998), describes an exchange of views 
at Spenborough Chamber of Trade and Commerce. Such reports are a commonplace in the 
local and national press around the world, but reveal in microcosm the contradictions of 
contemporary free-market social relations. Whilst the, largely positivistic, methods of 
economics, sociology and social psychology can partially explain these events, a dialectical 
approach seeks to go further and penetrate beyond the immediate 'facts' of the outer and link 
them to the social relationships of the inner. 
Relatively few people regularly use the term &aJectics, or know much about its meaning and 
genesis. One way of beginning a study of the subject is to refer to the well known poem by 
T. S. Eliot (1963) entitled Burnt Norton, since it contains a number of dialectical formulations. 
Eliot had studied philosophy at Harvard University and wrote, but did not submit, a doctoral 
thesis on the work of the British philosopher F. H. Bradley. According to Kenner (1962) 
Bradley's dialectical philosophy continued to exert a strong influence on Eliot's poetry. The 
idea that the world is perpetually in a state of change was an important theme in Bradley's text 
Appearance and Reality., 'Tor whether there is progress or not, at all events there is change"- 
quoted on page 41 of Kenner. Bradley rejected the idea of a split between the observing 
. 
human subject and the object of cognition, writing instead of the natural and social world as a 
totality which "is experienced all together as a coexisting mass, not perceived as parted and 
joined even by relations of coexistence. It contains all relations, and distinctior&', - Kenner page 
42. These dialectical themes were taken up by Bradley from the writings of the ancient Greek 
philosophers, particularly Heraclitus, and from the German philosopher Hegel. Therefore, it is 
I 
no surprise that Eliot's poem is introduced by two, fragments from Heraclitus. The poem 
begins: 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in timejuture, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternallypresent 
All time is unredeemable. 
nat might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining aperpetualpossibility 
Only in a world ofspeculation. 
nat might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is ahvayspresent 
According to Kenner, these lines on time were influenced by Bradley's remark that "The 
character of an existence is determined by what it has been and by what it is (potentially) about 
to be", page 54. They draw attention to another dialectical theme paradox, or contradiction, 
particularly the idea that contradiction is the source of change and development. This idea is 
expressed in the following extract from Eliot's poem: Or say that the end precedes the 
beginning, And the end and the beginning were always there Before the beginning and after 
the end. And all is ahvays now. Eliot's use of the term abstraction in the first extract is also 
important in dialectical thought both as a polar opposite to the term concrete, and in its 
meaning of taking parts out of a whole. ' 
Later Eliot writes: 
7he innerfreedomfrom the practical desire, 
777e releasefrom action and suffering, releaseftom the inner. 
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded 
This draws attention to the relationship between the outer and the inner, which is sometimes 
expressed in dialectical idiom as the appearance and the essence. Eliot may be revealing a 
Buddhist influence in his use of the term desire, which in that religion is viewed negatively as 
the cause of suffering. However, Eliot later views desire positively as a means of linking the 
subject and the object: Desire Wet( is movement .. Between un-being and 
heing. Thus Eliot 
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suggests that desire produces purposeful activity, or praxis, in order to satisfy need and 
replace nothing with something 
These quotations set the pattern for the remainder of this text; dialectical thinkers will 
normally be quoted directly, rather than merely paraphrased, and the commentary will ground 
the quotations historically. Alternative approaches to dialectics, for example that deployed in 
Lenin (1961) consisting in part of lists of dialectical formulae, is rejected. Similarly the idea of 
writing a textbook on dialectics which reduces the method to a number of rules, as in books 
on formal logic, is considered inappropriate since it reduces specific content to empty form. 
The method chosen presents a socio-economic history of dialectics, from earliest hunter- 
gatherer society to the present day. In this way the form and content of the dialectic is shown 
to be inseparable from social being in general, and specific social struggles in particular. The 
need for a comprehensive history of dialectics was bolstered by the fact that there is no such 
history available in English, nor, to my knowledge, in any other language. , 
A number of texts contain short introductions to the dialectic, and the following from Martin 
Nicolaus' foreword to Marx (1973) is typical: 
Dialectics has a very long history. (The term comesfrom the Greek 'dig, meaning split in 
two, opposed, clashing; and 'logos', reason; hence 'to reason by splitting in two ) ... the early 
Greek philosophers .. seeing, 
for example, an arrow in flight or a bird winging across a 
river .. would reason in this way: in its motion, the thing is changedftom being here to being 
there. Since 'here' and 'there' exclude each other, they reasoned that motion is the 
transformation of one state of things into the opposite state; or, since the motion includes 
both the beginning and its opposite the end, that motion is the unity of these opposites; or, in 
sum, that motion is contradiction. Since there were other philosophers who asserted that 
everything is motion, it is easy to see why dialectics could become an important tendency 
within philosophyfrom very early on, pages 27-8. However, Nicolaus, in common with most 
of the radical intelligentsia, suggests that the Greeks first employed the dialectical method, 
when if fact, as we shall discover, the mode of thinking long predates Heraclitus and Zeno. 
One text which has attempted a summary history of dialectics is Kolakowsi (1978), 
particularly the first chapter entitled 7he Origins of the Dialectic. However, this author 
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similarly begins his study with the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, and then arbitrarily selects 
Plotinus, Augustine, Eriugena as a prelude to Renaissance esoteric and mystical thought, 
which prepares the ground for the German idealists. Kolakowski fails -to locate these writers 
historically and therefore omits to mention how changes in the form and content of the 
dialectic are connected to social being. For example, Kolakowski is silent on the question of 
why the concept of the Absolute, or the One, from its content as God was later inverted to 
become nature, and was subsequently inverted to refer to humanity. 
If we consider further the themes of Eliot's poem, we see that the natural and social world are 
both interconnected and constantly changing, and that our fives contain contradictions. However, it 
is also the case that normally our world appears to be reasonably stable and predictable, and fife's 
contradictions are either resolved or suppressed. Even thinkers supporting the social status quo, be 
this slavery, feudalism or contemporary capitalism, who tend to stress the stability and harmony of 
society, accept that change and contradiction can never be totally suppressed. Contemporary 
media-dominated society provides another example in a recent perfume advertisement which 
features a product called Conftadiction. The advert draws attention to, and exploits, the 
paradoxical desires and relationships of its potential customers. Even mainstream theologians, 
including the Pope, management gurus, economists and other ideologues speak of "paradoxe! e' in 
society, and the term 'The Three Antinomies of Greed' is used by the economist Brockway (1995). 
Financial journalists give examples of contradictions, such as the fact that a high interest rate 
favours importers because it lowers the prices they have to pay, but simultaneously hurts exporters 
by pricing them out of foreign markets. It is similarly a commonplace to hear reports that farmers 
are being paid not to grow food in a world where millions of people face starvation. Whilst stable 
weather conditions apply most of the time, and are a prerequisite in providing for our subsistence 
needs, adverse weather conditions all too often threaten our ability to subsist. To the extent that we 
are conscious of contradiction, change and the existence of totalising relationships in our natural 
and social world, we are thinking dialectically. 
In the broadsheet press, as in most sections of the academic community, dialectics is usually 
associated with a few formulae, such as the negation of the negation, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, or 
the relation between base and superstructure. Engels in his Dialectics ofNature (1940) was in large 
measure responsible for reducing dialectics to the mechanical application of formulae. As we see in 
Chapter Nine, Engels' method became the official logic of Communist Parties throughout the 
4 
-world: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and Mao used what came to be known as dialectical materialism, or 
IDiamat, as a kind of Realpolilik or means of defending the privileges of their class, the radical 
intelligentsia. Recently many philosophers have used the "collapse of Communism" as evidence for 
-the view that all dialectical thought takes this form, and therefore it should be abandoned. This text 
-takes the opposite view, seeing the dernise, of &alecfical nzaterialism as an opportunity for both an 
examination of the history of dialectical thought and an assessment of its usefulness in 
-understanding the complexities of late 20th century capitalism. 
The text concentrates on the dialectical explanation of society, rýecting an immanent dialectic of 
: nature and similar a pribil methods. However, a strong case can be made for the application of a 
dialectical method ofpresentation to some natural phenomena, since what was implicitly dialectical 
-thought was used by Newton as a means of presenting his empirically derived discoveries. An 
implicit dialectic is used routinely in the natural sciences, particularly in presenting the results of 
sub-atornic experiments. Dialectics is the origin of both fiizzy logic and complexity theory, currently 
-used in a range of disciplines, and it is no exaggeration to say that a growing minority of social 
scientists, especially in economics and management theory, are becoming aware of the limits 
imposed on them by the exclusive use of static, or formal, logic or related types of "common 
sense7'. The kind of abstract thought used in formal logic, and mathematics, is more or less 
adequate when dealing with those aspects of reality which are relatively static. However, to 
the extent that material reality is changing, interconnected and contradictory, it presents 
problems which are more likely to be articulated, if not solved, by the use of dialectics. 
An important theme in the text is the rejection of the Leninist preoccupation with Iýnilitant 
materialisnf',, which roots out idealism wherever it manifests itself The philosophy of 
materialism, based on the concept of matter taken from 19 th century physics, is rejected and 
replaced by a totalising dialectic of life and thought. The text uses the idioms of the Hegelian 
dialectic, 
- with 
its roots in tribal magic, religion, myth, mysticism, alchemy and much else that 
is dismissed by Leninists as "idealism7'. 
The thesis of the first chapter is that dialectical thought, along with the ability to think 
deductively and inductively, began with earliest hunter-gatherer people, who, because they 
were engaged in a struggle for existence, were aware that their needs could only be satisfied 
by the interpenetration of theory and practice, intellectual and manual labour. No society could 
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survive without tools and the ability to theorise the cause and effect relationships embodied in 
them. The relationship between symbolic theory and material practice is apparent in the art and 
culture of earliest society, as is demonstrated by the Japanese goddess Kwannon, "who holds a 
different object in each of her hundred hands" page 33 of Bames (1965). The idea of forces 
was a key concept in earliest society; these can be either negative or positive, either 
destructive or essential for life, as demonstrated with example of the multiplicity of processes 
unleashed by fire, which hunter gatherers were able to create from friction or other sources. 
'The survival of early agriculturalists depended on the theorisation of weather patterns and the 
seasons, and, as noted in Chapter Two, the ancient Egyptians developed a sophisticated 365 
day calendar in the fifth milleniurn B. C.. It is clear from their records that they theorised both 
the regularity and the apparent arbitrariness of the movements of the planets and stars. The 
idioms many of which are highly dialectical, contained in the religion, myths, magic and art of 
earliest society are attempts to theorise their natural and social world. A lack of technical 
knowledge led to explanations of cause and effect relationships in a totalising world of forces 
and spirits which connected, and often metamorphosed, gods, humans and animals. As Eliot's 
poem suggests, earliest deductive, inductive and dialectical thought is part of a theoretical and 
practical continuum with the past, present and future. As Barnes explains: 
The mind stretches far beyond the limited experiences of the individual, It contains within 
itsetf all the past and the future. It has grown up, in the race, step by step, and has passed 
through stages as different from its present form as we can possibly conceive. It is so vastly 
complex that it is never twice alike in the same individual, nor are ever two minds the same. 
It is the product of millions ofyears of struggle, page 40. 
, The mediation between thought and practice is language, which "transforms the process of 
social tradition; precept accelerates education ... 
human experience can be pooled ... 
language 
makes tradition rational", Childe (1964), pages 18-19. Reasoning, in particular the process of 
abstraction, allowed early society to eliminate irrelevant detail and avoid unnecessary trial and 
error by going through practical processes in their heads using symbols and images of the 
actions involved. However, the theory developed from reasoning takes on a degree of 
independence from practical life, thus allowing society to escape its "bondage to the 
concrete". Spiritual ideas such as cause, freedom, beauty, the One and immortality, which 
refer to nothing having sensual being, became increasingly important. These conceptions 
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interrelate with everyday things in explaining, controlling and transforming nature on the one 
hand and holding society together and lubricating its workings on the other. As a result of 
division, of labour, certain tribal members came to monopolise the abstract thought and 
developed occult science in opposition to the manual labour of the mass of the tribe; so began 
class society. 
The intellectual 61ite developed various occult systems of thought, including natural magic or 
"the deepest knowledge of the secrets of nature", quoted in Nataf (1994) page 55, and 
hermetic time, which is contrasted with clock time and lived time. Eastern Martial Arts 
involved the "dialectical argument between full and empty", page 57, balance and imbalance, 
and the Tarot, with its links to the Kabbalah, was based, not on rigid concepts but on 
combinations of "affirmation and negation, then synthesis and solution ... meaning and chance! ', 
page 91. The occult is typically defined as "not understood or able to be understood by the 
mind, beyond the range of ordinary knowledge", Nataf page 1. Occult dialectics influenced 
psychoanalysis which provided'much insight into our understanding of concepts like mind, 
consciousness and the self, all of which, despite Leninist charges of "idealisrif', are crucial to 
our comprehension of the relationship between the individual and society. The Great Monad 
of occult mathematics is simultaneously unity and nothingness, the infinity of the circle; it 
generates the dyad, the triad and all -numbers, and metaphorically squares the circle. An 
important aid in gaining knowledge of invisible forces is analogy with the visible, or using the 
known to learn more about the unknown. Anticipating the Hegelian dialectical interpretation 
of history, initiation into a Mystery cult was a quest whose object was not the destination but 
knowledge acquired on the journey itself. Also anticipating classical political economy, the 
Trade-Guilds and Masonic Lodges spoke of the mysterious power of human labour, orpraxis, 
in their struggles with the feudal lords, and later the factory owners. The occult pentagram 
represents the link between the coincidence of microcosm and macrocosm, the part which 
contains all aspects of the whole, the link between earth and heaven, practice and theory, This 
occult dialectical theme, captured in the Hermetic principle "all that is below is like all that is 
above", Nataf page 83, provides an early articulation of the title of this text: thought and social 
struggle. Thus, for example, we can link the replacement of goddesses of fertility by abstract 
male gods to the move from hunter-gatherer or early matriarchal agricultural modes of 
production to patriarchal slave-based or feudal societies. 
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Dialectical thought survived in a number of esoteric cults and lodges in 18th century France, 
most of which supported the Revolution, and were subsequently involved in the Paris 
Commune and the First International. A number of French socialists, notably'Proudhon and 
Fourier, were influenced by the occult in their use of dialectics. Fourier used his Theory of 
Attraction or human passion, based on myth and alchemic symbolism, as a utopian solution to 
the contradictions of capitalist society. Jollivet-Castelot was a late 19th century French 
alchemist who attempted a synthesis with materialism and formed a society called the Non- 
Materialist Communist Union. He asserted that alchemy, a source for Hegel's dialectic, 
"must treat matter as living, respect it therefore and manipulate it in the awareness of its 
intellectual potential. He must see in it a part of Being, multiplied, fragmented, divided and 
suffering, but tending through endless evolution towards reconstitution in the Unity of 
Substance", quoted on page 147 of Nataf. 
As 18th century political economy struggled to theorise the complexities of the emerging 
capitalist mode of production, its leading exponents readily acknowledged the existence of 
"paradoxes". These included Mandeville's "private vices and public benefits" and Adam 
Smith's water-diamonds paradox. These acted as paradigms for the neo-classical "economic 
problem! ' and the Keynesian "paradox of thrifV', which in turn inspired the articulation of a 
number of paradoxes in late 20th century capitalism by contemporary writers such as Charles 
Handy in his Empty Raincoat (1994) and Paul Ormerod in 777e Death of Economics (1994). 
That these "paradoxes" remain today is evident from the fact that the Monetary Policy 
Committee is on the one hand being advised by finance capital not to reduce interest rates so 
as to avoid inflationary pressures. On the other hand it is being advised by exporting 
manufacturers 
, 
to reduce interest rates so as to lower the high value of the pound which is 
damaging their sales abroad. 
The final chapters concern the degradation of the dialectic by Bolshevik intellectuals and its 
subsequent regeneration in the critique of Western Marxism, and the conclusion contains two 
examples of critique applied to contemporary debates. The examples of worker-dialecticians, 
such as Joseph Dietzgen and Fred Casey, show that the dialectic need not be the occult 
property of the radical intelligentsia, but can be democratised and taken up by the masses. 
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It only remains to point out that concerns with space have prevented consideration of a 
number of writers who have made contributions to dialectical thought, such as Bhaskar, 
Adorno and Benjamin. Similar reasons have meant that the text does not consider well known 
criticisms of dialectical thought, in particular those by Popper, Della Volpe, Althusser and 
Elster. -1 
9 
Chapter One 
Dialectics and Earliest Society 
Dialectical reasoning is both ancient and ubiquitous, Murphy (1976), page 8 5. 
1. There exists a yawning ahyss, hordered on one side hy a realm of mist and cold, on the other 
hy a region offire. 
2. A giant is hrought into heing through the melting of the congealing vapour in the place of cold 
hy a spark offireftom the region ofMuspelheini. 
3. Ais hecomes the progenitor of a race ofgiants. 
A Scandinavian creation myth recorded in Spence (1994), pages 1934, which illustrates the 
dialectical theme of the interpenetration of opposites. ' 
As I die and, dying, live, so shall ye die and, dying, live. A Hottentot message spoken by a hare 
sent by the moon, quoted in Wemer (1995), page 3 3. 
7"his immortality of the dead is afantastic reality. 7he dead really live on socially in the inherited 
culture of society, but to the primitive they live fantastically, clothed in the affective and concrete 
images of his dreams in another ghostly world, Caudwell (1971), page 32, giving an insight into 
the totalising metaphysics of 'primitive! peoples. 
Problems involved in the study of the thought of earliest society 
One cannot simply posit another people'sjudgments of 'reality'a priori, hy means of common 
sense or common humanity, without taking the trouble of an ethnographic investigation, 
Sahlins (1995) page 163. 
Archaeology is of only limited help: without recourse to the lahoratory of mankind, primitive 
thoughts can only he inferred hazily, if at all, from the detritus of vanished material cultures 
which digs unearthftom time to time, Femandez-Armesto (1998) page 16. 
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There are a number of problems associated with the study of the modes of thought of earliest 
society. As there is so little direct evidence of this thought, apart from the spoken literature of 
its few survivors, we must rely on the evidence of traders, travellers and missionaries as well 
as the academic research produced by anthropologists, economists, psychologists, ethnologists 
and others. For reasons to be explained much of this evidence is highly suspect, therefore it 
has to be examined critically, and supplemented by a totalising anthropology. As Carr (1964) 
pointed out, we need to be aware of the vantage point of the recorder of each piece of 
historical evidence. Evidence will always be mediated by the life and times of the recorder, and 
will implicitly relate to his or her attitudes to the past, present and future. Murphy (1972), in 
his useful though limited text, argued that functionalist anthropology, for example, developed 
during a period of relative stability in western capitalist society, and by and large emphasised 
stability and order in earlier societies. In contrast the period after 1968, with its greater 
political and economic uncertainty, led to the adoption of anthropological and sociological 
models which corresponded rather more to the new contemporary cjrcumstancesý 
This chapter will begin with the palaeolithic mode of production, which can be defined as 
small groups of hunter-gatherers, obtaining their subsistence with the aid of unpolished 
chipped stone tools. However, as an example of the problem identified in the previous 
paragraph, neo-classical economists, as Sahlins (1974) points out, wrongly claim that these 
hunter gatherers spent most of their time at work in order to fend off impending starvation. 
This neo-classical view is based upon the assumed existence of a universal 'economic 
problem', the 'problem' being the finite level of the planet's natural resources on the one hand 
and the infinity of human wants on the other. To bolster this claim of a universal contradiction 
at the core of human existence, neo-classicals usually resort to pseudo-mathematical models of 
asocial individuals, reminiscent of Defoe's Rohinson Crusoe and Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations, optimising their welfare subject to 'scarce resources. Francis Fukuyama's (1992) 
book presents the same view from a philosophical perspective, but features an ill-informed 
account of earliest society, based on the, views of Hobbes, Locke and, surprisingly, Hegel. 
Fukuyama sees human history as a process involving linear progress from an initial 'primitive 
society' followed by steady development towards 'individual self-consciousness'. The 
historical process ends in the triumph of capitalism, or liberal democracy, which implicitly 
provides the best possible solution to the 'economic problem, and represents 'the end of 
history'. As this text develops it will become clear that the neo-classical view of earliest 
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society and its place in history is, despite its one-sided truths about resources and human 
wants, incorrect and represents a crude rationalisation of history from the vantage point of the 
ideological needs of contemporary capitalism. 
Most economics textbook writers, indirectly influenced by the work of early anthropologists 
such as Frazer (1993), Tylor (1871), Read (1995) and Lang (1995), compound their historical 
limitations by implicitly adopting an Aryan colonialist world view. As Bernal (1991) shows, 
this view developed from the 19th century romantic, historical progress and racist movements. 
It was used to justify the appalling practices of the colonial era by claiming that only white 
Europeans were civilised and capable of rational thought. According to this view, philosophy, 
along with mathematics, science, democracy and culture in general, only began with the 
ancient Greeks, who were alleged to be an Aryan people. Lang (1995) is typical when he 
speaks of "savages", "lower races" and "black fellows". Even those researchers who learned 
the languages of tribes by and large faed to use them to develop an awareness of the 
imperatives of both their own society and the one under study. As a result most failed to 
understand the complexity of the life aný thought of the tribes which they studied. 
Contemporary neo-classical economists have dropped the more overt racist and colonialist 
language,, but continue to present a Hollywood style image of devil-worshipping grunting 
savages, living in grinding poverty. This image continues despite much anthropological 
evidence to the effect that mathematical principles, large vocabularies, subtle grammars, 
abstract terms, advanced art and the use of perspective, all developed in some early societies. 
These observations demonstrate the need to be critical in interpreting the evidence on life and 
thought in earliest society, not only where the sources contain examples of colonial and racist 
stereo-typing, but also where they seem at first sight more enlightened. 
Few writers speak of the social class of the recorder of anthropological and other evidence on 
earliest thought. As most evidence is collected by members of the middle class intelligentsia, it 
is necessary to consider the world view of this class and consider how this is likely to affect its 
thinking on earliest society. It is currently fashionable amongst the radical intelligentsia to 
promote what remains of earliest society in the name of identity politics. However, such a 
perspective normally amounts to little more than promoting conspicuous consumption in the 
form of package holidays in exotic locations or writing articles in praise of, for example, Anita 
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Roddick's antics in the Brazilian rainforest. The complex relationship between the class which 
lives from its intellectual labour and other classes is a theme which will be developed 
throughout this text. 
Research on the palaeolithic age in particular presents difficulties because, although hunting 
and gathering accounts for the vast bulk of human history, it is a mode of production which 
has now almost completely disappeared. The hunters and gatherers that survive have largely 
been forced onto marginal areas such as the Australian interior and the Arctic tundra. The 
research suggests that these are "displaced persons" compared to those hunters and gatherers 
who once lived in areas which abounded in food. This has to be taken into account in 
speculations based on backward extrapolations as to the life and thought of these societies. 
Clearly the fact that field work is being done means that a tribe-is likely to react to being 
observed thereby negating the worth of the evidence, as even the colonialist Read (1995) 
pointed out. It is difficult to know how representative a tribe's current thought is of that going 
back thousands of years, even where the evidence suggests little contact with other tribes. 
There is a contradiction here, in that it might be expected that tribes which survive are likely to 
be'the most developed in their thinking, yet these are going to be the tribes which have had 
most contact with other peoples. However, the more contact the greater the likelihood that 
the members of the tribe will become assimilated into other modes of production or, if the 
contact has been with 19th century European colonisers, eliminated by genocide or starvation. 
Laurens van der-Post (1975) records the genocide of the remaining Kung (the I is used to 
indicate the indigenous clicking sound), or 'Bushmen' to use his Boer term, who are 
mentioned by the ancient Egyptians and may be the oldest people on earth. Today these 
people are almost universally treated with contempt, even some anthropologists and other 
academics displaying ignorance of their lives and thought, claims Post. Nonetheless, in their 
depleted and debased current state, these people retain a high level of cultural attainment in 
their art, music and dancing. Post records a pantomime performed by the Kung which takes 
the form of a war caused by male tribal jealously over a woman, and, unlike the bloodletting of 
Homer, it is clearly a pacifist version of this oldest of themes. He also records a totalising 
rounders-like game played by IKung women which integrates singing, dancing and mime into a 
theme of knowledge about, and love for, the animals in their lives. These examples make it 
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highly likely, according to Post, that these earliest of people long ago developed a mode of 
thinking which is both advanced and totalising. 
Murphy (1972) gives the example of research done on North American Indians, where the 
total destruction of their mode of production, not to mention genocide practised against some 
tribes, means that their present life of "desultory fanning, wage labour, or just sitting", page 
23, is hardly likely to produce much evidence on the practice and thought of Indian tribes of 
thousands of years ago. "The American students turned to this surviving source, wringing out 
the last bit of memory from the oldest Indians they could find before even this information was 
completely lost ... How, 
indeed does one reconcile the proud warrior of the Plains with the 
drunken Indian lying in a pool of his own vomit in a backstreet gutter in Billings, Montana? ", 
page 24. However, it is important not to make the opposite error, as many anthropologists do, 
of imagining a tribe's static golden age, before its fall from grace. As Murphy points out, all 
societies are in a constant state of flux, though the rate of change may be very slow, or 
uneven, at times. He makes the further point that anthropologists tend to do field work in 
areas which are either present or former colonies, or are under their respective governments' 
sphere of influence, although he fails to speculate on how this and related influences may 
affect the content of their work., 
A major theme in dialectical thought is the concept of the whole or totality. The whole was 
often referred to as the one, or God, by thinkers in earliest society, and was considered in 
terms of its relationship with its component parts, or the many. This dialectical way of 
thinking has important implications for the study of earliest thought. Each piece of 
authenticated evidence resulting from field work and elsewhere must be interpreted as part of 
the totality of the evidence, and seen as true only within its limits. Because this truth is limited, 
or one-sided to use Hegel's term, it must be recognised and negated, or overcome. Since 
Hegel regarded the true as the whole, his method contrasted sharply with that of positivist 
anthropologists. The latter adopt a fixed dualist opposition of true or false with regard to the 
evidence, or "social facts" to use Durkheim's phrase, on the thought of earliest society. 
Positivism further assumes that there is a fixed duality between the anthropological subject 
who passively records "the facts" of a world of isolated objects. This approach relies on the 
correspondence theory of truth, where each of the subject's thoughts, expressed in discrete 
words and sentences, corresponds on a one to one basis with the discrete objects of 
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experience, rather like a mirror reflection. The dialectical method, in sharp contrast to 
pogitivism, insists that reality is composed not of self-subsisting things or facts, but of 
relationships or aprocess of becoming. 
Leninist philosophy, which we examine in c, hapter nine, is similar to much anthropological 
methodology, ' particularly the structuralism of Levi-Strauss, examined later in this chapter, in 
positing fixed dualist distinctions in its analysis of earliest society. Typical of the methodology 
of Leninism. is the fixed opposition between the material base and the ideological 
superstructure, which is based on a few isolated remarks made by Marx. The most famous of 
these remarks is contained in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, see Marx (1970): "The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness ... The 
changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole 
immense superstructure", page 20-21. Such a reductive approach is inadequate, and at odds 
with other remarks made by Marx; firstly in so far as it fails to recognise that these base and 
superstructure polarities are abstractions from the integrated totality of society, and secondly 
in its further claim that developments in the base cause developments in the superstructure but 
never the other way round. This example of reductive thought is cited in order to show why a 
methodology based on fixed polarities must be rejected in the study of earliest society. ý 
The Marxist anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, in Stone Age Economics, see Sahlins (1974), 
implicitly rejects this linear cause and effect relationship, suggesting instead a more complex 
totalising two-way relationship. The economy, culture and all other aspects of the life and 
thought of earliest society, like that of all societies, interpenetrate in the process of becoming, 
CC new social forms are struggling to emerge", to quote Murphy, page 83. A range of cultural 
factors, such as attitudes to age, gender, religion and magic, profoundly affect the division of 
labour and when, where and how labour is performed. In order to understand life and thought 
in these early, and indeed all, societies, it is necessary to adopt-methods which stress the 
complex tensions which create the internal dynamic of their totality. 'As even the functionalist 
anthropologist Evans-Pritchard explains of the Nuer: "One cannot treat Nuer economic 
relations by themselves, for they always form part of direct social relations of a general kind 
... there is always between them a general social relationship of one kind or another, and their 
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economic relations, if such they may be called, must conform to this general pattern of 
behaviour", quoted in Sahlins page 186. 
Sahlins on the genesis of reiried thinking 
Each people knows their own kind of happiness the culture that is the legacy of their ancestral 
trachtion, transmitted in the distinctive concepts of their language, and adapted to their specylic 
life conditions .. 7hey come to it not simply as cognitions 
but as values. To speak of reasoning 
correctly on objective properties known through unmediated sensory perceptions would be 
epistemologically out of the question ... commonsense 
bourgeois realism, when taken as a 
historiographic conceit, is a kind of symbolic violence done to other times and other customs. I 
want to suggest that one cannot do good history, not even contemporary history, without regard 
for ideas, actions, and ontologies that are not and never were our own Different cultures, 
dfferent rationalities, Sahlins (1995) pages 12 and 14. 
A recent text by Sahlins (1995) traces the historical process which begins with the totalising 
anthropocentric cosmology of earliest society and ends with "the bourgeois solipsism of a individual 
in need of the object, who accordingly comes to know the world by an adaptive process and as the 
empirical values of bodily self-satisfaction", page 154. He says that earliest thinkers mediated their 
"classifications of birds, animals, plants and the rest of nature according to local distinctions of 
groups and genders, habitats - and directions, times and places, modes of production and 
reproduction, categories of kinship, and concepts of spirit ... the human values of their objective 
characteristics", page 159. Sahlins quotes Marx to emphasise his anthropocentric view: "Nature 
taken abstractly, for itself - nature fixed in isolation from man - is nothing for man", page 162. 
However, says Sahlins, this reified abstract riature is precisely the approach adopted by the 
Hebrew-Christian monotheistic tradition, in which a transcendent God replaces the anthropocentric 
spirits immanent in nature. In contradistinction to the divine humanism of earliest society "Like the 
Hebrew people before them, Christians viewed the 'deification of nature' as the essence of a 
paganism from which they sought to distinguish themselves", page 164. Thus began both the 
materiality of nature, devoid of spirit, and the debasement of humanity: the greater is God, the more 
insignificant are men and women. From the monotheistic original sin emerged the bourgeois 
concept of economic man (sic) locked into a lifelong quest to satisfy his ever expanding needs in a 
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world of scarcity. Utilitarian positivist logic, and the empirical world of things, replaced magic and 
myth based on analogy, similitude, microcosm and the totalising dialectic of the hunter-gatherer. 
There was an end to the totality, continuity and interpenetration between organic and inorganic 
nature, between humanity and divinity; each was classified into its own self-subsistent category of 
being. 
Joseph Campbell's Masks of God 
mytholoSy is a rendition offorms through which the fonnless Form offorms can be known. An 
inferior object ispresented as the representation, or habitation, of a superior, Campbell (1991), in 
Platonic mode, page 55. 
Volume One of Campbell's four volume work (199 1) contains a mass of useful material. He begins 
in the foreword with the claim that "It is ... circa 5500-4500 B. C. - that those well-known, unfifelike, 
conventionalized naked-goddess figurines appear that have been generally associated with the 
earliest village arts. A trend from naturalism to abstraction, from visual to conceptual thought, 
would seem thus to be indicated", page vii. He implies that myth acts to encourage change, a form 
of proto-critique: "mythology is no toy for children, Nor is it a matter of archaic, merely scholarly 
concern, of no moment to modem men of action. For its symbols (whether in the tangible fort-n of 
images or in the abstract fon-n of ideas) touch and release the deepest centres of motivation, moving 
literate and illiterate alike, moving mobs, moving civilizations", page 12. He continues: "the festival 
of the lived myth abrogates all the laws of time, letting the dead swim back to life ... the gods and 
demons are not conceived in the way of hard and fast, positive realities. A god can be 
simultaneously in two or more places - Eke a melody, or Eke the form of a traditional mask ... there 
has been a shift of view from the logic of the normal secular sphere, where things are understood to 
be distinct from one another, to a theatrical or play sphere, where they are accepted for what they 
are experienced as being and the logic is that of 'make befieve'-'as if", pages 21-2. , 
He notes that the division between gods, animals, nature and humans is ill-defined, so that there 
must be an exclusion of "the advocates of Aristotelean logic, for whom A can never be B; for 
whom the actor is never to be lost in the part; for whom the mask, the image, the consecrated host, 
tree, or animal cannot become God, but only a reference ... one should be overtaken... spellbound, 
set apart from one's logic of self-possession and overpowered by the force of a logic of 
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indissociation! - wherein A is B, and C is also B", page 25. Campbelrs emphasis on'play' anticipates 
the view of the Situationists, who we consider in chapter ten. He says that we should be 
"undaunted by the banal actualities of fife's meagre possibilities, the spontaneous impulse of the 
spirit to identify itself with something other than itself for the sheer delight of play, transubstantiates 
the world - in which, actually, after all, things are not quite as real or permanent, terrible, important 
or logical as they seem", page 29. 
Campbell quotes an anthropologist who reported on the dialectical views of a Shaman, Najagneq, 
who said the spirit Sila upheld the universe, the weather, "in fact all life on earth - so mighty that his 
speech to man comes not through ordinary words; but through storms, snowfall, rain showers, the 
tempests of the sea, through all the forces that man fears, or through sunshine, calm seas of small, 
innocent, playing children who understand nothing. When times are good, Sila has nothing to say to 
mankind. He has disappeared into his infinite nothingness ... 
he is with us and infinitely far away at 
the same time", page 53. The idea of nothingness was, as we shall see, to become important in the 
development of dialectical thought. 
In his final chapter Campbell explains the antinomy that myth enables people to transcend their 
"local, historical conditions", yet "binds the individual to his family's system of historically 
conditioned sentiments, activities, and beliefs". It renders "an experience of the ineffable through the 
local and concrete, and thus paradmically, to amplify the force and appeal of the local forms even 
while carrying the mind beyond them ... the whole system of childhood fantasy and spontaneous 
belief is engaged and fused with the functioning system of the community", page 462 and 467. 
Campbell continues: "Though such half-mad games and plays ordered human societies were 
constellated in which the mutually contradictory interests of the elementary and social urges were 
resolved ... The biological urges to enjoy and to master (with their opposites, to loathe and to fear), 
as well as the social urge to evaluate (as good or evil, true or false), simply drop away, and a 
rapture in sheer experience supervenes, in which self-loss and elevation are the same", page 469. 
I-Es final paragraph ends anthropocentrically with the point that "the human mind in its polarity of 
the male and female modes of experience, in its passages from infancy to adulthood and old age, in 
its toughness and tenderness, and in -its continuing dialogue with the world, - is the ultimate 
mythogenetic zone - the creator and destroyer, the slave and yet the master, of all the gods", page 
472. 
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Frankfort and mythopoeic thinking 
Mythopoeic thought substantializes a quality andposits some of its occurrences as causes, others 
as effects ... the gods as personifications of power among other things 
fuý71 early man's needfor 
causes to explain the phenomenal world, Frankfort (1946) page 17. 
.. mythopoeic thoughtfully recognizes the unity of each phenomenon which it conceives under so 
many different guises, the many-sidea'Wss of its images serves to do justice to the complexity of 
the phenomena ... 7he spatial concepts 
6f the primitive are concrete orientations, they refer to 
localities which have an emotional colour, they may be fwnifiar or alien, hostile orftiendly. 7he 
mythopoeic conception of time is, like that of space, qualitative and concrete, not quantitative and 
abstract, pages 20-21 and 23. 
What would a purely external truth be? It can be recognised only when we participate in it and 
therefore appropriate it inwardly, A Eck, quoted in Femdndez-Arrnesto (1998), page 9. 
A text by H. and H. A. Frankfort (1946) states that in the mythopoeic thinking of earliest societies 
"man and nature did not stand in opposition and did not, therefore, have to be apprehended by 
different modes of cognition- natural phenomena were regularly conceived in terms of human 
experience and that human experience was conceived in terms of cosmic events ... 
for modem, 
scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an'le; for ancient - and also for primitive - man it 
is a 'Thou"', page 4. Although the authors wrongly posit the idea that primitive 'I-Thou' thinking is 
unique, they acknowledge that ... Thou is'not contemplated with intellectual detachment; it is 
experienced as fife confronting He, involving every faculty of man in a reciprocal relationship", 
page 6. There is constant use of analogy between nature and humanity in earliest society, so, for 
example, "Creation is then conceived as birth", page 9. Whilst this abstracts from the Merences 
and tensions within, and between, different societies, there can be little doubt that the empirical 
evidence points to the existence of a primitive totalising dialectic in which, for example, "at any 
moment the lock of hair or shadow may be felt by the primitive to be pregnant with the full 
significance of the man", page 13. The Frankforts refer to the "paradox of mythopoeic thought. 
Though it does not know dead matter and confronts a world animated from end to end, it is unable 
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to leave the scope of the concrete and renders its own concepts as realities existing per se", page 
15. 
Although it contains no social context, the recent text by Fern6ndez-Armesto (1998) confirms both 
Sahlins! and the ' Frankforts' conclusions, concerning the existence of an early anthropocentric 
dialectic. He speaks of a Njug myth involving "an encounter with a sphinx-like creature, on a 
journey in search of enlightenment, through a world of contrasting but interpenetrated moieties", 
page 11. The anthropocentric nature of early thought is again confirmed in the Winnebag Indian 
myth in which the "Earthmaker realized by experience that his feelings became things when the 
tears he shed in his loneliness became the primal waters", page 27. The author rejects the work of 
writers, including Piaget, who compare the thought of primitives to that of children; he shows how 
sophisticated, yet practical, earliest thought can be. For example, he quotes Radin who points out 
that the Achonawi language of Californian Indians distinguishes, in all its nouns, pronouns and 
verbs, between an absolute-abstract form and a relative concrete one. 
Hamill's Ethno-Logic 
-contradiction is an ethnogrcphicfact, Hamill (1990), page I 11. 
Hamill (1990) makes useful points in his study of the logic of 'primitive' people. He points out that 
taking "Western logic as the norm for 0 logical systems clearly begs the question. It cannot lead to 
significant insights about how people think because observations that do not compare well with a 
norm, no matter what the norm, are marked - they may be overvalued or under valued. Thus when 
ethno4ogicians start with Western logic as the norm, they often conclude that non-Westem people 
are logically inferior to Westerners", page 15. Hamill suggests that Aristotelian logic be taken to be 
"western Europe! s folk logic", and treated as equal to other folk logics rather than being treated as a 
paradigm for rational thought. He is critical of the work of such writers as Luria and Hallpike, who 
take Western logic as the norm, and reject folk logics as variously too concrete or too abstract. 
Although Hamill concludes that "nothing as simple and primitive as a taxonomy can hope to 
capture the comple3dties of human semantic systems", page 37, his own work actually uses the 
syllogistic structure as a norm to describe the thinking of other folk logics, even though he admits it 
is "far too simplistic and too rigid" and does not describe how all people think. 
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In his final chapter Hamill discusses contradiction, which he unprornisingly defines in Aristotelian 
terms as threatening "to make any observed meaning system irrelevant ... 
it has the potential to 
destroy the meaning on which the descriptions of reasoning patterns rest", page 109. However, he 
acknowledges that people do maintain contradictory views, and "in the real world contradiction 
'does not fulfil its logical threat to dissolve all meanings and to annihilate interpretive anthropology", 
page I 10. He goes on to give examples of tribal thinking, and practice, which display contradiction; 
but his discussion of the problems raised by contradictions reveals the inappropriateness of his 
training in formal logic to deal with the issue. 
Contrasting perspectives on thought in earliest society 
As we have seen, it is a commonplace amongst anthropologists to state that compared to the 
generally analytic,, inductive and deductive thought typical of capitalist society, especially that 
used by the vast majority of its scientists and technicians, thought in earliest society tends to 
the synthetic. Today we are educated to think in tqrms of either-or, true or false, discrete facts 
or things, whereas in earliest society thought was more totalising, and at home with 
contradiction. One aspect of this chapter is to explain the reasons for the differences in earliest 
and contemporary thought by contrasting'the totalities of the life and thought of hunter 
gathers, or the early agricultural mode of production, with that of contemporary capitalism. 
Earliest palaeolithic societies lived in a way which brought them into a direct unmediated 
relationship with nature. The members of these societies led far more hazardous lives than do 
most people today; their survival depended on co-operation and conformity to a much greater 
degree than in other modes of production. Therefore they developed a number of means of 
transmitting a totalising culture corresponding to their co-operative practical needs. Ritual and 
ceremony were a major aspect of the lives of earliest people, and these took place at varying 
times of the day and night, not only in formal settings but often integrated into practical 
activities. As a result "activities personal and social, peaceable and war-like, economic, 
political and religious are so intertwined that the benefits and privileges of one provide an 
incentive to perform the duties required by another", Lewis (1969) page 147. - In their attempts 
to gain greater control over a hazardous nature, members of early tribal societies 
anthropomorphically projected themselves into nature. Through sacrificial offerings to Gods, 
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artistic representation, symbolism and the summoning of spiritual powers, they attempted to 
bolster their lack of technical knowledge and consequent lack of practical control. Their 
cc environment becomes, in part, at any rate, benevolent, human and social", Lewis, page 177. 
In his Man and his Superstitions Read (1995) reveals his vulgar colonialist and racist views 
on thought in earliest society. On page 22, for example, we read: "the general nature of 
reasoning is the same from Socrates to Sambo". Despite his dogmatic pronouncements on "the 
savage's" inability to formulate and reason according to the Aristotelian syllogism, he makes 
the important point that reasoning, which he rightly links to desire and expectation, is from its 
beginning in earliest society linked to the technique of abstraction. On page 13 he says that: 
"Every desire fixes attention upon beliefs favourable to it, and upon any evidence favourable 
to them, and diverts attention from conflicting beliefs and considerations. Thus every desire 
readily forms about itself a relatively isolated mass of beliefs, which resists comparison and, 
therefore ... does not recognise the principle of contradiction. Incompatible desires may be 
cherished without our becoming aware of their incompatibility; or, -if the fact obtrude itself 
upon us, we repudiate it and turn away. The more immature a mind, again, and the less 
knowledge it has,, the less inhibition of desire is exerted by foresight of consequences that 
ought to awaken conflicting desires or fears; and the less compassion one has, ý the less is desire 
inhibited by its probable consequences to others: therefore, in both cases, the less check there 
is upon belief ". This view, whilst expressed in dialectical terms and containing insights into 
abstraction and contradiction, flies in the face of the mass of evidence that earliest thought is 
actually more totalising than that of people in later modes of production, and for this reason is 
aware of contradictions. It is in general because of a lack of technical knowledge, rather than 
anything to do with the lack of understanding of the Aristotelian syllogism, as Read claims, 
that people in earliest society are unable to resolve their contradictions in practice and so 
attempt to resolve, move or sublimate them by recourse to religion, magic, myth and 
metaphysical thought. Read fails to see that the very survival of early tribes depends on their 
cc compassion" and cooperation. 
Whilst his work-is overly biographical, rather romantic, and contains a number of colonialist 
assumptions, van der Post (1975) contains some useful material on the Bushmen and women, 
or to give them their own name Mung. He describes them as "natural botanists" and "expert 
organic chemists", page 15, and alludes to the high quality of their'paintings, which imply 
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zoolatry, referring to their creation myth, cosmology and *evolution from animal to human in 
-their varied themes. Post mentions their -various beliefs and "aboriginal superstitions", in 
passing, and suggests that they constitute an attempt at theorising those "aspects of reality that 
are beyond rational articulation", page 160. 
Post uses some dialectical formulations in his work on the Kung, exemplified by the 
following quote: "Perhaps this life of ours, which begins as a quest of the child for the man, 
and ends as a journey by the man to rediscover the child, needs a clear image of some child- 
man, like the Bushman, wherein the two are firmly and lovingly joined in order that our 
confused hearts may stay at the centre of their brief round of departure and returif', page 11. 
He speaks of the totalising thought of the Kung living at a "time when birds, beasts, plants, 
trees and men shared a common tongue, and the whole world, night and day, resounded like 
the surf of a coral sea with universal conversation! ', page 20. "Today we overrate the rational 
values and behave as if thinking were a substitute for living. We have forgotten that thought 
and the intuition that feeds it only become whole if the deed grows out of it as fruit grows 
from the pollen on a tree. So everywhere in our civilised world there tends to be a terrible 
cleavage between thinking and doing! ', page 61. "The whole of human development, far from 
having been a product of steady evolution, seemed subject to only partially explicable and 
almost invariably violent mutations. Entire cultures and groups of individuals appeared 
imprisoned for centuries in a static shape which they endured with long-suffering indifference, 
and then suddenly, for no demonstrable cause, became susceptible to drastic changes and wild 
surges of developmenf', page 68 . ..... one 
is free of the tyranny of the many in life only by 
committing oneself totally to the service of the one", page 74. - 'i I 
In the proto-scientific thinking of earliest society the simultaneously physical and metaphysical 
concept offorce is crucial, as Read reluctantly acknowledges. It is a clear example of abstract 
thought relating on the one hand to muscle exertions, water power, lightning and other natural 
forces; and on the other hand to spells, charms and spirits. This is advanced thinking in that it 
encompasses both the empirical and the non-empirical; rather like the contemporary scientific 
Concept of the theoretical entity, which refers to forces such as magnetism and gravity. 
Animism is Tylor's (1891) name for earliest society's concept of force, and along with their 
equally abstract termform, represents the beginning of philosophy. This philosophy involves 
the distinction between the body and the soul, and anticipates the distinction between 
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appearance and essence, a major theme in dialectics. The soul, when it is disembodied, 
becomes a ghost, and the latter is given more or less equal status with the body by earliest 
'thinkers. It becomes clear from Read's work,, as elsewhere, that the rudiments of Egyptian, 
]Buddhist, I-Endu and Platonic thought on the soul, reincarnation, morality and so on, were 
already well developed in the thought of earliest society. 
.1 
Many anthropologists, and others, have remarked on the dualist distinction between the overt, 
or exoteric, and the secret, or esoteric, in earliest thought. Van der Post (1975) notes how 
members of a Mung tribe refused to discuss their cosmology with a non-initiate like himself, 
though they later agreed to do so. Similarly many tribes believe that some things have secret 
names, knowledge of which confers power over the thing on the knower of the name. Clearly 
in this latter example there is interpenetration between the two domains because esoteric 
knowledge gives power in the exoteric. As early agriculture developed esoteric knowledge 
became a major factor in transmitting the privileges of the magicians and priests. Read 
comments on anthropological evidence of early intellectual division of labour in the 
compartmentalisation of formerly synthesised knowledge amongst these proto-scientists. The 
division of labour in secret knowledge eventually led to the development of astronomy, 
astrology, medicine, meteorology, chemistry and alchemy in ancient and classical society. To 
varying degrees these became separate domains of knowledge, albeit to a lesser degree than is 
the case today, and were passed from father to son, or occasionally mother to daughter, in 
elaborate initiation ceremonies. 
Read emphasises the importance of omens in earliest society. They can take many forms, such 
as natural events, divinations, oracles or dreams, but generally are interpreted as either 
warnings against misfortune or propitious signs of things to come. He explains that lack of 
technical knowledge tends to synthesise mere coincidence and genuine cause and effect 
relationships in the form of signs of impending events. These signs in turn become integrated 
into the totality of the life of the tribe, being explained in the form of analogy with the caprice 
of gods or magical powers. 
George Joseph's The Crest of the Peacock (1990) features a chapter on earliest mathematics, 
and he points out that: 
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As far as we know there has never been a society without some form of counting or tallying 
Oe matching a collection of objects with some easily handled set of markers, whether it be 
-Ttones, knots or inscriptions such as notches on wood or bone). If we define mathematics as 
tiny activity that arises out of, or directly generates, concepts relating to numbers or spatial 
configurations together with some form of logic, we can then legitimately include in our study 
-Proto-mathematics, which existed when no written records were available, page 23. 
Despite analytical limitations, Joseph explains that many records of counting in earliest society 
survive and in particular mentions the famous Ishango bone from East Africa. It contains a 
large number of notches which involve tallies of sixty, the use of a base 10 number system, 
-knowledge of duplication and prime numbers. The precise purpose of the bone is a matter of 
speculation, though it is thought to be many thousands of years old and probably influenced 
the Egyptian number system, although it may involve the simultaneous use of a number of 
different systems. Similarly the Yoruba from Nigeria had a base 20 number system that relied 
heavily on subtraction, which may be of very early origin. However, despite his useful 
discussion concerning the African, or 'Ethiopian', origin of Egyptian mathematics, because he 
lacks a knowledge of 'primitive' dialectics, Joseph fails to point out the tension between form 
and content which mathematics engenders, a tension which may have been noted even by 
some of its earliest practitioners. Similarly; though he discusses the links between earliest 
mathematics and astronomy, Joseph fails to realise the part that proto-mathematics played in 
the totality of earliest society, in particular the esoteric magical properties of number. As we 
shall see, these properties were developed further in Egyptian and Greek mathematics, notably 
in the Pythagorean school. 
We have already noted that myth is an important component of the thinking of earliest 
society. Lang's (1995) work is full of examples of mythical thought, a mode of thought which 
'Was passed on to the ancient world, and which remains important today. On page 43 of 
'Volume one Lang quotes an anthropologist describing an Australian aborigine myth from the 
Lake Tyers region: "at one time there was no water anywhere on the face of the earth. All the 
waters were contained in the body of a huge frog, and men and women could get none of 
them. A council was held, and ... 
it was agreed that the frog should be made to laugh, when the 
'waters would run out of his mouth, and there would be plenty in all parts ... At last the eel 
danced on the tip of his tail, and the gravity of the prodigious Batrachian gave way. He 
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laughed till he literally split his sides, and the imprisoned waters came with a rush". As we 
ýý'hall see, Horton has shown that this is proto-scientific totalising thought in that it uses an 
idiom, though one alien to contemporary science, in order to explain a natural event. 
Commenting on "savage thoughf', Lang, despite his colonial world view, makes it clear that 
Nve are seeing the beginning of science and idealist philosophy. He says of "the savage": 
-- -all things , animate or inanimate, 
human, animal, ý vegetable, or inorganic, seem on the 
-Vame level of Iýfe, passion and reason ... He regards himsetf as literally akin to animals and 
4blants and heavenly bodies; he attributes sex and procreative powers even to' stones and 
-'-ocks, and he assigns human speech and human feelings to sun and moon and stars and 
Ivind, no less than to beasts, birds andfishes .. By virtue of the close connection already 
Apoken of between man the animals, the souls of the dead are not rarely supposed to migrate 
into the bodes of beasts, or to revert to the condition of that species of creatures with which 
each tribe supposes itself to be related hy ties of kinship orfriendship .. the souls of the dead 
c1re spoken of, at other times, as if they inhabited a spiritual world, sometimes a paradise of 
--y7owers, sometimes a gloomy place, which mortal men may visit, but whence no one can 
escape who has tasted of the food of the ghosts ... From this opinion comes the myth that man 
is naturally not subject to death: that death was somehow introduced into the world by a 
O'nistake or a misdeed .. The savage, 
like the civilised man, is curious. The first faint impulses 
Cf) the scientific spirit are at work in his brain; he is anxious to give himself an account of the 
-World in which he finds himself.. the savage has a story for answer to almost every question 
that he can ask himself Aese stories are in a sense scientific, because they attempt a 
-volution of the riddles of the world.... Ae changes of the heavenly bodies, the processes of day 
cind night, the existence of the stars, the invention of the arts, the origin of the world (asfar 
Qs known to the savage), of the tribe, of the various animals andplants, the origin of death 
itself, the origin of the perplexing traditional tribal customs, are all accountedfor in stories, 
Pages 49-52. 
The totalising proto-scientific aspects of earliest thought are clear in what Lang calls: a 
Philosophy which takes resemblance, or contiguity in space, or nearness in time as a 
-Tufficient reason for predicating the relations of cause and effect .. (they) often amaze us 
hy 
their wealth of abstract ideas. Coincidence elsewhere standsfor cause ... like affects like ... you 
can injure a man, for example, by injuring his effigy .. 777e part suggests the whole. A 
lock of 
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cl man's hair was part of the man; to destroy the hair is to destroy its former owner. Again, 
-I, vhatever event follows another in time suggests it, and may have heen caused hy it, Lang 
Page 94-96. 
These examples given by Lang make it quite clear that much cosmogonic myth is an idiom for 
proto-science. The descriptions of chaos, "the beginning", matter ý in potential, being and 
becoming, anticipate later Egyptian, Indian, Greek and other dialectical thought. Earliest 
-thinkers had their versions of the later Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel myths, along with 
-%tories of the flood and other catastrophes. However, Lang shows his distaste for 
'Contradiction when he points out that the creation myths of some tribes are contradictory in 
-that they contain elements of ready made humans on the one hand and gradual evolutionary 
]processes on the other. Similarly he notes that the morality myths are often highly developed 
ill their philosophical form, yet savage in their content. Lang is apparently unable to see 
, evidence of similar contradictions in contemporary thought. 
At the end of volume one of his book Lang discusses the contradictions in the communistic, 
4or "unselfish", ethic of hunter gatherers: "They support, with never a murmur, widows, 
, orphans and old men, yet they kill hopeless or troublesome invalids, and their whole conduct 
'to Europeans was the reverse of their domestic behaviour", page 338. However, he claims 
'that this communistic structure, and its corresponding ethic, is inferior to one based on 
ýf aristocracy and acquisition of separate property" in terms of the survival of the tribe. As we 
shall see, compared to the work of Sahlins, Lang's understanding of the contradictions 
involved in the political economy of earliest society is threadbare. 
Gladwin (1973) comments on the lack of rigorous research into the logical methods used in 
, earliest society, pointing out the shortcomings of the little work done in this area. He takes as 
his example the totalising Trukese thought which underpins their navigation techniques, 
learned from relatives and kept in the family, and compares them with techniques used in 
contemporary capitalist society. Gladwin's results allow us to speculate on earliest navigation 
ELnd other skills, whilst providing insights into the complexity of some early thought. He 
distances himself from Freudian and other psychological approaches, which attempt to 
raeasure "intelligence" and deductive skills by such methods as IQ tests, and tries to 
'Understand how the Trukese canoeist is able to navigate accurately over vast distances of 
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'Ocean to a tiny dot of land, using no equipment whatever. The Trukese navigator's 
"information consists of a large number of discrete observations, a combination of motion, 
-ý; ounds, feel of the wind, wave patterns, star relationships, etc", page 114. Gladwin's 
conclusions are tentative and equivocal, but he rejects the idea that these techniques 'are 
Itnerely "inductive", a term often used by those working within the Aryan model to describe all 
]Pre-Greek thought. He states that the "total process goes forward without reference to any 
explicit principles and without any planning ... the process ... must reflect a 
high order of 
intellectual functioning", page 118. Despite the concrete goal of the navigator, it is clear that 
lie must be able to synthesise a mass of information about rapidly changing conditions, a 
Tnany-sided process clearly transcending dualist logical categories of deduction and induction. 
Post (1975) similarly records the skill of the Bushmen in finding their way in the Kalahari 
desert over great distances without reference to maps or instruments. 
I end this section with a quote, on page 54 of volume 2 of Lang, from a dialectical Maori 
r-osmogonic myth: 
-From the conception the increase, 
-From the increase the swelling, 
-From the swelling the thought, 
-From the thought the remembrance, 
-From the remembrance the desire. 
7he word becameftuitNI, 
-It dwelt with thefeeble glimmering, 
-It broughtforth Night. 
From the nothing the hegetting, 
-It produced the atmosphere which is above us. 
Ae atmosphere above dwelt with the glowing sky. 
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Sahlins and the contradictions at the core of earliest society 
Sahlins (1974) re-examined the classic studies of hunting and gathering and, contrary to the 
claims of neo-classical economists, points out that even today some marginalised hunter 
gatherers spend large parts of their day in leisure and ritual activities, resting or sleeping. 
Because hunter gatherers spend less time working than the mass of people in- all other modes 
of production, Sahlins comes to very different conclusions from those of the neo-classical 
economics textbook writers, such as Samuelson and Lipsey, not to mention the classicals like 
Adam Smith, and the early anthropologists already mentioned. He describes hunting and 
gathering as the "original affluent society", in which needs were modest and there existed a 
state of underproduction. There was a kind of comfort, evidenced by their varying diet, in the 
poverty of'. the palaeolithic age compared with poverty in the wealth of contemporary 
capitalism. Sahlins states ironically:, the hunter is "uneconomic man" marked by freedom and 
lack of servility. Needless to say these aspects of their lives profoundly affected the thinking of 
hunter gatherers, as is clear when ideas of freedom clashed with the desire to create a proto- 
state, which developed in some tribes due to the introduction of agricultural techniques. 
There existed a sharp division of labour in hunter gatherer societies, based on sex and age; 
and there were some specialists such as priests, Shamans and craft-workers. However, initially 
there were no social classes and sharing the product of their respective forms of labour was 
the norm. For this reason Marx used the term "primitive communism! ' to refer to these 
societies. They were nomadic within the boundaries of the tribal territory, because their 
Inembers must move on as soon as "diminishing returns" to their labour occur in a particular 
location. The contradiction inherent in primitive communism is that it requires constant 
Inovement from location to location, so that society is limited to what it can carry. Although 
some possessions may be kept in semi-permanent camps, in general there can be little or no 
technological development, because it is inconsistent with a nomadic lifestyle. Although this 
Mode of production stunts the development of technology and many aspects of culture, it is 
the case that myth, religion, magic and ritual are well developed in the thinking of at least 
some of these people. There is also considerable evidence of the development of painting, 
cooking, embroidery, games, dancing and other activities in earliest society. 
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_113ecause 
of the contradiction between wealth and mobility there is little storage of food, as it 
-'Lý; pointless, and the production of tools, clothing, utensils and ornaments must be limited. Post 
1975) records his difficulty in thinking of an appropriate gift for the Bushmen and women 
'When he leaves them. There is so little that they need because they "see beyond the dialectical 
IQlbsessions with externals which bedevil our minds", page 254. Tribal or family numbers must 
'be restricted if their leisurely lifestyle is to be maintained. This has a considerable influence on 
-t1he ethical thought of members of these societies, evidenced by their resort to infanticide and 
-'ýIenilicide, although the practice of sexual restraint is common. Post (1975) records the birth of 
4ý1 child to a Rung woman during a drought "which threatened the survival of aw, page 242. 
-these people are known for their deep love of children and yet the child was immediately 
laken by other women and killed. This event, and Post similarly records the way old people are 
left to die with as much food and water as the tribe can spare, brings into sharp focus the 
'ý'-ontradiction between the survival of the individual and the survival of the tribe, a 
'Qontradiction which can only be resolved in favour of the tribe: "Life was only possible for all 
'Qýf us because, in our past, there had been those who had put the claims of life itself before all 
'-Ise", page 255. 
liunter-gatherers are highly vulnerable, due to their small numbers and lack of technological 
Oevelopment, when they come into contact with people who live in different modes of 
Droduction. It is clear that despite, or because of, its communistic social relations, this mode of 
Production is fragile and hardly survives today. There is a one-sided truth in the neo-classical 
"ýConomists' articulation of the 'economic problem' in that, despite its simple affluence, 
hardship was commonplace and natural disasters threatened the very existence of the tribal 
'Unit. This led many tribes to begin to cultivate food and keep animals for their meat, milk and 
ý%kins. 
With the onset of the neolithic age, from its beginnings in slash and bum forest clearing 
'techniques, the average amount of labour performed each day by tribal members rose. As 
Tnore tribes became tied to the cultivation and fallow cycle, and the level of technology, 
Z; torage facilities and population size grew, so also did property, inequality and class 
Illifferentiation. There were, says Sahlins on page 37: "two contradictory movements: enriching 
but at the same time impoverishing, appropriating in relation to nature but expropriating in 
relation to man". To the extent that they can be meaningfully separated, the inter-relation, or 
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interpenetration, between economic base and cultural superstructure became more complex in 
the neolithic mode of production because technology, culture and property relations became 
more diverse. 
Early in the neolithic period production centred around the domestic unit. Although output of 
the units varied greatly, the communistic ethic remained in the thinking of the mass of tribal 
members. Therefore sharing and exchange were common, as was the culture which stressed 
the need to work only until sufficient, rather than a surplus, had been produced. As class 
relationships developed the exploiting class, which partly emerged from the intellectuals, had 
to destroy this anti-surplus, or underproduction, culture amongst the masses. As was the case 
with the hunter gatherers, the distinction between work, ritual, play and rest was not well 
developed either in the practice or the totalised thinking of these early agricultural societies. 
However, technical knowledge and cultural activities began to diverge in line with the 
emergence of different social groups, which manifested itself in tensions in the practices and 
thought of these groups. 
As the domestic mode of production, evolves there arises a profound contradiction between 
the tribe and the individual household, or tribe in miniature, in particular between the growing 
domestic property interests and those of the group who align themselves with the chief, who 
exerts a strong influence on the thought of the members of the tribe through religious, magical 
and kinship means. The household unit tends to want freedom and decentralisation, and 
sometimes breaks away from the tribe, whereas the chief exerts centralising tendencies and 
tries to impose a general will. The larger the tribe the greater the tensions and the stronger the 
political forces in both directions; thus a classic contradiction develops between the forces and 
relations of production, explains Sahlins in his original analysis. However, individual 
households sooner or later cease to be able to provide the means for life, and the smaller the 
domestic or tribal unit the more likely it is to become the victim vis a vis other units. Therefore 
the chief S power affords a certain security, which influences the thought of the tribe in favour 
of centralisation. The extent to which the communist ethic in the thought of the hunter-gather 
decayed in primitive agricultural society is clear in the decline in sharing and increase in theft, 
though at times of general crisis the tribe tends to pull together. Sahlins gives examples of 
verbal articulations of the contradictory thinking of these people, which corresponds to the 
real fife contradictions between the tribe and the domestic unit: "Raw food is still possessed, 
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cooked it goes to another" or "Broil a rat with its fur on, lest you be disturbed by someone", 
and similarly with the proverb "A relative in winter, a son in autumrf', pages 125-6. Out of 
these contradictions emerges the major force for increasing production and raising the level of 
technology, thereby creating a surplus product, which is the centralising force of the proto- 
state in the form of the chief. Whatever the chief s subjective motives may be, such 
centralisation seems to be the only way to bring to an end the general economic chaos caused 
by the individualism of the domestic units. 
One much discussed aspect of the thought and culture of early agricultural societies is the 
technique used by chiefs and priests in order to effect centralistion: gift exchange. Sahlins' 
claim that this, and barter, represent a market economy in embryo is disputed by some 
economists and anthropologists. Gift exchange has the effect of increasing the overall level of 
production, because the chief s apparent generosity to members of the tribe who are in need 
leads to a culture of reciprocity and obligation. Sahlins quotes an example of dialectical 
Eskimo thinking: "Gifts make slaves, as whips make doge', adding that the "economic relation 
of giver-receiver is the political relation of leader-follower" and "everywhere in the world the 
indigenous category for exploitation is 'reciprocity"', pages 133-4. Therefore the chief sets the 
standard of productivity by supervising the increase in output of his large household and 
calling other members of the tribe to follow suit, partly to keep up with the new standard of 
conspicuous consumption but - also to repay their obligations in the form of ever more 
generous gifts to the chief. 
In the proto-market relations of the gift, the mystical and magical aspects of the obligations 
are highly important. A Maori sage, Tamati Ranapire, cited by Sahlins produced a text which 
introduces a key concept in Maori thinking: the hau, which roughly translates as fecundity, 
material yield, fertility, etc. However, according to Sahlins, these concepts in no way do 
justice to the totalising term hau' which has economic, legal, political, social, religious and 
magical aspects as it component parts. Failure to observe the reciprocity of hau, or to steal, 
would result in the tribal priest or magician casting a spell in order to punish the wrong-doer 
and thereby maintain justice in this alienated society. So there develops a virtuous circle, such 
that the greater the power of the chief the greater the surplus of the tribe, and the greater the 
surplus the greater the power of the chief To the extent that a chief is successful in raising 
productivity, tribal strife, and tensions between rival tribes, reduces, and his support grows. 
32 
Sahlins quotes a member of a Tikopian tribe who states: "When the land is firm people pay 
respect to the things of the chief, but when there is a famine people go and make sport of 
them! ', page 143. Feasts organised by the Tikopian chiefs impel people "to participate in forms 
of co-operation which for the time being go far beyond his personal interests and those of his 
family and reach the bounds of the whole community. Such a feast gathers together chiefs and 
their clansfolk who at other times are rivals ready to criticise and slander each other, but who 
assemble here with an outward show of amity... (and) support the Tikopia system of 
authority", quoted on page 190. 
Chiefs may try to increase the surplus by conquest; but if this fails to result in a greater 
surplus the chances of rebellion are large, especially amongst members of newly conquered 
tribes. At this stage of development there is no proto-state, and therefore no monopoly of the 
means of violence. Sahlins concludes that the primitive agricultural mode of production 
"discovered limits to its ability to augment production and polity, this threshold which it had 
reached but could not cross was the boundary of primitive society itself', page 148. 
To the extent that this mode of production begins to be transcended, and trade with 
"strangers" develops, the Siuai "native moralists assert that neighbours should be friendly and 
mutually trustful, whereas people from far-off are dangerous and unworthy of morally, just 
consideration. For example, natives lay great stress on honesty involving neighbours while 
holding that trade with strangers may be guided by caveat emptoe, SaWins page 191. In 
contrast to this mode of thinking, Malinowski suggests that amongst Trobriand Islanders 
boundaries between barter or trade on the one hand and gift exchange on the other start to 
break down, paving the way for more generalised impersonal trade relationships. As trade 
became more generalised, a concept crucial for the history of dialectical thinking emerged: 
Buso traders came to realise the difference between the exchange-value and use-value aspects 
of commodities, as is clear in the following: 
I was interested to ohserve when accompanying some Busama on a trading journey 
southwards how the Buso (pottery) villagers kept exaggerating the lahour involved in pot 
making. 'We toil all day long at it from sunrise to sunset, one man told us over and over 
again .... The members of our party murmured polite agreement 
but subsequently brought the 
conversation round to the inferior quality ofpresent-day pots, quoted in Sahlins, page 289. 
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In Capital Marx credited Aristotle with the discovery of this crucial distinction in ne 
Politics. However, it seems likely that early traders were able to conceptualise the tensions 
involved in their activities. It is clear that the Buso have gone beyond Aristotle in realising the 
hasis of exchange-value, labour, as, well as implicitly distinguishing between quantity and 
quality. 
Although trade began to flourish, in the long run, as with the palaeolithic mode of production, 
the mass of early agricultural domestic producers were doomed, says Sahlins, because: 
Nothing within the structure of production for use pushes it to transcend itself. 7he entire 
society is constructed on an obstinate economic base, therefore on a contradiction, because 
unless the domestic economy is forced beyond itself the entire society does not survive. 
Economically, primitive society isfounded on an antisociety, page 8 6. 
Me German Ideology, Marx and Engels (1974), contains a dialectically formulated discussion 
of division of labour, including some points relevant to the present discussion. Commenting on 
the division of labour based on gender and age in earliest society, they say: "The division of 
labour is at this stage still very elementary and is confined to a further extension of the natural 
division of labour existing in the family. The social structure is, therefore, limited to an 
extension of the family; patriarchal family chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, 
finally slaves. The slavery latent in the family ý only develops gradually with the increase of 
population, the growth of wants, and with the extension of external relations, both of war and 
of barter. ", page 44 . 
..... there develops the division of labour, which was originally nothing but 
the division of labour in the sexual act, then that division of labour which develops 
spontaneously or 'naturally' by virtue of natural predisposition (e. g. physical strength), needs, 
accidents, etc. etc. Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a 
division of material and mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is 
concurrent. ) From this moment onwards consciousness can flatter itself that it is something 
other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without 
representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself 
from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, 
etc. comes into contradiction with existing relations, this can only occur because existing 
social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production ... the forces of 
production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with 
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one another, because the division of lahour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual 
and material activity - enjoyment and labour, production and consumption - devolve on 
different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in 
the negation in its turn of the division of labour. ", 'page 52. These remarks are highly relevant 
to the discussion of the state capitalist mode of production in Chapter nine. 
Gender contradictions in earliest society 
Marx and Engels point out that the implicit contradictions in "the natural division of*labour in 
the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is 
given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative 
and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of 
which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent 
slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it 
corresponds perfectly to the definition of modem economists, who call it the power of 
disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and ý private property are, 
moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity 
as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity", pages 52-3. 
Marx and Engels' ideas on division of labour and gender contradictions in earliest society are 
demonstrated by Lang (1995) who notes that tribal Mysteries were often hidden from women. 
This suggests that the struggle between men and women was already well developed, and 
anticipates ancient Greece where the privileges associated with mental labour were restricted 
to men. Similarly, there is evidence of gender contradictions in Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 
(1992), speaking of the Umeda semi-nomadic people of New Guinea, Gell comments on their 
"sharing ethos ... and corresponding lack of 
interest in amassing personal property ... Umeda 
women had the 'sexy', rather than 'reproductive', image... the basic theme in Umeda society 
was male sexual rivalry, fired up by the capriciousness and sexual manipulativeness of 
womerf', page 154. Gell goes on to hint at male don-finance by the use of terms like wife- 
receiving, wife-giving, sister exchange and woman-debt in the social reproduction of this 
society. The boundaries of societies like this "are a male preserve, physically and symbolically, 
because men are specialists in hunting and violence. In the hinterland, barter trading is 
masculine and disarticulated from social reproduction - in particular from the processes of the 
35 
Indigenous Service Economy, and the inequalities inherent in affinity. At the margins of the 
world, men encounter other men in war and trade, but not as parties interested in reproducing 
one another. In this mutual disinterestedness there is exhilaration, danger (violence is never far 
from the surface) but also solace. ", page 158. Gell adds "The peripheral barter-exchange 
schema provides an idiom for an all-male social universe, -weakening the position of women 
accordingly. Moreover, as this transactionalisation and masculinisation of the process of social 
reproduction takes place, the Indigenous Service Economy becomes an almost all-female 
affair, in which male participation becomes more and more marginal. ", page 162. "The open 
sea plays the same role as in this as the 'frontier area' between tribes plays in the hinterland 
trade, i. e. it is given over to the masculinity and female influences must be shunned there 
(though attacks by flying witches are an ever-present possibility). Long-distance seaborne 
trade is the last bastion of the masculine republic, and the sea itself comes to be a sort of 
nature-reserve for men, when all else has been lost through the active presence, or even 
predominance, of women in commodity exchange. ", page 166. 
Another social tension is identified when Gell explains the terms of the barter of fish for sago 
between the women of the Murik and latmul tribes. The terms are grossly unfair to the Murik 
women; but this state of affairs is explained by the 'military protection' which in their hey-day 
the latmul 'mothers' provided to a third tribe, the Chambri, but did not extend to the Murik. 
Marilyn Strathern, in the same text, comments on a similarly unequal barter relationship based 
on a more general social inequality between Iatmul and Sawos women. Generally the readings 
in this text are a mish-mash of neo-classical and Marxist ideas on barter, for example the 
authors provide no definition of terms like commodity and mode of production. However, 
they reject neo-classical ideas on both the double co-incidence of wants, the 'disutility of 
barter', and the idea that barter is just a stage in the development of a money-based 
commodity economy: "Barter may even serve as a solution to the problems of money", they 
say on page 4. 
The last two readings explain the reproductive and expansionary effects of gift exchange, the 
peripheral nature of barter and the relevance of gender tensions. Marilyn Strathern's reading 
ends the book with a dialectical approach to barter in Melanesia: "At the moment of exchange, 
an analogy is created between the kind of regard that two parties have for each other; they 
exchange perspectives. One view is compared with another, a totalising moment. ", page 181. 
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Speaking of vegetable sellers she says they: "would throw away produce or take it home at 
the end of the day rather than sell at a price that would diminish its value through an 
inappropriate match. The vendor's produce is to be extracted from her by the buyer, who is 
the cause of her selling, but as long as it is in her possession, its origin in other relationships 
remains. ", page 186. Strathern ends by adding: "Items in themselves, then, carry no guarantee 
of equivalence, not even two identical looking pigs, for in terms of particular social relations, 
in reference to cause and origin, no two things are qualitatively equivalent. This pig was 
reared by that partner, that by another. Rather, they are made equivalent units in the process 
of the substitution of relations. We might think of this unity as a reification, the aesthetic form 
which comparison takes ... Uncertainty 
is reinforced at every stage. Far from exchange relations 
providing some secure integrative framework, they problematise interactions by challenging 
persons to decompose themselves, to make internal capacities externar, pages 187-8. 
Strathern is reminiscent of Hegel's Logic when she says of bride exchange between two 
groups and tribal counting: "At the base of both operations is an assumption about number: 
namely that there are occasions on which many 'is the same as' one. A collectivity or 
multiplicity of units can always be represented as a single unit, insofar as its unity is elicited in 
turn by other social identities. Thus the line of dancers (or component groups within a clan) 
acts as one in confrontation with their exchange partners/audience. They evince magnitude. 
Yet they are not being added together ... Or, we might say, where 'one' 
has two forms, as a 
unit or as a pair. ('Two is not a plurality, but one in another form, viz. the joining of halves or 
moieties or the alliances of mutualities. )", page 183-4. Strathem is far ahead, not only in her 
dialectical formulations but also in her economic and social understanding, of the other writers 
in the text, who fail in their claim to see barter in "the light of its social context", page 2, and 
approvingly quote Marshall's views on marginal utility and 'true equilibrium'. They do not 
explain the social processes and contradictions involved in the hunter gatherer and early 
agricultural modes of production, thus failing to see that the gender, and other, relations of 
most of the societies they mention are mediated by colonialism and capitalist commodity 
exchange. 
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Magic and Religion in Earliest Society 
Having studied both the practical life and general thought of earliest society, we can now 
move onto a more detailed look at religion, magic and related thought. The work of James 
Frazer presents earliest society in a way that is typical of the British colonial world view. In his 
abridgement of Yhe Golden Bough, Frazer (1991) highlights what he considers to be the 
contradiction between early thought based on magic and that based on religion. According to 
the philosophy of magic society and nature conform to fixed laws, whereas according to 
religion they are ruled by capricious gods. Frazer sees contradiction because he insists on 
positing a fixed duality between religion and magic, failing to locate these two modes of 
thinking in the practical reality and totalising thought of earliest society. As we have noted, 
earliest societies live very close to nature and experience natural and social phenomena as both 
regular and cyclical, or apparently law-like, but at other times as arbitrary and chaotic. 
Consequently, taking account of the appropriate social mediations, their contradictory 
attitudes to magic and religion correspond to the practical reality of their lives. 
Frazer's explanation of magic, based on the principles of similarity and contagion, is accurate 
as far as it goes; but his approach is positivistic, as opposed to totalising and dialectical. 
However, he argues that magic is proto-science, with its references toforces in its attempts to 
describe cause and effect relationships for natural and social phenomena. The magician 
attempts to harness his or her knowledge for a variety of purposes, which include providing 
subsistence for the tribe, often popularly called white magic, or alternatively providing a 
system of justice which punishes anti-social behaviour by tribal members, often referred to as 
black magic. 
Frazer realises that magic, religion, myth and other modes of thought are merely ways of 
mediating social relationships. They bolster the intellectual division of labour, and mediate 
between social factions or classes and between a simultaneously ordered and chaotic nature. 
As most anthropologists point out, some tribes, though by no means all, develop totems, 
normally an animal which is important in their immediate environment. The totem functions in 
a number of ways, most notably to limit the possibilities for sexual relations, reproduction and 
marriage. As a general rule, though not always, these are taboo amongst people of the same 
totem. It is to Frazer's credit that he, unlike many thinkers, notes the totalising connections 
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between the totem and magic based on both contagion and similarity in their negative, or 
prohibitive, forms. Thought in "savage" society is, according to Frazer, democratic and 
anthropomorphic, it posits men-gods or women-gods, whose personalities contain all the 
strengths and weaknesses of mere mortals. Therefore, he claims, the art of the priest is to 
make sacrifices, or provide other gifts, in order to please or placate the jealous, avaricious or 
fickle tribal god. 
Lewis (1969), although by no means consistent in his views, disagrees with Frazer on the 
latter's interpretation of the "savage'e' attitude to the natural and supernatural. Unlike us, says 
Lewis, the "savage" makes no fixed dualist distinction between these two realms: the tribe, 
nature, God and the other supernatural forces are one. The totalising Shaman, priest or 
magician taps into whatever forces are available and useful for the achievement of given 
practical results. However, he or she, and to varying degrees all members of the tribe, says 
Lewis, also use ceremonies and symbols in summoning these forces in order to powerfully 
express the tribe's "attitudes, desires and hopes", page 153, in the same way that art, and 
other cultural activities, function in contemporary society. This, claims Lewis, has the effect of 
boosting the psychological well-being of the tribe, preventing accidents caused by hostile 
forces, curing illness, improving the providence of nature, and in turn promoting co-operation 
and the fulfilment of obligations. In fact magic and its functions become even more complex 
and all encompassing when they begin to represent the means of legitimising class society, or 
the beginning of "crude government". Read (1995) says: 
what we know of the most backwardpeople now extant makes it highly probable that Magic 
was the sanction for their crude government, supplemented sooner or later by Animism or 
belief in the influence of spirits, and the consequent growth of kingship andpriesthoods. And 
these beliefs in Magic and Animism ... not only made possible the beginning of 
government .. but ever since have had a potent share in maintaining and directing it.., pages 
xiii_xiv. 
Like Frazer, Read stresses that magic, which he calls superstition, does not "worle' and 
therefore represents a false belief in the ability of supernatural powers to influence events in 
the natural world. Yet he makes the following profound dialectical comment, which is 
reminiscent of Lukacs: "Spells, being thought of as forces, are reified; so that blessings or 
curses cling to their objects-like garlands, or like contaminating rage, page 53, which 
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highlights the principal form of alienation to which earliest men and women were subject. 
Early magicians are in part attempting to discover cause and effect relationships in nature; as a 
result of their relationships with nature and other tribal members, they developed a complex 
metaphysics involving the interplay between the forces of magic and capricious 
anthropomorphic gods. 
As the contradictions of agricultural society develop, magic becomes a focus and sanction for 
all manner of social relationships. Thus, on the one hand primitive communism declines and 
relationships of increasing inequality, status and power emerge, yet on the other hand 
important mutually beneficial relationships are maintained, and magic reinforces both. Read 
(1995) realises this when speaking of magic in terms of the "sympathy and antipathy between 
families, parties, tribes... so that beliefs become fashionable, endemic, coercive, impassioned 
and intolerant", page 14. Implying the existence of social contradictions based on the division 
of labour, Read adds: "even at a low level of culture individuals are found for whom common 
sense constitutes a private standard, and who are sceptics in relation to their tribal beliefs. But 
such a private standard cannot be communicated, and for the great majority of the tribesmen 
common sense is no confident guide; and perhaps they are even incapable of effectively 
comparing their ideas", page 19. This quote, despite its colonialist assumptions, raises the 
important issue of ideological dissent, and its relation to social contradictions, as manifested in 
challenges to tribal magic, religion and other aspects of the culture of early society. However 
these early anthropologists in their haste to prove that magic "does not work" fail to see the 
depth of the complex social tensions reified in the practice of magic in early agricultural 
society. 
Nataf (1994) points out that even the earliest magic represents highly developed and 
dialectical thinking in so far as it relies on the use of analogy. Analogy stresses the common 
features of two phenomena, allowing "us to pass from the known to the unknown, from the 
phenomenon to the nournenon and from the visible to the invisible ... the microcosm and the 
macrocosm ... scientific causality proceeds by means of the dogmatic division of the world, 
whereas analogy takes each fragment of the real world and fits it into the whole of which it is a 
part. The two procedures are complementary and it is a great pity to neglect either one of 
thenf', page 10. Alleau claims that "Complete identification by analogy is never achieved; by 
definition, the analogy can never be complete. So analogy remains open to the interplay of 
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consequences and changing relationships brought about by the introduction of additional 
experimental or conceptual information into the concrete whole. The dynamic process of 
analogy therefore has a legitimate place within any dialectical procese', quoted in Nataf, page 
10. We can compare this quote with one from Read (1995) who takes a colonialist view of 
early or "savage" society-and speaks of "remote and absurd analogies ... there 
is no logic at 
hand and not enough common sense to distinguish the wildest imaginative analogies from 
trustworthy conclusions", page 16. 
The magic practised by the Dogon people is typical of African totalising thought in that it 
includes esoteric, or secret, elements which are rich in images that, anticipating Chapter Two, 
formed the basis of later Egyptian mystery cults. The first principle learned by the initiate is the 
importance of analogy, particularly that paradoxical one between the microcosm (man) and the 
macrocosm (the universe). The second principle concerns the contradictory relationship 
between the visible and the invisible, although Nataf fails to explain the social basis of these 
polarities. There is ample evidence that tribal initiates learned a cosmology based on the 
interplay between the four elements: fire, water, earth and air, which were so important to 
subsequent ancient cosmology. 
Magic, in sharp contrast to its central role in early society, has by and large become a middle- 
class cult in contemporary capitalism; an amalgam of conspicuous consumption items located 
in the Mind-B ody- Spirit department. Religion too is ceasing to be a key component of a 
totalising philosophy and becomes compartmentalised in the lives of most of today's believers, 
something one thinks about on the Sabbath, along with shopping, as part of the recuperation 
from the weekday stresses of work or business. 
There is a debate amongst anthropologists and others as to the early development of 
monotheism, and the extent to which it represents progress beyond polytheistic beliefs 
prevalent in earliest society. Bernal persuasively argues that these debates derived more from 
projections of the religious views of the researchers than an attempt to understand the thinking 
of earliest society. Although Lewis states that "polytheism belongs to a higher level of social 
development than that of tribal and village life", page 180; on the same page he goes on to 
present the sort of argument described by Bernal when he states: " Vie One God concept is 
generally regarded as a very late development in which religion merges with philosophy. Even 
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the Hebrews were not monotheists at first ... monotheism ... is the culmination and not the 
origin of the religious quest". Read tries to penetrate more deeply when he claims that the 
development of more formal religious systems, both polytheistic and monotheistic, represents 
the formation of a class-based agricultural society with an established hereditary priest class, 
which grows out of early hunter gatherer magical and religious thought. He explains how the 
caprice of the gods becomes a seemingly rational explanation for the failure of magic, as 
proto-science, to solve practical problems: 
As the gods emerge ftom the shadow of night and the grave, and are cleansed ftom the 
savour of corruption, and withdraw to the summit of the world, they are no longer regarded 
with the shudderingfear that ghosts excite; as they acquire the rank of chiefs and kings, the 
sentiments of attachment, awe, duty, reliance, loyalty, proper to the service of such superiors, 
are directed to them; and since their power far exceeds that of kings, and implies the total 
dependence of man and nature upon their support and guidance, these sentiments - often 
amazingly strong toward earthly rulers - may toward the gods attain to the intensest heat of 
fanaticism. Extolled by priests and poets, the attributes of the gods are magnified, until 
difficulties occur to a reflective mind as to how any other powers can exist contrary to, or 
even apart from, them: so that philosophical problems arise as to the existence of evil and 
responsibility, page 116. 
Read then discusses the contradictory relationship between the priests and magicians on the 
one side and members of the tribe on the other. It seems that tribal accusations of charlatanism 
are commonplace, so that "failure" demands ever more sophisticated explanations which 
constantly test the intellectual aptitude of the priest or magician. 
Lang (1995) sees a mass of contradictions in earliest magical and religious thought. In keeping 
with most early anthropologists, he attempts to resolve them by reference to those reified 
aspects of capitalist thought which stress compartmentalisation and the particular. Typically 
life under capitalism is split into work, recreation, worship, shopping, and so on. In each 
sphere a separate, and appropriate mode of behaviour and thought is adopted, the 
contradictions arising from these separate spheres are suppressed by attempting to maintain an 
arbitrary separation. So for Lang religion, myth, magic, totemism, science and the practical 
activities necessary for subsistence in earliest society are analysed in the same way. In earliest 
society, with its tendency towards totalising thought, the particularised contradictions 
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expressed by Lang are not experienced by members of these societies as they are today. Life is 
experienced, and theorised, more as an integrated whole, in which what may be interpreted as 
contradictions or antagonisms are idealised as contrasting experiences, thoughts and emotions. 
Lang notes the characteristics of the early Australian chief of demons, Turramullun, author of 
disease, mischief and wisdom. He goes on to identify what he takes to be a conflict between 
Aborigine notions of religious -contemplation and submission, which are occult and kept 
secret, and their myths which are variously humorous, obscene and fanciful: "The moods are 
present, and in conflict, through the whole religious history of the human race. They stand as 
near each other, and as far apart, as Love and Lust", page 5, "in the religions of even the 
lowest races, such myths as these are in contradiction with the ethical elements of the faith", 
page 10. Similarly Lang quotes Emeric-David as concluding "that these animals, plants, and 
monsters of myths are so many "enigmas" and "symbole' veiling some deep, sacred idea, 
allegories of some esoteric religious creed", page 11. 
Because of his monotheistic and colonialist world view, Lang reduces the integrated thought 
of earliest "savagee' to logical contradictions. He notes immortal gods who feel "fear and 
pain ... the ýtars are mixed up with beasts, planets and men in the same embroglio of 
fantastic 
opinion. The -dead and the living, men, beasts and gods, trees and stars, and rivers, and sun, 
and moon, dance through the region of myths in a burlesque ballet of Priapus, where 
everything may be anything, where nature has no laws and imagination no limits", page 13. 
Yet, in a mode of thought reminiscent of Feuerbach, Lang states: "Man found that his gods, 
when mythically envisaged, were not made in his own moral image at its best, but in the image 
sometimes of the beasts, sometimes of his own moral nature at its very worst: in the likeness 
of robbers, wizards, sorcerers, and adulterere', page 14. 
I end this section by making the, point, that the dialectical thought of earliest society, in 
particular the emphasis on the metamorphoses of animals to humans to gods, profoundly 
influenced later thinkers. Marx's economic thinking, for example, despite his attacks on 
'mystification', 'idealism' and the like, often uses the term metamorphosis to describe the 
change in physical form of one commodity when it is exchanged for another. 
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Radin and social differentiation 
Paul Radin (1927) introduces the idea that the division of labour between intellectuals and 
those who perform predominantly manual work, whose thought is mainly concerned with the 
achievement of practical outcomes, is crucial the study of earliest thought. He sees the 
intellectuals, such as medicine-men or -women, poets, magicians and priests, as the main 
contributors to earliest philosophy, and rejects the approach taken by most anthropologists, 
which sees earliest society as composed of more or less undifferentiated tribal groups. 
However, the theme is not well developed in Radids work; he is unaware of the social 
dynamic which exists between the proto-classes of earliest society, and restricts himself to the 
modest goal of describing "primitive cultures* in terms of their intellectual class, from the 
viewpoint of their thinkers", page 5. 
Radin claims that the bulk of people in earliest tribal society did not have deep religious 
convictions, these being reserved for the intellectuals. His research suggests that, rather like 
today, the majority of tribal members expressed only a limited commitment to the tribal 
religion and its culture. Their religious beliefs and ceremonies were closely connected to the 
achievement of their practical goals, and acted as an extra means of attempting to ensure 
success. He contrasts this with the philosophical thought of the primitive intellectual, 
illustrated in the following Maori poem, which contains references to such totalising concepts 
as life, power, seed and light, as well as a number of oppositions: 
Seeking, earnestly seeking in the gloom. Searching - yes on the coast line - on the hounds of 
night and day; looking into night. Night had conceived the seed of night 7he heart, the 
foundation of night, had stoodforth set(-existing even in the gloom. It grows in gloom - the 
sap and succulent parts, the Iýfe pulsating, and the -cup of life. Yhe shadows screen the 
faintest ray of light. 77te procreative power, the ecstasy of life first known, andjoy of issuing 
forth from silence into sound Thus the progeny of the Great-Extending filled the heaven's 
expanse; the chorus of life rose -and swelled into ecstasy, then rested in Hiss of calm and 
quiet, page 23 8. ? 
An Hawaiian poem which he quotes shows similar totalising tendencies in the way that it 
identifies water in the following fornis: 
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.. at sea, on the ocean, In the driving rain, In the heavenly haw, In the piled-up mist-wraith, In 
the hlood-red rainfall, In the ghost-like cloud-form ... In the heavenly hlue, In the h1ackpiled 
cloud, In the h1ack, h1ack cloud, In the h1ack-mottled sacred cloud of the gods ... Deep in the 
ground, in the gushing spring ... A water of magic power - The water of life! 
The work of Claude Livi-Strauss 
777e savage mind tototalises... it is in this intransigent refusal on the part of the savage mind 
to allow anything human (or even living) to remain alien to it, that the real principle of 
dialectical reason is to befound. Uvi-Strauss (1966), page 245. 
Uvi-Strauss (1994) is in part a tribute to the analysis of Paul Radin, particularly his fieldwork 
amongst the Winnebago people. Levi-Strauss summarises a myth which concerns "two friends, 
one of them a chief s son, who decide to sacrifice their lives for the welfare of the community. 
After their death, they undergo a series of ordeals in the underworld, and finally reach the 
lodge of Earthmaker, who permits them to become reincarnated and to resume their previous 
lives'among their relatives and friends", page 199. Uvi-Strauss explains that their sacrifice 
grants extra life expectancy to the. two friends and the rest of the tribe, and sets up an 
opposition between ordinary and heroic life and between final death and death "swinging 
between life and death", page 201. Whilst drawing attention to these "oppositions", in keeping 
with structuralism, Levi-Strauss then "transforms" them into grids of "correlations" and other 
relationships. This grid technique has the effect of adopting too formal an approach to the real 
social contradictions that underpin the myth. 
Ldvi-Strauss' anthropological works are concerned in large measure with the thinking of 
surviving "savage" people. Despite his frequent adoption of some of Sartre's dialectical 
formulations, such as the one quoted at -the- beginning of this 'section, Levi-Strauss' 
"transformations" are central to his methodology: 
The characteristic feature of the savage mind is its timelessness; its object is to grasp the 
world as both a synchronic and a diachronic totality and the knowledge which it draws 
thereftom is like that afforded of a room by mirrors fixed on opposite walls, which reflect 
each other .. 7he savage mind .. builds mental structures which 
facilitate an understanding of 
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the world in as much as they resemble it. In this sense savage thought can be defined as 
analogical thought Levi-Strauss (1966) page 263. 
Structuralist methodology, which was developed in opposition to existentialism, or the "shop- 
girl's philosophy" as Levi-Strauss described it, quoted in Leach (1970) page 14, has since 
become highly influential in anthropology and elsewhere. The dualist social oppositions of the 
kind developed above are based on de Saussure's and Jakobson's structuralist linguistics. 
These correspond, claims Levi-Strauss, apparently unaware of the existence of social tensions 
and perpetual, if sometimes very slow, change, to transformations of structures which already 
exist in both nature and the human mind. He reifies the mind, in effect treating it as a thing, 
and seeks to find its universal properties, its structure. It is a commonplace to claim that things 
have forms or structures, ý but dialectical thought identifies the mind as simultaneously natural 
and social, it is both the organ of thought and a mediator of relationships, it has no fixed 
structure. Recent neurological research supports this by showing that the electro-chemical 
makeup of the mind is forever changing according to its relationship with nature and society. 
In the next chapter we shall examine what Bernal calls the Aryan, or Eurocentric, model. 
Uvi-Strauss opposes this racist view when he claims that all societies are, if only potentially, 
equally sophisticated; only their systems of notation differ, but their thought structures are 
universally valid. He states: "Th6 savage mind is logical in the same sense as ours, though as 
our own is only when it is applied to knowledge of a universe in which it recognises physical 
and semantic properties simultaneously. " Uvi-Strauss (1966), page 268. However, Ldvi- 
Strauss' structuralist method, which insists on the timeless and static nature of primitive 
society: "societies with no history", not only prevents him from conducting a study of the 
thought of people in earliest society which takes account of its social dynamic, but also makes 
inevitable his failure to see the mutual dependency of form and content, collapsing the latter 
into the former. He shares this deficiency with functionalist anthropologists, who overstress 
the static forms of early society and similarly omit the dynamic content which, however 
gradually, leads to new forms. 
The development of post-structuralism was a reaction to the sort of binary logic used by Levi- 
Strauss in his positing of such static oppositions as: raw and cooked, life and death, nature and 
culture, id and ego, conscious and unconscious, self-interest and tribal morality, and the matrix 
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style structures and naturalistic analogies developed from them. In reality none of these 
examples are fixed polar opposites, they all inter-penetrate; even raw food is simultaneously 
cultural and natural, because all uncooked food is the product of a social process. Similarly in 
his discussion of the relationship between science and magic Levi-Strauss (1966) says that "magic 
postulates a complete and all embracing determinism` ', page 11. %ilst this Frazer-like remark is 
true, it is one-sided because, in constructing his taxonomy of magic, he fails to see its complex 
social context, its part in the totalising thought of early society. The fixed duality science-magic, like 
the ones modem-savage and myth-art, cannot do justice to the change and tension which, despite 
Levi-Strauss's claims to the contrary, exists in all societies. 
I close this section with a quote from Levi-Strauss' Savage Mind in which he gives a dialectical 
description of contradictions involved in the way the Hidatsa Indians hunt eagles "by hiding in pits. 
The eagle is attracted by a bait placed on top and the hunter catches it with his bare hands as it 
perches to take the bait. And so the technique presents a kind of paradox Man is the trap but to 
play this part he has to go down into the pit, that is, to adopt the position of a trapped animal. He is 
both hunter and hunted at the same time. The wolverine is the only animal which knows how to 
deal with this contradictory situation: not only has it not the slightest fear of the traps set -for it; it 
actually competes with the trapper by stealing his prey and sometimes even his traps. It 
follows ... that the ritual 
importance of eagle hunting among the Hidatsa is at least partly due to the 
use of pits, to the assumption by the hunter of a particularly low position (literally as we have just 
seen, figuratively as well) for capturing a quarry which is in the very highest position in an objective 
sense (eagles fly high) and also from a mythical point of view (the eagle being at the top of the 
mythical hierarchy of birds .... 
)", pages 50-5 1. 
Leach's criticisms of structuralism 
As a result of his limited methodology, argues the anthropologist Leach, Levi-Strauss's work 
is never extended enough to get to grips with his object of study: 
He always seems to be able to find just what he is looking for .. wherever the 
data runs 
counter to the theory LM-Strauss will either by-pass the evidence or marshal the full 
resources of his powerful invective to have the heresy thrown out of court/, Leach (1970) 
page 20. 
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However, we can in turn see the limits of Leach's functionalist approach, mixed with 
Popperian falsificationism, to "primitive" thought when, for example, he explains Levi- 
Strauss's structuralist methodology by-use of an analogy with a set of traffic lights. Leach 
admits that this example is, as far as he is aware, never actually used by Levi-Strauss himself, 
but is typical of the latter's approach to "savage" thought. A-structuralist approach begins 
with the natural relationship between the 6olours of the spectrum corresponding to red, amber 
and green. The structuralist claims that these colours are perceived by the human brain, 
according to their wavelengths and luminosity, as discrete segments in which red and green are 
accepted as "opposites" in the same way as we accept the "oppositiorf' in black and white. 
Because of its natural property of being at the mid-point of the luminosity spectrum, yellow 
forms a triad mid-point between red and green. There follows a transformation of this natural 
triad into a cultural context; Leach mentions the "natural" association between red and blood, 
and could in similar vein have noted that between green and grass. This observation prepares 
us for the association between red and stop, or danger, and we could add that between green 
and go or "naturar', which exists in many cultures. It is then easy to develop the structuralist 
row matrix: red-amber-green, stop-caution-go corresponding to the British traffic light which 
represents a transformation of the natural into the cultural. I 
The significance of the argument for Leach is not made clear, other than as an example of the 
kind of transformation regularly made by Levi-Strauss. However, its implication is that 
drivers, pedestrians and others readily accept this arbitrary cultural product, the traffic light, 
because it is a transformed natural relationship having as its base a corresponding structure in 
both the light spectrum and the human brain. Hodge and Kress (1988) discuss Leach's traffic 
light example, although one could easily find other instances of such nature-culture 
transformations applied to societies and subject'them to similar criticism. They point out that 
the stop-caution-go triad could be replaced by any arbitrary system of signs, such as one-two- 
three, and frequently are when the lights break down and hand signals are used. The authors 
argue that the acceptance of these signs by any individual is mediated by the realisation that a 
minority of road users jump or ignore the lights. To truly understand the social dynamic of the 
traffic light involves knowledge of commodity production, including the need for workers to 
get to work, for commodities to be moved between factory, warehouse and shop, and the 
sanctions available to police and courts, in short the totality of capitalist social relations. 
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The point of this traffic light analogy is that to understand the thought involved in a particular 
cultural product, it needs to be perceived in the context of its part in the totality of life of the 
society concerned. Although Uvi-Strauss does sometimes try to do this, especially, when he 
applies some of Freud's dialectical formulations to primitive myths, or mentions societies' 
different experience of time, he is often content to construct a matrix of the product and posit 
its conformity to some universal aspect of the human mind. 
Language is very important in Ldvi-Strauss' work, which claims the use of symbols is what 
distinguishes humans from all other life forms. He points to the links between words and the 
practical reality of their user. Chapter One of Ae Savage Mind presents numerous examples 
of how different societies develop either abstract general words or detailed subdivisions 
according to their praxis. However, commenting on Levi-Strauss's view of language as the 
key to the distinction between human beings and their culture on the one hand, and animals 
and the rest of nature on the other, Leach states: "verbal categories provide the mechanism 
through which universal structural charactefistics of human brains are transformed into 
universal structural characteristics of human culture", emphasis in the original, page 3 8. These 
structures, says Leach, are innate and represent an "algebraic matrix of possible permutations 
and combinations located in the unconscious 'human mind"', page 42. 
These quotes from Leach show the anti-empiricist, pro-Freudian position adopted by Levi- 
Strauss in his studies of "savage" thought. With reference to his objective idealist structures, 
or matrices, Leach asks: where are they located? The answer seems to lie in the collective 
unconscious of psycho-analysis: myths operating in men and women without their knowledge. 
In rejecting myth as "a universal primitive non-rational logic", Levi-Strauss interprets them as 
manifestations of Freudian unconscious wishes. Levi-Strauss's strengths, such as his dialectical 
articulations, and weaknesses, notably his attempted reduction to pure form, are suggested in 
the following, quoted on page 58 of Leach: 
All the paradoxes conceived by'the native mind, on the most diverse planes: geographic, 
economic, sociological, and even cosmological, are, when all is said and done, assimilated to 
that less obvious yet so real paradox which marriage with the matrilineal cousin attempts but 
fails to resolve. But the failure is admitted in our own myths, and there precisely lies their 
function. 
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Finally, Leach shows his affinity to the thought of Salifins when he comments on Levi-Strauss' 
discussion of the 11idatsa: "in the thinking of the I-Edatsa, such practical ý economic matters as 
hunting and agriculture are inextricably entangled with attitudes towards cosmology, sanctity, food, 
women, life and death, and certainly this is diametrically opposed to our own contemporary fashion 
which lays down that, in order to rate as rational scientists, we must keep facts and values entirely 
separate. Our thinking is the product of a Culture alienated from Nature: that of the IFEdatsa derives 
from a Culture integrated with Nature", - page 119. - 
Lucien Livy-Bruhl's How Natives Think - 
L6vy-Bruhl (1926) is probably the most dialectical of ýthe colonialist orientated 
anthropologists who speak of "inferior races", page 29. He'implicitly acknowledges the 
existence of a 'savage' or tribal dialectics, part of, an esoteric "natural philosophy", 
compensating for a lack of technical knowledge. At worst he claims that this mode of thinking 
contrasts sharply with the 'civilised' thought of "men of our own type", page 14. However, at 
times he acknowledges the influence of tribal dialectics on contemporary thought. Mysticism is 
the name he gives to the tribal "belief in forces and influences and actions which, though 
imperceptible to sense, are nevertheless real", page 38. By reference to these "forces" he gives 
examples of totalising representational tribal thought. The problem with Uvy-Bruhl's analysis 
is that it presents this "rnysticism7' in a one-sided way by exaggerating its all pervasiveness. As 
Horton (1967) points out members of earliest society, like people today, find "common sense 
is the handier and more economical tool for coping with a wide range of circumstances in 
everyday life. Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances that can only be coped with in 
terms of a wider causal vision than common sense provides. And in these circumstances there 
is a jump to theoretical thinking", page 60. 
Although L6vy-Bruhl oversimplifies, as in his claim that tribal thought is "prelogicar' because 
it fails to recognise cause and effect or distinguish between subject and object, some of his 
examples raise important issues. A penetrating illustration is tribal views on names, which are 
part of the totalising relations between tribes and their sub-divisions, totems and ultimately 
their whole philosophy. This contrasts with a person's name in contemporary capitalism, 
where most names correspond to the largely arbitrary, routine and trivial nature of the 
'culture'. This shallow "spectacular" culture imposes itself on the anthropologists' interpretation of 
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tribal thought, in particular, explains, Uvy-Bruhl, tribal myth. Because we possess little sense of 
their totalising mystical atmosphere, our translation of their myth is a "betrayar', an "inanimate 
corpse which remains after the vital spark has fled", page 370. As we shall see this point could 
equally be applied to the translation of ancient and classical texts, such as Plato who is made to 
sound like one of the chaps in the senior common room. 
L6vy-Brul-A (1926) sums up the difference between tribal thought and the static dualism of much 
20th century thought when he says: "The superstitious man, and frequently also the religious man, 
among us, believes in a twofold order of reality, the one visible, p alpable, and subordinate to the 
essential laws of motion; the other invisible, intangible, 'spiritual', forming a mystic sphere which 
encompasses the first. But the primitive'st mentality does not recognise two distinct worlds in 
contact with each other, and more or less interpenetrating. To him there is but one. Every reality, 
Eke every influence, is mystic, and consequently every perception is also mystic. ", page 68. Like 
Sahlins, L6vy-Bruhl seeks to explain, and express an element of regret at the move away from 
totalising tribal thought towards a more analytical mode, which stresses the reified distinction 
between subject and object. 
Evans-Pritchard on Livy-Bruhl 
Evans-Pritchard (1965) is the archetypal British upper class anthropologist. His approach is 
one of "getting at the facts" by fieldwork, though he seems unaware of the problems 
associated with the study of the thinking of 'primitive' peoples. The text is a review of the 
various anthropological approaches to understanding early religious thought. Evans-Pritchard 
rejects Tylor's concept of animism, whilst arguing that Durkheim's understanding of the 
Polynesian totalising notion mana is lacking in subtlety; although he draws attention to what 
he thinks is positive in each anthropologist's work. He gives examples from the work of 
Darwin and Galton, which shows the kind of abuse heaped on earliest society as a result of the 
Eurocentric colonial view. His most positive remarks are reserved for the work of Levy-Bruhl, 
who draws attention to the fact that'for "prelogical" thinkers "Objects and beings are all 
involved in a network of mystical participations and exclusions ... They are reasonable, 
but they 
reason in categories different from ours", Page 81-2. Moreover they do not try to avoid 
contradictions. 
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Evans-Pritchard continues: "primitive man sees an object as we see it, but he perceives it 
differently, for as soon as he gives conscious attention to it, the mystical idea of the object 
comes between him and the object, and transforms its purely objective properties ... a primitive 
man does not perceive a leopard and believe that it is his totem-brother. What he perceives is 
his totem-brother. The physical qualities of a leopard are fused in the mystical representation 
of totem, and are subordinated to it ... it is the mystical which evoke the perceptions", page 83- 
4. He makes the point more forcefully than Levy-Bruhl that none of this prevents 'primitive' 
people from being able to act in the appropriate way in order to achieve required practical 
goals. Evans-Pritchard notes that they "live closer to the harsh realities of nature, which permit 
survival only to those who are guided in their pursuits by observation, experiment and reason", 
page 89. He assails Uvy-Bruhl because he plays down the extent to which western thought 
today is "mystical" or "prelogical". However, Evans-Pritchard's own thinking is often a 
paradigm of the reified positivistic thought so pervasive in capitalist society. 
Livy-Bruhl's final writings 
I have not heen sufficiently careful when speaking of 'contradiction', Uvy-BrulA (1975) page 7. 
To be, to exist, is to participate ... If participation were not established, already real, the 
individuals would not exist. Yhus the question is not: here are objects, individuals, how can they 
participate with each other?, L6vy-BruW, pages 16 and 18, articulating 'primitive' totalising 
thinhing in opposition to modem reification. He notes: the Aranta language, more archaic than 
any other ... has as a characteristic to express only actions and states, but not objects, page 18. 
In notebooks written in the final years of his life, Levy-Bruhl (1975) expresses serious misgivings 
about his earlier ideas, especially his term "prelogical". As the preface, by Leenhardt, puts matters: 
L6vy-Bruhl takes up "his dialectic again without the intense concern for traditional 
logic 
... contradictions and 
incompatibilities which it contains, become ... clear when... 
it is translated 
into a form. Juxtapositions which logic does not comprehend when they are presented in speech, 
here seem well ordered in the work of art ... 
in the mind functions assert themselves which even the 
bonds of logic cannot constrain", pages xv and xviii. L6vy-Bruhl says that "For primitive men the 
fact that the ghost and the corpse are located in parts of space separated from each other does not 
prevent them from still constituting a duality-unity ... Here 
is the essence of participation, of which 
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one of the characteristics is that the bi-presence is not an obstacle to what may be felt ... 
it is felt, 
therefore it is real; objectively real", pages 4-5. He distinguishes between physical impossibility, 
which he equates with the incompafibility of propositions, so, for example, someone cannot be at 
place A and place B, a hundred miles away, simultaneously, and logical impossibility. Uvy-Bruhl 
says that there is nothing logically impossible about these propositions, they are merely logically 
contradictory. He points out that in contemporary Western thought the omnipresence of God, the 
virgin birth or the existence of miracles demonstrate the distinction between these two forms: 
physical impossibility, and logical contradiction which, although it wreaks havoc with Aristotle! s 
laws, we all accept in certain instances. I 
Robin Horton's Aftica article 
This article, written by the philosopher of science Robin Horton (1967), is an important 
contribution to the theory of tribal thinking. By comparing tribal thought with contemporary 
scientific thinking, Horton exposes a number of misrepresentations of the former, and shows that 
these are partly caused by misunderstandings of the latter. However, he fails to trace the 
development from one type of society to the other, especially the secretive nature of science today 
and its links with ancient Mystery cults, which reveals a lack of understanding of social dynamics. 
%ilst Horton is not a conscious dialectical thinker, his work highlights some dialectical aspects of 
both tribal proto-science and contemporary science. For example: "The quest for explanatory 
theory is basically the quest for unity underlying apparent diversity, for simplicity underlying 
apparent complexity; for order underlying apparent disorder; for regularity underlying apparent 
anomaly", page 5 1. He reports on his research into tribal thought, which shows that "the gods of a 
given culture do form a scheme which interprets the vast diversity of everyday experience in terms 
of the actions of a relatively few kincls of forces-all the various oppositions and conflicts in 
Lugbara experience are interpreted as so many manifestations of the single underlying opposition 
between ancestors and adro spirits ... Like atoms, molecules, and waves, then, the gods serve to 
introduce unity into diversity, simplicity into complexity, order into disorder, regularity into 
anomaly", page 52. 
Horton uses the example of disease diagnosis to illustrate the process of abstraction, analysis and 
reintegration in tribal thought. The diviners present diagnoses which represent not only the firnit of 
tribal technical knowledge of relevant diseases, but also seek knowledge from the patient 
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concerning his or her social relationships and look for wider social tensions as an equally important 
part of the diagnosis. The process of abstraction, an important aspect of dialectical thought, and the 
use of analogy are well developed in traditional thought. But only those aspects of the analogy 
which are relevant to the matter in hand are used: "The definition of a god may omit any reference 
to his physical appearance, his diet, his mode of lodging, his children, his relations with his wives, 
and so on. Asking questions about such attributes is as inappropriate as asking questions about the 
colour of a molecule or the temperature of an electron. ", page 66. 
In part two of Horton's article, some weaknesses are exposed: he assumes "that in traditional 
cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical 
tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed7', page 
155. This claim is only partially correct because all cultures to a degree contain their respective 
opposites. To suggest that any society is entirely static in either its practical or theoretical aspects is 
wrong, whilst to imply that modem science is entirely "open! ', as Horton does, is similarly, as 
Thomas Kuhn's work in the 1960s showed, mistaken. As a result of these one-sided views, Horton 
compounds his error when talking about reactions to, and explanations of, predictive failure in 
traditional and contemporary societies. Had he used examples of thinking on this matter in other 
societies, such as ancient and medieval ones, the fact that all societies contain a dialectical 
combination of open and closed aspects, freedom and necessity, in their theory and practice would 
have become clearer to him.. it is this combination, and the tensions to which it gives rise, which is 
the lifeblood of all societies. 
Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough 
Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not hasically an English parson of our times with all his 
stupidity andfeehleness, Wittgenstein (199 1) page Se. 
-everything a man perceives year in, year out around him, connected together in any variety of 
ways - that all this shouldplay a part in his thinking (his philosophy) and his practices, is obvious, 
or in other words this is what we really know and find interesting. How could fire or fire's 
resemblance to the sun havefailed to make an impression on the awakening mind of man? But not 
'because he can't explain W(the stupid superstition of our time) -for does an 'explanation'make it 
less impressive?, page 6e. 
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Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages, for these savages will not be so far ftom 
any understanding of spiritual matters as an Englishman of the Aventieth century. His 
explanations of the primitive observances are much cruder than the sense of the observances 
themselves, page 8e. 
Wittgenstein (1991) is a collection of remarks, taken from his notebooks, on Frazer's ideas on 
earliest thought. He begins by making the Hegelian inspired point that "To convince someone 
of what is true, it is not enough to state it; we must find the road from error to truth ... Frazer's 
account of the magical and religious notions of men is unsatisfactory: it makes these notions 
appear as mistakes. Was Augustine mistaken, then, when he called on God on every page of 
the Confessions? Well - one might say - if he was not mistaken, then the Buddhist holy-man, 
or some other, whose religion expresses quite different notions, surely was. But none of them 
was making a mistake except where he was putting forward a theory", page I e. Wittgenstein 
continues: "magic always rests on the idea of symbolism and of language ... it expresses a 
wish ... There is a mistake only if magic 
is presented as science", page 4e. He says that "it is 
precisely the characteristic feature of the awakening human spirit that a phenomenon has 
meaning for it. We could almost say, man is a ceremonial animal. This is partly false, partly 
nonsensical, but there is also something in it ... men also carry out actions that bear a peculiar 
character and might be called ritualistic", page 7e. 
Wittgenstein compares the 'primitive' totalising cosmology with contemporary reified 
thinking, which merely draws "attention to, the similarity, the connection, between thefacts. 
As one might illustrate the internal relation of a circle to an ellipse by gradually transforming 
an ellipse into a circle, hut not in order to assert that a given ellipse infact, historically, came 
from a circle (hypothesis of development or evolution) but only to sharpen our eye for a 
formal connection", page 9e. Again in Hegelian fashion, Wittgenstein sublates Frazer's 
Eurocentrism when he says "What is true is that every view is significant for him who sees it 
so (but that does not mean 'sees it as something other that it is). And in this sense every view 
is equally significant", page IIe. 
Frazer presents an easy target for Wittgenstein; however, both fail to see the social essence 
mediated by the ceremonies and magic of 'primitiv& people. This is clear when Wittgenstein, 
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like Horton, claims that "we can express the difference between science and magic if we say 
that in science there' is progress, but not in magic. There is nothing in magic to show the 
direction of any development", page l3e. 
Mainstream British Philosophy and Earliest Thought 
British academic philosophy is currently dominated by intellectuals who subscribe to the analytical, 
or ordinary language, school. The work of Wittgenstein remains very influential to this school; 
however, whilst analytical philosophers display his weaknesses, they show few of his strengths. 
Typical of the analytical school is Mounce (1973), whose Understanding a Primitive Society 
emphasises the fixed dualities: rational-irrational, language-reality, true-false and scientific-non- 
scientific, whilst assuming that there is a universally acceptable distinction between the two. Despite 
his claims to the contrary, Mounce is unable to totalise 'primitive' thought by placing it in its wider 
social context and judging its 'rationality' from this perspective. Instead of realising that magic 
represents the sublimation of social relationships, especially the division between intellectual and 
manual labour, Mounce claims that much of 'primitive' magical thought and practice is outside the 
rational-iffational duality. Following Wittgenstein, he sees only the desire for Aishes to be fulfilled 
and, in emphasising what he sees as the limits of tribal language, fails to see the insights made by 
Frazer, in particular that, in its own idiom, magical thinking is proto-science. 
The Cult of the Shaman 
The last few years have seen the development of an expanding market for books on, and other 
accessories connected with, Shamanism. Most of this material will no doubt follow the usual 
product life cycle, but a number of analytical texts exist, e. g. Cohen's (199 1) Yhe Decadence of the 
Shmnans. Cohen begins by explaining the links between myths of a lost primordial paradise and 
human alienation, with reference to Marxist and Hegelian ideas on humanity's relationship with 
nature. However, Cohen reveals his romantic notion of the democratic role of the Shaman in 
"primitive communist society". He fails to see in the tribal intellectual division of labour, with its 
esoteric knowledge and initiation ceremonies, the beginning of a long process culminating in the 
chief-magician-priest in those tribes which adopted the early agricultural mode of production. This 
development is connected to the deep contradictions in hunter-gather societies, explained in the 
work of Marshall Sahfins. "The shaman has been supplanted by the priest - even if the old shamanic; 
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practices may continue to a greater or lesser extent within the villages and among the unconquered 
tribal cultures. ", claims Cohen on page 11, revealing a lack of awareness of the complex and 
contradictory process of transition, explained by Sahlins. 
Although he is correct when he points out the dialectical aspects of Freud's work, Cohen 
compounds his problems by using psycho-analysis to bolster his argument. He includes some 
interesting material on tribal concepts of time and the role of the unconscious, but his static 
distinction between materialism and idealism and his use of Freud to promote his view, mean that 
his argument in favour of the "grandeur of the Shamar&', with their "art of flying', astral projection 
and telepathy, largely fails. The failure is caused partly by weaknesses in his theoretical approach, 
but also because his knowledge of the fife and thought of the two earliest modes of production is 
scanty. This is demonstrated by his dialectical, but oversimplified, claim that "the unity of the 
primitive community was in this sense an oppressive, totalitarian unity ... posited upon the division of 
mankind into a host of separate units, unconscious of, or even hostile to, each other. The unity of 
the tribe was predicated upon the disunity of the species, and the latter could not have been 
overcome without the dissolution of tribal boundaries and the emergence of class society. ", page 
36. Whilst the argument is correct, it must be supplemented by a more detailed discussion of the 
tensions and resulting movement of earliest society. This is provided by Forde (1954) which 
emphasises stability within change in the life and thought of a number of Affican tribes, and most 
notably in Sahlins (1974). 
Anthropology and The Invention ofAfrica 
Mudimbe (1988) summarises the writing of some African anthropologists, who ask searching 
questions, including doubt regarding the possibility of an early Affican philosophy. He takes as his 
starting point the work of the white Belgian Jesuit Temples, whose study of Bantu philosophy 
generated much debate within the Affican academic community. Temples said that "We can 
conceive the transcendental notion of 'being! by separating it from its attribute, 'force!, but the Bantu 
cannot. Torce!. in his thought is a necessary element in 'being', and the concept of 'force! is 
inseparable from the definition of 'being'. There is no idea among Bantu of 'being! divorced from the 
idea of 'force! ", quoted on page 138. Mudimbe himself says that 'Mtal force appears to be the 
essential sign of ordering identities, differences, and relationships. From the extreme depth up to the 
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level of God, there is a permanent and dynamic dialectic of energy: vital force can be nourished, 
diminished, or stopped altogether", page 139. 
He quotes the work of Kagame, who studied the metaphysics of Bantu philosophy: "The existing 
cannot be used as a synonym for heing there, since in Bantu languages, the verb to he cannot 
signify to exist. The opposite of the existing is nothing. In analysing the cultural elements, one must 
conclude that the nothing exists and it is the entity which is at the basis of the multiple. One being is 
distinct from another, because there is nothing between them", page 147. Mudimbe summarises: 
"the ntu is somehow a sign of a universal similitude. Its presence in beings brings them to fife and 
attests to both their individual value and to the measure of their integration in the dialectic of vital 
energy. Ntu is both a uniting and a differentiating vital norm which explains the powers of vital 
inequality in terms of difference between beings", page 148. 
Concluding remarks on chapter one 
Despite doubts concerning many of the anthropological sources, it is clear from the material 
presented in this chapter that dialectical thinking was a commonplace in earliest society. However, 
it is the case that the totalising dialectic form of 'primitives' is dominated by its inverted content, and 
is ultimately an alienated mode of thinking. The gods, spirits and occult forces of these hunter- 
gatherers and early agriculturalists are nothing other than inverted social forces. Earliest societies 
were engaged in a struggle against nature, and only the combined social forces of the tribe could 
resist this alien nature. Therefore the inverted anthropocentrism, which was such a feature of 
earliest culture, has to be understood as the intellectual counterpart of the genesis of the movement 
to humanise nature. The attempt to humanise nature is doomed within the limits of the technology 
available to a nomadic tribe, and this is the contradiction at the heart of hunter gatherer society. The 
gradual sublation. of cyclical time is the reason for the development of social classes, which exist in 
potential in the division of labour in earliest tribal society, and represents the movement, rather than 
the resolution, of this contradiction. That this contradiction was expressed in both the form of 
theological scepticism, which has as its corollary a challenge to the priest caste, and as social 
tension, is clear from the following example of Maori thinking: 
(God) himsey' made the good and the bad people. He is compassionate hut he does not ahvays 
know how to adjustlyfor he gave us death. God acts unjustlyfor he made some people good and 
others had I and my companions work together in the fields; the crops of one prosper and those 
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of othersfail Aisproves that God is unjust and treats men unequally. God treats us, our children 
and our wives who perish, unkindly. If men behaved like that we say nothing, hut when God acts 
thus it hurts us. From this we are right in inferring that God is unjust, quoted on page 378 of 
Radin (1927). 
In the next two chapters I hope to demonstrate that the intellectuals of the class societies which 
developed in the ancient and classical world were profoundly influenced by the tribal dialectic. Their 
writings reveal the development of the concept of totalisation and the idea of the interpenetration of 
opposites. There was also development in the idea of contradiction, in particular the finther 
articulation of the existence of contradictions both between nature and society, and, crucially, 
within society. 
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Chapter Two 
The Ancient World 
I am that which is, that which was, and that which will be; no one has lifted my veil, an 
inscription in the sanctuary of the Egyptian goddess Neith at Sais, quoted in Hegel (1952) 
page 257. 
Goodpeople do not go infor dialectics; 
And dialecticians are not goodpeople. 
Real knowledge is not knowing everything; 
And the know-alls have not got real knowledge. 
From chapter 81 of the Tao, Te Ching, quoted in Hughes (1942) page 164. 
For a thing to be separated out (from the mass) isfor it to become a thing. For it to become a 
(complete) thing isfor it to de-become. Every single thing both becomes and de-becomes, 
both processes being to andfto in the unity of mutual interpenetration. Only the man of all- 
embracing intelligence knows this unity of mutual interpenetration. 
Part of a work by Chuang Tzu, a Taoist influenced 'anarchist' poet, quoted on page 176 of 
Hughes. 
Great men have theirproper business, and little men have theirproper business .. Some 
labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. nose who lahour with their 
minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who 
are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them. 
A quote from the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, cited in Balazs (1964) page 17. 
It was once the tradition that thefirst king of India was Manu Svqyambhu (the Self-born 
Manu). Manu was born directly of the god Brahma, and was a hermaphrodite. From the 
female half of his body he bore two sons and three daughters, from whom descended a series 
of Manus. 
Thapar (1966), page 28. 
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The transition from early agricultural society to the ancient mode of production: the 
urban revolution as the temporary resolution, or movement, of contradictions 
There is no text in the English language which gives a comprehensive account of the history 
of the ancient world making substantial use of a dialectical perspective. Marx's writings on 
this topic are not well informed or developed, for the most part they are occasional remarks 
scattered around his larger works, particularly the third volume of Capital and Ae German 
Ideology, notes, such those referred to as the Grundrisse, articles and correspondence. In his 
introduction to Marx (1964) Hobsbawni mentions Marx's "brief, unsupported and unexplained 
list of the 'epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society' -namely, the 'Asiatic, 
ancient, feudal and modem bourgeois', of which the final one is the last 'antagonistic' form of 
the social process of production! ', page 11. Hobsbawn makes the point that Marx and Engels 
were "exceptionally well-read laymen7' but in the mid to late 19th century had little translated 
literature and less archaeological and anthropological research available to them. Whilst their 
knowledge of India, Persia and China was comprehensive by the standards of the time, they 
knew little about Egypt, the rest of Africa and the Tigris-Euphrates basin. 
Hegel's The Philosophy of History (1952), not to be confused with his History of Philosophy 
(1995), was a one of the few dialectical approaches to history available to Marx. However, 
this work shows Hegel at his worst; it is a perfect example of the kind of Hellenomania, 
Eurocentrism, and even blatant racism, such as the use of terms like "African stupidity" page 
250. Although Hegel's text contains a number of useful observations, such as the Egyptian 
influences on Pythagorus and Plato and the dialectical basis of Zoroastrianism, it is marked by 
Eurocentric prejudice and crude generalisations about the I-Endu, Buddhist, Chinese and 
Egyptian "character". Consequently most of its dialectical formulations seem artificial and 
empty, which demonstrate the point that dialectical logic expressed as a number of abstract 
formulations can never be a substitute for detailed knowledge of the matter in hand. It is likely 
that Hegel's book formed the basis of the ill-informed generalisations made by Marx in some 
of his writings on the ancient world. Yet, in contrast to Engels' unilinear scheme which formed 
the basis of the Marxist-Leninist historiography, Marx's writings show how dialectics can be 
used to articulate internal contradictions which bring about movement, development and 
transformation in the ancient mode of production 
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A text with a promising title is Hindess and Hirst's Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production 
(1975), but it is written from the then fashionable structuralist perspective. The authors attack 
Hegel's "idealisnY' and "essentialisrW', rather than his lack of knowledge of the ancient world 
and his vulgar Eurocentrism. The authors try to produce an antiseptic 'Marxism' purged of 
Hegelian dialectics. What is valuable in the text is taken from Marx's writings, but they make 
little effort to familiarise themselves with twentieth century scholarship on their subject and 
therefore present a one-sided 19th century view of pre-capitalist societies which emphasises 
their static aspects. Because of their rejection of dialectics and lack of relevant scholarship, 
they are unaware of most of the social struggles, and the corresponding dialectical thinking of 
the participants, which took place in the societies considered in this chapter. They are unable 
to understand the tensions behind the static appearances during certain periods of the history 
of these societies and the resultant storing up of contradictions, which, when eventually 
manifested, come as a surprise to these authors. 
One popular text on ancient history which stresses class struggle and the way that 
contradictions "in due course compelled the emergence of new productive forces and a new 
cycle of social evolutioW', page 8, is nat Happened in History, Childe (1964). This work 
makes the point that the apparent resolution of contradictions which occurs as a result of the 
transformation of a given society, often only suppresses, or moves, them, so they may manifest 
themselves in a new, more intense way. Clark's forward to this edition makes the point that 
Childe was 
profoundly impressed by the limitations imposed on societies at the level of savagery by the 
low density of population and uncertainty offood-supply normally associated with reliance 
on hunting and gathering-Neolithic barbarism in turn he saw to have been handicapped by 
a surplus too small to withstand natural disaster and by a self-sufficiency which meant that 
expansion could only be achieved by enlarging the area of settlement, a solution inherently 
wasteful since it could only be achieved in the end through conflict. This is why he stressed 
the'importance of achieving a surplus which was reliable and large enough to support urban 
life and the employment of specialists like metal-workers, priests, and rulers, an achievement 
whichfor him constituted a veritable Urban Revolution. But the urban civilisations of Egypt, 
Sumer, and the Indus Valley were no more immune ftom the effects of inborn contradictions 
than the neolithic peasantries had been: to mention only two, the concentration ofpurchasing 
power in comparatively few hands prevented an adequate expansion of the market, and 
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divorce hetween craftsmen and literate memhers of society constituted an effective drag on 
technical advance., pages 8-9. Apart from the comments on hunter gatherers, this is a good 
summary of the genesis of the urban revolution. 
A key term in the discussion of the long, process leading to the urban revolution is social 
surplus. So, for example, Childe, writing about the transformation of riverside villages into 
cities in the Nile, Indus and Tigris-Euphrates valleys, says farmers produced: "a surplus of 
foodstuffs over and above their domestic requirements, and by concentrating this surplus used 
it to support a new urban population of specialized craftsmen, merchants , priests, officials, 
and clerks.,.. The social surplus, derived primarily from subsistence agriculture by irrigation, 
was concentrated in the hands of a relatively narrow circle of priests and officials, whose 
limited expenditure limited also the growth of the urban industrial and commercial 
population ... In the 
Classical or Greco-Roman economy ... the surplus, now partly 
derived from 
specialized farming, was more widely distributed among an upper middle class of merchants, 
financiers, and capitalist farmers. This permitted a notable growth of population, at least in the 
Mediterranean basin, which was, however, ultimately checked by the relative impoverishment 
or actual enslavement of the primary producers and artisans. ", pages 30-31. There has been 
considerable discussion of the concept of surplus in the transition from agricultural to urban 
society. This debate hinges on the meaning of surplus, in particular what kind of 'thing' or 
tentity' it is. Dialectical thinking emphasizes that a surplus, as the above quote makes clear, 
can only be understood as a relationship. Sometimes the true relationship is transparent, or it 
may contain a contradictory essence behind the surface appearance of use-values produced by 
workers in proto-capitalist social relations. 
We saw in the previous chapter that slash and bum agriculture developed in various parts of 
the world as a temporary solution to the stunting contradictions of the hunter-gather mode of 
production. Agricultural nomadism, caused in part by the erosion of the productivity of the 
soil on a given plot of land, similarly stunts the growth of the population and holds back the 
development of technical knowledge and culture. Therefore, various techniques for restoring 
the yield of the soil developed, such as the grazing of animals and the use of their droppings as 
fertilisers, which in turn caused fixed site villages with granaries and warehouses to emerge. 
Childe points out that these villages were initially largely, though never completely, self- 
sufficient. However, as populations grew and new needs developed, intercourse with other 
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societies in the form of trade by barter developed, along with a division of labour which was 
radically different from that in hunter-gather society. In order to feed, clothe and shelter the 
growing populations of these villages, new land was brought into cultivation and pasture, but 
this led to new contradictions because acquisition of land was at the'expense of the remaining 
hunter gatherers or of other villages. These contradictions explain the growth in the 
production of weapons which archaeological research reveals in the later neolithic period, and 
the incidence of "conquest, expulsion, or enslavement of one people by another ... the result 
may be a 'mixed culture' (which ) may denote stratified societies divided into rulers and 
ruled... they probably symbolize the incipient break-up of the clan and 'kinship' organization of 
society", Childe, pages 74-5. - -; 
Childe goes on to show how one of the key contradictions of hunter gather societies, the 
vulnerability to natural disaster, is only partially resolved in the development of the neolithic 
village. It was the development of city states in the fourth milleniurn B. C. which made possible 
the amassing of a surplus'of use-values. The development of appropriate technical knowledge, 
following the increased division between mental and manual labour, offset some of the worse 
excessesses of nature. One of the key technological developments of this period was the alloy 
of copper and tin known as bronze, and the development of metallurgy as a separate occult 
craft or "mystery". It not only added to the growing division of labour, but also to the rise of 
both itinerant smiths and mining away, from the fertile valleys in response to the growing 
demand for all manner of metal use-values. To the extent that peasants, warriors and others 
used metal, it had to be obtained by barter for an ever greater surplus of subsistence goods, 
thereby intensifying the tensions of the self-sufficient village economy. The development of 
specialist carpenters, potters and people with other craft skills had both positive and negative 
effects on village life. Despite the benefits to the quality of life which resulted, the negative 
side was that most of these skills were monopolised by men, which profoundly affected the 
economic and social relationships between the sexes and set off a process culminating in the 
debasement of women in the classical world. Similarly the use of the wooden plough during 
this period, which came to contain more metal inputs, revolutionized agriculture, transforming 
it from being a largely female activity, based on the hoeing of plots, to a largely male one in 
fields. 
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The urban revolution seems to have begun with a combination of factors coming together in 
certain large villages to create the qualitative change to the first city states in the Nile valley, 
Indus and Tigris-Euphrates basin. The factors which caused this process, which can be 
articulated dialectically as the transformation from quantity to quality, included a relatively 
large population formed partly by military conquest and supported by a high yield agricultural 
system controlled by a ruling class through a proto-state. The state, once developed, was 
composed of a tribal chief-monarch supported by ministers, court advisers and administrators, 
and a priest class with knowledge of a number of intellectual disciplines such as architecture 
and astronomy. The state structure survived changes in'the dynasties caused by revolution or 
invasion, due to a stable bureaucracy, a well organised and well equipped military, police force 
and courts. There was considerable division of craft labour, a workforce composed of slaves, 
peasants and others able to perform corv6e, or state imposed, labour. A growing merchant 
class, able to import a range of use-values, revolutionised the Mesopotamian city states after 
Sargon's reign by its conversion of the general surplus product into profit, rent and interest, 
measured in barley or precious metal. It seems from the excavation of the third millenium 
Indus cities of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa that craftsmen were producing for the market, 
rather than the monopoly state, as was the case early in the development of the Egyptian and 
Sumerian cities, whilst a wealthy merchant middle class promoted imports and exports. 
Access to strategic raw materials was obviously necessary for a city state to prosper, and the 
famous Epic of Gilgamesh (1960) reveals the crucial contradiction that wood, cedar in 
particular, was necessary, but not available to, the early city states such as Uruk. This 
contradiction inspires the key theme of the Epic which is the mythical journey, presumably a 
sublimated military expedition to the forests of ancient Lebanon, that was typical of the time. 
The historical records show similar expeditions to Nubia, Syria and elsewhere by the ancient 
Egyptians in search of strategic raw materials such as wood, metals and stone. 
Archaeological records show that the city states' search for raw materials inevitably led to the 
further contradiction that diminishing returns set in as the various city states competed with 
each other. It was partially resolved firstly by war and the qualitative change to a single, or 
nation, state composed of a number of cities, and secondly by the establishment of colonies 
and spheres of influence in order to plunder, extract tribute and engage in other forms of 
'trade'. However, the class structure of these societies generated other contradictions, such as 
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the concentration of the bulk of the surplus produced by the masses in the hands of the ruling 
class. Whilst this surplus made possible vast public works schemes, such as the building of 
city walls, temples and pyramids, it restricted the development of Other social classes. Childe 
gives examples of lack of access to the surplus holding back the development of proto- 
industry and craft production, partly through insufficient research and development and also 
through deficient effective demand for the products of artisans. As ancient urban society 
developed out of tribal village life, there followed the most intense social struggles. These 
included the antagonistic class relationships centered around the distribution of the surplus 
product, struggles over access to fertile land, raw materials and slaves; simultaneously there 
emerged markets and redivision of labour. There were also struggles between different 
imperial powers, between city states, individual monarchs and their priests or administrators. 
As hunter gatherers and early agricultural societies were overrun, the number of slaves, 
servants and other landless peoples grew, and men and women of all social classes struggled 
against each ý other as patriarchy developed. Childe notes that the routine exploitation of the 
masses, through taxes and other charges, was compounded by arbitrary abuses by priests and 
administrators, so that a Sumerian decree spoke of "restoring the old order" and establishing 
"a power apparently standing above society, necessary to moderate the conflict of classes and 
keep it within the bounds of order", Childe (1964), pages 107-8. 
Childe charts the rise of the middle classes in the ancient city states, noting the example of the 
booty, including slaves, brought back by the Akkadian kings and shared by the soldiers. This 
developed purchasing power and stimulated the market for goods, land and slaves, which in 
turn increased the numbers of artisans and merchants. As metal currency developed, from 
about 80OBC in Assyria and Syria, and money-lending spread, so did the number of insolvent 
debtors who became slaves, thus reducing the wages of free labourers. Kings fixed maximum 
prices, to restrict the power of the merchants, and maximum wages in order to reduce the 
costs of corv6e - labour. Childe also mentions the profound effect of technological 
developments, such as bronze weapons, chariots and tools, which changed the balance of 
power in favour of those who possessed them. The iron age also revolutionised the production 
and ownership of tools and weapons, in that they became far cheaper than those made from 
bronze. City states began to spring up from Spain in the west 
- 
as far as China in the east. 
Anyang was established as the capital of the Shang dynasty around 140OBC, typically its 
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divine monarch appropriated the surplus product of the peasants in order to support the court, 
military, and employ artisans and others. 
The'Black Athena debate 
Volume one of Black Athena, Bernal (199 1), caused a controversy because it challenged the 
beliefs held by the majority of classical scholars, and a wider lay public, about ancient Greece 
and its relationship with the rest of the ancient world. Most classicists believe that the Greeks 
more or less invented science, mathematics, philosophy, democracy, literature, architecture 
and art, thereby making European civilisation possible. Closely connected to this belief is the 
view that the 'Aryan' people of Europe are intellectually superior to all others. In contrast 
Bernal and others claim that Greek learning represents a continuation of ideas and techniques 
developed in ancient Egypt, Phoenicia, Sumeria, India, and elsewhere. Most classicists chose 
to ignore Bernal's challenge, but the collection of papers published in Black Athena Revisited, 
Lefkowitz and Rogers (1996), represents a classicist response. Bernal's offer of a contribution 
to this book of papers was refused by the editors, and'the result is a pedestrian text which 
mainly focuses on denying the blackness of the ancient Egyptians. 
It is only in the post-1945 period that scholars began to challenge the various colonialist 
assumptions of the Helenocentric model of ancient history. The work of a number of African 
and African-American scholars, such as C. A. Diop (1991), T. Obenga (1989 and 1992) and 
George James (1992), concentrated on the various contributions to knowledge and civilisation 
of the ancient Egyptians. They exposed the implicit, and in some cases explicit, attempt of 
classicists to hide years of ridicule, exploitation, enslavement and genocide of black people. 
Their work is important and positive because it exposes the key contribution of black Africans 
to Greek thought and knowledge, and thereby promotes self-respect for many millions of 
black people, most of whom continue to live wretched lives either as dispossessed peasants or 
ghettoised proletarians. 
However, it is necessary to place the development of the ideas of these black writers, and 
Bernal, into their social context. They are part of the tendency within capitalist social relations, 
as in earlier modes of production, for the division of mental and manual labour to promote the 
formation of a relatively privileged intelligentsia. Political correctness and the politics of 
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identity, of which Afrocentrism is a part, must be understood as contradictory developments 
linked to social phenomena such as the 'collapse of communism', attacks on Marxist 
academics and the current weakness of the western working class. The intellectuals who 
subscribe to identity politics claim to speak on behalf of all women, black people, gays and the 
disabled respectively, irrespective of social class. In doing so they omit to point out that these 
natural differences are always socially mediated. To abstract these natural differences from 
their place in the totality of capitalist social relations is to present a one-sided view, a view 
which will be inadequate to the task of fundamental social transformation. Because it 
marginalises social class, and avoids a direct assault on market social relations, the identity 
politics movement does not normally have difficulty with career advancement. However, there 
are exceptions, such as the Afrocentrist Leonard Jeffries whose challenges to American 
classicists led to him being dismissed from his academic post. 
With the partial exception of Diop, the negative side of the Afrocentrics' argument is that in 
their zeal to point out that ancient Egypt was predominantly black and highly influential on 
Greek thought and knowledge, they project their lack of interest in contemporary class 
struggle onto their historical perspective. They conservatively present Egypt as a benevolent 
static hierarchy, by and large ignoring its class relations marked by struggle and change. This 
leads to a failure to see how class relations interpenetrated with three thousand years of 
alternate colonial expansion and of occasional outside occupation of pre-Roman Egypt. As a 
result the Afrocentric writers, and Bernal, share with their classical opponents the inability to 
link these social struggles to the contributions to philosophy, and dialectical thought in 
particular, made by the ancient Egyptians, Indians and others. 
The political economy of pharaonic Egypt 
Knit, the black land or land of the black people, is known by us as Egypt, the name given to it 
by the ancient Greeks. Egyptian culture, according to Obenga (1989), is closely linked to that 
of a number of African tribes, such as the Dogon from West Africa and the Bantu of Southern 
Africa, whilst other writers suggest links with the Mung. Egypt was formed from the struggle 
between clans, tribes and peoples, with their chiefs, priesthoods and deities represented by 
their animal totems: "the victory of a clan confirmed the power of its god and increased his 
prestige", Sauneron (1960) pages 171-2. The Pharaonic dynasties were modeled on the earlier 
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Nubian Ta-Seti dynasty of about 3,400 BC. Upper and lower Egypt were united by Menes to 
form a single state far wealthier than the individual Sumerian city-states. Their respective 
deities were absorbed, and those of the court and the powerful priesthoods at Thebes, 
Memphis and Heliopolis became nationally known and formed into the Ennead, or divine 
council of nine dieties. 
In keeping with the totalising tribal beliefs examined in the previous chapter, kings, and some 
viziers, like Imhotep, were deified. Egyptian mythology is full of examples of metamorphoses 
between humans, animals, gods and inanimate objects or forces. There is evidence of extensive 
use of the tribal magical techniques described in the last chapter. The renowned Egyptian 
medical techniques, pioneered by Imhotep, were a synthesis of defensive magic with 
anatomical and biological knowledge. The Egyptians attached great importance to the magical 
power available to someone who knows the esoteric name or word, what the Greeks called 
logos, for an entity. This is a major theme in texts written in hieroglyphics, literally 'sacred 
words' which they believed could not be translated into any other language: "Never did the 
Egyptians consider the language - that corresponding to the hieroglyphics - as a social 
instrument; it always remained for them the sonorous echo of the basic energy which sustains 
the universe, a cosmicforce. Thus the study of this language gave them an 'explanantion' of 
the world. ",, Sauneron page 127. The use of hieroglyphics became dialectical and totalising, 
because "the spelling of a divine name would henceforth create around this name an aura of 
secondary ideas, a whole series of descriptive adjectives which could be applied, in the 
context, to this divinity ... a 
definition of the world which was at the same time visual and 
symbolic: the universe, its laws and its history, were born from the pronunciation of the divine 
words: a part of this secret force, of this all-powerful primeval energy, remained enclosed in 
the secret of their hieroglyphe'. pages 1334. 
The evidence contained in Bierbrier (1989), although interpreted in a positivistic way, 
contains useful information on the class structure of ancient Egypt. The research is based on 
the excavation of a site now called Deir el-Medina near Luxor. This site was typical of those 
which housed the workers who built the Pharaonic pyramid tombs from about 1880 BC, 
although step pyramids were first built at the beginning of the Third Dynasty, about 2660 BC. 
The mass of evidence shows that ancient Egypt in this period was a class society with a highly 
developed division of labour. For example the high-priests were supported by a mass of lesser 
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priests and auxiliary temple staff, organized on the basis of a division of labour unprecedented 
in the ancient world. The ruling class composed the royal family. - whose head was known as 
the Pharaoh in later times, the military, priesthood, and a large number of local and national 
administrators. The state, which levied taxes and rents on the rest of the population, is thought 
to have acquired its power by organizing the labour of the masses in order to utilise the flood 
water of the Nile for agricultural and other purposes through the development of irrigation 
techniques. Land was owned either by the state or leading members of the ruling class. The 
land was worked by a peasant class, who, as in European feudal society, were required to 
work for the state for a number of days per year, known as corv6e labour. Peasant labour was 
conscripted by the state for other purposes during the flooding of the Nile, when agriculture 
stopped. However, members of other social groups were able to avoid their corvee by 
providing substitutes or making appropriate payments to state officials. Those from lower 
social classes who ran away from the corv6e were either imprisoned or became hereditary 
servants, a position half-way between the free peasants and slaves. 
There gradually developed a class in which male breadwinners learned craft skills from their 
fathers and rented them to the state under the supervision of foremen and scribes in return for 
wages. Note that wages, as was the case with all income, were paid in kind as the monetary 
system was not well developed until about 700 BC. According to Childe (1964) barley was the 
means of payment and unit of account in Sumeria; metals were used but they were weighed 
and not minted into coins. The wages of the state employed tomb builders supported a 
relatively good standard of living, and workers from parts of the vast Egyptian empire applied 
for these j ob s. S ome tomb workers were even able to - club together to buy slaves. Although 
there were slaves in ancient Egypt, their legal and economic status was so much better than 
that in other parts of the ancient and classical world that some commentators do not consider 
them to be slaves at all. Most slaves, including the Hebrews, Nubians and Asiatics, had been 
war captives, brought into the country and sold by merchants. They were mainly female and 
used as'domestic servants, or agricultural labourers for the few males, and owned their own 
small homes and had families. Slaves had rights, could sometimes obtain their freedom and 
occasionally married into the families of their former owners, although they had to provide 
corv6e labour in excess of that required by citizens such as free servants and peasant labourers. 
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Women in ancient Egypt lived much better lives than those in any other society in the ancient 
or classical world. Their legal rights, especially in the area of property and divorce, were 
comparable with those of women in contemporary capitalist society. They often obtained high 
positions in the ruling class, including high priestess and even Pharaoh, Queen Hatehepsut 
usurped the throne and ruled from about 1479 to 1458 BC. The gender-based division of 
labour inherited from tribal society meant that most women tended to work in the home, 
although women of higher social classes had slaves, but child care was onerous, because 
families were frequently large, with up to fifteen children. Nye (1990) gives an extract from a 
hieroglyphic text in the prologue to her book, though surprisingly she makes no comment on 
the text. The goddess Isis is trying to discover the true name of the god Rah and thereby gain 
his power for herself. The myth is derived from tribal thought, it uses magic and links gods and 
humans in a totalising way, and its central concern is with the struggle for power. It is possible 
that this struggle between men and women in the highest social class of ancient Egypt 
corresponded to the transition from tribal society, in which women retain a good deal of 
power because of their functions in the division of labour, to the ancient mode of production 
which redefines the division of labour to the disadvantage of women. 
Most writers, including those adopting an Afrocentric perspective, present a static idealised 
view of life in ancient Egypt. However, Bierbrier shows evidence for routine bribery and 
corruption of state officials, and the existence of police forces, courts, debt-collectors and 
bailiffs tell their own story. Quite apart from colonial wars and civil wars between contending 
Pharaohs, there is a good deal of evidence of class struggle. Angela Thomas' (1988) 
Akhenaten's EVpt documents this period, circa 1352 to 1336 BC, in which the Pharaoh 
formed a new religion in order to combat the power of the Theban priesthood: 
Unlike his predecessorsAkhenaten extended his policy to an attack against the cult of Amun 
and to a certain extent against the cults of other gods. Their names were erased in temples 
and their worship suppressed How widespread this suppression was is difficult tojudge but it 
would have struck mainly at the officials andpriesthoods of the gods concerned Such a step 
gave the king immense political power. In more practical, terms there were also economic 
advantages. If temples were closed and their priesthoods disbanded, the estates and income 
of those cults could he repossessed by the crown. Akhenaten needed more revenue in order to 
build his city andprovide lavish offeringfor the new temples toAten. The property which he 
acquired by these means was administered by his own officials and not, as before, by local 
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ones. Goveniment, therefore, became more centralised and the officials and priests, all 
educated men, who were adversely affected by the changes, could not do other than accept 
them, pages 22-23. 
Thomas discusses the background to this development as one in which Egypt had colonised 
Nubia to the South and Palestine and Syria to the north east, but were constantly worried by 
military threats from the Near East, especially the Mitanni, Hittites and Assyrians. Bierbrier 
mentions strikes by workers, such as one during the reign of Ramesses 111, circa 1158 BC, 
when workers went on strike and engaged in sit-down demonstrations due to unpaid wages: 
'It is because of hunger and because of thirst that we came here. There is no clothing, no 
ointment, no fish, no vegetables. Send to Pharaoh our good Lord about it and send to the 
vizier our superior, that sustenance may be made for us. ", Bierbrier page 41. Stead (1986) 
quotes from texts which reveal the class relationship between the scribes and craftsmen, 
stressing the high status and standard of living of the former, and their contempt for manual 
labour. He also claims that peasants who failed to pay their rents and taxes were ordered to be 
beaten by local officials. 
In the General 7heory Keynes (1973) makes a number of comments on the economic 
implications of the Egyptian state's decision to organize massive public works schemes, most 
notably the building of pyramids and the search for precious metals "the fiuits of which, since 
they could not serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance", page 
13 1. Keynes' confusion concerning the social relations of ancient Egypt, which caused his 
failure to recognise that gold was exchanged for imports, is compounded when he implicitly 
compares this mode of production, which he links with feudalism, with the lack of effective 
demand in 1930s British capitalist society: 
In so far as millionaires find their satisfaction in building mighty mansions to contain their 
bodies when alive andpyramids to shelter them after death, or, repenting of their sins, erect 
cathedrals and endow monasteries orforeign missions, the day when abundance of capital 
will interfere with abundance of output may be postponed 'To dig holes in The ground, paid 
for out of savings, will increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of 
use , 
ful goods and services. It is not reasonable, however, that a sensible community should he 
content to remain dependent on suchfortuitous and often wasteful mitigations when once we 
understand the influences upon which effective demand depends., page 220. 
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Keynes' remarks demonstrate his understanding of the workings of the capitalist mode of 
production from the vantage point of the crisis-bound British capitalist class mediated by the 
paternalistic Cambridge intelligentsia. He sees the profound contradiction that a multiplier 
effect may be set in motion by the destruction, and subsequent replacement, of a part of the 
stock of means of production which are still in good condition. Although this would be 
ruinous for the individual owners, to the extent that it, or any 'wasteful' activity sponsored by 
the state, caused profitable production, it would benefit capital as a whole. However, Keynes' 
remarks reveal his inability to negate a neo-classical theorisation, which ignores social class 
and sees only atomised individuals, and look behind the veil of the surface phenomena of 
1930s capitalism in crisis. This prevents him from realising that the problems of 
overproduction, underconsumption, lack of foreign trade, falling prices, wage cutting and 
mass unemployment, are all manifestations of the antagonistic relationship between the 
productive forces and social relations of capitalist society. For our present discussion, it is 
important to note that Keynes also lacks sufficient knowledge of ancient social relations, and is 
therefore unable to compare the ancient and capitalist modes of production. 
During the pyramid-age labour was not performed in return for money wages, it was a means 
to creating a surplus product which was appropriated by the ruling class in the form of use 
values. Keynes fails to see that different contradictions follow from the specific content of the 
surplus product, in particular that a money based economy is subject to a more intense cycle of 
boom and slump than a predominantly barter economy. The fact that the Pharaohs, priests and 
others extract a surplus suggests proto-capitalism, but does not mean that a given use-value is 
'wasteful' or 'Productive', as judged by the logic of capitalism. These major "public works" 
schemes have to be examined in the context of the antagonistic social, and colonial, relations 
which apply at different periods in Egyptian history. Childe is influenced by Keynes when he 
mentions the contradiction that: "the economy of the Early Bronze Age cities could not 
expand internally owing to the over-concentration of purchasing power ... the urban economy 
must - and did - expand externally",, page 147. However, although he acknowledges elsewhere 
that the ruling class can increase both the size of the labour force and its productivity, thereby 
expanding the surplus product, Childe is too dogmatic about the possible rcasons for Egypt's 
decline. He claims that: 
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In the event the bounds of these activities were reached with the pyramids of the fourth 
Dynasty Pharaohs. Not even the fabulous reserves offertile ESypt could support indefinitely 
such unproductive expenditure., 7he economic system began to shrink. The nobles' great 
estates became increasingly self-contained 'households', a relapse towards neolithic self- 
sufficiency, page 132. 
There may be other reasons why pyramid building ceased. Recent archaeological research at 
the temple at Karnak suggests that the economic and military decline which set in at the end of 
the New Kingdom, 1,500-1, OOOBC, was caused by the priests amassing much of the tribute 
from the empire, as well as up to a third of all the land of the country. This profoundly 
weakened the military capacity of the Pharaoh, so that a series of foreign invasions of Egypt 
followed. 
The social struggles and dialectical thought of the Egyptian priest class 
At the height of Egypt's imperial power in the New Kingdom, the magnificent temple at 
Karnak, which employed 80,000 people at its zenith, was gradually constructed as a 
monument to the esoteric religious beliefs of the priests. At the focal point of their religion 
was a dialectic between order and chaos, which suggests a sublimation of the relationship 
between social order and disorder. The sun god, Arnun, had to be worshipped because, like 
the waters of the Nile, its constant renewal was the means by which the world retained its 
natural and social order, called Maat. Arnun had to be pleased because he was the reason that 
the world avoided the descent into the primal chaos, or Noun. The priest class were the 
spiritual basis of the imperial claim to bring Maat to the Noun of the barbarian world. - 
As Sauneron (1960) points out, the priest class, which included women, normally inherited its 
knowledge and privileges from tribal times, though positions could be bought from, or issued 
by, the Pharaoh. The priests monopolised the temples, ' from which the masses of the 
population were excluded. Whilst the priest-class as a whole maintained their monopoly of 
Mystery cult knowledge of religion, magic, philosophy, mathematics, astrology, alchemy and 
the natural sciences, some of its members were ignorant of these subjects and maintained their 
privileges by corruption and intrigue. Although its highest ranks were part-time, often for 
three months a year, and new appointments were made by the sovereign from the highest 
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strata of the ruling class, the most powerful priesthoods maintained their hereditary privileges 
over many generations and often contended with the royal court for state power: "There were 
periods in the New Kingdom, when the clergy of Amon was richer and more powerful than the 
king himself 
.. The religious 
history of Egypt is thus marked, in every period, by an official 
double attitude of the kings, apparently contradictory: considering the dynastic god as the all- 
powerful ally who assures his own glory, and who has the right to the most sumptuous 
attentions; but; 'at the'same time, watching with a distrustful eye the scope of the clergies 
whose appetite and needs never ceased to grow - always beyond the favors conceded therw', 
Sauneron page 173. 
According to Bierbrier, a surprisingly high proportion of the population of ancient Egypt was 
able to read and write the demotic, and sometimes the hieratic, although not the hieroglyphic, 
text. Therefore the priests could not maintain their privileges because of their monopoly of 
literacy per se, 'as was the case in medieval Europe. However, they did have a near monopoly 
of the hieroglyphic script which they used for their esoteric knowledge. Of the literature that 
survives, the most numerous is the so-called wisdom literature which consists of ethics, 
religion and philosophical themes. It is a genre which was said to have begun with the vizier- 
priest Imhotep, circa 2650 BC, and later priest-sages such as Hordjedef and Heferti who were 
renowned throughout the ancient world. Although much of the writing which survives, such as 
7he Blinding of Truth hy Falsehood, consists of static oppositions and vulgar moralising, 
some shows evidence of dialectical thinking and contains esoteric knowledge developed by the 
priests and is the culmination of the African tribal Mystery cults 
One totalising aspect of priestly thinking was the concept of Maw, which is similar to the 
Chinese Tao and comes from the tribal dialectic between the One and the many, which guides 
both natural and social processes. The Pharaoh is charged by God with guaranteeing the 
natural, political and ethical order, rather like the chief in tribal society, but in practice all but 
its overtly political aspects are delegated to the specialists, functionaries, scientists and 
technicians: the high priests. Maw, along with some other totalising concepts, became a 
conservative world view, in keeping with a priesthood which accepts its privileged status in a 
hierarchical society normally dominated by the Pharaoh. However, the detailed working of 
Maat, and other aspects of priestly thought, is more contradictory, such as the tendency to 
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return to primal chaos, the Noun, and the rise and fall of the various gods, which is more in 
keeping with a class engaged in a struggle for wealth and power. 
A number of European scholars have joined Afrocentric writers like Diop (199 1) and Obenga 
(1989 and 1992) to defy the classics establishment, by examining the Egyptian priest class and 
stressing its philosophical achievements, including its dialectical thinking. The work of R. A. 
Schwaller de Lubicz was based on fifteen years studying the art and architecture of the Temple 
of Luxor. His short text (1978) Symbol and the Symbolic, concentrates on the thinking of the 
Pharaonic priest class as recorded in their writing and art. Their thought, which, the author 
argues loses much when translated from hieroglyphics into our analytically based language, 
displays what he calls analogical thinking, which seeks to integrate the subject with the object 
of thought. By use of this esoteric method the priests discerned hidden connections, or 
essences, behind the'exoteric appearances. The greatest priest philosopher of the Pharaonic 
period was Imhotep, on whom the Greeks based Asklepios, whilst Hermes Trismegistus was 
the Greek name for the Egyptian god Thoth. In the Hermetic texts, to be considered in 
Chapter Four, Trismegistus tells his pupil, the initiate Asklepios, that people "are deceived 
when they suffer themselves to be drawn after the image of things, without seeking for the true 
reason of them7', Schwaller page 12, which is a good example of the essence-appearance 
duality, which was crucial to Marx's economic writings. 
Schwaller points out that according to the hieratic philosophy nature is subject to hidden 
positive and negative forces, which are depicted in artistic and written form in myth. One 
example is the antagonism between Seth of the south and Horus of the north, negative and 
positive forces respectively. The interpenetration between these forces accounts not only for 
the terrestrial magnetic poles but also for the dynamic of cause and effect. Seth's negativity is 
based on the tendency to return to primeval chaos, also a major theme in tribal thought, that 
helps to explain why nature is unstable, resulting, for example, either in overflooding or 
underflooding of the Nile. To demonstrate this point Schwaller uses the example of light and 
shadow; without either aspect we would be overwhelmed by the other and unable to see 
anything. The reality of change or movement, which cannot be adequately expressed 
conceptually, is a major theme in Pharaonic thought. The benu-bird, or phoenix, being reborn 
from its own ashes, and the artistic depiction of birds in flight are attempts to conceptualise 
movement. The priests' conceptualisation of time attempts to show its essence not in empty 
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abstractions, hypostatized in fractions of seconds or instants, as in the paradoxes of the the 
Greek philosopher Zeno, but as real movement. This is said by Schwaller to be the hidden 
meaning of the two Aker lions called respectively 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow', shown on his 
page 52. The key theme of Schwaller's book is that priestly symbolism attempts to capture the 
essence of the phenomena which elude static modes of thought. He gives the example of the 
symbol 7c, which attempts to capture the essence of a circle in a way that no numbers can. In a 
footnote a similar point is made about the contradictory essence of 4-1, which is 
simultaneously +1 and -1. Most Egyptian priesthoods believed in a godhead, shown in the 
depiction of a human with the two heads of Horus and Seth, which is a dialectical interplay 
between what we would call monotheism and polytheism, that defies Aristotelian logic with its 
law of non-contradiction. 
Lamy (1981), Schwaller's daughter in law, continued the tradition of research into the dialectical 
aspects of the thought of ancient Egypt. She noted the explanation of the creation contained in the 
Pyramid Texts in vertical columns of hieroglyphics which was accepted by the priesthoods at 
Heliopolis, Memphis, Hermopolis and Thebes: "Before there was any opposition, any yes and no, 
positive and negative; before there was any complementarity, high and low, fight and shadow; 
before there was presence or absence, life or death, heaven or earth: there was but one 
incomprehensible Power, alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefinable cosmic sea, the infinite 
source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space and Time. ", page 8. Summing up the sacred 
wisdom Lamy says: 
the theoloSy seems continually to challenge our rational logic, often presenting side by side two 
notions which seem difficult to reconcile, if not contradictory ... the ancient ES)ptian mind nearly 
ahvays envisages a notion together with its inverse, which is indissociahle from it. For example, 
dilation is inconceivable without contraction; likewise every concrete ohject necessarily has two 
sides. 7his leads to the notion of reciprocity, in which an activity in'one direction implies an 
activity in the other. ... A third characteristic of the 
Pharaonic mentality is an appreciation of 
simultaneity. Ais is expressed in various ritual representations - encountered chiefly in the 
temples - by the superimposition in a single image of severalpoints of view and moments of time. 
7he falcon hovering over the king is a typical example: its head is in profile, - one of its wings is 
represented as seen from above; the other wing and the fail are seen from below. "at at first 
seems to he a frozen moment offlight thus actually represents several moments offlight seen 
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together. Another example is provided by the calendrical system of the ancient Egyptians. 7his 
system is comparable to no other, for it is neither exclusively stellar nor solar nor lunar nor 
seasonal, but incorporates all these cycles in a simultaneity which seems inconceivable to us., page 
18. 
Lamy discusses the secret scientific principles encoded in the mythology of the Egyptians. She 
gives the example of the depiction of a thunderbolt by two parallel arrows going in opposite 
directions, and the fife force, or becoming, generated by the One becoming Two, which is the 
generative power of much of nature. Lamy quotes the following fines from an Egyptian coffin 
inscription on page 9: 
I am One that transforms into Two 
I am Two that transforms into Four 
I am Four that transforms into Eight 
After this I am One. 
Kheper in ancient Egyptian, which can be translated as constant and ceaseless Becoming, is an 
important principle in dialectics, stressing the idea of being, or what is, as movement or flux, the 
One becoming Many. The Pyramid Text begins: I 
(when) I hecame, the hecoming hecame, I have hecome in hecoming (the form) of Khepri who 
came into heing on the First Time .. when I hecame, the ftwzsformations 
hecame, all the 
metamorphoses coming to puss after I had hecome., quoted in Lamy page 14. 
Dialectics in ancient China 
Balazs' (1964) text, which stressed the "intimate relation between social and intellectual history" 
page xviii, argued out that, after the unification of China in 22 1 BC, the state became dominated by 
a tiny scholar-official class, the mandarins. The large land ownership of this class only partly 
explains its power relative to the merchants and artisans, since its administrative, coordinating and 
supervising functions were also important. - The author prefers the term "class" to "caste" to 
describe this "literaff', because unlike castes which are closed it allowed a limited amount of entry 
to its ranks based on literary examinations. Speculating about the longevity of its dominance, 
which lasted until the 20th century, Balazs was both impressed by its achievements and repelled by 
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its tyrannies. He notes Hegel's view of China's permanence, but goes beyond it by pointing out the 
permanence within change of the mandarins when he says: 
The first thing that strikes one ahout this social stratum is the precarious position of its memhers 
individually, contrasted with their continuous existence as a social class. Even the highest officials 
were, as individuals, at the mercy of the ahsolute despotic state, and were liahle to disappear 
suddenlyftom view. Any one of them might he minister one day, and consigned to a dungeon the 
next; yet within the same state that had condemned him as an individual, the hody of officials as a 
whole continued, undisturhed, toplay i1spart, page 6. 
The mandarins dominated intellectual labour in China and eventually synthesized the static 
Confucian natural and legal philosophy with other philosophies. Their outlook was reminiscent of 
medieval scholasticism, but it was atheistic and tried to purge any mystical tendencies which were 
seen as "a cloak for subversive tendenciee', page 18. Confucianism insisted on hsiao, obedience, to 
one's elders and betters, which justified the suppression of firstly the peasant masses and secondly 
the rising bourgeoisie in their attempts to employ wage labour and thus sow the seeds of capitalism. 
Their philosophy began as the world view of the Ju, a group a revolutionary diviners, teachers and 
intellectuals who serviced the land owning class; not surprisingly its metamorphosis into the 
ideology of the mandarins led to contradictions. The Confucian view speaks of a struggle for 
democracy for "the people", but it was restricted to the ranks of the aristocracy or "hundred 
families! '. Another contradiction concemed the Confucian belief that the family should have priority 
over the state, which in practice sanctioned personal aggrandisement in the form of bribery and 
other corrupt practices, which were the nonn amongst the mandarins. As all written work had to be 
approved by the scholar-officials, few if any dialectical texts became available after 221BC, 
although from the - sixth to the tenth century Buddhism, which arrived from India, challenged 
Confucian orthodoxy. Our study of Chinese dialectical thinking concentrates upon the earlier, 
turbulent period. 
Whereas Menes united ancient Egypt in 320OBC, ancient China did not become a unified state for 
almost another three thousand years. During this period China went through a long period of 
transition from early agriculture to local kingdoms. Maoist ideology speaks of the transition from 
slavery to feudalism as part of a unifinear scheme associated with the historical materialist view of 
ancient history, a term developed by Engels' epigones. According to Balazs (1964) however, the 
transition was complex and centered around the conflict between large feudal land owners, a few 
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slave owners, a small revolutionary intelligentsia and other social classes such as merchants and 
money-lenders. This period consisted of both class struggles, and wars over raw materials, tribute 
and cheap labour between contending city states, culminating in a united China only in 22113C. 
There were ferocious battles between over 130 warring local tribal states, internal struggles 
between the nobility and insurrections by the serfs, which resulted in the eventual dominance of five 
large city states. These struggles provided the background to a number of works which surnmarised 
these experiences in the form of principles of war, diplomacy, including anti-war treatises, and 
economics. One work of the period is A Dialogue Between Tang and Li in which we read the 
following dialectical formulation: "My normal forces would seem extraordinary to the enemy,, and 
my extraordinary seem normal. Extraordinary forces appear to be normal and normal, 
extraordinary; changes are unpredictable ... It would 
have been impossible for us to win, if normal 
forces had not been disguised as extraordinary and extraordinary, normar', quoted in Sun Tzu 
(1993) page 41. 
Yhe. Art of War, written by the military strategist, SunTzu (1993) in about 50OBC, the so-called 
Spring and Autumn period, is the most important of these military works for our purposes. The 
edition cited contains a commentary by the Maoist general Tao Hanzhang, who following Marx 
rather than Engels, defines materialism as "man's'practical knowledge of the objective world which 
has been developed on the basis of his social practice". In keeping with the Maoist preoccupation 
with the fixed duality, materialism and idealism, Tao points out that Sun Tzu's short work is 
remarkable because it is written in a logical materialist style making almost no references whatever 
to magic, divination, myth, religion, and the like; "proffibit superstitious doubte', Sun Tzu says on 
page 126. Generals who thought "materialistically" opposed the more conventional ancient Chinese 
military thinkers who refused to fight on certain days of the year. - The tribal concept offorce was 
transformed from its religio-magical meaning into more secular concepts like initiative: "speed is of 
the essence of war", page 93. The enemy, says Sun, must be overcome by the use of wisdom rather 
than force alone: "foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy 
with past events, nor from deductive calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the 
enemy situation! ', page 83. Sun's thought is totalising because it insists on the need for the general 
to, take account of "a comprehensive conflict embracing politics, economics, military force, and 
diplomacy", says Tao's commentary on page 19. Sun links war and economic relationships in 
logical steps: "carrying supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are 
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gathered, prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away. When wealth is 
drained away, the peasantry wiff be afllicted with urgent exactiot&', page 90. 
Sun Tzu notes the importance of the weather in turning disadvantages in advantages, in particular 
"the interaction of natural forces; the effects of day and night, rain and fair weather, cold and heat 
time of day and seasons, and to make ffill use of of favourable conditions and avoid any negative 
factors", page 20. In similar fashion to the Dialogue just cited, Sun Tzu uses the dialectic when he 
writes: ... There are unending changes of the normal and extraordinary forces. They end and 
recommence - cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn - 
recurrent, as are the passing seasons. Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage the enemy 
and the extraordinary to win. Therefore, the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary 
forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth, as inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers ... 
it is 
the skillul operation of, the extraordinary and the normal forces that make an army capable of 
sustaining the enemy's attack without suffering defeat. " He adds: "For these two forces are 
mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as that of interlocking rings. Who can determine 
where one ends and the other begins? ", page 84. 
There is a chapter in Sun Tzu's text entitled 'Void and Actuality', a popular -theme in ancient 
China, which can be compared to the yin-yang opposition discussed below. In this chapter Sun 
writes: 
.4n army may be compared to water, for water in its natural flowing avoids the heights and 
hastens downwards. So in a war, an army should avoid strength and strike at weakness. As water 
shcpes itsflow in accordance with the nature of the ground, an army manages to be victorious in 
relation to the enemy itfacing. As water retains no constant shcpe, so in war there are no constant 
conditions. One who can modify his tactics in accordance with the enemy's situation and succeed 
in gaining victory may be called a divine, page 5 6. 
In a later chapter Sun uses an analogy with a particular snake which, when 
struck on the head, its tail attacks; when struck on the tail, its head attacks; and when struck in the 
center, both head and tail attack.. Yherefore exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy loses 
his alertness and gives you an opening, then move as swiftly as a hare, and the enemy will be 
unable to resistyou, page 57. 
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The commentary by General Tao is in keeping with the style of the original text when he brings to 
mind the interpenetration of opposites, and the duality essence and appearance. He explains that: 
In employing troops, there must be interchangeable elements of 'actuality'in 'void, and 'void'in 
'actuality'. Normally, it is easier to adopt theform of 'voidwhile being strong thanfirom a weak 
position... 'Void'and 'actuality'are interchangeable and limited by time. It is often difficult to see 
through theenemy's changes. Aerefore, it is essential to have wise, active, flexible, courageous, 
and care fiul commanders, page 5 5. 
As Sun notes, whilst "the battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos ... one's array must be in 
good order", page I 10. I-Es dialectical style is clear in the following: "when the enemy is at ease be 
able to tire him, when well fed to'starve him, when at rest to make him move! ', page I 11, and "of 
the five elements, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, 
some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. That is also the law of employing 
troope', page 113., --I 
An important part of the development of dialectics in Ancient China is the yin--yang principle, 
which consists of the two polar opposites which both constitute and govern the cosmos. The yang 
is active, male, Wgh and heavenly, whereas the yin is passive, female, low and earthly. The two rise 
and fall relative to each other, in an essential relationsHp underpinning appearances such as the 
processes of natural change from fight to darkness, motion and rest, hot and cold, and social change 
such as the rise and fall of dynasties. Many twentieth century thinkers, including the psychologist 
Jung and the physicist Bohr, have been impressed by the yin-yang principle which seems to date 
back at least to the Chou dynasty of II OOBC. The following extract from a poem concerns an 
appeal for the yin to calm the intense struggles of the period: 
South Mountain with its beetling crags, 
Rankfoliage on its every slope. 
The Grand-Master in hisfeýuftl might 
Spreads dire injustice through the land 
Calamity and woefirom Heaven abound, 
Death and destruction hand in handf 
Andyou, our curses in your ears, 
Repent not, nor hewailyour deeds. 
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Yhzs Yin, great officer of state, 
Yhe prop and shield of sovereign Chou, 
To hold the halance in the land 
7hat near andfar may have one mind, 
From the Book of Odes, quoted on page I of Hughes (1942). 
A well known exponent of the yin-yang principle was Tsou Yen who, although his works are lost 
had a reputation for using a 'dualism in monism' concept in conjunction with the five dynamic 
forces: wood, fire, soil, metal and water. The overall effect is consistent with "all things realizing 
their potentialities to the UP, quoted on page 219 of Hughes. A description of the principle is 
given in an "amplificatioif ' quoted on pages 269-70: 
Yhe Yin and Yangforces in the universe, do they not involve the tangled skein of change? With 
these forces coming in orderedJuxiaposition the principle of change is established within their 
scope of operations. For, if these two forces were abolished there would be no way by which 
changes could emerge'to view, and if changes could not so emerge, the heavens and the earth 
would almost cease tofunction. 
Although most of the schools of philosophy in ancient China began as a radical critique of the 
status quo, all were eventually banished or rendered harmless by being integrated into the 
imperialist orthodoxy. This is true of Mohism, a philosophy derived from the artisan class, the 
Tillers, utopian farmers and artisans, and Taoism, which eventually became the official philosophy 
of the Han dynasty. The main source of radical Taoism is the Tao Te Ching, a long poem which 
attacks Confucian orthodoxy. It is currently thought to be a collection of writings from different 
Taoist authors rather than the work of Loa Tan, or Lao-Tzu, who is quoted by Schwaller as 
saying" In order to expand, one must must first contract; in order to contract, one must expand. ", 
pages 11-12. The search for the "unchangeable Tao", or way, is reminiscent of the more static 
thought of the Greek sage Parmenides. The overcoming of desire is an important theme early in the 
poem, but far from retaining this static view the poem soon compares ideas to their opposites, and 
sets up a unity between the resulting polarities. Speaking of the sage, the poem states: "Surely it is 
because he has no personal desires that he is able to fufil his desires. ", Hughes page 147. The 
following two passages are also dialectical: 
7he whole world knows that heauty is heauty. and this is (to know) ugliness. 
Every one knows that goodness is goodness. ý and this is (to know) what is not good 
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Yhus it is. ý existence and non-existence give hirth to each other: 
7he hard and the easy complete each other. ý 
the long and the short are comparatively so: 
the high and the less high are so hy testing. - 
the orchestra and the choir make a harmony. - 
And the earlier and the laterfollow on each other. 
This is why the sage ahides hy actionless activity, 
Andputs into practice wordless teaching. 
Quoted in Hughes page 145. 
777e Object you look at and cannot see is called 'invisible 1, 
The soundyou listen to but cannot hear is called 'inaudible 
Yhe thingyou try to grasp but cannot get hold of is called 'intangible', 
These three (qualities) it is impossible to investigate to the end, 
And thus it is that they blend and make One. 
This oneness on its upper side is not light, 
On its under side is not dark, 
It has unbroken succession (in time), 
For it goes right back to the (time when there was) nothing. 
Yhus it is called the form of theformless, the 'image of the non-material'. 
Yhus it is called 'indistinguishable', 
For ifyou go to meet it, you can see noftont to it, 
Ifyoufollow after it, you can see no back 
Lay hold of (this) ancient truth. 
By it you can he master ofyou present existence, 
You can know how antiquity hegan, 
And that is a clue to the Tao. 
Quoted on page 150. 
Attacking Confucianist sages, and giving us an insight into class struggles of the period, on page 
152 the poem states: 
Away with these ývise menl 
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Yhe profit to the people will be a hundredper cent., 
Away with these 'human-hearted men'! 
Away with these just men'l 
Ihe people will turn back tofilialpiety and (plain) kindness. 
Away with these skiffid artisans! 
Away with these profit-making merchants! 
Thieves and robbers will cease to exist. 
Another Taoist sage, of the fourth century B. C., was Chaung Tzu (1998), who hints at the 
dialectical interplay of freedom and necessity when he says that those who follow the Tao are free, 
a resonant philosophy with the peasants and artisans. As the introduction to the text, by van der 
Weyer, explains: "To the logical and practical western mind, much of Chuang Tzu's teaching is an 
affront; and for this reason it is sometimes hard to grasp. He relished contradictions and he loved to 
undermine conventional wisdom! ', page 16. According to Chuang a sage "draws a clear distinction 
between the inner and outer realms", page 19; and says that "I may regard an object as 'this; but 
another person may regard the same object as, 'that'. Thus we can say that 'this' and 'that are born 
out of one another. But where there is birth, there is also death; and were there is death, there is 
birth. Similarly where there is possibility, there is impossibility; and where there is impossibility, 
there is possibility. In the same way, where people recognise right, they also recognise wrong - and 
vice versa. The wise person cannot proceed by opposite, but by the Way. On the Way this and that 
contain one another; so do right and wrong ... Through the Way all things are seen as one, 
regardless of their completeness or their difference. Those who follow the Way are able to see the 
unity of all thinge' pages 24-6. Chuang is wrestling with the problems of what is and what is not, 
which shows more philosophical abstraction than is displayed in tribal dialectics. He says: "There is 
order in chaos, and certainty in doubt. The wise are guided by this order and certainty ... There 
is 
what is, and there is what is not. It is not easy to ý confirm that what is not is not. This is a 
statement. Yet I do not know whether my statements affirm what is, or affirm what is nof ', pages 
26-7. 
In the late fourth century there developed a group of thinkers, described by Hughes as 
"dialecticiane'. Maspero (1978) uses this tenn for thinkers, including Mo-Tzu, who study logic or 
those, Eke Kung-Sun Lung and Hui Shih, who engage in disputation and thereby hope to prove 
their opponents' ideas wrong. Maspero and Hook (1982) describe these thinkers as "Sophiste', a 
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school of philosophers considered in depth in the next chapter, of whom Hui Shih was the first. 
These radical Sophist-dialecticians have been compared to the Greek Zeno, who according to 
Aristotle invented dialectics, in that they developed paradoxes and aphorisms which suggested both 
a relativist view of knowledge and the primacy of change. The following paradoxes of Hui are 
quoted from Hughes pages 120-1: "a creature exactly when he is born is exactly (beginnirýg to) 
die ... The myriad things 
in Nature are both completely similar and completely dissimilar. This state 
of affairs should be described as a great similarity-in-dissimilarity ... To-day 
I go to Yueh State and I 
arrive there in the past ... the 
hub of the world is north of Yen State and south of Yueh State ... the 
heavens and the earth are one composite body. " 
Kung-Sun Lung, a disciple of Hui Shih, similary tried to articulate and explain paradoxes, most 
famously in A Discussion on nite Horses, and Twenty-One Paracloxes. The latter includes the 
following: "Fire is not hot (i. e. the sensation of heat is in us and not in the fire) ... Eyes 
do not see 
CLe. it is the mind which perceives by means of the eye and fight) ... T-squares are not square, and 
compasses cannot make circles (i. e. T-squares and compasses cannot be relied on to make the 
perfect square and the perfect circle as visualised by the mind) ... The shadow of a 
flying bird never 
moves ... A dog can 
be a sheep Q meaning that since everything is in process of changing into 
something else, therefore a dog can become a sheepy', quoted in Hughes page 128. This school 
also stated what later came to be known as the law of non-contradiction: "In argument, (a thing) is 
designated as ox, or it is designated as non-ox: the one excludes the other", quoted in Maspero 
page 334. 
In the third century BC an unidentified group of Mohist-influenced thinkers also engaged in 
the process of trying to unravel and explain paradoxes. However, in doing so they sometimes 
introduced new contradictions. They used a term which Hughes translates as "dialectic! ' to 
refer to this process, although he fails to supply the original Chinese word, which also 
addresses the logical and epistemological issues raised by their philosophical opponents. It is 
clear from their writings, which are often difficult to understand in the original, that all sides to 
these disputes were able to use analogies, expose fallacies and construct arguments. The 
following quotes introduce important themes in dialectical thought: 
Ae interpenetration of hardness and whiteness (in the same object) is complete. 
Interpenetration= mutually getting. 
Ihe parts of a body interpenetrate but not completely. 
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Similarity=in some respects interpenetrating, in some respects not. 
A 'that' (i. e. a proposition, a subject for dialectical discussion) must not be two different 
things if it is to be allowed (as a subject of discussion). 
In re a 'that': (for example) 'All cows are not-cows': to have two concepts (of the 
proposition) is in all cases wrong. 
Dialectic=contending over a 'that', and in dialectic the right wins. 
In re dialectic: (for example) one party says that is a cow and another party says it is not a 
cow; this is contending over a 'that'and the parties cannot both be right. Since they are not 
both right, one of them must be wrong. Quoted on page 131 of Hughes. 
Action =preserving, destroying, exchanging, lessening, increasing, or transforming. 
In re action: to fortify. a rampart is (characteristic oj) preserving, to contaminate 
(characteristic qj) destruction to buy and sell (characteristic oj) exchanging, to smelt ore of 
diminishing, to grow bigger of increasing, frogs becoming rats of transforming. 
, 
Likeness and unlikeness taken together=disclosing to view what exists in a thing and what 
does not. 
In re likeness and unlikeness taken together: for example, the practice in rich families of 
achieving reciprocity in the exchange of the good things they possess for those they do not. 
7hey compare and measure quantities, allowing so many oysters in return for so many 
silkworms, Hughes, pages 133-4. 
'Fire is not hot': the explanation lies in perception.... 'For a man to know what he does not 
know': the explanation lies in selection and rejection by means of names... 'Non-existence is 
not necessarily conditioned hy existence': the explanation lies in the matter under 
consideration. In re non-existence: if a thing arrives at non-existence, then itfirst existed and 
afterwards ceased to exist, asfor example, if horses ceased to exist. But if the skyfell down, 
there would he now existence piled on non-existence. page 13 5-6. 
With regard to dialectic, it sets out to make clear the dividing line between truth and error, 
(and so) to discriminate the different threads which constitute order and disorder: to make 
clear the relative positions of likeness and unlikeness, and to examine the logic of names in 
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relation to actualities, to distinguish between the beneficial and the hannful and to resolve 
doubts. 
This passage, quoted in Hughes, page 137, who points out in a footnote that "these later 
Mohists were deeply convinced of the need for order in thinking as a condition for order in 
society. " This point implicitly draws attention to the argument that there will inevitably be a 
relationship, though not a simple reflection, between the patterns of thought and the social 
struggles of a given historical period. 
The social struggles of ancient India 
Thapar's A History of India volume one (1966) analyses the tensions of ancient Indian 
society. She begins by making the point, long before Bernal, that western attitudes, and those 
of the Indian intelligentsia, towards India have undergone considerable change due to a range 
of social factors. Each of these attitudes, whether based on the vantage point of colonial 
occupation, the current mind-body-spirit market, or comparisons with Greece, represents a 
kind of moment, to use a Hegelian term, and is therefore important in adding to our 
understanding of the whole. Much of the earliest source material is from oral traditions later 
written in Sanskrit texts by the priests, or Brahmins. As a result the texts were "biased in 
favour of those in authority and generally adhered to the brahmanical interpretation of the 
past, irrespective of its historical validity"P page 18. On the static image of India, in which 
there is only repetition or cyclical time, a view encouraged by Hegel and Marx, she says "there 
is in India a continuous cultural tradition extending over three thousand years, but this 
continuity should not be confused with stagnation", - page 
20. Thapar's greatest merit however, 
is to link philosophical and religious thought to material reality, to social struggle and 
development. 
Thapar considers the controversial Aryan issue, emphasising the tensions resulting from the 
racial and cultural dimensions introduced by the movement of these central Asian people to 
India in about 150011C. She notes that the city states of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro, which 
were at their peak around 230OBC, were populated by people who were more advanced than 
the later pre-urban Aryan invaders, with their proto, Indo-European language and less civilised 
culture. However, as the Aryans settled and learned from the native population, its priest caste 
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established a virtual monopoly over intellectual labour. The result has come down to us in the 
form of the Rig Vedas, and later Brahmanas and Upanishads, written by generations of 
Brahmans. Apart from religion and philosophy, these works speak of the redivision of labour, 
inter-tribal wars, wars with native tribes, land disputes, including the change from communal 
to private property, and cattle stealing. Through these works, the Brahmans announced their 
rise to dominance in the new Aryan imposed hereditary caste system. The priests eventually 
established themselves above the kshatriyas, or warrior caste, and the vaishyas, prosperous 
landowners and traders. The lowest castes were the shudras, mainly darker skinned natives, or 
Dasas, and those of mixed parentage, some of whom later became the untouchables, the 
lowest caste of all. As this extract from a Rig Veda hymn explains, each ý part of the human 
body was associated with a caste: 
7'he brahman was his mouth, of his arms were made the warrior. 
His thighs became the vaishya, of hisfeet the shudra was born. 
Quoted on pages 39-40 of Thapar. 
Buddhism, Jainism and other sects opposed to the dominance of the Brahmans drew their 
support in large part from the shudra by disavowing the caste system altogether. Others 
sought to avoid the rigid system by resorting to asceticism, withdrawing from society and 
denying Vedic beliefs. By 70OBC the local village-based tribal system was in serious decline 
and found itself in profound contradiction with the monarchies, which embraced the caste 
system, and with the republics which were in the ascendancy. Some tribes took on a republican 
social formation, and in certain cases the members maintained a measure of decision making 
power in local assemblies. Budhhists and Jainians were keen on such institutions, since their 
founders came from tribes which adopted comparatively democratic methods. However, more 
generally the social dislocation involved in the process of change, especially the establishment 
of intolerant monarchies and urbanisation, added to the desire of supporters of these religions 
to escape from the new social formations. This challenged the Brahmans' dominance of 
thought and ritual, which provided their livelihood and power within the caste system. 
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Dialectical thought in ancient India 
Early Aryan thought was heavily influenced by tribal dialectics, including animistic beliefs and 
the idea that fire acts as a link between gods and humans; themes which are in evidence in the 
early hymns of the Rig Vedas. Eurocentric writers tend to denigrate the mythical thought 
found in the Vedas, failing to realise that much of the thought of their own society, its religion, 
festivals, nationalism, and much else, is based on myth. The denigration often forms part of a 
programme to show that all thought prior to the Greeks was "pre-philosophicar' or "pre- 
rational". Sproul (1979) writes sympathetically about myth, discussing some of the dialectical 
Vedic themes. Although her religious perspective leads her to neglect the social aspects of 
myth, she points out the recurring theme of a relationship between an unchanging timeless One 
and the flux of the Many: "religions go beyond the universe of change to consider the 
changeless structures basic to it", page 21. In later chapters we will examine how dialectical 
thinkers have dealt with the issue of interpreting "the unchanging One". 
Sproul stresses the dialectical aspects of both tribal and ancient creation myths, because "they 
do not just reflect random attitudes toward reality. Rather, they begin With a perception of 
reality as a whole and in its light construct an integrated system for understanding all its 
parts ... Although these myths are of varying 
degrees of profundity, at their best they consider 
the essential structure of the whole of reality: matter, spirit, nature, society, and culture. They 
consider the origin and nature of being, the very fact of existence. Thus the Rig-Vedas, the 
earliest hymns of which were composed about c. 120OBC, begins" page 5): 
Then neither Being nor Not-Being was 
Nor atmosphere, norfirmament, nor what is beyond. 
"at did it encompass? Where? In whoserprotection? 
"at was water, the deep, unfathomable? 
Neither death nor immortality was there then, 
ATo sign of night or day. 
That One breathed, windless, by its own enersy: 
Nought else existed then. 
In the beginning was darkness swathed in darkness, 
All this was but unmanifested water. 
Whatever was, the One, coming into being, 
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Hidden by the Void, 
Was generated by the power of heat. 
In the beginning this (One) evolved, 
Became desire, first seed of mind 
Wise seers, searching within their hearts. 
Found the bond ofBeing in Not-Being. 
Their cord was extended athwart: 
Was there a below? Was there an above? 
Casters of seed there were, andpowers: 
Beneath was energy, above was impulse... 
Quoted on page 183 of Sproul. 
This famous hymn draws attention to a number of the dialectical themes which, to a limited 
extent, we have already considered. However, Sprout does not link them to their social 
context, i. e. the Brahmins, the "Wise seers" or "mouths of the Vedas", struggling to justify 
their privileges in the caste system, and especially to establish their status relative to the 
warrior caste. The nearest she comes to explaining the social basis of the hymns is when she 
states they "tell of great battles between the old, degenerate gods of the conquered people and 
the young, energetic deities of the conquerore', page 29. Sproul also fails to see the full 
significance of the concept of desire in this hymn. It is a term, discussed by Hegel in the 
Phenomenology, which indicates our link with nature and the rest of society. We are not 
indifferent to our world but linked to it through impulses for food, clothing, shelter, sexual 
gratification, affection, beauty, and the like. Desire links a one to an other, a subject to an 
object, so that it can be a force which totalises the world. 
The importance of desire is partially recognised by Sprout in an extract from a Maori chant, 
also quoted in the previous chapter, which links conception with desire through a chain of 
progressive developments: 
From the conception the increase, 
From the increase the thought, 
From the thought the remembrance 
From the remembrance the consciousness, 
From the consciousness the desire. 
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Commenting on this quote, Sproul adds that desire implies an "object of desire: the idea and 
reality of the world", page 23. She discusses the way in which myths sometimes attempt to 
probe into the nature of reality, or "ground of beine', by developing negative concepts like the 
unknown, the unknowable, nothing, and the even more negative: nothing-that-was-not, all of 
which, are important dialectical ideas. We should also note the animistic approach, which in 
some Vedic thought suggests the existence of totalising spirits behind the appearance of 
reality. An example of this idea is found in another early Indian text, the Kena Upanishad 
(800-40OBC): 
no sends the mind to wander afar? "ofirst drives life to start on itsjourney? 
no impels us to utter these words? no is the Spirit behind the eye and the ear?... 
We know not, we cannot understand, how he can be explained. He is above the known, and 
he is above the unknown. 
Sproul, page 8. 
Although her arguments about early Indian thought are at times static, due to her religious 
interpretation of an unchanging One, Sproul shows how our understanding of our world, as 
revealed in tribal and ancient myth, often relies on the use of polar opposites: "We categorise 
things by how much they are like any one, part of such a pair of opposites, how unlike the 
other they are ... Now the most 
basic of such pairings is being and not-being, the positive and 
negative alternatives expressed in terms of existence. And, as with all polar oppositions, the 
parts of this primary one require each other. What 'is' derives from what 'is not; what 'is 
not' comes from what 'is'. Which came first, being or not being? Which came first, the 
chicken or the egg? ", pages 8-9. Or as the Chandogya Upanishad (c. 70013C) expresses the 
problem: 
1. In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being, one only, without a second. To be 
sure, some people say: 'In the heginning this world was just Not-Being, one only, without a 
second, - thatfrom Not-Being Being was produced' 
2. But verily, my dear, whence could this he? said he. How ftom Not-Being could Being he 
produced? On the contrary, in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a 
second. 
Quoted in Sproul page 9. 
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In response to this positive one-sided solution, non-being arising from being, Sproul points 
out that picking either of the sides of the opposition, Being or Not-Being, chicken or egg, is to 
remain within a riddle. Demonstrating the continuity between tribal thought and ancient 
thought, she uses an example of a Maori chant which takes the negative solution: 
From nothing the hegetting 
From nothing the increase 
From nothing the ahundance 
The power of increasing 
The living hreath... 
Quoted in Sproul page 9. 
She claims that the Rig-Veda solution to the problem is the correct one when it states: 
"Neither Being nor Not-Being was there then ... Only the One breathed, windless, by its own 
energy", quoted on page 9. It is similar to ancient Egyptian dialectics, which speaks of 
transcending, yet preserving the interdependence of, the positive and negative in the form of 
the primal chaos. This is the "raw clay", in which there is the potentiality for both the positive 
and negative, day and night, spirit and matter, good and evil, which starts off the creation 
process and thus engenders change and development. A similar idea is found in the Hopi 
American Indian myth; which has the infinite conceiving the finite: 
Thefirst world was Tokpela (Endless Space). 
Butfirst, they say, there was only the Creator, Taiowa. All else was endless space. There was 
no beginning and no end, no time, no shape, no life. Just an immeasurable void that had its 
beginning and end, time, shape, and life in the mind of Taiowa the Creator. Yhen he, the 
infinite, conceived thefinite. 
Quoted in Sproul, page 17. 
Another key dialectical theme is the duality essence-appearance, which is discussed in the 
Upanishads in the following dialogue between a father and son: 
Fetch me aftuit of the Banyan tree. 
Here is one, sir. 
Break it 
I have broken it, sir. 
What do you see? 
93 
Very tiny seeds, sir, 
Break one. 
I have hroken it, sir, 
What do you see now? 
Nothing, sir, 
My son, what you do notperceive is the essence, and in that essence the mighty hanyan tree exists. 
Believe me, my son, in that essence is the seý'qf all that is. Yhat is the True, Mat is the Set(.. 
Quoted on page 47 of Thapar. 
Jainism and the dialectic 
As we have seen, wandering ascetics and "sophists" produced heterodox philosophical 
systems which, in India, challenged the Brahman orthodoxy. From these social phenomena a 
number of more organised groups emerged, including the atheistic materialists, the Carvakas, 
who accused the Brahmans of speaking "vain and lying nonsense" (Thapar page 64), the 
Buddhists and Jainians. The latter two eventually became mass religions, despite their atheistic 
tendencies, and ceased to challenge the monarchies in an overt political way. As was the case 
with Christianity,. the social origins and philosophy of Jainism and Buddhism are obscured in 
mythology, which developed quickly as part of the establishment of a new religious orthodoxy 
based round the fives and alleged teachings of their leaders., These two faiths described politics as 
"evir', and advocated a fife of quiet contemplation. Embree (1988) einphasises that Jainas and 
Buddhists developed the doctrine of transmigration, although Buddhists rejected the concept of the 
unchanging soul, beyond the orthodox version found, in the Upanishads: 'With this belief in 
transmigration came a passionate desire for escape, for unison with something that lay beyond the 
dreary cycle of birth and death and rebirth, for timeless being, in place of transitory and therefore 
unsatisfactory e-Astence! ', pages 44-5. Given the considerable social upheavals of the period it is no 
surprise that the doctrine became popular, particularly amongst some of the lower castes. 
Mahavira, the sixth century teacher known as "the Conqueror", renounced Vedic orthodoxy and 
became an ascetic in the Ganges valley. His ideas, based on those of a number of earlier thinkers, 
were at first transmitted orally, but were eventually recorded in the third century BC. He had a 
totalising view of the universe, claiming that it passes "through a series of cosmic waves of progress 
and decline", Thapar page 65. Crucial to the Jaina philosophy is the idea that our knowledge is 
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always partial because it depends on the vantage point of the knower, as is illustrated by the six 
blind men story, in which they each touch a part of a elephant, but insist that the part they touch is 
not part of an elephant but is respectively a rope, a snake, a tree trunk, etc. It is a reaction against 
the more orthodox idea that one should aim for total or absolute knowledge as a means of 
salvation. The Jaina non-violent doctrine, including not killing any animal or insect because it 
possesses a soul, was a form of tribal animism. It was a direct challenge to Vedic sacrifice, 
excluding certain castes, such as warriors and agriculturalists, yet including others, particularly 
manufacturers, traders, money lenders and other urban occupations. 
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Much Jainian thought is recorded in medieval texts, such as an early one from Jinasena, which 
rejects the creation suggesting instead a more dialectical alternative: 
Know that the world is uncreated, as time itself is, without beginning and end. 
And it is based on the principles, life and the rest. 
Uncreated and indestructible, it endures under the compulsion of its own nature. 
Quoted on page II of Sproul. 
The most famous aspect of Jaina thought is known from a 12th century text by Hemacandra, 
which in the main attacks the Carvakas, Ondus and Buddhists, but also sets out what has come to 
be known as Jainian seven valued logic. Although Ernbree claimed that this form of thinking existed 
in the sixth century BC, we can only speculate about the extent to which the text sets out a form of 
logic actually used by Jaina thinkers of that period. To the extent that it does, it represents the most 
advanced form of thought in the ancient world, with profound implications for the concept of 
ideology, and is the earliest example of thought becoming self conscious, to use a Hegelian term 
which refers to thinking formally about the links between thought and reality, in particularly 
thinking about thought. The Hegelian idea that the world is experienced by groups and individuals 
from particular vantage points or moments, later develope d in Marx's Capital, is set out in the 
following summarised Est of the seven values on page 261 of Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957): 
1. Somehow a thing is. 
2 Somehow a thing is not. 
3. Somehow a thing is and is not 
4. Somehow it is indescribable. 
5. Somehow it is and is indescribable. 
6 Somehow it is not and is indescribable. 
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7. Somehow it is, is not, and is indescribable. 
The interpretation of the term 'indescribable' in line 4 seems to be the articulation and 
reconciliation of being and non-being, posited as a contradiction in fine 3. Critics have asked why 
there are only seven possibilities, to which the medieval commentary replies: "the elders say: 'As 
many as are the ways of speaking about a thing, so many are the statements of the standpoint- 
method. ' Nevertheless, seven standpoints have been taught by ancient scholars by making seven 
meanings all-inclusive! ', quoted on page 268. However, on page 77 Embree states that: "The first 
four of the seven divisions are fairly clear and intelligible. The last three divisions, on the other 
hand, are a pedantic refinement of the theory, and some early Jain schools did not accept thene. On 
the same page, Embree fists another seven divisions which relate to the distinction between the 
abstract and the concrete in the context of level of analysis. So, for example, we can consider a 
particular person as an individual or as a member of a group, or we can consider the person at this 
point in time or include his or her future or past. Unfortunately Embree fails to see the crucial 
significance of this aspect of Indian thought especially for the explanation of ideology, dealing as it 
does with what Ollman (1993) calls "level of abstraction! ', to be considered in Chapter Ten. 
Moore's commentary on such logic states: "Thus understood, no absolute affirmation or negation 
is possible about anything, for the nature of things is too complex to be exhausted in any single 
predication. Thus, all predications are, predications only from a particular point of vieW', page 262. 
Criticisms of this mode of thought in ancient India, and 20th century criticisms such as those of 
Karl Popper, are in essence the same in claiming that the statement in fine 3 is inherently 
contradictory and leads to conceptual chaos: everything and nothing is possible. In answer to this 
Moore, on the same page, points out: 
7his criticism is regarded hy the aAerent of this doctrine as actually missing the very point, for, 
according to this doctrine, contradictions are avoided only when statements are made firom 
different points of view. Jaina logic admits that contradictory statements cannot be made about 
the same thing in the same sense at the same time and place, but stresses the fact that 
contrachajon can he avoided only hy their own doctrine .. in which every statement is made only 
from a particular point of view. Yhe charge of contradiction lies, tf at all, at the door of the 
absolutist, who affirms or denies a statement about a thingfrom nopoint of view, as it were, which 
according to the Jaina logician, is invalid 
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Although, as argued in later chapters, there a number of weaknesses in Moore's argument, his 
explanation makes the crucial point that a contradiction must be articulated and explained, and as a 
result is 'resolved' in thought, if not in practice. However, we must bear in mind the point that each 
articulation has to be concrete, otherwise this form of logic is in danger of becoming an empty 
abstraction because, Eke the rules of formal logic, it implies that it is 'all-inclusive' or universally 
valid. Thus, a concrete example, which relates to two ideologically opposed standpoints in 
contemporary political economy, can be demonstrated by the first four fines fisted above: 
L Somehow a thing is. From the point of view of the capitalist owner the company's wage bill is a 
cost which reduces profit. 
2 Somehow it is not. From the point of view of the company's workforce their wages are income, 
income which could be higher if profits were reduced. 
3. Somehow it both is wd is not. So from these two different perspectives wages both are and are 
not costs. 
4. Somehow it is indesctibable. However, the fact that we can see these two different standpoints 
implies that we have adopted a third "indescribable' standpoint, one which totalises the other two. 
Embree astutely observes that this mode of thinicing was in part responsible for the tolerant 
attitude of the Jains towards their rivals: they understood that their rivals' views corresponded to 
their respective vantage points and were not false, but only partial. The significanceof this point, 
and the other important aspects of Jaina thought, are lost on Chattopadhyaya (1979). Although he 
sees that these polemics have a basis in social struggle, when spealcing of "compromise" in the 
following quote, on page 132-3, he reveals his lack of understanding of Hegelian moments, and 
totalising thought in general. He says of Jainism: 
It was an effort to steer a mWIe course between the bpanishadic doctrine of the ultimate reality 
being absolutely permanent, i. e., without beginning, change and end, and the Bu&Mistic doctrine 
of the eternalflux- Instead ofsubscribing to any of these afternatives, which were considered to be 
extremes, the Jainas wanted to effect a compromise and aclazowledge partial truth in both 
Permanence was true and so was change. Accor&hgly, reality was viewed as not ofpermanent 
and unalterable nature; it underwent the processes of productioA continuation and 
destruction.. Thus, clay may be regar-ded as permanent, but the form of ajar of clay or its colour 
may come into existence andperish 
Chattopadhyaya goes on reveal his limited understanding of dialectical thought in general: 
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Obvtouslýv, it is &fficult to mainwin such a position with any real philosophical senousnes& One 
cannot, eg senously claim that idealis7n is somehow true and so also is materialism. A 
philosopher has necesscirily to be a poWsan in the sense of being a positive defencler of his own 
views, quoted on pages 134-5. 
The fixed opposition between 'materialism' and 'idealism', along with the failure to realise that 
social struggle promotes an increasingly totalising mode of thought, are typical of Leninism, which 
we consider in Chapter Mme. Totalising, or 'indescribable'P thought is superior to a partial or one- 
sided view of reality as seen from a particular vantage point. When we come to consider the term 
cy1fique, this point will become clearer, especially in its relevance to people in struggles for 
emancipation. 
Buddhism 
Gautama Buddha, a contemporary of Mahavira, shared the latter's views on the caste system, 
atheism and the cosmic rise and fall. He, like Mahavira, came from the warrior caste, and had his 
origins in the movement associated with the republicanism of the Shakya tribe. Buddha is reported 
to have rejected his position as prince of the tribe, becoming firstly an ascetic and later an advocate 
of meditation on the suffering of the world. ]Preaching his famous sermon near Banaras, Buddha 
explained that suffering is caused by desire, and that therefore through adopting the Nliddle Way 
desire can be overcome. This leads to an end to suffering and salvation, in the form of an end to the 
cycle of rebirth and the attainment ofnirvana However, Embree says: 
Yhe legends that were told about him in later times are mostly unreliable, though they may 
contain grains of historical truth Moreover many of the sermons and other pronouncements 
attributed to him are not his, but the work of teachers in later times, and there is considerable 
doubt as to the exact nature of his original message, page 92. 
The inclusion of women as nuns was a challenge to Vedic orthodoxy, as was the appeal to the 
masses of the lowest urban castes and substitution of the Magadhi language for the Vedic Sanskrit. 
The social essence of the new religion eventually became its support for the interests of the urban 
manufacturers, merchants and money lenders; although its monks claimed to represent the masses. 
The dialectical aspects of early Buddhism centre around the idea of continuous flux: everything, 
including the gods and the souls of living beings, are constantly changing, they have no permanence 
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or individuality. Buddhists remain sceptical about any essential reality behind the fleeting world'of 
the senses: 'Vhereof we cannot speak we must remain silent! ', Radhakrishnan and Moore, page 
273. Desire, which according to Buddhists is the attempt to establish individuality, was the search 
for permanence where none could be found, and therefore led only to fiustration and suffering. 
Although this philosophy is a negation of the potentiality for meaningful human life, the obsession 
with abstract "suffering! ' originally corresponds to tribal society's inability to resist the 
extemfination and brutal subjugation of their members by new monarchies. Buddha's insistence on 
perpetual movement is an important development in the history of thought: "Two symbols are 
generally used to illustrate this conception - the stream of water and 'the self-producing and the 
self-consuming'flam6", quoted on page 130 of Chattopadhyaya. Also significant is the Buddhist 
idea of a causal chain in explaining becoming: things depend on each other in a series of totalising 
relationships: "that being present, this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises ... that 
being 
absent, this does not become; from the cessation of that, this ceases! ', page 128 of Chattopadhyaya. 
Further development in the dialectical aspects of Buddhist thought are considered in the next 
chapter. 
Dialectics in ancient Mesopotamia 
In the last chapter we noted that one of the key principles of tribal magic involved the idea that to 
know the true name of a thing, or person, is to have power over it. In Sumerian myth the totalising 
pantheon creates the various parts of nature by pronouncing their true names. As the older tribal 
laws were replaced by royal fiat, the priests developed their occult systems accordingly, and their 
arithmetic, geometry and', 'ýýurat architecture represented the universal divine order. There is an 
example of the interrelations of Akkadian thought when Childe points out that their word for 
"working out a sud' is the same as "performing a ritual ace', page 144. As was the case elsewhere, 
the priests, who dominated intellectual labour, synthesized astronomy and astrology as part of their 
study of what West (1992) calls the "Divine Principles" unlying the movements of the planets and 
stars. 
In Ae Great Year, which is the essence of Mesopotamian astrology, Campion (1995) explains that 
this theory has both a naturalistic reductive determinist and a dialectical basis, and together these 
aspects underpinned their natural and social science. The naturalistic aspect is explained by the fact 
that the "Sun's diurnal and annual patterns, moving ceaselessly between the extremes of hot and 
99 
cold, and fight and dark, provide a model of the whole of human e3dstence ... 
human history itself 
becomes a seasonal experience, moving from a collective winter to a collective summer and back 
again ... From simple reverence 
for the, Sun and Moon, the Mesopotamians, sometime before 
200OBC, began to incorporate other stars into their political cosmology, and at this point astrology 
was borrf', page 2 1. Campion uses a dialectical idiom when he points out that: 
the study of the past in the ancient Near East was intimately connected with the need to know the 
fiture. Yhe origins of historiography, literally the writing of history, are deeply bound up with 
political imperatives and religious devotion and the state's need to maintain order and guarantee 
its existence into thefuture ... Yhefuture, then, can 
he understood only by reference to the past, and 
study of the past is necesswy to hnow thefuture, page 9. 
It may come as a surprise to know that Karl Popper noted the dialectical basis of astrology 
because its fatalistic philo sophy "involves the contradictory conception that the knowledge of our 
fate may help us to influence this fate", quoted in Campion page 23. Knowing society's future, as 
decreed by the Gods and revealed to the priests by the planetary and stellar movements, helps the 
king to change it. This paradox developed during a period when the warring Mesopotarnians faced 
political uncertainty, and their fives depended upon the level of flooding of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, and the appropriate weather for a good crop: "The Mesopotarnians lived in a world of 
paradox, walking a tightrope between the unalterable order of the cosmos and the anarchy into 
which that order might condemn them. By revering order and keeping a close watch on the 
anomalies it contained, they believed thaý they might steer a careful course, observing the cycles of 
time and seizing the best moment to act", page 57. 
For the Sumerians all simultaneously occurring events were associated, there was no concept of 
mere coincidence, when something happened was as important as what happened. Childe (1964) 
states: "Observation of the stars proved so successful in foretelling when to begin agricultural 
operations that the Sumerians were induced to hope by the same means to predict the 
unpredictable. In other words astronomy led to astrology, in pursuit of which the. motions of 
heavenly bodies were studied not unprofitably by the Sumerians' cultural heirs. ", page 118. The 
circle of the heavens, or zodiac, was divided into twelve equal parts by the priests, though other 
subdivisions have been used in other cultures, twelve being a number with a totalising esoteric 
significance of multiplicity within unity. If we take these signs of the zodiac they contain the 
polarities male-female, active-passive and positive-negative. So Aries is positive,, Taurus negative, 
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Gemini positive and so on. However, -these polarities interpenetrate to form triads, for as West 
explains, in Chaldean thought: "The triad, the principle of three, expresses relationship. If the 
universe were homogeneous, nothing would happen. If it were merely dual, nothing could happen 
either. A state of eternal and unbridgeable tension between two equal and opposite forces would 
result. There must be a reconciling principle, a Third Force ... one 
becomes two and three 
sirnultaneously... Man-Woman is a polarity, but Lover-Beloved-Desire is a relationship", pages 32- 
33. 
In astrology the triads, or Modes of Action, iake the form of Cardinal, Fixed and Mutable and 
these are applied successively to each sign of the zodiac, so that Aries is cardinal and positive, Leo 
is fixed and positive, Virgo mutable and negative etc; consequently each sign conforms to a 
simultaneous dualistic and triadic configuration. However, says West, all this is too theoretical: 
"nothing has happened yet", to make things happen, a law of four is superimposed over the two 
and three. This law is the four substances: earth, fire, air and water from tribal cosmology; thus 
Aries comes to life as positive, cardinal and fire. The full zodiac therefore contains twelve unique 
signs linked by a geometric figures which represent a "simultaneous fusion of polarity, triplicity and 
quadricity, and its harmonically determined aspects and angles, is a whole. ", page 38. All of this 
was thought by the Chaldeans to be the basis of a macrocosmic harmony, and each microcosmic 
part conformed to the same principle; a system similar to the cosmic principle of the Egyptians, 
which Pythagoras learned from them, which was later codified in Plato's Timaeus. 
One of the surviving texts, of ancient Mesopotamia is -the previously mentioned Epic of 
Gilgamesh (1960), which reveals the tensions engendered by Uruk's lack of strategic raw 
materials in the militaristic third millenium. The introduction to the text explains a quarrel 
referred to in a poem of the period which "appears to revolve round the barter of corn from 
Uruk against precious metals, gold, silver, lapis lazuli and probably building stone from 
Aratta. ", page 19. The Epic reveals a number of tribal preoccupations such as secret 
knowledge, taboos, ambiguous metamorphoses between animals, mortal men and women, and 
immortal gods, with paradoxical aspects, summoning the forces of nature. We read, for 
example, about Gilgamesh who is two thirds god and one third man, Ishtar with her 
contradictory qualities as the goddess of love and war, "an awful and lovely goddess", which 
may be explained as a synthesis of two tribal deities. Similarly the god Entil 'is "the word 
which stilleth the heaven above", but he is also, "a rushing deluge that troubles the faces of 
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men, a torrent which destroys the bulwarks"', page 25. The myth reveals themes such as the 
alienated relationship between men and women and the tension between the countryside and 
the ancient city, as evidenced by the early appearance of Enkidu. He is a grass eating man 
reared with animals, who is seduced by a harlot from the temple of love in the city, and as a 
result is rejected by the animals. Aspects of the class structure and the division of labour in 
Uruk are revealed by mention of sages, masters and servants, priestesses and counselors of the 
city. There are more examples of polar opposites in the Epic, such as heroes waxing and 
waning, but the following comment of the immortal sage, king and priest, called Utnapishtim, 
is profound: 
Yhere is no permanence. Do we build a house to standfor ever, do we seal a contract to hold 
for all time? Do brothers divide an inheritance to keepfor ever, does theflood-time of rivers 
endure? It is only the nymph of the dragon-fly who sheds her larva and sees the sun in his 
glory. From the days of old there is no permanence. Ae sleeping and the dead, how alike 
they are, they are like a painted death. nat is there between the master and the servant 
when both havefuYVIed their doom?, page 104. 
An example of ancient Persian dialectics 
r.. Hicks (1975) suggests that Zoroastrianism has to be understood as the ideological component 
of a Persian nationalist movement, culminating in the large empire established in the sixth 
century BC. The Achaemenids, the Persian ruling family, took up the new faith in order to 
sever links with their Vedic past and create a uniquely Persian culture. Tomlin (195 9) provides 
some useful material on Zoroaster, a Greek rendering of Zarathustra, but fails to identify either 
the social basis of his movement or its dialectical idioms. Zoroaster's movement was probably 
composed of a small group of Magi, hereditary priests, of the old faith who set up a rival faith 
and soon obtained royal patronage in Eastern Iran. 628BC is the likeliest date of birth for 
Zoroaster, though lengend states 600OBC, explaining his death as due to being enveloped in a 
flash of lightning. Ninth century AD Pahlavi texts treat his life in a way reminiscent of tribal 
dialectics in that the distinctions between animals, humans and gods are not fixed. The 
movement was initially revolutionary, firstly because it challenged the Vedic pantheon and 
replaced it with a more monotheistic system, and secondly because it introduced the possibility 
of individual choice between good and evil, thus being a blueprint for Christianity. Clearly the 
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old tribal ideology, with its capricious gods and vested interests, was challenged by Zoroaster, 
his Magi priesthood and their royal patron. 
The opposition between good and evil existed in the faith prior to Zoroaster, but he 
introduced a greater level of sophistication to the theology. He posited two basic principles of 
the universe, the first of two opposites is Ahoora-Mazda, and a number of related gods, which 
represents light and good who are in the above, before the existence of time; and the second 
opposite Ahriman, or darkness and evil, existing below, with open space between the two. 
However, these are not fixed polarities but rather, like the yin-yang, engage in a battle which 
animates all of nature and society, with its positive features created by Ahoora-Mazda, and its 
evil and defects "counter-created" by Ahriman. The myth explains that Ahriman, unaware of 
the existence of Ahoora-Mazda, chances upon a ray of light over which he tries to gain power, 
and notes its antagonistic properties. However, the witchcraft of Ahriman is confounded by 
the "pure words" of Ahoora-Mazda. Maclagan (1977) suggests that the confrontation obliges 
Ahoora-Mazda to create a world in time, which "contaminates his integrity", page 28; thus 
introducing another polarity between the unmoving and timeless, on the one hand, and 
movement and time on the other. Ahoora-Mazda produces a proto-humanity having only the 
power to reflect, without the power to speak or eat. The first true human is actually born by 
the mysterious interpenetration of the force of evil, or Ahriman, with that of good, Ahoora- 
Mazda. 
Hegel (1952), like Nietzsche, was probably affected by the 'Aryan' origins of Zoroastrianism, 
the Persians being part of the Iranian family of tribes, which in turn was part of the mass of 
nomadic peoples who originally left southern Russia in about 200013C. This 'Aryan' 
connection probably disposed him to be impressed by the dialectical aspects of Zoroastrianism, 
a fact which perhaps contributed to Engels' decision to learn Persian. According to Hegel the 
principle of light is "sensuous universality itself, simple manifestation... the signification of the 
spritual ... the 
form of the good and the true, the substantiality of knowledge and volition as 
well as of all natural things. Light puts man in a postion to be able to exercise choice", page 
238. Hegel comments on the antithesis between light and darkness, and the other 
corresponding polar oppositions, claiming that, whilst the Persian myth partially resolves the 
contradiction or recognises "the unity of the antithesis", it only does so either by going back to 
a "Primal existence" prior to these oppositions, or by light conquering, and thereby 
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eliminating, darkness. These remarks suggest that Hegel's thought is limited by his 
Eurocentric agenda, for him it is only with the Greeks does 'true' dialectical thought begin. 
Concluding remarks 
Despite a degree of doubt due to the vagaries of translation, there can be little question that 
there developed a number of dialectically orientated philosophies in the various states and 
cities of the ancient world. Compared to tribal anthropocentrism, the form of the ancient 
dialectic was at times more secular and immanent, i. e. suggesting the universe was dialectical 
in itself, irrespective of human consciousness. The content of the dialectic was largely 
normally nature, rather than society, though natural contradictions are in large part a 
sublimation of social contradictions. Dialectics was normally the preserve of the occult 
knowledge of the priest class; however, in China and India, the dialectic was part of the 
philosophy of recalcitrant courtiers and artisans, who in some cases sympathised with the 
peasant masses in their struggles against their rulers. Thus in the ancient world we are 
introduced to itinerant philosophers, anticipating the Sophists, who undoubtedly made an 
important contribution to dialectics in ancient and classical Greece, to where we now turn our 
attention. 
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Chapter Three 
Ancient Greece 
The ancient Greek polis 
7he Greek dialektiki, ftom dialigoinai, 'converse'or 'discuss', mewis the 'art of discussion'. 7he 
democratic city-state offered unlimited opportunitiesfor &scussion in the assembly and the law- 
courts, and there arose a new Oe of philosopher, the sophist, a professional teacher who 
imparted to his pupils a general education with special attention to public speaking and debate, 
Thomson (1961) pages 317-8. 
As the Greek dialectic emerged out of the totalising thought of tribal society, the focal point of its 
development became the polis, which combined a growing market economy and the extensive use 
of slave labour. Compared with cities elsewhere in the ancient world, the classical Greek polis was 
relatively open, and occasionally democratic, for free men, yet not for women. Such openness for 
the few usually accompanies the rivalry, uncertainty and complexity which results from the 
penetration of commodity production, and the introduction of coined money on a large scale. 
Commodity production arrived from the east, where, as we saw in the previous chapter, market 
social relations developed in certain areas. The following fragment from Ugarit suggests the 
existence of a certain level of commercial activity, accompanied by the usual contradictory 
fluctuations: "The price; high price; low price; poor price; fixed price; good price; stiff price; fair 
price; town price7', quoted in Thomson (1961) page 106, who states that the development of the 
Greekpolis was assisted when 
By the end of the eighth century the Greeks had broken the Phoenician monopoly of the Aegean 
canying trade wzd were challenging them in the Levant .. since the Black Sea was closed to the 
Phoenicians 
.. their trade with that region was conducted through the 
Ionians as intermediaries.... it 
seems likely that one of the main incentives to colonisation, Phoenician and Greek alike, was the 
questfor slaves, who were bought upftom kidnappers in backward regions, where their value was 
low, corresponchng to the low level of production, and then transported to the main industrial 
centres, where their value was correspondingly high", pages 184 and 188. 
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As well as commercial change, there was at first modest technological development, which 
included the introduction of sheep-shears, the rotary com grinding quern, wine-presses and the 
crane. However, as we shall see, the increasing use of slave labour held back finther technological 
progress. For the merchant class, and increasingly for all other classes, "Money-making had ceased 
to be a means to an end and become an end in itself, and to this process there is no limif', Thomson 
page 195. From its beginnings on the west coast of Asia Minor, the market driven polis moved 
onto the Greek mainland. Engels described developments in Athens, whose people 
were soon to learn how rapidly the product asserts its mastery over the producer when once 
exchange between individuals has begun andproducts have been transformed into commodities. 
With the coming of commodity production, individuals began to cultivate the soil on their awn 
account, which soon led to individual ownership of the land Money followed, the general 
commodity with which all others were exchangeable. "en men invented money, they &d not 
realise that they were again creating a new social power, the one general power before which the 
whole of society must bow. And it was this new power, suddenly sprung to life without the 
knowledge or will of its creators, which now, in the full brutality of its youth, gave the Athenians 
thefull taste of its might, quoted in Thomson page 196. 
The contradictions inherent in both the introduction of commodity production and the existence of 
slavery soon became manifest in Athens, which became the site of intense class struggle. Thomson 
explains that for free Athenian men the democratic constitution was presented 
as restoring to them in a new form those principles of tribal equality which their ancestors had 
enjoyedftom time immemorial until they had been robbed of them under the landed aristocracy. 
7his was an illusion .. and it was the exact reverse of the reality. Being designed to facilitate the 
growth of commodity production, the democratic republic created the conditions in which the old 
tribal, gentile, traditional, patriarchal, personal relations were swept away. Such was the 
contraction that forced itself on the consciousness of the Greeks... with the rapid growth of a 
monetaty economy, its internal unity was negated hy the struggle for the land and later hy the 
antagonism between slave-owners and slaves In each state the citizens were united against the 
slaves, yet divided against themselves by competition for the surplus value produced hy slave 
lahour .. In Greek democracy the individual found himself freed'ftom all relations other than 
those determined by the mysterious nexus of commochty exchange .... one of the basic factors 
determining the development of the city-state, was this internal contradiction between the old 
system of land-tenure and the newforce of commodity production-By the democratic revolution 
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of ancient Greece we mean the transfer of state power ftom the landed aristocracy to the new 
merchant class, pages 205-8. 
Thomson explains that accumulation and concentration of wealth in the polis led to the 
development of a small leisured class, which proved vital to the history of thought in general and 
dialectics in particular. Despite the Leninist reflection metaphor, Thomson is astute in his summary: 
At the same time, just as society was divided within ifse6(, so also was the human consciousness. 
7hese internal contradictions, kept in constant motion by continuous developments in theforces of 
production, have been the driving force of history. Without them the polarisation of wealth 
necesswy for the creation of a leisured class, ftee to devote itsel( to theoretical pursuits, such as 
the abstract sciences andphilosophy, would have been impossible; yet, with this division between 
intellectual and manual labour, theory was continually being drawn apart ftom practice and so 
losing touch with reality. Without it there could have been no development of abstract thinking, 
and hence no philosophy or science; with it, the intuitive dialectics ofprimitive society, springing 
ftom the union between theory and practice, was continually being effaced by metaphysical 
mystifications... Such meWhysical views of the world are indeed a reflection of reality; but the 
reality which they reflect is not simply, as it purports to be, the world of nature; it embodies also 
the class structure of society as seen by the ruling class, which cannot maintain itsep'withoul 
fostering the illusion that its power is a product, not of history, but of nature. And yet, since the 
social relations, ftom which these illusions spring, are constantly chatong and developing in 
response to developments in the productive forces, so all the intellectual products of class society 
also change and develop, driven forward by their internal contradictions. 7his is the secret 
historical logic which, unknown to the debaters, presided over the Prolonged symposium' of 
Greekphilosophy, page 340. 
The slavery debate 
Well, I will tell you; for of my slaves 
I holdyou to be the most loyal... and the biggest thief. 
Aristophanes, quoted in Fisher (1995) page 80. 
In ancient society fteedom was believed to consist in the conscious domination exercised by the 
slave-owner over the slave. His domination was socially complete, being limited only by the 
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physical capacities of the slave. 7his relation gave rise to teleological theories of the universe, 
which is set in motion and directed hy a 'divine master' or first mover' without any physical 
effort on his part hut simply hy an act of will. 7here was no conception of natural law. Its place 
was taken by the idea of andnke or 'coercion, which connoted the relation between slave-owner 
and slave. In feudal society... the domination is no longer complete, being restricted by the feudal 
system of 'degrees'. which include the serf as a fill member of the community. Accordingly, the 
Aristotelian system, which was accepted as the foundation of medieval theoloSy, was modified at 
certain points. In particular, the divine master operated within the sey-imposed limits of his own 
appointed 'laws' Mis marks the beginning of the concept of natural law. Thomson pages 342-3. 
we must be careful not to exaggerate the development of ancient commodity production. 
Resmcfed as it was hy slave Jahour, it was never strong enough to aholish entirely the old 
households, based on a seý'-sqfficient natural economy, Thomson page 338. 
There exists considerable debate between historians and economists concerning the extent of 
slavery in ancient Greece. As Greek philosophy, including dialectics, was developed by a leisured 
class on the backs of the labour of slaves, a consideration of this debate is crucial to a history of 
dialectics; it will also demonstrate the need to think dialectically, especially with respect the concept 
of internal contradiction. The various positions taken in the debate are inevitably connected to the 
social vantage points of the protagonists. The Eurocentric view adopted by the majority of scholars, 
including many Marxists, is central. To the extent that Greek achievements in philosophy, science, 
mathematics, art and democracy are shown to be based on the brutal exploitation of slaves, mostly 
notably in the Laurion silver mines where slaves were more or less worked to death, it obviously 
undermines Eurocentric notions of a benevolent ruling class. In an attempt to resolve an awkward 
contradiction at the core of European intellectual life, Eurocentrics often attempt to abolish one 
side of the freedom-slavery duality, by adopting a 'minimalist' view of slavery. They claim that 
slavery made only a marginal contribution, mainly in the production of commodities, to the surplus 
product which sustained the leisured class. Eurocentrics are keen to point out that slaves were used 
in clerical work, including banking and supervisory roles, in the police and military, as well as 
female domestic work. They also play down the routine beatings, and sexual exploitation, of these 
women, and the extent of slave-prostitution. In response to all this even the 'moderate' Fisher 
(1995) says: 
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On all hut the first, extreme 'minimalist, views, Athens would still qualify as a 'slave-society', in 
that the major surplus for the elite came ftom slave lahour, ý and the democracy depended on 
slavery since many of the rich allowed political and economic freedom to the Peasants in part 
hecause they had their own slave-hased wealth. 7he political implications of 'Maximalist' views 
would he to extend the direct depenclence on slavery to many, or even to very many, of the citizens. 
On these views the dependence of rich lwzdawners on agricultural slaves is increased (the use of 
tenancies and hired lahour hecomes minimised, and many of the tenant-farmers would themselves 
use slaves); hut more than this, many of the ordinmy peasant-citizens were somewhat richer, as 
well as more seýccoqfident, independent and leisured, hecause they owned slaves, page 46. 
Despite his Hellenomanic influences, Engels (1986) described ancient Greece as a slave mode of 
production, in which the slaves outnumbered the citizens by a factor of at least eighteen. He was in 
no doubt that the bulk of the surplus product appropriated by the wealthiest citizens, merchants and 
aristocrats of the polis was provided by slave labour. More recent scholarship suggests that this 
ratio of slaves is grossly overstated, that the role of slavery was more complex, and that the 
contribution of slaves to the surplus varied over time and place in ancient Greece. A useful 
summary of the scholarship is contained in Fisher, who begins by saying that "For classical Greece, 
unfortunately, we are almost totally denuded of evidence giving us access to the slaves' point of 
view, and most of our evidence indeed comes from the literate 61ite of the city states ... Reliable 
statistics on the total numbers of slaves in anypolis do not exisf', pages v and 2. 
Although there is still controversy on the extent of chattel slavery in agriculture, it is hard to avoid 
the conclusion that classical Athens was a society in which chattel slaves were responsible for the 
bulk of the surplus product. Aristotle, in Book I of the Politics describes chattel slaves as belonging 
completely to their master in the form of animate pieces of property, or tools, and yet he 
acknowledges that they are human beings. The contradiction meant that slaveowners asserted both 
their 'power and brutality' and 'more humane and wann relationships and the granting of some 
limited honour and the hope of freedom, at least to a minority of the slaves', Fisher page 6. The 
granting of some human contact to slaves was obviously a prerequisite to their reproduction by 
breeding. which was also assisted by the rape of female slaves by their owners. Apart from 
Epictetus, analysed later, there is little evidence of the views of slaves themselves. The American 
slave Frederick Douglass reveals the contradiction at the core of the social relations of slavery, as 
Fisher explains "it was on the rare occasions that slaves were treated with kindness and humanity 
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that they conceived the greatest desire to attain fuff freedom - not just to have a good -master, but to 
have no master", page 66. 
In order to be aware of the material underpinning of the leisured class, which was able to develop 
abstract thought we need to look at the complex reality of Greek slavery. Chattel slaves could be 
sold to new owners, they were regularly beaten and could be legally tortured at the owner's whim. 
Newly acquired slaves had their personalities destroyed by a humiliating process which Fisher calls 
social death. As he points out, even the freeing of slaves, with or without a fee, was not as one- 
sidedly generous as it seemed: "Whatever the reasons for manumitting slaves, it is to be seen as a 
mechanism which served to strengthen, not to weaken, the institution of slavery as a whole, and 
was managed in ways which maximised the practical advantages to the slaveowners as well as 
increasing their reputation for decency and generosity", page 70. Fisher also highlights the 
paradoxes inherent in more cultured slaves bringing up the children of wealthy Athenians, and 
educated slaves performing some of the occupations mentioned earlier. One is reminded of the 
contradiction which led to the restriction of child labour in Britain and elsewhere in the late 19th 
century, capital as a whole, in the form of the state, had to intervene to prevent depletion of the 
labour force through exploitation of child labour, which was in the interests of each individual firm. 
Engels (1986) traced the development of slavery out of the primitive communism of tribal society. 
By Homeric times a male hereditary nobility, along with farmers and artisans, emerged and sought 
to reinforce its power by establishing city states which became the focus for slavery. They added to 
slave numbers by war booty, debt-bondage and those captured by pirates or traders, slaves at first 
being both non-Greek and coming from Greek tribes. Engels comments bitterly on this: "Children 
sold by their father - such was the first fruit of father right and monogamy! And if the bloodsucker 
was still not satisfied, he could sell the debtor himself as a slave. Thus the pleasant dawn of 
civilisation began for the Athenian people", page 144. 
Solon, an aristocrat who turned to trade, introduced a number of reforms in sixth century Athens 
which affected the nature of slavery. These reforms were a necessary compromise between the 
landowners and the merchants, who both feared that the economic ruin of the peasantry would 
cause them to revolt. The reforms standardised the coinage and reduced food prices, thus favouring 
merchants and artisans at the expense of the big landowners. Solon secured the status of male 
peasant-citizens by establishing a stricter duality between slave and free. He also cancelled peasant 
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debts, which reduced the incidence of debt-bondage that had grown with the expansion of coined 
money, so reducing the number of Greek slaves. The new citizens were distinguished from slaves 
or 'state-serfs', foreigners and women. They began to import their own slaves, who worked in the 
expanding commodity production sector, agriculture, and, worst of all, mining. Fisher quotes 
Finley's dialectical remark on these reforms as representing "the advance, hand in hand, of freedom 
and slavery", page 19. It can be compared with Critias' remark that Spartiates were "the most free 
of all the GreeW, as their state-serfs, or helots, were "the most enslave&', quoted on Fisher page 
24. The helots were numerically larger than Spartan citizens, they were the conquered enemies of 
the Spartiates and likely at any moment to rise against them: 
7he more Spartan economic, social and political systems can be seen to be collapsing under a 
network of internal tensions and contrachchons, the more remarkable becomes the discipline, 
organisation and subtlety with which her rulers, so few in number, maintained their physical and 
ideological grip over their serfs. 7he need was indeed great. the helots were the ultimate source of 
their wealth and power, and in all probability the chief cause of their having adopted for 
themselves such an austere, and ultimately unsustainable, life-style Fisher page 3 2. 
The nearest thing to a rejection of slavery in ancient Greece was offered by Plato's philosophical 
opponents, the Sophists, especially Antiphon and Alcidamas, who questioned the prime assumption 
that slavery was natural andjust. By contrast, leisured Athenians' attitudes towards slavery were, 
for reasons already explained, contradictory. Fisher claims that most free Greeks, apart from the 
major land and slave-owners, had no problem with work per se, only with working under the 
supervision of, or as Aristotle explained "for the benefit of', someone else, which was in effect to 
be reduced to 'slavery. Sophists challenged the fixed polarities, free-slave, male-female, Greek- 
non-Greek and nature-social convention, which were propagated by the defenders of Greek 
aristocratic privilege, patriarchy and slavery, the most able advocates of which were Plato and 
Aristotle. They vainly tried to maintain the fixed nature of these dualities, despite the contradictory 
reality of these relationships. To note just three examples of these contradictions: both of these 
philosophers were obviously the result of a union between male and female parents, Aristotle was a 
Macedonian, rather than a Greek, whilst Epictetus was a slave and philosopher. Fisher notes that 
the fragments of Antiphon's work which survive give the impression that he thought that the 
acceptance of slavery, and other negative aspects of Greek fife, makes Greeks "barbarians with 
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regard to each other". If this interpretation is correct, it to some extent anticipates 18th century 
views on alienation. 
Ellen Wood's (1981) article Marxisin andAncient Greece presents a summary of her 'minimalist' 
views, which ignore the simultaneously brutal, yet paternalist, aspects of slavery. She begins by 
describing ancient Athens as "the society which first articulated the concept of democracy", on 
page 3. However, this bland statement is made without any reference to the genesis of democracy 
in societies which long predate classical Athens. We have looked at the democracy of hunting and 
gathering societies, and could mention various forms of tribal assembly in the ancient world. 
Although few written records remain, all societies must theorise their social relationships to some 
degree, and many tribes fought to maintain their proto-democracy. Wood's subsequent discussion 
of the development of Hellenomania fails to explore the relationship between the classics scholar 
and the dynamic of contempormy capitalist social relations. She also fails to provide more detail on 
the specific social struggles, which burgeoned the theory and practice of Athenian 'democracy'. 
Whilst Wood makes useful criticisms of the cavalier claims of some Mandst writers, her 
'minimalist' view of the extent and significance of Athenian slavery is inconsistent and 
unconvincing. As the following quotes show, Wood largely accepts the 'maximalist' thesis she 
claims to be challenging: 
Even though it was the surplus Jabour of slaves more than that ofpoor butfiree producers that was 
appropriated by wealthy citizens, the opposition between rich andpoor took a particular definite 
form in Athenian eyes as the opposition between citizens who were compelled to labour for a 
livelihood and citizens who, by virtue of their property, were able to live on the labour of 
others. -It is true that Graeco-Roman civilisation employed, systematically and on a large scale, 
slaves who were clearly defined in law as chattels, and it would be absurd to deny the significance 
of thisfact, pages 10- 11. 
Wood draws attention to vulgar Mar,, dst claims about the ruin of free artisans and wage workers 
due to competition with slave artisans, but her static methodology fails to provide any analysis of 
these methods of production, nor of the contradictory relationships between the classes at the core 
of Athenian mar ket relations. Similarly Wood's use of the term "the ideological effects of slavery" 
fas to account for the contradictions in the theory and practice of slavery mentioned by Fisher. As 
we shall see these contradictions were to have a profound effect on Greek philosophy. 
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The thesis that slavery retarded the introduction of new technology, and a corresponding division 
of labour, is explained by Engels in the following quote: 
nerever slavery is the mainform ofproduction it turns labour into servile activity, consequently 
makes it dishonourable for freemen 7hus the way out of such a mode of production is barred 
nile on the other hand slavery is an impediment to more developedproduction, which urgently 
requires its removal. 7his contradiction spells the doom of allproduction based on slavery and of 
all communities based on it. A solution comes about in most cases through theforcible subjection 
of the deteriorating communities by other, stronger ones (Greece by Macedonia and later Rome). 
As long as these themselves have slavery as their foundation there is merely a shifting of the 
centre and a repetition of the process on a higher plane until (Rome) finally a people conquers 
that replaces slavery by another mode of production Or slavery is abolished by compulsion or 
voluntarily, whereupon the former mode of production perishes and large-scale cultivation is 
displaced by s7nall-peasant squatters, as in America For that matter Greece too perished on 
account of slavery, Aristotle having already said that intercourse with slaves was demorafising the 
citizens, not to mention the fact that slavery makes work impossible for the latter. Engels (1947) 
pages 421-2, Engels' brackets. 
Wood's challenge to this thesis is unconvincing, ignoring as she does the fact that, building on 
knowledge from the ancient world, Greek science made theoretically possible a level of 
technological development which was not actualised. Vulgar Marxists are prone to overstate the 
static nature of slave society; the Greek polis was marked by change within permanence. There 
was a more or less constant rivalry between the city states, which often broke out into armed 
conflict, whilst armed struggles broke out between Greece and her foreign rivals. Combined with an 
expanding market for commodity production, there was every incentive for technological 
innovation in both the means of production and final use values. However, as long as there was a 
means of expanding the supply of slave labour, either through importation or internal breeding, the 
need for technological innovation to increase the surplus was either reduced, or even completely 
negated. 
In her article, Wood attacks the views of Perry Anderson, who replies in a review of Ste. Croix 
(1981). Anderson (1983) paraphrases Ste. Croix's definition of class as: "social relationships of 
exploitation, that secure the extraction of surplus labour from the immediate producers", page 
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61. In what is highly relevant to ancient Greece, he continues: "That exploitation may, or may 
not, generate a sense of collective unity and interest in the exploited - outcomes depending on 
the determinate possibilities for common action open to them. Consciousness of class identity, 
in other words, varies enormously in history - amongst the dominated classes (the dominant 
classes, by contrast, will always possess a strong measure of it). " page 61. Ste. Croix himself 
adds: "To adopt the very common conception of class struggle which refuses to regard it as 
such unless it includes class consciousness and active political conflict (as some Marxists do) 
is to water it down to the point where it virtually disappears in many situations. It is then 
possible to deny altogether the very existence of class struggle ... between masters and slaves in 
antiquity, merely because ... the exploited class ... 
did not have any 'class consciousness' or take 
any political action in common except on very rare occasions and to a very limited degree. But 
this, I would say, makes nonsense not merely of The Communist Manifesto but of the greater 
part of Marx's work", page 57. 
In answer to Wood's 'minimalist' argument about numbers of slaves and free producers, 
Anderson says: "The hulk of the labour performed in Antiquity ... may nearly always have 
been 
the work of non-slave producers - whether small-holders, artisans or dependent tenants. But 
the surplus labour that provided the income and wealth of the dominant classes was 
essentially extorted from slaves", page 62. Positivist methodology, which takes account only 
of the facts of appearance, is oblivious to the internal class relationship which is reified in the 
surplus. With regard to Wood's arguments on the extent of slave labour in agriculture, 
Anderson relies on Ste. Croix when he says: 
"there is far less evidence for any otherform of agrarian exploitation by the wealthy in these 
epochs. 'How then', he asks, 'if not by slave labour, was the agricultural work done for the 
propertied class? How otherwise did that class derive its surplus? ' (p. 172). Not merely is 
there no sign empirically that wage-labour or leasing, the only alternatives, were more 
widespread, but logically neither, he demonstrates, could have yielded rates of exploitation 
comparable to the use of slave-labour in the conditions of the time", page 62. 
Whilst aware of the exploitation of small producers, Ste. Croix nevertheless concludes that it 
was slave-owners who on the basis of their exploitation "produced virtually all Greek art and 
literature and science and philosophy", page 115. It is this key point which explains my 
extended consideration of slavery. 
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Also important is the position of women in ancient Greece. Ste. Croix claims that women as a 
whole must be regarded as a separate class because of their monopolisation of the 
reproduction function. Anderson refers to the contradictory position of women in ancient 
Greece, arguing that in terms of their different roles in the process of extracting surplus 
labour, women must be placed in different social classes according to their function. Female 
slaves could not be worked as long or to the same level of intensity if they were to reproduce 
the slave population at times when importation was difficult. Because of this, together with 
high infant and maternal death rates, says Ste. Croix "the inevitable consequence is that the 
propertied class cannot maintain the same rate ofprofitfrom slave labour, and, to prevent its 
standard of living from falling, is likely to be driven to increase the rate of exploitation of the 
humblerftee population", page 23 1. 
Although Thomson (1961) combines vulgar Leninist formulations with fanciful speculations, 
he also provides a number of useful observations on the relationship between thought and 
social struggle. He notes that the increased use of slaves in commodity production eventually 
ruined so many free small producers that they "sank to the level of lumpen proletariat. In this 
way, being no longer a civil community of slave-owning landholders, the political form 
represented by the polis ceased to correspond to the social content. The result was that, after a 
period of destructive civil strife, the Greek city-states were subjugated by the Macedonians, 
who, just because of their backwardness, had preserved a free and prosperous peasantry", 
Thomson page 16. 
Meikle's thesis on Aristotle and political economy 
Before studying the detail of the development of dialectics in ancient Greece, we can briefly 
consider the debate concerning Aristotle's contribution to theorising the political economy of the 
polis. Scott Meikle's book (1995) Aristotle's Economic Yhought is a recent contribution which, 
despite flaws, is worthy of consideration. The author begins by observing that the "fewer than half a 
dozen pages" in Aristotle's work devoted to the subject is the first "analytical contribution to 
economics, and histories of economic thought usually begin with if', page 1. Aristotle's thought 
was the "backbone" to Christian and Muslim economic theory, profoundly influencing neo-classical 
economics, and providing some of the metaphysical categories of Marx's political economy. 
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However, Meikle makes no mention of Aristotle's discussion on the role of women, nor of the 
attempt to eliminate the remnants of their power and subordinate them to the new forms of 
economic reproduction- In the context of the debate on why economic theory emerged in at this 
time in Greece, and the alleged link between this theory and the development of a market economy, 
Meikle's thesis is that, even at the time of Aristotle's writing, market social relations were not well 
developed in Greece. The author makes little mention of slavery, thereby failing to perceive the 
reason for Aristotle's inability to identify labour as the basis of exchange value. As Marx explained: 
7here was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle ftom seeing that to attribute 
value to commodities is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and 
consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had 
therefore for its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour powers. 7he secret of the 
expression of value, namely, that all kinds of Jabour are equal and equivalent because and so far 
as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered until the notion of human equality has 
already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. 7his however, is possible only in a society in 
which the great mass of the produce of Jabour takes the form of commodities, in which, 
consequently, the dominant relation between man and man is that of owners of commodities. 
Marx, quoted on page 330 of Thomson. 
Meikle's main thesis concerns the lack of market social relations, but most of the evidence, 
especially in Plato's dialogues, points to a high level of market penetration in classical Greece. For 
example in Plato's Sophist (1961) the Stranger says: 
Mere is a distinction between the sale by a manufacturer of his own products and the business of 
exchanging what others have produced-Further, that department of exchange which amounts to 
about one hao' thereof, and is carried on within the city walls, is known as local retail 
trade ... Contrasted with which we 
have mercantile trade, ie the buying of goods in one cityfor sale 
in another, page 167. 
The anti-market polemic contained in Aristotle's economic writings, his discussion of fair 
exchange, the abuse of money and the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, make 
little sense, if, as Meikle claims, the market was peripheral in Athens. Meikle's second thesis is even 
less credible, for it suggests that Aristotle writes from no social or ideological vantage point, no 
"mindless prejudices of the Greek landowning clase', page 126, but shows "typical detachment", 
page 127, in his discussion of the Greek economy. Apart from philosophical objections the claim of 
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objectivity for Aristotle, Meikle ignores the polemical nature of Aristotle's writings, in particular 
Book One of the Politics and the sections of the Metaphysics to be discussed later. His n9ve view, 
which is compounded by the claim that "there is no reason to believe that there was any serious 
antagonism between the commercial class and the landed aristocracy", page 138, leads Meikle to 
refer to Aristotle's "strange defence of slavery", page 95. Had Meikle understood the nature of the 
social struggles in Athens, and Aristotle's place in them, he would not have found these views on 
slavery, women and the Sophists so "strange". 
Dialectical thinking and the first Greek philosophers 
all things are three, and there is nothing more or less than these three things. Of each one thing 
the excellence is threefold. intelligence and power and fortune, from Ion's treatise Triad, see 
Bames page 223. 
Even snow is black.. there is a portion of everything in everything, Anamgoras quoted in Thomson 
page 308. 
All things were together. Then mind came and arranged them, Anaxagoras quoted in Barnes page 
236. 
(Leucippus) held that being no more exists than non-being, and both are equally causes of the 
things that come into being, see Bames page 243. 
Poverty in a democracy is preferable to what is calledprosperity among tyrants - by as much as 
liberty ispreferahle to slavery, Democritus, quoted on page 277 of Bames. 
There are a number of collections of the remaining fragments of, and commentaries on, the pre- 
Socratic philosophers, but they are all to varying degrees written from a Eurocentric perspective. 
Barnes (1987) has written one of these collections. He begins by agreeing with Aristotle that these 
thinkers were essentially students of nature, orphusikoi, rather than society. They spent most of 
their time on questions concerning the order and adornment of the kosmos and its archd, or first 
principle, as well as its logos, or reasons for being the way it is. However, on occasions they did 
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consider society, positing interpenetration between the natural and the social, using one polarity as 
an analogy for the other. 
Most of the early pre-Socratics did little more than codifying their tribal world view. However, 
other early Greek thinkers made public the secret knowledge of the ancient world, particularly that 
of the Egyptian priests, under whom many of them studied. Several of the Greek philosophers were 
initiated into Egyptian Mystery cults or were influenced by the derivative Greek Orphic or 
Eleusinian Mysteries. Yet others, like Pythagoras, set up their own cults modelled on the Egyptian 
Mysteries. Hall (1965) includes a hypothetical account of Plato's initiation, noting that these secret 
societies were the prototypes of present day Masonic lodges. 
Barnes quotes from the seventh century poem Yheogony by Hesiod which contains examples of 
the kind of tribal dialectics which were traditional for the early pre-Socratic philosophers: 
Love, who isfairest among the immortal gods, 
loosener of limbs, by whom all gods and all men 
find their thoughts and wise councels overcome in their breasts. 
From the Chasm came black Darkness and Night; 
andftom Night came Ether and Day 
whom she conceived and bore after mingling in love with Darkness. 
Earth borefirst, equal to herself, 
stany Heaven, to veil her all about 
that there might be an eternal safe seatfor the blessedgods. 
Bames, page 57. 
According to the conventional wisdom of Eurocentrism, Thales, was the first philosophical, rather 
than religious or mythical, thinker and scientist. However, Lindsay in Origins of Alchemy (1970) 
points out that "Thales seems to have taken over the earlier Egyptian notion of a primitive cosmos 
of water, out which the earth merely emerged in division to float like a rafV', page 47. According to 
Herodotus, Thales' family originated from Phoenicia; other sources say that he learned geometry, 
astronomy, including the 365 day calendar, the theory of the immortal soul and other knowledge mi 
Egypt. Thales believed in the animistic view that soul was responsible forforce, such as that which 
causes magnets to move iron, an example he uses. His understanding of the antagonistic 
relationships of the newly developing market is clear in the anecdote, quoted on page 66 of Barnes, 
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which suggests that he "made a huge sum of money" by hiring the ofive presses in anticipation of a 
bumper crop. We also learn of his social values in the story that "he thanked Fortune ... that I am a 
man and not a woman ... that I am a 
Greek and not a foreigner", quoted on page 67 of Barnes. 
Thales' pupil Anaximander reveals the Milesian dialectical view in his assertion that the principle, 
arcN, of nature consists of the infinite which manifests itself as an endless cycle of generation and 
destruction. Opposites, according to Thomson's commentary on Anaximander, "encroach 
periodically on one another and so lose their identity by becoming reabsorbed into the 
undifferentiated form of matter out of which they emerged. This is what he means when he says 
that they 'render satisfaction to one another for their wrongdoing according to the order of 
tirne'... The idea of change as a cyclical process carries with it the implication that the subject of it 
returns repeatedly to the state from which it started and hence to that extent remains unchanged", 
pages 162-3. Such a cyclical philosophy is an idealisation of the social relations of the cyclical time 
of an agricultural society, but one giving way to new social tensions. Anaximander, claims 
Thomson, thinks anthropomorphically when he explicitly links nature and society: these opposites 
"render satisfaction to one another for their wrongdoing according to the order of time". This, 
according to Thomson, is a case of applying the natural cycle to that of the situation at the time of 
Solon's reforms in which "The rich encroach upon the poor until they impoverish themselves by 
ever reaching after more; the poor revolt and rob the rich, only to suffer the same fate in their turn! ', 
page 23 1. Thomson adds the point that the cyclical view is also an idealistion of Anaximander's, 
and Solon's, forlorn hope for the contending classes to restrain their contradictory aims and so 
avoid their mutual ruin. The Milesian Anaximenes also adopted a dialectical cosmology, since he 
believed in the archd of infinite moving air, which changes its form as it condenses and rarefies. The 
third century Christian Mppolytus summarises Anaximenes' cosmology: "Thus the most important 
factors in coming into being are opposites - hot and cold", Barnes page 77. 
The Pythagoreans 
Pythagoras is said by Eurocentrics to have invented deductive reasoning whilst developing his 
mathematical theorems. Were this claim to be true, which it is not, it would be crucial to the history 
of logic. The merchant, philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras of Samos, who kept slaves but 
held liberal views about their treatment, was probably initiated into the Mysteries during his stay in 
Egypt. Pythagoras also visited Mesopotamia, where mathematical reasoning was, according to 
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some sources, very advanced. He may have gone as far as Persia and India, learning from the 
Magi, Brahmins and others. Chinese mathematical reasoning was very advanced around 50OBC, 
however, no ancient source claims that Pythagoras visited there. Diop (1991) challenges the 
Eurocentric view that Greeks, like Pythagoras and Archemides, invented symbolic notation and 
algebraic manipulation, whilst the Egyptians and Babylonians merely used "empirical formula!? '. 
This claim was never made by the Greeks nor any ancient commentator; indeed they acknowledged 
that Greeks learned from the ancients. Although many Egyptian mathematical papyri were lost, 
Diop claims that the Rhind and Moscow papyri show clear evidence that the Egyptians must have 
known and performed operations on symbolic formulae according to the rules of algebraic and 
geometrical inference. Diop states that only this would explain why the practical exercises in these 
papyri, and Egyptian architecture, were so rigorous.. The famous 'theorem of Pythagoras' was 
actually invented by the Egyptians, who gave it a dialectical interpretation because, according to 
Plutarch: "The vertical side symbolises the male, the base the female, and the hypotenuse the 
progeny of the two", quoted in Diop page 272. 
According to Isocrates, Pythagoras was the first person to introduce philosophy into Greece. He 
seems to have formed a secret society, similar to that of the Egyptian Mystery cults, on his move to 
Croton in southern Italy. Polybius says that: "Pythagoreans practised no ordinary silence and their 
esoteric views were not divulged to ordinary mee', quoted in Barnes page 202. Like Plato and 
others, Pythagoras adopted Egyptian ideas on ethics, the soul, geometry and a universal harmony 
based on numerology. Strathem (1997) notes that the kind of logic used in the mathematical 
deductions which Pythagoras may, his contributions are disputed, have done took place "almost 
two centuries before its 'invention' by Aristofle7, page 9. For Pythagoras the number ten 
represented perfection, and, crucially for the history of dialectical thought, his system fisted ten 
pairs of terms which were treated as fixed oppositions. These oppositions were central to the 
thought of Plato and Aristotle, and have remained important to most philosophers to the present 
day. Aristotle tells us that Pythagoras' 
principles are ten in number, and come in co-ordinate pairs. limit - infinite, odd - even, one - 
quantity, right - left, male -female, resting - moving, straight - crooked, light - darkness, good - 
bad, square - oblong, quoted in Bames page 209. 
From what he admits is "tenuous evidence", Thomson speculates that these dualities represent 
"antagonistic classee' and that Pythagoreanism is the world view of the emerging merchant class, 
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with its need for numbers. The doctrine of the mean as a fusion of two opposites, which was used 
by both Plato and Aristotle, may well originate from Egypt via Pythagoras and is taken, by 
Thomson, to be a final resolution, "concor&', or "blendine', of the struggle between the landed 
aristocracy and the peasantry, mediated by the merchants. Thomson notes the views of Theogonis 
of Megara who "denounced the effect of money in blending the opposites, the nobles and the 
commoners, which, as a noblemen, he wished to keep apart", page 272. Lindsay, in his discussion 
on the relationship between "social and intellectual positione', sirnilarly claims that Pythagorean 
views on "proportion and law", which seem to have been important to their esoteric doctrines, can 
be linked to their political struggle as merchants and artisans sandwiched between the aristocracy 
and plebeians. Hence their credo: "Labour is good: pleasures of every sort are bad7, Iambfichus, 
quoted on page 204 of Barnes. In contrast with Pythagoras' ten dualities, Alcmaeon of Croton, 
Aristotle tells us, believed in haphazard pairs "such as black and white, sweet and bitter, good and 
bad, great and smalr', Bames page 90. Alcmaeon reveals something of the social tensions of his 
time in the saying attributed to him: "it is easier to be on your guard against an enemy than against a 
fiiend", Barnes page 92. 
Xenophanes of Colophon in Ionia was a travelling poet-philosopher and critic of Pythagoras, who 
is said to have been Parmenides' teacher. Though Xenophanes' views on being and non-being are 
static and can be subsumed under the study of Parmenides, he took tribal dialectical thought about 
animals, humans and gods and developed it in a way which anticipates Feuerbach, by claiming that 
different races depict god in their own image. He is reported to have said: 
But if cows and horses or lions had hands 
or could draw with their hands and make the things men can make, 
then horses would draw the forms ofgods like horses, 
cows like cows, and they would make their bodies 
similar in shape to those which each had themselves. 
Quoted in Bames, page 95. 
The dialectic of Heraclitus and Empedocles 
Heraclitus says that the universe is divisible and indivisible, generated and ungenerated, mortal 
and immortal, Word and Etemity, Father and Son, God and Justice, I-Eppolytus, quoted in 
Bames, page 102. 
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.. the things that exist arefitted together 
by the transformation of opposites- All things come about 
through opposition, and the universe flows like a river.... the treatise is not about nature but about 
politics and that the remarks on nature are there by way of illustrations, Diogenes Laertius 
summarising the views of Herachtus, Bames pages 106-8. 
It is not an accident, therefore, that the term 'dialectics'was inventedfor the study of the ideas in 
which the external world is reflected rather than for the study of the external world Useff, 
Thomson, page 320, breaking vith Leninist, orthodoxy on dialectical thought. 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, in Asia Minor, was in his prime around 50OBC and, according to Diogenes 
Laertius, resigned his kingship in favour of his brother. Thomson states that he was, like Plato, an 
anti-democrat who had been initiated into one of the Mystery cults. His view that the basis of being 
is perpetual movement represents, says Thomson, an idealisation of the struggle between the three 
major classes of the Greek world of his time: "if Heraclitus excels Pythagoras in his grasp of 
dialectics, this too must be ascribed to his class position. As one opposed to democracy, he was 
quicker to discern its internal contradictions, by which it was destined to be destroyed, and so was 
enabled to perceive the truth that only conflictý motion, change are absolute", page 282. In most of 
the summary histories of dialectics presented by Leninists, because of remarks made by Hegel and 
Marx, Heraclitus is incorrectly treated as if he was the only thinker of any consequence in the 
ancient world. Heraclitus' dialectical method, explains Thomson, is like that used by the 
playwrights Aeschylus and Sophocles. Heraclitus writes in a way in which 
words and clauses are ahruptly counterposed so as to lay hare the contrachctions in the ideas 
which they convey. 7he effect, as descrihed hy Plato, is like a series of volleys ftom a hand of 
archers. In a highly inflected language like Greek such a style is necessarily accompanied hy 
constant rhymes and assonances, and to these Heraclitus adds the use of puns -a universal 
characteristic of primitive speech, designed to invest it with a magical or mystical significance, 
Thomson page 132. 
Heraclitus uses the four elements of tribal dialectics, and singles out fire as crucial because of its 
obvious dynamic properties. Similarly he links mortals and immortals, as illustrated in the following 
chiasmus: "Immortals are mortals, mortals immortals: living their death, dying their lif6", Barnes 
page 104. Heraclitus continues the tribal dialectical tradition of explaining being from the interplay 
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of opposites: "There would be no attunement without high and low notes nor any animals without 
male and female both of which are opposites", quoted in Williams (1989) page 21. Heraclitus goes 
beyond this to explain how a human artefact such as a bow whose "function is death" utifises 
identity and difference: "They do not comprehend how, in differing, it agrees with itself -a 
backward turning connection, Eke that of a bow and lyre", Barnes pages 102 and 115. The 
significance of slavery to Heraclitus is clear in the following: 'Var is father of all, king of all: some 
it shows as gods, some as men; some it makes slaves, some free". In this quote it is apparent that 
for Heraclitus slavery is not natural, as it was for Aristotle, but the result of war and therefore 
social. 
Heraclitus refers to the opposition between immediately observable phenomena and more essential 
relationships in the following translations of fragments: "The hidden attunement is better than the 
obvious one", Williams page 21; "Umpparent connection is better than apparent .... nature likes to 
hide itself' Bames pages 102 and 112. These fragments could be applied either to nature or to 
society, where it is an anticipation of Adam Smith's invisible hand analogy used to describe civil 
society in 18th century Scotland. Williams points to the Heraclitean dialectic and asks: 
But is not Heraclitus here pointing at the dynamic nature of any society in which no rules and 
institutions can be taken as enfirelyfixed andfast, and in which the pattern is not set by what is 
commonly agreed but rather what is controversial and under dispute? ... 
Without doubt for 
Heraclitus conflict is not onlypart of society, it is its vital element, page 29. 
To emphasise his point, Williams refers to a letter by Marx quoting the following fragment which 
links a natural phenomenon to the newly developing market economy: "All things are requital for 
fire, and fire for all things, as goods for gold as gold for goode', Williams page 28. A more general 
social comment is the following: "One should know that war is common, that justice is strife, that 
all things come about in accordance with strife and with what must be! ', quoted in Dames page 114. 
This fragment is fifther evidence for the claim that Heraclitus uses nature as an analogy for the 
social. In this context Thomson argues that much of the language of natural science, such as 
tscientific law', is composed of metaphor derived from social relations. Although Plotinus tells us 
that Heraclitus failed to make his argument clear when he said that "it is weariness for the same to 
labour and be ruled7, quoted in Dames page 117, clearly Heraclitus is referring to social 
contradictions. The same could be said for "most are at odds with that with which they constantly 
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associate - the account which governs the universe - and that what they meet with every day seems 
foreign to thenf', in Marcus Aurehus, quoted in Barnes page 126. 
Heraclitus seems to be anticipating the theory of internal relations, that is that opposites are not 
arbitrary fixed dualities but are organically linked, when he speaks of day and night, and beginning 
and end, as one. He continues: "Sickness makes health sweet and good, hunger plenty, weariness 
resf', Bames page 109. He applies this idea to craft working when he says: "The path of the 
carding-combs, is straight and crooked", Barnes page 103. Similarly he speaks of up and down, and 
the pure and the polluted, being one and the same, explaining the latter example in terms of 
different vantage points, a technique made explicit in the following fragment: "The sea is most pure 
and most polluted water; for fish, drinkable and fife-preserving; for men, undrinkable and death- 
dealing", quoted in Barnes page 104. Perhaps the most profound of Heraclitus' fragments are the 
various versions of the river analogies which explain permanence, or identity, within change and 
change within permanence: 
On those who enter the same rivers, ever different watersflow ... 
We step and do not step Into the 
same rivers, we are and we are not, quoted in B ames, page 117. 
Empedocles, from Sicily, was a wealthy supporter of democracy. In his book On Nature he took 
the tribal theory of the four elements and had them "working in a system of opposites, love and 
strife, attraction and repulsion ... Empedocles sought to carry this sort of outlook 
into a detailed 
application of the struggles between the two conflicting forces, with necessity as the sum of their 
activity, together with the 'contract' that ties them together as they build and destroy - each of them 
limited by the effects of the othee', Lindsay page 2. In contrast to the Eleatics, in his Physics 
Empedocles explains what is, or being, as composed of an interpenetration, or vortex, between the 
one and the many: "At one time they grew to be one alone from being many, and at another they 
grew apart again to be many from being one ... And these never cease their continual change, now 
coming together by Love all into one, now again all being carried apart by the hatred of Strife ... to 
that extent they come into being and have no lasting fife; but insofar as they never cease their 
continual change, to that extent they exist forever, quoted in Barnes, page 166. 
Thomson claims that Empedocles' use of the opposition between love and strife, which is related 
to Orphic myth, highlights the differing ideologies of the aristocracy and the masses. For the 
aristocracy "Love was a dangerous thing, because it implied desire, ambition, discontent. The 
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tendency of aristocratic thought was to divide, to keep things apart ... In the philosophy of 
Empedocles, who had much in common with the Orphics, it is Love that brings the world together, 
Strife that forces it apart, and the world is best when Love overcomes Strife. The tendency of 
popular thought was to unite", page 238. Whilst this explanation is possible, Thomson fails to 
clarify which class is thinking the "popular thought" which Empedocles supports against the 
thinking of the aristocracy. 
Lindsay (1970) claims that the early Greek dialectical thought used by Heraclitus and Empedocles 
synthesised the opposition between the rising market economy and "tribal society as it grew aware 
of its unity with, and its difference from, nature. jand) a society in which individualism with all its 
small local conflicts, endlessly splitting up the general interest, had been born - above all, a society 
in which money systems and mathematics had arrived as the expression of the new divisive forces 
inside the overriding unity, the strongly surviving tribal elements", page 3. However, on the same 
page Lindsay states that there was both a positive and a negative side to this dialectic of opposites: 
7he emphasis put by Heraclitus and Empedocles on opposites or contraries continues in Greek 
thought, and is the source of both its greatest strengths and its greatest weaknesses. Aristotle, who 
makes the principle an insistent feature of his physics, declares that the theme was shared by 
Greek rational physics ftom the outset. Indeed it could hardly have been otherwise; for in this 
matter the Greeks were canying on the deepest and most pervasive element in primitive tribal 
thinking, where the dual organisation ofsociety is reflected in every aspect of the way in which the 
universe and naturalphenomena are regarded, 
Lindsay claims that this immanent dialectic was too metaphysical or formal, too one-sidedly 
concerned with the qualitative at the expense of the quantitative; observation, measurement and 
experiment were almost totally neglected. Similarly, it possessed little or no sense of the internal 
relations of entities. Paradoxically, it was too atomistic and concerned with the external relationship 
between self-subsisting entities; it sharply delineated identity and difference, form and matter. 
Lindsay attempts an explanation of such thought in the transition from tribal society to a class 
structure increasingly based on oppositions between atomic individuals, or human beings reduced 
to heterogeneous 'things'. The internal relations of the new mode of production, consisting of 
slavery, wage labour and labour performed by artisans, were not understood and therefore could 
not be theorised. Lindsay claims that the abstract dialectical thought used by these Greek proto- 
scientists, together with the productivity of the slave, or human machine, profoundly reduced both 
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the likelihood of, and the need for, science to be applied to the development of machines. He states 
that slavery: 
proceeded, not out of any purely economic motivation or need, but out of the total human 
situation, which in turn it affected and modified Yhe concept of the 'atomic individual' as thefiree 
man (with all its virtues of liberating menfirom ancient constraints) had as its reverse side the 
concept of the man-thing or man-mechanism; the new sense offireedom was dogged all the time 
by an increasing sense offate or necessity. Hence the dilemma of Greek thought, which on the one 
hand was richly aware of the patterns of change and on the other hand could not advance firom 
dialectical generalisations to applications in mechanics and dynamics, page 8. 
Using a similar argument Thomson points out that the Sumerians and Egyptians "who in technical 
inventiveness far surpassed the Greeks", were not responsible for a new world outlook: "The early 
Greek philosophers owed what was new in their work ... to the new developments in the relations of 
productioW', page 172. 
Parmenides, Zeno and the law of contradiction 
Parmenides was bom into the landowning class of Elea, a part of southern Italy settled by Greeks, 
and was probably an initiate of the Pythagorean Mystery cult. A substantial part of a poem of his 
survives, giving us a summary of his philosophy. His views represent the antithesis of the dialectic 
of Heraclitus, and were the first attempt to codify a rigid duality between being and non-being. For 
Parmenides these terms corresponded with truth and falsehood, from which is derived the law of 
non-contradiction. Thomson states that, even though this view fails to distinguish between the 
empirical and the intelligible, it is a landmark because "for the first time in the history of western 
thought, we have to deal with a metaphysical conception of being, contradicting the dialectical 
conception of becoming, which prevailed hitherto without questiorf', page 292. "That 
contradictories are not true together he shows in the verses in which he finds fault with those who 
identify opposites", is a paraphrase by Barnes of the explanation of these views by the ancient 
commentator Simplicus, Bames page 133. Parmenides' poem says that being, or what is, "is 
ungenerated and indestructible, whole, of one kind and unwavering, and complete7, quoted in 
Barnes page 134, and this contrasts absolutely with non-being, or that which "is not and must not 
be - this I say to you is a trail devoid of all knowledge ... For you could not recognise that which is 
not (for it is not to be done), nor could you mention if', quoted on page 132 of Barnes. 
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Despite her Eurocentric stance, Nye (1990) analyses Parmenides' logic within its social context, 
Greece in the sixth-century BC. She stresses the need to examine Parmenides' synthesis between 
poetry, which represents emotion or desire, and logic, which invokes abstract entities and 
passionless reason: 
Desire puts him on the road to logic, leads him through andpast the or&na, -y concerns of human 
life in a quest or searchfor something loved and lost, dreamt of but never atzained.. 'What is'is 
the perfected object of desire, a being that can be approached without any of the confusiot4 fear, 
indecisiog or ambivalence with which we approach the physical objects ofdesire Partnenides has 
found an object of love eternally faithful, beyond birth or death, held tightly in the embrace of 
logical necessity, pages 10 and 13. 
By a careful textual analysis of her translation of Parmenides' poem, Nye draws attention to its fink 
with the struggle by the ruling men of the newly established pofis, who want to eliminate the 
vestiges of the traditional freedoms, power and status enjoyed by women in earlier Greek tribal 
society. She seeks a philosophical basis for homosexuality, common amongst the Greek 
aristocracy, although she fails to fink the orientation to social class: "If a female mixes with a male, 
the result is both female and not female, impossible by the rule of non-contradictiom.. 'What is' 
cannot come to be out of what is not, like a man from a woman, nor can it be destroyed. In logic 
the way of nonbeing is kept separate from being, just as what is male is kept separate from what is 
not male. In logic there is no intercourse of being with noribeing, and therefore no disappointment 
or ambiguity, only the perfect fidelity of the unmoveable, unchangeable, perfect 'well-roundedness' 
of trutlf', - pages 14 and 16. 
This interpretation is supported by the text of the poem, but, because of her particular social 
vantage point, Nye fas to see that the laws of non-contradiction and the excluded middle sublimate 
a fixed dualism which corresponds to the Greek social formations. These include the desire by 
Parmenides to distinguish between freemen and freewomen on the one hand, and slaves on the 
other. Plato and Aristotle similarly use the laws in a way which suggests a fink with the need to 
reinforce both the male-female and freeman-slave distinction, which they allege is natural. But they 
also distinguish between law and chaos, Greek and barbarian, Gods and humans, and between the 
true philosopher, who in practice must have the amount of leisure only available to the landowning 
class, and the Sophist, who is aligned with the rising merchant-trader. Each of these oppositions 
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corresponds to the contradiction between the authentic timeless positivity of being and the transient 
and illusory negativity of non-being posited by Parmenides. This opposition was to prove highly 
important to the eventual codification of deductive thought, especially in the Aristotelian syllogism 
and 190' and 2& century formal logic. 
One of Parmenides' disciples was Mellissus, who used prose, rather than poetry, to explain his 
teacher's views, which were to be the beginning of the development of the reified metaphysics of 
19' century positivism. Simplicius summarises the philosophy of Mellissus as "perceptible objects 
do not mist but seem to exist", and explains fin-ther this influential philosophy in the following 
extracts from a fragment: 
But it is not possible for anything to come into being either ftom the non-existent (not even 
something else which is nothing, let alone something actually existent) orftom the existent (for in 
that case it would have existed all along and would not come into being). What exists, therefore, 
has not come into being. Therefore it has always existed Nor will what exists he destroyed For 
what exists can change neither into the non-existent (the natural scientists agree on this) nor into 
the existent (for in that case it would still remain and not be destroyed). Therefore it always has 
existed and will exist-nothing that exists is empty,, for what is empty is nothing, and what is 
nothing cannot exist. So what exists does not move -for it has nowhere to move to if nothing is 
empty. Nor can it contract into itse#' For in that case it would be both rarer and denser than 
iise#, ' and that is impossible .. But what is 
hot seems to us to become coIg and what is cold hot, 
and what is hard soft, and what is soft harg and living things seem to die and to come into being 
ftom what is not alive, and all these things seem to change .. So it is clear that we do not see 
correctly, and that those many things do not correctly seem to exist. For they would not change if 
they were true, hut each would be as it seemed to he; for nothing is stronger than what is true. And 
if they changed what exists would have perished and what does not exist would have come into 
being. In this way, then, if there exist many things, they must be such as the one is, all quotes are 
from Barnes, pages 144-9. 
Zeno of Elea, another disciple of Parmenides, was said by Aristotle, and others, to have invented 
the dialogue form later referred to by Plato as the dialectic. Although Kerferd (1981) rejects this 
claim, it may be true since in the following 6xtract from Plato's Pamenides Zeno, referring to his 
book of arguments, says: "My book attacks those who say that several things exist, aiming to show 
that their hypothesis, that several things exist, leads to even more ridiculous results, if you examine 
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it properly, than the hypothesis that only one thing miste', quoted in Bames page 152. Zeno 
believed that true being is composed of an eternal unchanging indivisible one, and evidence of a 
reality composed of many changing entities is false. He used a number of negative dialectical 
arguments to try to demonstrate this simple truth, including the argument from dichotomy, which 
claim that if we repeatedly subdivide the One, this leads either to an infinity of undivisible minima, 
or a dissolution into nothingness. In either case, argues Zeno, the result is absurd, and therefore the 
opposite argument, that the One is indivisible, is true. Most famously Zeno argues that motion is 
not possible, because to assume that it does leads to absurdity. He does not see motion as 
continuous sensuous movement, but as abstract discrete jumps from one point to another, points 
which again can be subdivided into ever smaller units. Therefore, exTlains Aristotle, "the slowest 
thing will never be caught when running by the fastest. For the pursuer must first reach the point 
from which the pursued set out, so that the slower must always be ahead of it. This is the same 
argument as the dichotomy', quoted in Barnes page 155. 
The debate on the Sophists 
7he best way of combining one's own interests and the demmuh ofjustice is to act according to 
justice when there are witnesses but according to nature when one is alone and unobserved, 
Antiphon, quoted in Wheelwfight (1966), page 259. 
Being is unrecognisable unless it manages to seem, and seeming isfeeble unless it manages to be. 
Gorgias, who wrote a book entitled ConcemingNot-Being, quoted in Wheelwright page 249 
7he "antilogical " method of the Sophists clearly reproduced in theory the upheavals and conflicts 
of their time .. Immoderate consumption offood and drink is hadfor the immoderate consumer, 
hut goodfor the tradesman. Victory at the games is goodfor the victor, but hadfor the defeated 
7he issue of the Peloponnesian War was good for the Lacedaemonians, hut had for the 
Athenians 
.. 7his 
line of argumentation reinforced the idea that social institutions are not 
unalterable hut can and should he remodelled with the changing requirements of mankind, 
Novack (1965) pages 185 and 187. 
(According to Antiphon) dreams were signs which required interpretation not literal application, 
and indeed often could mean the opposite of what they appeared to say, Kerferd page 5 1. 
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One of the later meanings of the verb dialegesthai from which dialectic was derived was 'to 
discuss by the method of question and ans-wer, Kerferd page 59. 
Plato and Aristotle constantly attack the methods used by their philosophical rivals, in particular 
the Megarians and the Sophists. The Megarians, none of whose work survives, were disciples of 
Eucliedes, a contemporary of Socrates, who, according to Aristotle, constantly broke the law of 
contradiction by insisting that a thing can both be and not be. 
The Sophists, of whom we know the names of about 26, were at their peak between 460 and 
380BC. Aristotle claimed in his lost dialogue, Sophistes, that Zeno invented the dialectic, although 
at other times his view was that the patent belonged to either Socrates, Plato or himself. In this 
section it will be argued that it was the Sophists who synthesised the dialectical method, or 
methods, in its more developed form, which reached its zenith in the writings of Hegel. Only a few 
fragments of unreliable and largely hostile commentaries on the writings of Protagoras and the 
other Sophists survive. Therefore my source for this claim is the persuasive evidence and argument 
contained in Yhe Sophistic Movement by G. B. Kerferd (198 1). Whilst Kerferd makes only passing 
references to the contradictions in the social totality of fifth century Greece, he amasses a large 
amount of evidence concerning the Sophists, who he claims are "condemned to a kind of half-fife 
between pre-Socratics on the one hand and Plato *and Aristotle on the other, they seem to wander 
for ever like lost souls", page 1. 
As hinted at in this quote, we rely heavily on Plato for our knowledge of the Sophists. However, 
Kerferd fails to tell us why Plato, Aristotle and other members of the Athenian land- and slave- 
owning class, who were also initiates to the Mysteries, misrepresented the views of, and were so 
hostile to, this group of professional thinkers and speakers who "offered an expensive product 
invaluable to those seeking a career in politics and public life generally", page 17. The Sophists 
were radical humanists and agnostics, who anticipated the bourgeois theory of the social contract. 
They viewed a human being as a complex of social and natural factors, from which they drew the 
conclusion that slavery was not natural. The medically inclined Sophist-humanists took something 
from anthropocentric tribal dialectics by insisting on knowing who and what a person is before 
treating him or her medically. Sophists came from all parts of the Greek world, attracted to the 
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affluence, social mobility and relatively open intellectual atmosphere of 5th century Athens. These 
polymaths charged fees for access to their knowledge and skills, being the intellectual equivalents of 
the new merchants and money-lenders who had challenged the economic and political power of the 
nobility. With their rhetorical skills and their dialectical multi-sided philosophy, corresponding to 
the contradictions and compleýý of the social relations of commodity production, these new 
intellectual entrepreneurs challenged the right of the land- and slave-owners to monopolise the 
world of thought. Not surprisingly the Sophists generated a good deal of hostility amongst the 
Athenian nobility. They were punished with imprisonment or e)dle, having their books burned and, 
in the case of Socrates, if we accept him as a Sophist death. 
Kerferd fails to explain the persistence of the negative attitude towards the Sophists amongst 
contemporary classics scholars at Oxford, Cambridge and other leading academic institutions 
around the world. These tenured intellectuals present philosophy in a frozen ahistorical way, which 
abstracts from its roots in the social struggles of the societies in which it developed. Therefore they 
tend to gravitate towards the timeless motionless world of the Platonic forms, waxing lyrically on 
the "geniue' of Plato, in sharp contrast to the base Sophists, with their vulgar eristic, who are 
presented as charlatans and sellers of 'virtue'. Kerferd claims that Hegel's attempt to rehabilitate the 
Sophists, crucial though it was, was only half-hearted. Hegel's view was dominated by his 
Hellenomania. His intention was to create a schematic genesis for the development of the 
philosophies of Plato and Aristofle, so that "paradoxically the traditional view of the sophists would 
seem thus to have been confirmed", Kerferd page 8. More positive is Untersteiner's dialectical view 
that "the sophists agree in an anti-idealistic concreteness which does not tread the ways of 
scepticism, but rather those of a realism and a phenomenalism which do not confine reality within a 
single dogmatic scheme, but allow it to rage in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity", 
quoted on page II of Kerferd. 
Plato, in the Phae&-us, credits Zeno, and not Protagoras, with the use of the art of antilogi", or 
antilogic, "which consist in causing the same thing to be seen by the same people now as possessing 
one predicate and now as possessing the opposite or contradictory predicate, so e. g. just and 
unjust, an art 'which is not confined to law courts and to public speeches, but which applies as a 
single art (if it is an art) to whatever things men speak about"', Kerferd page 63. Protagoras, who 
according to Philostratus studied under the Persian Magi, rejected Parmenides' view that a negative 
statement had no meaning because it did not refer to anything. In a famous fragment, which is 
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imilar to Januan logic and anticipates the Hegelian dialectic, he points out that the antilogos could 
be full of meaning when it asserted the non-existence of a thing: "Man is the measure of all things, 
of things that are as to how they are, and of things that are not as to how they are nof', quoted on 
page 85 of Kerferd. However, Protagoras also said that all logiai did not have the same ontological 
status, since the orthos logos was superior to alternatives, a view to be compared the idea that 
ccopposing arguments could be expressed by a single speaker, as it were within a single complex 
argumenf', Kerferd page 84. Perhaps Protagoras is merely pointing out the truism that dfferent 
statements have different ontological statuses as descriptions of reality seen from particular vantage 
points. Kerferd's discussion of the problem is notable for its lack of awareness of Hegel's views, 
which similarly applies to his discussion of the Sophist Gorgias' views on the concept of nothing, an 
important idea in Indian dialectics. 
That Protagoras, the leading Sophist, wrote on logic and methods of debate is clear from the titles 
of two of his, now lost, books: 4rt of Eristic and two volumes on Antilogiai. There is also an 
anonymous Sophistic teA the Dissoi Logoi, which opens with "twofold arguments are spoken in 
Greece by those who philosophise, concerning the good and the bad". Kerferd explains that the 
text's "basic structure clearly consists in setting up opposing arguments about the identity or non- 
identity of apparently opposite moral and philosophic terms such as good and bad, true and 
false ... this is an application of the method of 
Protagoras7, page 54. The "method of Protagorae', 
which Kerferd claims is really the method of the whole of the Sophist movement, consisted of " I. a 
formal expository style whether lecture or text-book, 2. the verbal exchange of a small informal 
discussion group, and 3. the antithetical formulation of public positions and the setting of party 
linee', page 34. This was the source of the dialectical method, which was to be used in Plato's 
dialogues and analysed in the Topics of Aristotle. 
Wheelwright (1966) exTIains how the Sophists' claim that "wisdom can be taughf' was a direct 
challenge to the aristocratic view that wisdom was a natural virtue inherited by the few. He goes on 
to quote the following fragment afleged to be by Protagoras, which reveals the Sophist's view of 
matter. It makes the point, which represents a massive leap forward in philosophy, that observation 
is active and has a subjective aspect: 
All matter is in a state offlux. A fluctuating thing may retain its shape, however, because the 
changes may be such that the additions compensate for the losses. It is our sense impressions of 
the thing that get modified, because affected by age and other bodily conditions .. Mere are 
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intelligible principles inherent in the matter of every phenomenon; because matter is essentially 
the sum of all the seemings that it hasfor any and allpersons, page 23 9. 
For the Sophists, particularly Protagoras, it would seem that antilogic involves two or more 
statements or arguments each of which are contradictory, yet which may all be true. The reason for 
each logos being in contradiction with the others, yet all being simultaneously true, is that for 
Protagoras each logos represents the different vantage point of each participant in the dialogue. It is 
clear that the Sophists went some way towards relating each of these vantage points to the social 
whole, an intellectual feat which, if taken far enough, involved a thoroughgoing analysis of the real 
contradictions at the core of the Athenian social totality. However Plato, as advocate of the 
privileges of the nobility, constantly sniped at the Sophists, taking refuge in the mystical theory of a 
timeless motionless essence beyond the empirical world. His ideological stance prevented him from 
seeing the profound insight of the Sophistic antilogic. 
As Mailloux (1995) demonstrates, there has been a radical re-examination and rehabilitation of the 
Sophists by some contemporary philosophers, in particular neo-pragmatists, post-modernists and 
some literary theorists. Mailloux quotes a source, Schiller's Humanism, which argues that 
Protagoras' aphorism "Man is the measure of all thinge' urges Science to discover how -Man may 
measure, and by what devices make concordant his measures with those of hisfellow men, page 8. 
Therefore different individuals and groups experience reality from different vantage points. 
Rejecting Plato's charge of "relativism7', Schiller claims that Protagoras attempts to transcend any 
one vantage point by synthesizing and reconciling opposing vantage points. He asks: what .. is the 
transitionftom subjective truthfor the individual to objective truthfor a/P., and continues: For if 
there is a mass of subjective judgments vwying in value, there must ensue a selection of the more 
valuable and serviceable, which will, in consequence, survive and constitute growing bodies of 
objective truth, shared and agreed upon by practically all. In the same passage Schiller adds a 
important point about the social context of 'objectivity': it is stillpossible to observe how society 
establishes an 'objective' order by coercing or cajoling those who are inclined to divergent 
judgments in moral or aesthetic matters .. all assertions, however 'contradictory, that are really 
made ... are true, in the sense that there really is something in the situation which provokes 
different minds so to formulate their various estimates., pages II- 12. Fish exTlicitly links the 
Protagorean view to the socio-economic dimension when he asks: Does might make right? In a 
sense the answer I must give is yes, since in the absence of a perspective independent of 
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interpretation some interpretive perspective will ahvays rule by virtue of having won out over its 
competitors, quoted on page 17 of Mailloux. We can only speculate as to the extent of Protagoras' 
understanding of the totalising aspect of his theory. What is clear is that despite its alleged 
tendency to relativism, the Sophists' massive contribution to dialectical thought was to prove 
invaluable for Hegel and Marx over two thousand years later. 
Plato and the dialectic 
Logic is here, for the first time in literature, contemplated as an autonomous science with the task 
of ascertaining the supreme principles of affirmative and negative propositions (the combinations 
and 'separations ), Taylor commenting on Plato's method of division in typically Eurocentric 
fashion, quoted in Thomson page 320. 
(Dialectic is the way in which thought engages in an) inward dialogue within the soul... the zigzag 
of contemplative ascent to the divine realm, Chadwick (1990) on Plato's view of the dialectic, 
page 109. 
Socrates explains, the rhetorician looks like a slave, the philosopher like aftee man .. What Plato's 
Socrates never foregrounds, of course, is that a great number of human beings must forego any 
hope of leisure so that the philosophical, ennobledjew can get their theories straight, Jasper Neel, 
quoted in MaiHoux pages 74-5. 
Because Plato's known biographical details are few and often repeated, I shall confine myself to 
extracts from the Parmenides and Philebus dialogues. The Parmenides, which was much praised by 
Hegel, features an end section, which may have been a later addition to the original text, on the 
dialectic of the One and the many begins: 
If it is one, the one would not be many, would it? 
No, how could it? 
Men there cannot be apart of it nor can it be a whole. 
Why? 
A part is surely part of a whole. 
Yes. 
But what is the whole? Wouldn't thaiftom which no part is missing be a whole? 
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Certainly. 
In both cases, then, the one would be composed ofpaHs, both if it is a whole and if it hasparts. 
Necessarily. 
So in both cases the one would thus be many rather than one. 
True. 
Yet it must be not many but one. 
It must. 
7herefore, if the one is to be one, it will neither be a whole nor have parts, 
Plato (1996), pages 141-2. 
This open knock-about, yet highly abstract, style continues to generate contradictions when the 
topic moves to the being and non-being of the One: 
7hen because it moves, the one is also altered 
Yes. 
Andyet, because it in no way moves, it could in no way be altered 
No, it couldn't. 
So insofar as the one that is not moves, it is altere4l but insofar as it doesn't move, it is not 
altered 
No it isn't. 
7herefore the one, if it is not, is both altered and not altereg 
page 171. 
The Philebus is more measured and carefijl about the use of dialectic. Still on the tribal dialectical 
theme of the One and the many we read the foffowing anticipation of Leibniz's monad: 
For it is a remarkable thing to say that many are one, and one is many, a person who suggests 
either of these things may encounter opposition. 
7hat isn't what I mean, Protarchus. the remarkahle instances of one-and-many that you have 
mentioned are commonplace: almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern 
onese#'with things like that 
First, whether we ought to believe in the real existence of monads of this sort; secondly, how we 
are to conceive that each of them, being ahvays one and the same and subject neither to 
generation nordestruction, nevertheless is, to begin with, most assuredly this single unity andyet 
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subsequently comes to be in the infinite number of things that come into being - an identical unity 
being thusfound simultaneously in unity andplurafity, 
Plato (1972) pages 19- 20 
Plato anticipates Hegel's discussion of mediation in the following passage: 
7here then; that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of enquiry, of 
learning, and of teaching one another,, but your clever modem man, while making his One (or his 
Many, as the case may be) more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when he has got his One 
proceeds to his unlimited number straight away, allowing the intermediates to escape him; 
whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a 
philosophical and a contentious discussion, 
page 24. 
The secondary literature on Plato's dialectic 
Most mainstream philosophers and classics scholars fail to explain the relationship between Plato's 
thought and his socio-political environment. The Leninist Thomson (1961) overcomes the 
deficiency by summarising the social basis of Plato's philosophy as follows: 
As a member of the old nobility who was bitterly opposed to democracy, Plato could see no hope 
for society except to undo all that had been done by the merchant class and re-estahlish the rule of 
the landed aristocraqy. ý in other words, to restore the past in such a way that it will remain 
henceforth as it was and suffer no further change. His whole philosophy is inspired by this 
antipathy to change, and hence it is not surprising that hefelt such an acNirationfor the EDpfian 
priesthood, which had succeeded so well in laying a dead hand on the cultural development of 
their people ... his philosophy expresses the reactioncuy outlook of a seylsh oligarchy clinging 
blindly to itsprivileges at a time when their social and economic basis was crumbling away. It is a 
philosophyfounded on the denial of motion and change and hence of life itse#', page 3 28. 
By contrast less perceptive Greek scholars, such as Plochman (1973), discuss Plato's philosophy in 
general, and his dialectic in particular, in the context of the duality between the phenomenal world 
of becoming and the unchanging being of the Forms. Plochman makes a modest attempt at 
showing how Plato improves on Parmenides by claiming that the main function of Plato's dialectic 
is to reveal the relationship between being and becoming. However, Plochman acknowledges that 
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Plato's dialectic is highly elusive, and can be defined in several different ways, running from the 
simple to the complex. At its most basic the Platonic dialectic is merely the kind of structured 
conversation in which truth, as opposed to opinion, is sought after, a method used in many of the 
dialogues. There is also the question and answer form, in which Socrates usually defeats his 
opponents by the use of elenchus, which represents a more intensive form of dialectic as compared 
with mere conversation. Dialectic is thus developed into an art, but to the extent that its practitioner 
becomes skilled, he or she is skilled in the most important of all the arts, because dialectic is the art 
of arts. The dialectic is also the art of enumeration, although this is defined widely and includes 
division and subdivision, but it "cannot proceed independently of experience", page I 10. To the 
extent that dialectic is a contest to win truth, it aims at victory by the use of statement, or logos, 
proof and refutation. Also the dialectic is self-revelation, since in the elenchus 
the character of the men .. is revealeg sometimes in spite of the speaker's 
desire to keep himse#in 
the background.. there can be no bitterness, nojealousy, in dialectic; the attack looks to reform of 
aperson's thinking and character, not to his discomfiture, page 111-12. 
Plochman explains the dialectical technique of impersonation, where dialogues are "all dotted with 
allusions to remarks others would have made, proofs they would have given7, page 112. How 
authentic these "remarke' and "proofe' of other philosophers, especially the Sophists, are in the 
hands of Plato is a matter of conjecture, but Plochman fails; to discuss this contentious point. Next 
he cites the dialectical technique of definition, which attempts to explain the being of a thing or 
idea. The technique relies on the fact that a speaker's definition is rarely true or adequate, and 
therefore "becomes a target for refutation ... 
Socrates himself rarely offers definitions but instead 
elicits them from his struggling respondente', pages 1134. Plochman says that on a higher level 
dialectics ceased to be a mere art, stating that to the extent that it seeks for the timeless being of the 
Forms, it takes on scientific status: "dialectic emerges as the common structure of inquiry binding 
together and finding the shared principles and formulas applicable to all or at least to many of the 
discipfines7', page 114. He reaffirms the point that dialectic is "the search for and demonstration of 
trutV, page 115, leading to the final stage in which dialectic becomes pure being. 
Plochman contrasts Plato's various approaches to the dialectic with other modes of thought 
including common opinion, rhetoric, science and history. In the case of science he concludes that 
dialectic must be placed above the sciences, for it includes their methods, it grasps the principles 
and conclusions of all of them, it sets them in their proper relationships on to another, and it 
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Justifies them by tracing their hypotheses back to some unitary principle. Dialectic says in effect 
that to have anyfully explicit scienfific knowledge one must transcend it and see it whole, which 
implies seeing ifftom outside, which in turn implies the seeing of all of reality, pages 119-20. 
Plochman says of history that "as a recounting of individual events (it) must be invested with a kind 
of structure by a dialectician - some principle of separation or of collection of elements in a Est. 
Otherwise history, for all its show, can teach us nothing, can give us no real knowledge, can lead us 
to no forms helping us to comprehend human fife and actiow', page 120. Doubtless Lindsay (1970) 
would agree, because he notes Plato's view that the duality symmetry-asymmetry is the basis of 
historical movement and development. He draws attention to the triadic relationship captured in 
Plato's claim that "It is not possible for two things to be joined together without a thir&', page 16. 
Thomson (196 1) attempts to locate Plato's thought socially when he argues that the cave allegory 
, public, with 
the rich ontological contradictions which arise from it, is an idealisation of in the Re 
slavery in ancient Greece, in particular the historical reality of those working in the silver mines at 
Laurion. However, this interpretation may by challenged since the purpose of the allegory is to 
release the cave dwellers from ignorance and captivity, which is in sharp contradiction to Plato's 
attitude to slavery. 
The phenomenological philosopher Karl Jaspers (1962), who engages in hagiography and lacks an 
understanding of the social totality of ancient Greece, comments on Plato's dialectic: 
the prevailing knowledge which supposes it has the thing it knows, is congealed, incomplete, and 
unjustifiably complacent. It can acquire its truth only by bursting it limits, by understanding Use#' 
in the knowledge of nonknowledge .. it is one with the reality of the knower .. JAat makes this 
knowledge that is always in motion so hard to grasp is that the thinking it demands is something 
more than the o1ject thinking implied in the prevailing concept of knowledge-It is a process 
which went on throughout Plato's life, taking on ever new forms, endlessly intensive, but making 
no definite progress.... 7his is what Goethe meant when he said that Plato 'dispels all objects with 
his method, page 17. 
Jaspers reminds us that Plato constantly refers to the world of sense perception, which he also calls 
becoming, finite knowledge or mere appearances; a world the in which "contradictions clash like 
flint and steer', page 36. In the manner of Parmenides the early Plato contrasts becoming with the 
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unchanging harmonious essential world of the Forms, which is pure being. However, Jaspers 
explains, "being and nonbeing are not ultimate opposites but are both present at every step though 
in different ways.. Matter or space is radically nonbeing, but with its potential becoming or coming- 
into-being, it is also an eternal potentiality toward being', page 38. Without realising the social 
significance of the analogy, Jaspers tells us that for Plato finite knowledge is "as a slave that lets 
itself be dragged about by all other states of mind", page 20, although here, as elsewhere, Jaspers 
provides no source for Plato's words. Speaking of both the One and self-awareness, Jaspers says 
"Self-awareness seeks to be one with itself. 'I would rather that my lyre should be 
inharmonious... or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that 
I, being one, should be at odds with myself and contradict myself ", page 18, again no source is 
given. 
With reference to the Platonic dialogue forra, Jaspers states that it is no 
accident that nearly all Plato's works are in dialogue form. Form and substance are 
concomitant .. "en Plato's philosophy is expounded undialectically as a doctrine, it becomes 
scarcely recognizable... 'For in regard to the value of what I say, I can call on only one witness, 
my adversaty with whom I am carrying on the discussion; as to the crowd, I ignore 
it'... Dialogue ... makes itpossible to attain agreement step 
by step, to arrive at logically compelling 
conclusions in the precision of question and answer, in the battle of afternatives.... Yhe 
demonstration of contradictions brings thinking into its natural movement Its consequence in the 
dialogue form is that the thought content is suspended in the movement of thinking. Wide in an 
exposition thoughts are setforth as definitive, in dialogue the truth develops spontaneously, in the 
course of the exchange, as an objective reality that is not contained in any one position, pages 22- 
6. 
Of the Platonic dialectic, Jaspers says that "Dialectic and philosophy are the same, the one stressing 
the method, the other the content", page 35. However, he oversimplifies Plato's view of 
contradiction when he states that opposites "are mutually exclusive. For no opposite can 'ever be 
or become its own opposite, but either it passes away or perishes in the change"', page 36. On the 
same page Jaspers acknowledges that even for the world of the Forms "what at first ends in 
perplexity becomes dialectically a means of speculation by which, with the contradictions 
themselves, one penetrates to deeper knowledge. Contradiction is the dynamic factor... It 'draws 
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the dialectician toward Being ... The chief test of a natural gift for dialectic ... 
(is) the ability to see the 
connections of things' (Republic)". Jaspers continues, dialectic "is an indirect method. If man 
attempted to see being itselý he must fear to be blinded, as the eyes are blinded when they look into 
the sun. Thus it is necessary to operate by way of concepts (Iogoi) and to investigate the essence of 
things with their help ... The Dialectic of mere oppositions remains aporetic and serves only as an 
indicator. Dialectic by intermediate concepts elucidates the divergent by establishing an intervening 
bond (demos). Hence the importance of the 'between' (metwcy), whereby separates are joined, 
whereby the one is present in the other or has a share in it. Hence also the importance of the 
moment (exaiphngs), of the transition, the junction of past and future in the present. Hence also the 
being of what is not, which in a certain way has being7, page 37. Jaspers ends with a colourfid 
description of the Platonic dialectic: "Philosophical thinking is an upward-tending erotic 
enthusiasm. But in it we experience our vaciflations, our ups and downs. We fall, we W, we five 
anew in the movement of love. For love is like philosophy, a being-between. It is having and not 
having. It fialfils in nonattainment' ', page 45. 
The views of Plochman and Jaspers, are uncritical, occasionally fawning and always asocial. In the 
same vein Robinson (1953) makes some observations on Plato's oral, as opposed to written, 
dialectical method. He begins by acknowledging the importance of going through all the relevant 
stages and the related necessity of taking the "long road" in Plato's dialectic, both of which are 
important in Hegel's dialectical method. However, he incorrectly claims that, though Plato 
borrowed elements from earlier thinkers like Socrates and Zeno, "the notion of dialectic which we 
find in Plato's dialogues was invented by Plato himself-Plato does not introduce the idea of 
dialectic until those dialogues in which he is no longer merely reproducing his master ... Plato 
represents the dialectical method as familiar to Socrates' hearers and yet as requiring to be 
explained to therif', pages 88-90. He points out that Plato's attitude towards the dialectic cools in 
his late works, the Laws and the Philebus. Referring to Plato's lack of precision in defining his 
dialectical method, Robinson says Plato has a "strong tendency ... to mean 
'the ideal method, 
whatever it may be'... In the same way, he applied the abusive terms 'eristic' and 'sophistry' on 
every occasion to whatever seemed to him at that time the danger most to be avoided" page 70. 
More fundamentally, Robinson argues that Plato's oral dialectic recorded in the dialogues, which is 
aimed primarily at the discovery of knowledge, requires that the writer, speaking through the leader 
of the dialogue, has already "done a great deal of private discovery beforehan&', page 81. In 
response, Robinson points out that for Plato "A process analogous to that of questioning others 
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goes on in the mind of the single inquirer", page 83. Whilst this is one-sidedly true, Nye (1990) is 
persuasive in arguing that the bulk of the dialogues could be written in treatise form, since the 
second speaker spends most of his words in appropriate assent and dissent to the questions of the 
leader. The Sophist is typical of Plato's dialectical form, rarely does the second speaker have 
anything of significance to say. 
Kerferd argues that an understanding of Plato's view of antilogic, requires us to contrast the term 
with eristic, which comes from eris meaning strife. Eristic means "seeking victory in argumenf' or 
"success in debate or at least the appearance of such success"; and the art of eristic "provides 
appropriate means and devices for so doing. Concern for truth is not a necessary part of the 
art ... Fallacies of any kind, verbal ambiguities, 
long and irrelevant monologues may all on occasion 
succeed in reducing an opponent to silence and so be appropriate tools of eristic", Kerferd page 62. 
In contrast to Plato's totally condemnatory description of eristic, his explanation of antilogic is 
rather less hostile; it is an inferior form of dialectic which "proceeds on the basis of (merely) verbal 
contradictions ... though well-meant 
it is inadequate to the task in hans', page 64. Antilogic consists 
of 
opposing one logos to another logos, or in discovering or drawing attention to the presence of 
such an opposition in an argument or in a thing or state of affairs.... when used in argument it 
constitutes a specific andfairly definite technique, namely that ofproceedingftom a given logos, 
say the position adopted by an opponent, to the establishment of a conftwy or contradictory logos 
in such a way that the opponent must either accept both logoi, or at least abandon hisfirst 
position, Kerferd, page 63. 
The term elenchus, sometimes referred to as negative dialectic, is the name given to the mutual 
cross examination used in Plato's dialogues. It consists of the refutation of a logos, arrived at in 
answer to a question such as what is courage? l either by showing the logos to lead to self- 
contradiction, or by showing its antilogos to be true, in either case leading to a state of aporia or 
uncertainty, which can in turn lead to misology, or hatred of arguments. Elenchus could involve 
merely the use of antilogos or dialectic itself, either way Plato argues that its use must be restricted 
to the mature philosopher, otherwise it can "destroy respect for traditional authority", page 64. 
Kerferd links the Platonic dialectic, as opposed to antilogic, to the method of establishing truth by 
reference to the Forms, but fails to acknowledge Plato's apparent rejection of the theory in the 
Parmenides, which contrasts sharply with Plato's early view that only be reference to the Forms 
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can dialogue overcome aporia and misology. These are inevitable because the empirical world is in 
constant flux and is therefore inherently contradictory. In contrast, Robinson's remarks on eristic 
and elenchus are more searching: 
7he reason why Plato constantly pillories eristic and distinguishes itfrom dialectic is that in truth 
his awn dialectic very closely resembled eristic, and this in turn is because his own dialectic, 
though having a constructive purpose, incorporates the destructive Socratic elenchus. Me 
Socratic elenchus looks to the or&nary observer like nothing so much as an obstinate 
determination to disprove whatever the otherpaiV says, pages 85-6. 
Nye's analysis of Plato's Sophist is similarly searching, beginning with Plato's challenge to 
Parmenides' assertion that nothing can be said about "what is not", or any negative proposition, 
because it has no being. As a result of this, Nye says, "what is7 is both everything and nothing: "If 
there is no nonbeing, there is no falsity and so no way to distinguish proper philosophical thought 
from improper, truthful statement from false ... All rational thought 
is threatened if no predication 
except simple identity is possible. Then we are only able to 'speak of a good as a good , and of a 
man as a man'... Such a formalism was certainly not acceptable to those, like Socrates and Plato, 
who were critical of Athenian democracy", pages 24-5. In order to negate this Parmenidean 
impasse, the dialogue concludes that "to say that something is 'not something else' is not to say that 
it 'is not' but that it is 'different' from something else in some respect ... once 
difference is 
recognised, false thinking and false talk can be identified", page 27. Crucial to Nye's argument is 
the point that, having transcended the Parmenidean empty identity of "What ie', Plato uses the 
process of division, bolstered by deprecating metaphors and analogies, to create a new set of fixed 
oppositions which correspond to his immediate polemical need to refute the Sophists: 
Ihe goodness or badness of the Sophist is no longer an issue for discussion hut constitutes the 
semantic structure of a language .. If the truth of a metaphor ahvays leaves space for another 
metaphor and another truth, the Stranger's logical reconstruction does not. It stands alone, as the 
only correct and true way to view the Sophist... it forbids the respondent to speak or think outside 
the categories in which these evaluations have been made. Argument is terminated It is not 
surprising that such a technique would be welcome to someone of Plato'spolitical views .. Logical 
division makes Possible a conversation in which one party is in complete control of the discussion. 
7he Stranger leaves 7heaetetus no openingfor any substantive contribution to the discussion. At 
the same time the illusion is created of an exchange of views. -Logic has restructured 
communication. Yhe laws of noncontradiction and excluded middleforce 7heaetetus's replies and 
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also his thought, into approved channels. 7hey structure a &III by which Yheaetetus can learn, not 
to think, but to repeat what his teacher says. Yhe logic of the Stranger's Wgument is the exercise 
of that authority. It is logical necessity itsep'that denies Aeaetetus'sfittile attempts at response, 
Nye, pages 29,30,33 and 34. 
Nye further explains that the Stranger, wishing to rise above the base logic of the Sophist, 
introduces a higher level of logical abstraction, or metalogic, i. e. a logic of logic, giving the 
appearance that the philosopher-aristocrat is not "in the same 'world', or on the same 'level"', page 
35, as the Sophist huckster. All of which is inseparable from Plato's hatred for the Sophists, the 
itinerant salesmen of philosophy, who threaten to undermine the slave-owners' monopoly of 
intellectual life. Nye's work on Plato is more perceptive than that of the other commentators 
because she accepts the need to locate his work socially. At their best Plato's dialectical dialogues 
pave the way for the brilliant formulations of the neo-Platonists and mystics. However, as Nye 
points out, much of the one-sided dialogue is merely an anticipation of Aristotle's 'laws of 
thought', being sublimations of the social oppositions of fourth century Athens. 
Aristotle's dialectic 
According to Aristotle the principle of subordination is a universal law of nature. As the 
slave is to his master, so the wife is to her husband, body to soul matter to mind, the universe 
to God. His First Mover is an ideological expression of the ownership of the homogeneous 
slave labour embodied in ancient commodity production, Thomson page 3 08. 
7he notion of dialectic is apiece of intellectual currency which, like the currency of cash, is 
more used than understood Most of those who use it are aware of it only in its more recent 
cultural forms and are unfamiliar with its historical genesis among the philosophers of 
ancient Greece, Evans (1977), page ix. 
The A ristotelians... treated logic almost in our modem sense as a practical instrumentfor the 
discovery offallacies in argument on any subject, an indispensable toolfor every department 
of human inquiry .. concerned with propositions and syllogisms and terms, Chadwick (1990) 
page 108. 
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(Aristotle) must still be credited with having progressed ftom (Platonic) dialectics to 
(Aristotelian) syllogistics, Chroust, quoted in Evans page 2. 
Dialectic must be distinguishedfrom the sciences in that it does not work with any set view of 
reality. In this it is opposed both to the many special sciences and the universal science of 
ontoloýy .. But what marks off the sciencesftom dialectic is that they embody a correct view 
of reality, Evans page 5. Aristotle himself makes the same point: "conversation is actually more 
liable to error than solitary thought; science does not proceed by question and answer, and dialectic, 
which does so proceed as its name implies, is not the method of science7', quoted in Robinson, page 
84. 
The quotes from Evans are typical of Aristotelian scholars who seek to justify the bifurcation 
of dialectic and formal logic. According to Smith, in Barnes (1995), Aristotle claimed "that he 
was the first to conceive of a systematic treatment of correct inference itself. As such Aristotle 
was the founder of logic", page 27. This kind of claim is a commonplace amongst cloistered 
scholars, analytical philosophers, formal logicians and Eurocentrics. Whilst the claim about 
Aristotle's first "systematic treatment" is true, for surviving texts, the idea that he was "the 
founder of logic" is false. Whilst Aristotle's various texts on logic are the earliest surviving 
substantial works on logic and inference, it is the case that, prior to Aristotle, philosophers like 
Plato and Protagoras, thought and wrote about logic, and the influence of both on Aristotle is 
clear. Moreover, Diop (1991) points out that Egyptian priest-mathematicians were using 
inference in arithmetic, geometry and trigonometry long before Aristotle. As Aristotle himself 
says in the Metaphysics: "In Egypt mathematical sciences first commenced, for there the 
nation of priests had leisure". As we have seen, Jainians, and perhaps other Indian 
philosophers, were thinking about logic at least as early as 50OBC. It is not credible to claim 
that Aristotle "was the founder logic" and inference ex nihilo. He codified ancient logical 
methods, learned from a variety of sources, such as Egyptian libraries, and adapted them to the 
needs of the dominant Athenian classes. 
Despite Evans' contrary opinion, Aristotle's view of the relationship between logic and 
dialectics is ambivalent. He uses his categories in an attempt to reconcile different social 
relationships, and inevitably his imperatives correspond, with varying degrees of clarity, to the 
social and economic changes which took place over the course of his life. In the first book of 
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the Topics Aristotle's distinction between logic and dialectics is unclear, although Smith points 
out that some commentators interpret Aristotle as saying that dialectic may be useful for 
establishing "indemonstrable first principles of sciences" page 62. Smith argues that, for 
Aristotle, dialectics is a practical competitive form of argument suitable for success in forensic 
settings, i. e. law courts or tribunals where the asking of questions, opinions and contested 
assumptions are the norm. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle's purpose is more complex; he rejects 
dialectics, along with 'sophistical' arguments, in favour of inference based on the law of 
contradiction. Smith states that Aristotle's six works on logic, or demonstration as he called it, 
later became known as the Organon, which was the paradigm for thinkers in the post-Hellenic 
era, particularly those living in medieval Christian and Islamic societies. As we see in the next 
chapter, in Christian Europe, William of Ockhain separated religious thought, with its Platonic 
dialectical aspects, from what came to be formal logic, based on Aristotle's 'laws of thought. 
Aristotle's philosophical method of deduction (sullogismos), which Smith defines as 
"discourse that tries to prove a poinf' page 29, is used as a means of demonstrating valid 
inference. Arguments are constructed by Aristotle in a standard format in which a conclusion 
follows logically, or necessarily, from a premise or 'prior' proposition, or as Aristotle argues 
two premises. Smith notes that the three part Aristotelian form is, confusingly, specifically 
called the syllogism by modem logicians, whereas Aristotle's word sullogismos is a more 
general term for deduction, as opposed to induction (epag6gg), which he discusses less 
rigorously. Aristotle builds his logical system by contrasting concrete terms, like Socrates, and 
universal terms, like man. He contrasts subjects and their predicates, along with affirmative 
propositions and their negations, and demonstrates degrees of contradiction by contrasting 
'determinations of quantity', as Smith calls them, such as 'every', 'some' and 'no'. Thus, for 
example, "Every A is B" is in sharp contradiction with "Some A is not B", whereas "Some A 
is B" is clearly not in contradiction with "Some A is not B". Because "Every A is B" and "No 
A is B" could both be false, according to Aristotle, these two propositions are in a less 
contradictory relationship. The use of these symbols creates problems, because symbols 
themselves generate intractable difficulties when used to represent more complex propositions. 
Symbols increase the tension between what is 'logical', according to sullogismos, and the 
range and complexity of relationships in the real world. There is also tension between the 
formal rules and logical systems based on different methods or levels of abstraction. Smith 
shows how problems multiply as propositions become more complex, for example in modal 
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statements which concern necessity and possibility, when "matters become very difficult 
indeed". Likewise in claims about the future such as the famous "There will be a sea battle 
tomorrow". However, Smith, in common with most formal logicians, fails to understand the 
real reasons for the "difficulties", quotes on pages 45-6. 
Book r of Aristotle's Metaphysics (195 6) is a key text for a study of the history of dialectical 
thought, being the first surviving discussion of the relationship between formal and dialectical 
logic. Aristotle, following Plato, muddies the water by linking dialectic and "sophistic", saying: 
Dialecticians and sophists alike imitate the philosopher: sophistic is wisdom in appearance 
only, while dialectic discusses all subjects simply because they pertain to philosophy. 
Dialectic and sophistic are both concerned with the same class of things as is philosophy; but 
philosophy differsftom dialectic in its method, andftom sophistic in the life-purpose which it 
implies. Dialectic is merely critical, while philosophy claims positive knowledge; sophistic is 
what appears to be philosophy, but infact is nothing of the kind, pages 118-9. 
Aristotle is in difficulty with his views on logic, caught between, on one hand, his knowledge 
of the pre-Socratic philosophers' views on the changing and contradictory aspects of being, 
and, on the other, the need to form a set of rules for winning arguments between members of 
the Athenian 61ite. However, the latter need is mediated by the attempt to preserve the static 
aristocratic life in face of the radical changes caused by the rise of the market. His logic, with 
its fixed rules, represents the sublimated needs of a class in crisis trying to achieve security in a 
world marked by change and uncertainty. Thus, after acknowledging that "Nearly all thinkers 
agree that existing things are compounded of contraries; at any rate all of them name 
contraries as first principles", page 119, he goes on to reject the corollary of this: "It is 
impossible for anyone to believe - though some say Heraclitus did - that the same thing can be 
and not be", page 123. He then states that "everyone in argument relies upon this ultimate law, 
on which all others rest", page 124. This constitutes the famous law of contradiction. 
Many leading philosophers reject this law, but Aristotle asks rhetorically "what principle ... is 
more self-evident than the law of contradiction? ", page 125. In support of his law, Aristotle 
uses seven proofs to demonstrate that the law holds in argument. However, Aristotle is merely 
adopting a fixed set of rules which abstract from the fundamental nature of being as 
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"compounded of contraries". His rules assume that being is composed of atomised, static self- 
subsisting entities. He 'proves' that, if these rules are broken, contradiction results, and 
following Plato's method in the dialogues, he assumes that contradiction is equivalent to error. 
The seven 'proofs' demonstrate that, although aware of some of the philosophical problems of 
cognition, Aristotle fails to recognise the use of different levels and modes of abstraction. Each 
of these levels and modes may require their own logical system in order to make them 
appropriate to their relevant vantage point, theoretical needs or practical requirements. 
Aristotle trivialised Protagoras' anthropocentric insights on vantage points, claiming that 
Protagoras, along with the Megarians, was merely asserting that any arbitrary statement made 
by anyone is automatically true, so that practical decision-making is impossible. When he 
argues that "If only the sensible exists, then without animate beings there would be nothing at 
aw, page 138, he is misrepresenting Protagoras' humanist view, which is that objects are 
always objectsfor us, not that they do not exist without a consciousness to be aware of them. 
Aristotle's law of the excluded middle similarly fails to acknowledge 'contraries', so that, in 
the example he often uses of whiteness, he cannot see that even the 'purest' white contains 
elements of its opposite black, as well as the other colours of the spectrum. 11is statement of 
the law shows that for the purpose of stating the rules of logic he must abstract from his 
philosophical awareness that change is fundamental to being, because this would involve, for 
example, accepting that during dawn or dusk there is an intermediate, or middle, between day 
and night. I-Es argument that "in the realm of numbers there will be a number which is neither 
odd nor even. But this is impossible", page 143, cannot be treated as universal support for the 
law of the excluded middle, because it assumes what it is trying to prove. Aristotle similarly 
muddies the waters by referring to the contradictions which result from the Cretan liar 
paradoxes, since he fails to discuss how these paradoxes arise. 
In an attempt to salvage his logic by adding the qualification of "at the same time" to these 
laws, Aristotle reveals that his abstraction from the movement of time, however small this 
movement may be, assumes that for the purposes of his logic natural and social being consists 
of a timeless instant of absolute identity. As Heraclitus' river aphorism shows, for some 
purposes this identity abstraction is adequate, but for others it is not. Aristotle admits the 
existence of change, but insists that it 
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is a practically negligible part of the whole, and it would have been more reasonable to deny 
all change in the universe on the grounds that the greater part is unchanging, than to posit a 
state of universalflux because a mereftaction of the whole is subject to change ... We must try 
to convince our opponents .. that there is an unchanging reality. After all, those who 
deny the 
law of contradiction imply that all things are at rest rather than in motion; for if all things 
already possess all attributes, there remains nothing into which they can change, Aristotle 
(1956), page 137. 
In the interests of defeating his 'eristic opponents', Aristotle retreats from his awareness of 
change as fundamental to being, purposely misrepresenting Anaxagoras' argument that there is 
"everything mixed in everythine', and compounding that misrepresentation by the non- 
sequitur that this means that nothing can change. 
In the Metaphysics Aristotle notes the distinction between the object of cognition, the fact, 
and thought about the object as expressed in its name. He is conscious of the problem that 
particular names can refer to more that one object, and the subsequent discussion shows that, 
to save his logical rules from refutation, he has to assume that each name refers to a fact which 
is ultimately a fixed essence, rather than to an accident or contingent set of qualities. In 
positing these fixed essences, Aristotle abstracts from the problem of the complex relationship 
between thought and being, and substitutes instead the rigid dualism required to support his 
prototype of the correspondence theory of truth. Despite these weaknesses, Aristotle's 
profound philosophical understanding, which was a major influence on both Hegel's Logic and 
Marx's Capital, still occasionally shines through in book IF of the Metaphysics. An example of 
this is the statement: "Now the essence depends on quality, which is detern-dnate, not on 
quantity which is indeterminate', page 148. Similarly a commentator on the Metaphysics 
states in Aristotelian fashion: "The physical sciences are defined as concerning objects that 
move; here the form cannot be abstracted from the matter without the subject ceasing to 
exist", Chadwick page I 10. 
Nye notes that Aristotle attacked Plato's dialectic, in particular his method of division which 
"can prove anything to anyone', proposing instead "a more practical study of the skilful 
combination of terms in statements to produce necessary conclusione', page 41. She notes 
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Aristotle's example of the two axioms: All mules are barren and 77iis animal is a mule, and 
the necessary inference: Ais animal is barren. Although this is a simple paradigm for more 
complex examples, Nye says that the study of inference is important for Athenian "men intent 
on winning and preserving power, privilege, and wealth7', page 43, who know little, and care 
less, about animal husbandry, noting that no "farmer would have use of it. The techniques 
described in the Prior Analytics assume a specific Athenian institution of elaborate, often 
artificial debate in which farmers, laborers, or workers were not involved", page 42. 
Aristotle's rules of inference were developed in the context of a social struggle in which the 
law courts and the Assembly became increasingly important: 
A city-state and its colonial empire in which the majority (slaves, foreigners, women, manual 
workers, artisans, conquered or dependent peoples) are ruled by a minority of propertied 
men required a new justice in the form of legislation written by men and adjudicated by men, 
legislation that defined offences, penalties and defenses. ne courts provided an alternate 
less destructive arena for the violent antagonistic contests for prestige and power between 
upper-class men that were the most distinctive feature of Greek culture and that in the close 
confines of the city-state were increasingly dangerous .. In the new courts, success depended 
not on guilt or innocence, but on cleverness and dexterity in argument. Not only did each side 
have the right to present arguments, they also had the right to question and refute those who 
accused them ... Juries awarded verdicts in the same way they might reward a particularly 
inventive if not too sportsmanlike wrestling hold Justice ... was a substitutefor the ruthless, 
violent competition for plunder and power that dominated Hellenic culture and that is 
documented in the Homeric epics. Now a successful man would learn how to use the weapons 
of rhetoric as skilffizilly as he used his sword against barbarians or his limbs against rivals in 
the gymnasium ... In the courts there were excuses, extenuations, exceptions, indulgences, and 
lesser penalties, to be argued and debated before a jury who would reward the most agile 
dialectician with success .. In politics, speakers in the Assembly borrowed the new forensic 
techniques to show up their opponents. Teachers advertising their skills showed off their 
knowledge in staged dialectical dehates. Aese practitioners and their clients were the 
clientele for whom Aristotle's Topics and Prior Analytics were written , Nye, pages 
44,45 
and 46. 
149 
In Aristotle's writings a tension exists between these techniques and the requirements of the 
Prior Analytics for a 'pure logic', which could eliminate the equivocality of real life and 
language, and so systematically detect fallacies. As an antithesis to establishing a democratic 
consensus, he sought to legitimate the rational mind of the 'natural' ruler: "Aristotle devised a 
mechanism for generating contradictions that would infallibly improve a disputant's 
performance", Nye, page 46. In distinguishing between mere truth and logical validity 
Aristotle helped the privileged Athenian who 
when a charge was brought against him in the courts.. would want to defend himsel(whether 
guilty or not. Therefore, in a dialectical argument truth was not in issue. The great merit of 
the concept of logical validity is that it takes this into account in a way that is impossible in 
ordinary communication ... If they were able to 
forget the truth and concentrate only on the 
form of the argument, they were likely to be successful. By isolating syllogistic forms of 
argument, by substituting letters for statements that allowed them to be arranged in certain 
validand invalidpatterns, Aristotle's theory of the syllogism madepossible this bracketing of 
the truth, and therefore couldform the foundation of an education that prepared a man for 
success in public life ... Trained in 
logic, graduates of Aristotle's Lyceum proceeded to posts 
in newly colonised areas, confident of their superiority and their ability to govem Logic was 
a badge of office, a way to identify 'that one who can plan things with his mind' and is 
therefore 'the ruler by nature'(Politics 1,1; 1252a32-33). Women, slaves, workers, and 
conquered people, all those who did not participate in dialectical contests, were expected to 
accept the superior reasoning of their masters, Nye, pages 47-48. 
To end this section, we may remind ourselves that Aristotle's views dominated the medieval 
Christian and Muslim world. Gilchrist (1991) summarises Aristotle's view of nature, which 
was taken unchanged from Egyptian sources, as explained in the Physics which: 
held sway in Europe until the new era of science dawned in the seventeenth century. He held 
that each element was composed of two qualities, there heingfour qualities in all - hot, dry, 
moist and cold. 7he element of air was hot and moist; fire was hot and dry; earth dry and 
cold; and water cold and moist. By changing a quality of each element, transformation 
became possible: by driving out the moisture from air, for instance, fire would result since 
the pair of qualities would now be those offire, which was hot and dry, page 18. 
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Lindsay (1970) argues that, despite Aristotle's dialectical transformations, or union of 
opposites, which he applies to the four tribal elements, "what was changed was only the form; 
the underlying matter was always the same", page 16. In contrast, the Stoics, to who we now 
turn, re-introduced tribal ideas of power, dynamis, as the driving force of the transformation 
of the elements; they did this in a way which eventually led to some progress in alchemy, and 
later in chemistry. 
The Stoics 
In Greece itseý, the Macedonians were opposed hy the ruling clique in each city, who had a 
vested interest in maintaining the autonomy of these petty states. 7hey succeeded hecause 
their expansionist policy provided the only means wherehy the Greek propertied class of 
money-lending landowners could maintain their wealth and power against the pressure of 
poor freemen, who, afflicted hy mass unemployment, 'went ahout as armed rovers, attached 
to no city, hiring themselves out to any state that neededfighting men, a constant menace to 
society', Thomson (196 1) on the decline of the polis, which coincided with the development of 
the Stoic philosophy, page 329. 
The Stoics' recommendation that slaves should be treated less harshly was consistent with 
later Roman imperial policy. In the early days of the Republic, when there was an abundant 
number of slavesfrom Rome's man conquests, efji'cient economy dictated that, slaves being Y 
cheap and replaceable, they be worked to death to spare the expense of their reproduction. 
Later, with fewer conquests andjewer slaves, a different imperial policy was required, Nye 
page 82 note 25. 
If we reflect that the Cynic and Stoic teachers were mostly foreigners in Greece ... 7hose who 
had been branded as natural slaves were now giving laws to philosophy, Stock (1908) page 
105. 
No evil can happen to a good man; contraries do not mix, Stock page 94. 
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Being and not being come round in endless succession for all save Him, into whom all being 
was resolved, and out of whom it emerged again, as from the vortex of some aeonian 
Maelstrom, Stock page 92 
Although by the time Zeno the Stoic was born, Athens had become part of the huge 
Macedonian empire, the city still attracted philosophers because of the existence of the rival 
schools established by Plato, Aristotle and others. Whilst there, Zeno, whose contemporaries 
called him a Phoenician, probably joined a Mystery cult. He was influenced by followers of 
Heraclitus, and by Diogenes and the other Cynics, who were famous for their unusual 
behaviour; also by the Sceptics and by the Megarians, of whom Eubulides was known for his 
antithetical logic and his ability to generate paradoxes. Although none of their work survives, 
we know from later commentators that from these influences Zeno, and the later Stoic 
Chrysippus, developed two antithetical systems. These were, firstly a dialectical cosmology 
centred around the Heraclitean fire, and secondly a contrasting formal logic which, despite 
rejecting both Plato's dialectic of the Forms and Aristotle's syllogisms based on essential 
being, frequently generated logical paradoxes in the style of the Megarians. 
Zeno's cosmology was based on an abstract theory of an interpenetrating dialectic of the 
active, a causal principle based on the Heraclitean logos, and the passive, which was matter or 
unqualified being. To these were added the four ancient elements, of which Heraclitus' fire 
was primary, and they were linked to the four qualities of matter: hot, cold, moist and dry. The 
Stoics were aware of the important dialectical concept of nothingness, or the void, which they 
defined as "absence of body", saying that "Place was compared to a vessel that was full, void 
to one that was empty, and space to the vast wine-cask7, both quotes from Stock (1908) page 
83. 
Stoic logic was divided into rhetoric, the "knowledge of how to speak well in expository 
discourses", and dialectic, "the knowledge of how to argue rightly in matters of question and 
answer", Seneca, quoted on Stock page 18. Zeno compared "rhetoric to the palm and dialectic 
to the fist", page 18. Nye explains the social context of Stoic logic: 
Stoic logic reorientated both logical theory and dialectical practice in the new context of 
world empire. The city-state had collapsed; no longer could its values or political integrity 
survive intact. No longer was there one superior Greek state which could legislate substantive 
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agreement on heavenly Forms or universal essences. Instead new kinds of logical constraints 
had to be invented consistent with the administration and repression of a plurality ofpeoples 
with differing values and customs, page 6 6. 
Nfindful of the divine logos of Heraclitus, the Stoic logicians turned to language itself, 
detached from substance and essence, as the key to truth. Zeno cut through the metaphysical 
categories of Aristotle and concluded that the world was composed only of "bodies, only 
physical beings in given states and relations, the objects formed at the first creation by God's 
spermal logic in a free act of creatiorf', Nye page 67. Sandbach (1989) confirms this: "For the 
Stoics the only thing that 'exists' is the individual: the universal is nothing but a mental 
construct. Accordingly they use a logic that would treat statements about individual things", 
page 96. Anticipating the structuralists, Zeno linked language and physical beings by the use of 
a triad: the sign, the meaning of the sign and the referent. His interest focused on assertive 
propositions, preferably couched in a algebraicised logical meta-language rather than a 
particular language, because the assertions could be adjudged to be either true or false, and 
amenable to truth function classification. Zeno realised that any syllogism could be converted 
into a conditional by adding an "if' to the axioms and a "therf' to the conclusion. As Nye 
explains: 
Men are rational animals; 
Socrates is a man: 
Therefore Socrates is rational 
becomes: If men are rational and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is rational. Page 68. 
The effect of this "if-then... " system, later supplemented by "and" and "either/or", was 
fundamental to the development of formal logic because it removed the specific relationship 
between the various terms, as explained by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics, and made the 
inferential relationship one between the propositions. Sandbach uses the p and q symbols to 
show five forms of inference based on the law of contradiction, allegedly used by Chrysippus. 
He adds that: "the Stoics made practical use of these syllogisms which, incidentally, have the 
advantage of accommodating verbs of all kinds, whereas the Aristotelian variety admits only 
the copula that joins a predicate to a subject", page 98. It had the effect of streamlining the 
rules for inference in the kind of propositions which were typical of the dialectical 
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confrontations in the law courts and elsewhere. Such forms of inference also circumvented 
Aristotle's problem concerning the need to seek the ontological basis of the key terms of a 
syllogism. 
However, like all formal systems, once the truth function rules of conditional propositions had 
to confront material reality the exceptions began to multiply, and the laws of contradiction and 
the excluded middle seemed to break down. Nye gives the example of the conditional 
proposition "If it is raining", and questions the status of this, and all related propositions and 
inferences, if it is not actually raining. She explains matters: "The status of the conditional with 
a false antecedent strains the most fundamental of logical principles, Parmenides's law of the 
excluded middle: a statement must be true and not true. The conditional with a false 
antecedent seems to be just that, neither true nor false or both true and false, ", page 69. These 
problems, and the ongoing debate with the Sceptics, forced the Stoics to redouble their efforts 
to find rules for the links between propositions and the things to which they referred, in order 
to establish a greater degree of certainty about the truth of propositions. The link was a rather 
abstract "what is said", which allegedly eliminated the problem of poor witnesses or errors of 
perception, tending towards a more algebraicised formal language. 
Nye explains the social context of the development of this abstract logical language in terms 
of the Hellenic empire's needs: 
If the superiority of Greek culture and the Greek right to rule was to prevail, it would have to 
be understood in a new way, not as based on race, but on linguistic and intellectual 
superiority .. Ae grammar of that 
language, not its substantive form, would be the bearer of 
authority. 7he unity of the Hellenic world would be a unity of thought expressed in a 
language removedfrom peculiarities of accent, dialectic, emotional tone, and even of ideas, 
which might differfrom Greek to Greek, orftom East to West. Logic wouldprovide the rigid 
skeleton andpowerful muscle that could hold such an empire together, page 75. 
When the Hellenic empire was replaced by the Roman, Greek remained the language used by 
most of the philosophers, "Latin was an inferior vehicle", Sandbach page 17, whilst wealthy 
Roman farnilies sometimes employed their own Greek speaking philosopher. From amongst 
the competing schools it was Stoic logic which was adopted by the new order, based on the 
divine logos as interpreted by the Emperor, and later by the Pope. As Cicero explained: "Since 
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nothing is better than reason and reason exists in both man and god, reason is the first bond of 
unity between them. But those who have reason in common also have right to reason in 
common; and since right reason is law, this also must be seen as a common tie linking men 
with the gods ... the whole universe must 
be seen as a single joint community of gods and men7, 
quoted on page 76 of Nye. Logic is not just the basis of the lawcourt and polis dialectic, it is 
also the "way to order thought and administer possessions ... Stoics were popular 
in imperial 
Rome; they were sought after as advisors to statesmen and tutors to the sons of ruling citizens. 
The Stoic, it was thought, made the ideal administrator", pages 76-7. 
Epictetus' dialectic of the slave 
As a blow against the pro-slavery views of the Athenian philosophers, the slave Epictetus 
became a Stoic teacher on obtaining his freedom. His teachings have been collected in 
Epictetus (undated), and he says defiantly on the subject of freedom: "What then? have ye 
nothing that is free? It may be nothing. And who can compel you to assent to an appearance 
that is false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to an appearance that is true? No 
man. Here, then, ye see that there is in you something that is by nature free", page 29. His 
views on slavery are clear in the following: "For if thou endure to have slaves, it seems that 
thou thyself art first of all a slave. For virtue hath no communion with vice nor freedom with 
slavery ... so neither would one that 
is free bear to be served by slaves, or that those living with 
him should be slaves", page I 10. 
On the theme of truth and falsehood, Epictetus says rather more opaquely: "Beliefs which are 
sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a 
man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that 
those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is 
anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation - that 
there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this - for what is this but to say that if there is 
anything universal it is falsehood", page 104. The chapter On Disputation reveals Epictetus' 
sympathetic view of men who are rejected by those wishing to win dialectical contests as 
"ignorant fellows". Although he states that "logic is that which distinguishes and investigates 
other things, and, as one may say , measures and weighs them", page 183, his response to the 
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disputants well versed in reason is perhaps best summed up by the title of another chapter: 
That the philosopher shall exhibit to the vulgar deeds, not words. 
The Epicureans 
Novack (1965) is a good example of a Leninist, or strictly speaking a Trotskyist, thinker who 
posits a view of history which sees a fixed dualist distinction between materialism and idealism 
as fundamental. He praises the Epicureans for their materialism, i. e. their concern with atoms, 
whilst noting their liberal attitude to women and their reactionary attitude to slavery, a view 
contested by Thomson who claims that they opposed slavery. Their debt to the dialectics of 
the pre-Socratics is clear in the following Epicurean epitaph: I was not, I was, I am not. I am 
unconscious of it", quoted on page 259 of Novack; who adds that 
Epicurus lived in the period when the city-state was disintegrating, setting individuals free 
ftom their old ties and associations in the petty community. The new Alexandrian empire was 
superseding the city-states and creating new types of relations between individuals and the 
society around them. ne atomism of the Epicureans sought to take these new conditions into 
account andfind a rational basis for the new social purposes... the contradictory conception 
of the nature of andfunctions of the gods, and the ambivalent attitude toward them held by 
the Epicureans, reflected the contradictory desires and demands arising from their own 
intermediate status in the social structure, pages 251 and 252. 
Epicurus, a contemporary of Zeno, developed a philosophy based on the primacy of matter, 
which became popular amongst the Roman middle classes, and culminated in the poem of 
Lucretius De Reum Natura. It was a polemic against the Stoic philosophy, with its emphasis 
on theology and determinism. However, Novack reveals his uncritical Eurocentrism when he 
fails to acknowledge the Egyptian origins of the Epicurean atomic theory used by Lucretius. 
Because his views on 'idealism' and religion are one-sided, failing to see either the function of 
religion for the masses themselves or its simultaneously revolutionary and reactionary 
potential, Novack reveals as much about his dualism as he does about the Roman "upper 
classes" when he explains: 
Many upper-class Romans who themselves had lost belief in the magic of augurs nevertheless 
insisted upon maintaining the imposture to dupe and police the people. Cicero, much like 
Plato before him, wrote: "Antiquity no doubt was deceived in many things, and has had to be 
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corrected by time, by experience, or the spread of knowledge. And yet the reverence of 
augury and college of augurs and the practice of augury must be kept up on account of the 
beliefs of the common people and for its great service to the state". The Greek historian 
Polybius praises the Roman aristocracy for its adroit use of superstition in maintaining the 
power. "Pie foundation of Roman greatness, " he asserted, "is superstition. 7his has been 
introduced into every aspect of their private and public life with every artifice to awe the 
imagination. For the masses in every state are unstable, full of lawless desires, irrational 
anger and violent passion. All that can be done is to hold them in check by fears of the 
unseen and similar shams. It was notfor nothing but of deliberate design that the men ofyore 
introduced to the masses notions about God and views on the after life ". pages 264-5. 
Novack's views on the Epicureans can be compared with the following remarks by Thomson on 
Greek materialism and atomism: 
7he resemblance of the atomic theory of Democritus and Epicurus to the atomic theory of modem 
physics is superficially so striking that that we are templed to regard the work of those 
philosophers as scientific. 7his is a mistake. Ancient atomism is not science but ideology .. it was 
an ideological expression of the individualism which characterised one section of the ruling class 
in the period of the dissolution of the city-state ... 7he philosophy of Epicurus is the culmination of 
ancient philosophical materialism His sense of dialectics, revealed in his conception of the 
interdependence of necessity and chance, of the relation between man and nature, and of the 
uneven development of human progress, invites comparison with the intuitive dialectics of Ionian 
materialism, which culminated in Heraclitus. .. 7he Epicurians did not seek to change the world, 
but to withcb-aw ftom it. 7heir ethics aimed at the seý(-negation of the subject. 7hey formed a 
closed circle offtiends, devoted to one another and to the pursuit of happiness in the present life, 
but cut offftom the rest of the world so far as that was possible. 7heir renunciation of the city- 
state was a bold repudiation of slave-owning society expressed in the categories of the society 
which it condemned It was the negative counterpart of the Stoic affirmation of world 
brotherhood, which expressed in positive form the tendencies making for the unification of the 
Mediterranean world, pages 3124. 
As Epicureanism faded, neo-Platonist, Stoic and neo-Aristotelian philosophies dominated 
Roman intellectual society. And after the fall of Rome, neo-Platonism kept alive dialectical 
modes of thinking in the Christian and Muslim world. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how the existence of slavery allowed the emergence of a class of 
intellectuals who, following their studies with the Egyptian priests, were able to develop 
relatively open philosophical views similar to those of the itinerant thinkers of ancient India 
and China. We have also noted that the immanent dialectic of nature remained dominant, but 
that some Greek philosophers, such as Heraclitus, tentatively applied the dialectic to society. 
There remains an ambivalence about Aristotle, who codified the rules of formal logic, yet also 
used the idioms of the ancient and tribal dialectic. These idioms were to influence Muslim 
philosophers, the scholastics, Hegel and Marx's methodology in CapitaL 
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Chapter Four 
Buddhists, Neo-Platonists, Alchemists and Mystics 
Religion and Dialectics 
Yhe beginning of Genesis describes not only the creation of the world, but the depelopment 
of God, McGregor Mathers (1991) page 47. 
This chapter explains how the continuation and development of dialectics up to the 
Renaissance largely took place in religious thought. In order to understand the various forms 
of religious thought considered, it is necessary to link each to the social totality to which it 
corresponds. Analytical philosophers, like Ayer and Russell, see only petty scholastic nit- 
picking in the polemics of the period, when in fact they were sublimated social struggles in 
which untold numbers of people lost their lives. Although Caudwell (197 1) normally speaks of 
fixed materialist-idealist dualities, he perceives in the following articulation the problem of 
explaining religious thought: 
Since the criticism of religion becomes, to Marxism, the criticism of the concrete social 
relations which produced it, the struggle against its errors and its distortions can never be a 
struggle against religion as such -a kind of armchair atheism - because such a struggle is 
not a real one - it is ideal truthfighting ideal religion and both, when abstractedfrom action, 
are unreal. 7he very criticism of religion, as soon as it becomes criticism of concrete 
religion, becomes criticism of the social relations that engendered it, and when this criticism 
emerges creatively as a struggle, it will not be an ideal struggle against religious ideas but a 
concrete struggle against real social relations. 7here is no absolute truth to set against 
fantastic lies, butfantastic reality whose fantastic content is exposed in real living, Caudwell 
page 19 (all page numbers refer to the second half of his text). 
Caudwell quotes the following paradoxical remark, attributed to Christ in the Gospels: 
Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar Is and to God the things that are God's, on 
page 63. It captured the social contradictions of first century Roman occupied Palestine, in 
which the most powerful indigenous social groups formed a tension-ridden yet powerful 
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alliance with the Romans, thereby dominating the masses. Jesus "was prepared to whip the 
money-changers out of the Temple but not out of the State', explains Caudwell on page 57, 
implying that the proto-communist ideals of Jesus and his followers were expressed in 
religious terms because they could not be realised in practice, a theme will recur throughout 
the chapter. 
Mahayana Buddhism 
Each technique is like a river bank. one stands there and watches the river flow without 
tumbling in and being carried off by the current. until there is nothing to stand on and no 
one to stand Bancroft (1979) speaking of mantra chanting, page 3 1. 
Chapter Two explained that Buddhism, with its dialectical underpinning, came into being 
during a period of intense social struggle in the Ganges valley. The republican tribes did not 
have the capacity to resist the more powerful imperial aggressor, so that they sought release 
from their suffering by universalising the human condition as one of intense suffering, or 
duhkha, an idea taken from yogic thought. For Buddhists the only possible release from 
suffering to is adopt the contemplative life and thereby attain Nirvana. As historical conditions 
changed, later Buddhist thinkers developed their abstract negative theory of suffering, and 
contrasted it with its opposite. It meant acknowledging the existence of sukha or pleasant 
feeling, which was more realistic in the new historical conditions, thereby widening the appeal 
of the faith. Lin-chi of the 9th century qualified the doctrine by suggesting that suffering could 
be avoided by living "without blind, enslaving desire", Bancroft page 18. On the same page 
Bancroft adds for the 20th century: "The true human being does not strive for what he can get 
out of life but for what life is in itself, and he lives according to this knowledge". The negative 
Buddhist articulation of desire will be compared with Hegel's positive articulation in Chapter 
six. 
Buddhist masters and their initiates formed a key part of the intelligentsia of their society. To 
the extent that they were privileged relative to the masses, they sought accommodation with 
the local ruling class. Once they were able to convert monarchs, such as Ashoka in the third 
century BC, Buddhism became the state religion, and its leaders avoided taxes. The social 
relations inside the temple formed a microcosm of the class society in which they were 
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located, and the use of slave labour became common. "When addressing those senior to them - 
that is, those who were ordained earlier than they were - monks should bow and generally 
show due respect ... Throughout 
its history Buddhism has tended to be the preserve of the 
members of an intellectual, spiritual and social elite, and the focus has almost everywhere been 
in the monasteriee', Snelling pages 89 and 110. 
The Mahayana schism reacted against such an hierarchical structure, led by wealthy monks. 
The radicals tried to convert more of the peasantry, and others marginalised by the caste 
system, by advocating a retreat from the world, claiming that striving and desire are related to 
involvement in "politics", a euphemism for life outside the temple. The retreat from "politics" 
avoided' the need for converts to understand, and challenge, the reason for the exploitative 
relationships between the castes and other social forces, such as the guilds and merchants, in 
India around the first century AD. The social basis of the Mahayana schism is complex, 
because as monarchs turned away from Buddhism and took up Brahmin orthodoxy, the 
merchants often aligned themselves with Buddhism, in its revolutionary Mahayana phase, as 
part of their struggle for freedom from royal and Brahmic restrictions. 
The dialectical aspects of Buddhist thought, imported from Vedic, Jain and other sources, 
were synthesized with other philosophical ideas by the Mahayana intellectuals. The concept of 
Shunyata, which translates as nothingness or emptiness, an important theme in this and later 
chapters, was added to early Buddhist ideas of totality, becoming, and the cycle of life and 
death, to be placed at the centre of a rejuvenated faith. The most important Mahayana 
philosopher is Nagaýuna, circa 150AD, who called the new faith the "middle way" to Nirvana. 
He sharpened the dialectical aspect of the faith, which became important in the eventual 
development of Tibetan and Japanese Buddhism. Hailed as a second Buddha, Nagaýuna's 
hagiographers claimed he was originally a Brahmin magician who made himself invisible to 
seduce women. He eventually became attached to a Buddhist master and obtained a royal 
patron. Nagouna, according to Lindsay, was aware of the dialectical aspects of alchemic 
transmutation, and used this knowledge in his debates with his philosophical opponents, such 
as the classical logicians, or Nyaya. These philosophical and religious debates were inevitably 
related to the social struggles of second century northern India. The privileged castes gave 
donations to the intellectuals whose ideas best represented their interests. In his polemics 
Nagarjuna 
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exploits the quirky, dualistic nature of language to turn all propositions on their heads. He 
uses various devices to this end, notably his famous tetralemma, by which a simple 
proposition may be reduced tofour logicalforms: 1. A; 2. not-A; 3. both A and not-A; and 4. 
neither A nor not-A. To take a concrete example: 1. Everything is real, ý 2. Everything is 
unreal, 3. Everything is both real and unreal,, and 4 Everything is not real and not 
unreal.... A Ithough Nagarjuna wanted to show the futility of all views, both positive and 
negative, the ruthless nature of his method - one writer calls it a kind ofphilosophical sadism 
- has a tendency to nihilism. Snefling pages 60-61. 
Phillips, in Solomon and Higgins (1995), discusses the debates between Nagaýuna, 
Buddhists from other schools and the Nyaya formal logicians. He draws attention to 
"Nagaijuna's identification of paradoxes, contradictions, and impossibilities in the positions of 
the quarrelling schoole', on page 93. Although his ideas are often contrived and arbitrary, in 
the following extracts from his famous Averting the Arguments we can see Nagaujuna's use of 
dialectics: 
22.7he 'being dependent nature' of existing things: that is called 'emptiness'. 
Mat which has a nature of 'being dependent'- of that there is a non-self-existent nature. 
49. If a son is produced by afather, and if that (father) is produced that very son (when he is 
born), 
7hen tell me, in this case, who produces whom? 
50. You tell me! "ich of the two becomes the father, and which the son - Since they both 
cany characteristics of father'and 'son'? In that case there is doubt. 
70. A 11 things prevailfor him for whom emptiness prevails; 
Nothing whatever prevailsfor himfor whom emptiness prevails. 
Quoted in Phillips page 95-100. 
Zen Buddhism 
Yhe circle represents on one level the totality of the universe and on another level its ultimate 
voidness, Bancroft page 35. 
As Buddhism gradually declined in India, Zen, or Ch'an, Buddhism developed in China in the 
sixth century A-D. when Bodhidharma, moved there. He became China's first patriarch, 
Ull. 
assisted greatly by the patronage of the Emperor Wu, a Buddhist convert. When asked by the 
Emperor to explain Ch'an, Bodhidharma is alleged to have said: "Vast emptiness, and there's 
nothing holy in if'. A novice who spoke respectfully about the Buddha was "told to rinse his 
mouth out and never to utter that dirty word again"; both quotes are from Bancroft page 7. 
Snelling (1990) explains the spread of Zen as follows: "Buddhism ... no 
doubt offered 
consolations that the intellectual and aristocratic elite were not able to find in their native 
traditions during this turbulent and insecure period ... 
Royal blessing and the support of the 
literati ensured it success. Soon enormous numbers of Chinese were ordaining as monks and 
nuns - by around 514CE there were two million of thenf ', page 3 1. However, this success 
contained within it the seeds of eclipse for Chinese Buddhism, and its move to, and 
rejuvenation, in Japan: 
The success of Buddhism had caused backlash before, but in 845 the 'church', which now 
had riches and power enough to eclipse those of the straitened Emperor himset( , was 
subjected to a draconian blow from which it never fully recovered Buddhism was not 
actually outlawed, but monks and nuns were required to go back to lay life, monasteries and 
temples were closed, and monastic lands, slaves and treasuries were seized Me Chan and 
Pure Land schools were resilient enough to survive this holocaust, but thereafter Chinese 
Buddhism went into an almostfatal decline. Snelling page 32. 
The hierarchical Zen temple community lived off the peasant-created surplus, as is hinted at in 
the following piece of hagiography concerning the 18th century Zen master Hakuin: "As an 
old man, he would sit in the fields with the peasants, perched on the furrows while they 
planted the seed, and talk to them of Zen", Bancroft page 22. Although the monks and their 
pupils did little or no manual work, some temples became very wealthy through their social 
connections. Indian Buddhist temples were originally based on tribal councils, enabling some 
degree of democracy, but gradually the Zen intelligentsia, or "masters", came to dominate the 
various sects and established a strict hierarchy similar to that of a tribal priesthood. The master 
Hakuin, whose "great death" theory is reminiscent of tribal Shamanistic thought, reveals the 
extent to which the retreat from 'politics' had been abandoned: "All of these men were 
possessed of insight far surpassing that of ordinary monks. Yet they assisted constantly in 
countless governmental affairs, rubbed shoulders with the 61ite of many lands, associated with 
nobles of the highest rank, participated in music, the rituals, and military affairs, engaged in 
ceremonial competitions, but never for a moment did they lose the affinity for the 
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Way ... Indeed they are as 
different from those fools who starve to death on mountains, 
thinking that dead sitting and silent illumination suffice", quoted in Solomon and lEggins 
pages 18-19. Where necessary the monks would rejuvenate their weakened ranks by allowing 
members of the peasantry to rise up their hierarchy; Bancroft mentions "Hui Neg, an illiterate 
peasant boy, who was one day to become the great Sixth Patriarch of Zen7, page 12. 
Rather like some early Christians, who rejected faith based on knowledge and accepted only 
that based on belief, Japanese Buddhism claimed to reject all philosophical speculation, 
metaphysics, and conceptual understanding. Zen took in elements of Taoist and Vedic 
thought, and ancient Yogic meditation techniques in its search for an ungraspable Void or 
Nirvana. Its goal is identical to the unchanging timeless Parmenidean Being of the previous 
chapter, which is opposed to Samsara, the world of appearances, or cycle of life and death. 
However, an important development over Platonic thought is that the Void is not apart from 
the world of appearances, as Hui Neng (637-714AD) explains: " The infinite Ground is not for 
one second apart from the ordinary world of phenomena. If you look for it as such, you will 
find yourself cut off from the ordinary relative world, which is as much your reality as 
everything else. ", quoted in Bancroft page 15. 
Zen adopted a sceptical attitude towards language and thought in the search for 
enlightenment: "The central methods of Zen are aimed at helping a pupil see that the 
conventional ways in which the world is conceptualized are useful for particular purposes but 
lack substance; when the concept-world is broken through, the pupil will come to experience 
of unmediated Reality - the discovery of the ineffable wonder which is existence itself-The 
phenomenal world is seen as it is, in its 'isness', without the projection of the 'I'. The 
Mahayana School realised that the concept 'all things are Reality' implicitly opposes 'all 
things' to Reality and then tries to create a union. Reality and all things are already united, and 
to make a union either in thought or feeling is to give oneself the idea that it does not already 
exist. In thought they can be separated, but in actuality there is no separation", Bancroft pages 
7-8. 
Although this quote captures the totalising conceptual aspects of Zen, Bancroft's account is 
one-sided, because it fails to mention the social, economic and political aspects of the totality 
in which Zen Buddhism arose in China. Zen's dialectical idioms were partly negated by the use 
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of a combination of home spun truths, popular psychology, such as 'enjoy every moment of 
your life for what it is', and vulgar moralising, to accommodate the needs of the dominant 
social class. However, at their penetrative, Zen's dialectical formulations reveal a "devastating 
use of contradiction and paradox ... paradox 
is a well known means of presenting religious 
truth ... Zen ... uses concrete presentation rather than abstraction", 
Bancroft (1979) pages 5-6. 
On the same page she continues "For instance, according to Fudaishi: 
Empty-handed Igo andyet the spade is in my hands; 
I walk onfoot, andyet I am riding on the back of an ox: 
"en Ipass over the bridge, 
Lo, the waterflows not, but the bridge isflawing 
Also useful in challenging the static nature of being, is the Zen denial of opposites, the way it 
sees the truth by using neither assertion nor negation. Ummon says, "In Zen there is absolute 
freedom: sometimes it negates and other times it affirms; it does either way at pleasure ... Zen 
denies all attempts to rationalise it, make sense of it, or turn it into a philosophy, and it 
compares man's desire to grasp it intellectually to a finger pointing at the moon - the finger 
continually being mistaken for the moon itself It has an amused indifference to the worldly 
goals of men. The Zen outlook has it that all is equally holy - even straw mats and horse dung 
- and to distinguish one of life's aspects and make it of more importance than another is to fall 
into dualistic error rather than reality. ", Bancroft (1979) pages 5-6. 
Speaking of the yogic meditational technique Suzuki, a famous 20th century Zen master, 
reveals the use of dialectics when he says: 
nen we cross our legs like this, even though we have a right leg and a left leg, they have 
become one. ne position expresses the oneness of duality: not two and not one. 771is is the 
most important teaching: not two, and not one. Our body and mind are not two and not one. 
Ifyou think your body and mind are two, that is wrong, ifyou think that they are one, that is 
wrong also. Our body and mind are both two and one. We usually think that if something is 
not one, it is more than one; if it is not singular, it is plural. But in actual experience, our life 
is not only plural, but also singular. Each one of us is both dependent and independent. After 
some years we will die. If we just think that it is the end of our life, this will be the wrong 
understanding. But, on the other hand, if we think that we do not die, this is also wrong. We 
die, and we do not die. This is the right understanding. Some people may say that our mind 
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or soul exists forever, and it is only our physical body which dies. But this is not exactly 
right, because both mind and body have their end But at the same time it is also true that 
they exist eternally. And even though we say mind and body, they are actually two sides of 
one coin. 7his is the right understanding. So when we take this posture it symbolizes this 
truth. When I have the leftfoot on the right side of my body, and rightfoot on the left side of 
my body, I do not know which is which. So either may be the left or the right side, quoted in 
Bancroft pages 26-27. 
Suzuki also speaks of the "swinging door movemenf' which as Bancroft explains "brings 
awareness not of the little ego but of universal or Buddha nature. In this awareness the usual 
dualistic way in which we regard life - good times and bad times, this and that, I and you - are 
seen as they really are; expressions of one indivisible existence ... Yet we must not cling to 
oneness as though it too were a thing. The one meaning is expressed in every variation - every 
blade of grass and grain of sand", pages 27-28. 
Another 20th century Zen master is Seung Sahn (S), and Bancroft quotes a conversation 
between him and a questioner (Q): 
S One plus two equals zero. 
QI don't see how. 
S Okay. Suppose someone gives me an apple. I eat it. Then he gives me two more apples. I 
eat them. All the apples are gone. So one plus two equals zero. 
Q Hmmm. 
S You must understand this. Before you were born, you were zero. Now you are one. In the 
future, you will die and again become zero. All things in the universe are like this, they arise 
from emptiness and return to emptiness. So zero equals one, one equals zero. 
QI see that. 
S In elementary school, they teach that one plus two equals three. In our Zen elementary 
school, we teach that one plus two equals zero. "ich one is correct? 
Q Both. 
S Ifyou say 'both, I say 'neither. 
Q WhY? 
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S If you say 'both, then the space ship cannot go to the moon. When only one plus two 
equals three, then it can reach the moon. But if one plus two also equals zero, then on the 
way the space ship will disappear. So I say, neither is correct. 
Q Aen what would be a proper answer? 
S 'Both' is wrong, so I hit you. Also 'neither' is wrong, so I hit myset( . Ae first teaching in 
Buddhism is form is emptiness, emptiness is form. ' 7his means that one equals zero, zero 
equals one. But who makes form? no makes emptiness? Both form and emptiness are 
concepts. Concepts are made by your own thinking. Descartes said, V think therefore I am. ' 
But if I am not thinking, then what? Before thinking, there is no you or I, no form or 
emptiness, no right or wrong. So even 'no form, no emptiness' is wrong. In true emptiness, 
before thinking, you only keep a clear mind All things are just as they are. 'Form is form, 
emptiness is emptiness. ' 
Q I'm afraid I still don't really understand. 
S If you want to understand, already this is a mistake. Only go straight ahead and keep 
don't-know mind. 7hen you will understand everything. 
Q "at is enlightenment? 
S Enlightenment is only a name. If you make enlightenment, then enlightenment exists. But 
if enlightenment exists, ignorance exists too. Good and bad, right and wrong, enlightened 
and ignorant - all these are opposites. A 11 opposites are just your own thinking. The truth is 
absolute, beyond thinking, beyond opposites. Ifyou make something, you will get something. 
but ifyou don't make anything, you will get everything. Quoted on page 66 of Bancroft. 
Whilst this conversation highlights aspects of dialectical thought, it is, as with most Buddhist 
formulations, abstract and lacking in social grounding. Similar criticisms apply to the koan, a 
short saying on which the student reflects, a much discussed example of the dialectical aspect 
of Zen. It shows both the profound aspects of Zen thinking, whilst implicitly revealing the 
profoundly hierarchical social relationships of the religion: the essence of the koan is for the 
pupil to accept the arbitrary whim of the master. Typical of the hagiography of Zen is "Ju- 
ching saw that Dogen's enlightenment was real", Bancroft page 20, who continues: "Some 
ancient but still well-used koans are: What is the sound of one hand clapping? ... Take 
both 
front and rear wheels (of a cart) away and remove the axle: then what will it be? ... 
What did 
your original face look like before your father and mother were born? ", pages II and 14. She 
quotes two masters on the koan: "it cannot be understood by logic; it cannot be transmitted in 
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word; it cannot be explained in writing; it cannot be measured by reason. It is like the 
poisoned drum that kills all who hear it, or like the great fire that consumes all who come near 
it. ", page 14. 
The former peasant Hui Neng comments on the koan and its link to the concept of emptiness: 
nen you hear me speak of emptiness, don't become attached to it, especially don't become 
attached to an idea of it Merely 'sitting'still with your mind vacant, you fall into notional Y 
emptiness. Ae boundless emptiness of the sky embraces the 'ten thousand things' of every 
shape andform - the sun, moon, and stars,, mountains and rivers; bushes and trees; bad 
people and good,, good teachings and bad; heavens and hells. All these are included in 
emptiness. The emptiness ofyour original nature isjust like this. It too embraces everything. 
To this aspect the word 'great' applies. All and everything is included in your own original 
nature, page 15. 
Hakuin explained the function of the koan as follows: 
If you take up one koan and investigate it without ceasing, your thoughts will die and your 
ego-demands will be destroyed It is as though a vast abyss opened up infront ofyou, with no 
place to put your hands andjeet. Youface death, andyour heartfeels as though it were fire. 
Then suddenly you are one with the koan, and body and mind are let go ... Ais is known as 
seeing into one's own nature. You must push forward relentlessly, and with the help of this 
great concentration you will penetrate without fail to the infinite source ofyour own nature. 
Bancroft page 24. 
For all its dialectical articulations, Zen failed to challenge the dominance of men over women: 
"Women were also accepted ... but only under stringent conditions, which included unmarried 
status and the passing of a test presented by the keeper of the gate. Zen nuns created and 
solved their own koans, and some of these are famous, such as the night interview of the nun 
Myotei who took off all her clothes before going to her teacher. The koan is: What is the real 
meaning of Myotei's coming naked for the night interview? ", Bancroft, page 12, which tells us 
much about Zen gender relations. 
Zen developed in a feudal Japanese culture which rejected individual being, rarely using the 
pronoun T, yet even this is given a dialectical gloss: "Japanese society discourages self- 
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assertiveness at the same time that it encourages indirectness and allusiveness in 
communication ... whereas most Western philosophers regard self-contradiction as something 
to be avoided, Japanese thinkers see the extreme form of self-contradiction that is paradox as 
a unique source of philosophical insighf', pages 3-4 of Solomon and 1-figgins (1995). We can 
obtain further insight into the social basis of Zen dialectics from the following description of 
the reality of 13th century feudal Japan by the Zen master Dogen: "Tonight or tomorrow we 
may contract some serious disease, or may have to endure such terrible pain as to be unable to 
distinguish east from west. Or, we may be killed suddenly by some demon, encounter trouble 
with brigands, or be killed by some enemy. Everything is truly uncertain", quoted in Solomon 
and Higgins page 11. 
In the west today the dialectical aspects of Buddhist thought have been largely forgotten. Its 
message for, largely middle class, converts to Buddhism is retreat to a state of bliss: "an 
English schoolteacher says: 'there was blackbird in the garden, and it was as though there had 
never been a blackbird before. All my inner turmoil melted away and I felt full of clarity and 
indescribable peace. I seemed at one with everything around me and saw people with all 
judgement suspended, so that they seemed perfect in themselves. "', Bancroft page 10. 
Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists 
Aerefore, if time robs eternity of its permanence and appropriates it, it destroys it; for 
though eternity may in some manner retain hold of it, it is destroyed by passing wholly into 
time, Plotinus in the Enneads, quoted in Gregory (199 1) page 125. 
The philosopher .. must be taught 
dialectical argument and be made a master of Dialectic, 
Plotinus, in the Enneads, on page 141 of Gregory. 
... with the 
bodies ofplants and animals; each is a unity, and if they escape their unity, broken 
into fragments, they lose their former essence; no longer what they were but become new 
beings, Plotinus from the Enneads, quoted on page 36 of Gregory (1991). 
Ae (creative) process is like the unfolding of a seed, moving from simple origin to 
termination in the world of sense, the prior ahvays remaining in its place, while begetting its 
169 
successorfrom a store of indescribable power, Plotinus in the Enneads quoted on page 96 of 
Gregory. 
(7he One is) not a determinate being, is without quality and quantity, and is neither intellect 
not soul; it is not in motion nor yet at rest, not in place, not in time, hut 'self-contained, 
unique inform'- or rather, formless, existing before allform, before movement, before rest; 
for these are the attributes of Being, which make it manifold. ny, then, if not in motion, is it 
not at rest?, Plotinus in the Enneads, quoted on page 37 of Gregory. 
These are examples of the dialectical metaphysics of Plotinus, the originator of Neo- 
Platonism, who was profoundly influential on most of the thinkers considered in the remainder 
of this chapter. Gregory points out that this mode of thought, with its preoccupation with 
what he translates as the intellect, became the world view of the "educated classes of the later 
Roman empire ... coinciding with a period of material 
decline and religious anxiety unparalleled 
under the Roman empire", page viL Plotinus (204-271AD), who mixed in the highest circles 
of Roman society and like the Greek philosophers denigrated the manual work performed by 
slaves and artisans, was the most important of a group of philosophers. His studies in 
Alexandria exposed him to a "cosmopolitan centre of learning where western and eastern 
cultural influences coincided, and where a rich variety of philosophical schools were 
flourishing 
... In 
his thirty-ninth year, hoping to make acquaintance with the philosophy of 
Persia and India, he joined a disastrous military campaign against the Persians led by the 
Emperor Gordian III and on its defeat escaped with difficulty to settle in Rome, where the rest 
of his life's work was done", Gregory pages 3-4. 
The later Empire was marked by "foreign invasions and military defeats at the frontiers ... civil 
strife ... economic crisis and widespread social unrest ... through all this the ruling classes of 
Rome, the cities and town of Italy and provinces experienced a new political impotence and 
want of purpose", page 19. So onerous were the military, land and poll taxes, not to mention 
spiralling inflation and the plague, that the "once-prosperous urban societies faced ruin! '. page 
21. It therefore comes as no surprise to learn that Plotinus, who refers to these troubles in the 
Enneads, advocated a retreat from politics, alienation and disharmony. It was his alternative to 
the apparently impotent Olympian gods, with the adoption of a life of contemplation and 
escape from the world: "the religion of Plotinus is individualistic, intellectual and elitist ... there 
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is also an optimistic humanism that contrasts with the Christian idea of Man's sinful 
inadequacy and dependence on divine grace", page 18. The Roman philosophers, unlike "the 
rabble", live like: "The Gods in heaven, being at leisure, for ever contemplate", Enneads 
quoted in Gregory page 63. Plotinus compares the philosopher with the manual worker: 
"Everywhere we shall find that making and action are either a weakening or an 
accompaniment of contemplation ... 
Children of dull intelligence bear witness to this, in that, 
incapable of intellectual and theoretical study, they descend to the crafts and manual labour", 
Enneads quoted on page 80 of Gregory. 
The Neo-Platonists, who also included the Roman Porphyry, his pupil lamblichus and the 5th 
century Athenian Proclus, were similarly influenced both by Plato's negative attitude to 
physical being, and by Aristotle's cosmology. Their thought was also derived from the pre- 
Socratic logos, i. e. the rational principle mediating between the opposing forces and 
contradictions in nature and society, from Pythagorean number and duality theory, and from 
the tribal dialectic of the One and the many. Plotinus, in the Enneads, makes it clear that he is 
aware of the "wise men of Egypf', who through hyroglyphics "exhibited the non-discursive 
thought of Intellect", quoted in Gregory page 62. Neo-Platonists were aware of the doctrines 
of Christianity, Gnosticism and other faiths, against which they polemicised. However, their 
major influence was Plato's dialogues; but theirs was a version of Plato which took no account 
of the different stages in his thought on such topics as the Forms, or archetypes as they came 
to be known, and the distinction between knowledge and opinion. 
Nevertheless, the Neo-Platonists were acutely aware of Plato's dialectical mode of thinking, 
especially the debate on the One and the many in the Parmenides, and the oppositions 
Motion/Rest and Sameness/Otherness in the Sophist. The Enneads also refer to Aristotle's 
dialectical oppositions between potentiality and actuality, and form and matter. Speaking of 
matter Plotinus says: "Grasped, then, by both orders of existence, it can belong to neither in 
actuality; its fate is to be potentiality merely, a feeble and faint shadow with no power to take 
on form. It is therefore actually a shadow, and so actually a falsity; which is equivalent to 'true 
falsity', or 'real non-existence'... static but without position ... present yet unseen ... it 
for ever 
wears contrary appearances, small and large, less and more, deficient and excessive", 
Enneads, quoted on Gregory pages 93-4. 
171 
Plotinus (1914) tells us that the dialectic is "a habit enabling its possessor to reason about 
every thing, to know what each thing is, and in what it differs from other things, what the 
common something is in which it participates, where each of these subsists, if a thing is, what 
it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non-beings (which are not nothing) but 
different from beings", page 18. Showing the influence of both Plato and Aristotle, and 
anticipating Hegel, Plotinus explains that dialectic attempts to define "what a thing is, and in 
order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which 
results from these, till it has proceeded through the whole of an intelligible nature; and again, 
by an analytic process it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first. Then, 
however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and being no 
longer busily employed, but becoming one, it surveys what is called logic", page 18. 
Both Gregory and Lindsay mention Plotinus' interest in magic, and the following quotes from 
the Enneads link his views to those of the pre-Socratic Empedocles: 
How are magical practices to be explained? By sympathy, by the existence of a concordance 
of like things and a contrariety of unlike things, and by a diversity of many operative powers 
in the one living universe. Without any external contrivance, there is much drawing and 
spell-hinding. 7he true magic is the Love and Strife in the universe. In magical practices men 
turn all this to their own uses. Quoted on page 7 of Lindsay (1970). 
Suppose a magician were outside the universe: he could not entice or hring down powers hy 
hewitchments or hinding spells. But as it is, hecause he operates from within the world, he 
makes his influence felt, knowing the mutual attractions at work within the living 
organism ... throughout the universe, though composed of contraries, a single harmony exists, 
and even those contraries share an affinity and kinship... Aus hoth the good and the had 
exist, like contrasting movements of a dancer ohedient to the same art; and while we see hoth 
good and had in the different sections of the dance, it is the contrast that gives perfection to 
the whole, quoted in Gregory pages 106-7. 
In Plotinus' dialectical metaphysics the sources, or hypostases, of existence are the One, the 
Intellect and the Soul, in descending order. From these come the moments in the Becoming of 
the multiplicity of Nature, or the material world, which though corrupt, and subject to desire 
and evil, always aspire to the Good in its ultimate source, the One. The function of the 
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dialectic, "the science which divides and classifies the forms of Being" Gregory page 17, is to 
show the way back for individual things, which Plotinus defines by their activity, to the unity 
of the One, via the Intellect. The One is infinite, has no attributes, and transcends existence, 
knowledge and description; all of which was the inspiration for the negative theology of the 
various forms of mystical thought, to be considered later. If, like Jack Lindsay, we are trying 
to link thought to social being then for Plotinus the One or Essence, to which all material 
things aspire, must be a sublimation of the Roman Empire. In this context it is worth pointing 
out that Plotinus was "highly honoured by the Emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina! ', 
Lindsay page 4. The One was a "metaphysical endorsement to the structure of imperial 
government", page 22, in which the later emperors became inaccessible, ostentatiously dressed 
and 'sacred'. 
Gregory claims that Plotinus was accused of plagiarising Numenius of Apamea, who believed 
that "the whole of intelligible Being is contained in each of its parts", page 14. This came to be 
known as the identity, or interpenetration, between the macrocosm and the microcosm, from 
which Plotinus drew the conclusion that "the individual human being is a microcosm of the 
universe", page 15. It is an important insight, as it anticipates developments in, for example, 
biology and Marxist political economy, with its idea that the individual contains, in microcosm, 
all the contradictions of capitalist social relations. As well as the use of negation, and the 
negation of the negation, in his metaphysics, Plotinus describes the contradictory tendency of 
the many to both multiply and hence become more corrupt, formless and less real, but 
paradoxically thereby to strengthen their link to the primal, real and perfect force of the One. 
However, the ascent of the individual soul back to the One is the task of the philosopher, or 
the initiated mystic, through withdrawal from 'politics' and a life of intellectual contemplation, 
an ascent which therefore excludes the labouring masses. 
Lindsay draws attention to alchemic aspects of Plotinus' thought: "there is no part of the 
mixed substance which does not participate in the mixture as a whole", quoted on page 22. He 
particularly shows how aspects of Neo-Platonist dialectics, for example the moments, or 
stages, of the soul's descent, were important in the further development of alchemy. Speaking 
of the colour of objects, such as metals, Plotinus develops the positive concept of desire; 
although like the Buddhists he is aware of its negative side, desire creates a unity between 
subject and object. He states: "That light known, then indeed we are stirred towards those 
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beings in longing and rejoicing over the radiance about them. Each one of them exists for 
itself, but becomes an object of desire by the colour cast upon it from the Good, source of 
those graces and the love they evoke ... As soon as the glow from above has pervaded it, the 
soul gathers strength, truly spreads its wings", quoted on page 51 of Lindsay. Gregory points 
out that Plotinus was aware of the identity of the subject and object; the former "looks with 
unaverted eye and in unbroken contemplation, he no longer sees another, but his seeing and its 
object merge, the seen becomes identical with sighf', Enneads quoted on page 174. In 
applying the dialectic to epistemology, Plotinus moved philosophy on to a new level of 
competence. 
Lucian's dialectic 
.. knowledge is useless if you do not try to improve the way you conduct your life, Lu cian, 
quoted on page 29 of Robinson (1976). 
Lucian was a satirist and social critic of Syrian descent, who lived in the second century A. D.. 
He sublimated his satires of Roman life by writing dramas from Greek myth and philosophy, 
which were popular themes with the Roman upper class, using characters such as politicians, 
philosophers and playwrights. According to Robinson (1979), Lucian was a Romanised 
Sophist, a sharp critic of the Socratic form of argument set out in Plato's dialogues. The 
names of his texts, 7he Parasite, Ae Dead Come to Life, Philosophersfor Sale and 777e 
Lover of Lies, make plain his preoccupation with the paradoxes and hypocrisies of the Roman 
ruling classes. Novack refers to Lucian's use of rhetoric and dramatic effect to highlight social 
contradiction: "In Lucian's Hades, society is turned upside down and the roles of the classes 
are reversed. The rich and powerful become penniless and despised; the common people enact 
legislation against the powers that were", page 277. 
As Lucian says: "we need not blame the philosophers for the prevalence of atheism. Why, 
what can one expect of men when they see all life today topsy-turvy - the good neglected, 
pining in poverty, disease, and slavery; detestable scoundrels honoured, rolling in wealth and 
ordering their betters about; temple robbers undetected and unpunished; the innocent 
constantly crucified and bastinadoed? With this evidence it is only natural that they should 
conclude against our existence", quoted in Novack, page 279-80. Lucian shows the mismatch 
between the high theory and the debauched practice of the philosophers and politicians. On 
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being told that he is not in Athens, a character in one of the satires says: "Thanks, you did well 
to remind me. I thought I was sober and talking about reality", quoted in Robinson, page 29. 
Robinson continues: "the contrast between the possession of vices and the profession of virtue 
depends for its satirical interest not on the individuality of the vice, but on the variety of 
techniques which Lucian uses to describe and ridicule if', page 3 1. This anticipates 
Mandeville's paradox of the existence of private vices and public benefits in 18 th century 
Europe, which proved fruitful to Rousseau, Adam Smith and other social critics. 
Lucian shows his awareness of the residue of tribal thinking in Greek and Roman thought, 
whilst regularly mentioning the anthropocentric theme of the relationship between gods, 
humans and animals. However, he not only notes their close proxinfity with each other, but 
also downgrades the status of the first two in line with the brutality, greed and generally 
debased lifestyle of the ruling class. 
The Hermetica 
Hermes declares that the totality of things, though multiple, is called One ... (Trismegistos) 
deepens the triadic concept by applying it directly to the moment of change, in which 
simultaneously there occur an act of union and an act of expulsion, of negation. 
Zosimos, with Lindsay's commentary, quoted in Lindsay (1970) pages 175 and 177. 
7he Hermetica is a collection of writings mythically attributed to the ancient Egyptian deified 
sage Thoth, or the Greek Hermes Trismegistus, who revealed all knowledge, including 
astronomy, architecture, geology, medicine and much else. The writings were to influence a 
number of important philosophers and scientists including Leonardo da Vinci, Roger Bacon, 
Newton, Jung, and others from Muslim and Jewish cultures. 7he Hermetica is actually a 
collection of texts written, by second and third century scholars in the port-city of Alexandria, 
in Greek, Latin and Coptic. During this period Alexandria was a melting pot for sages and 
scientists from every race and nation, and the collection of half a million scrolls in the famous 
library was a tribute to the liberal r6gime of Ptolemy 1. The work is a attempt to bring together 
Egyptian religion and philosophy, the Mysteries or Oneness that contains all opposites. 
Although presented in Greek dialogue style, the work accords in content and idiom with the 
later discovered ancient Egyptian writings, such as the Pyramid Texts. 
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There follow some dialectical formulations as extracts from the abridgement of the text, see 
7'he Hermetica (1997): 
God is Oneness ... Because 
he unites every thing, his nature is paradoxical, He is the creator 
who creates himself (page 43)... The All is not many separate things, hut the Oneness that 
subsumes the parts. 77ie All and the One are identical ... they are united - linked together, and 
connected by a chain of Being ... 
Do you think there are many Gods? That's absurd - God is 
one ... 
A tum works with Nature, within the laws of Necessity, causing extinction and renewal 
(pages 46-8) ... 
The Cosmos creates Time. Time creates Change... 77ie essence of Time is 
movement. The essence of Change is Life ... Time works through increase and decrease. 
Change works through quality and quantity (page 77) ... through the intermingling of the two 
natures, the female acquires male vigour, and the male is relaxed in female languor (page 
84) ... 
Me end of becoming is the beginning of destruction. The end of destruction is the 
beginning of becoming... The new comes out of the old (page 119) ... Embrace within yourself 
all opposites - heat and cold, hard andfluid ... 
See that everything coexists within Mind (page 
133) ... 
For the soul's first step is to struggle against itself - stirring up a civil war. It is a 
feudfor unity against duality. The one seeking to unite and the other seeking to divide (page 
140) ... 7here is no 
discord amongst the inhabitants of heaven (page 147). 
Social Tensions and the Alchemic Method 
... the essence of drama is conj7ict, 
Gilchrist (199 1), page 108. 
With all their limited applications (alchemists) yet saw reality as unitary, concrete, involving 
critical or nodal points of change, and consisting of interrelated hierarchical levels of 
organisation; and they wanted a method above all which brought all these aspects together. 
They saw human values as implicated in every phase of the work and as determining the 
direction of research from within the processes, not merely as a system of ends imposedfrom 
without, Lindsay page 3 92. 
By my virtue and efficacy I make the imperfect perfect, whether it he a metal or a human 
body. I mix its ingredients, and temper the four elements. I reconcile opposites, and calm 
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their Discord. Ais is the golden chain which I have linked together of my heavenly virtues 
and earthly substances. 
Mehung, quoted in Gilchrist, page 50. 
In the West alchemy centred on metals and minerals, coming of age in the melting pot that 
was Alexandria during the Roman empire. It later shifted to a new centre of gravity in the 
Muslim world from where it re-emerged in Europe in the 12th century. In the East, it "had a 
preoccupation with creating an elixir of longevity" and the "tradition carried on (with cyclical 
ups and downs) right through the succeeding centuriee', page 4 of Gilchrist (1991). Western 
practitioners of the art seem to have come from various sections of the growing middle 
classes, in particular artisans initiated into metal-work skills, merchants and moneylenders. 
Other practitioners were dissident monks and priests, and other independent intellectuals, 
including some women, with the means to buy suitable premises, equipment and raw materials. 
Alchemists were often connected with counterfeiting gold and silver, accused of causing 
inflation, condemned by the Church, Emperor or a local monarch, and as a result were 
"underground" (Lindsay), insecure and often secretive. The reputation of alchemy "fluctuated. 
Sometimes it was considered to be a most elevated study, worthy to be practised by royalty, 
while sometimes it was looked upon as the profession of rogues and knaves ... only to 
be 
passed on directly by word of mouth or through the ambiguity of symbol and allegory", 
Gilchrist, page 4. The alchemists' social isolation is made clear in the following extract: 
Aus we feel prompted at times to burst forth into the desolate exclamation of Cain: 
'noever finds me will slay me. ' Yet we are not the murderers of our brethren; we are 
anxious only to do good to ourfellow-men. But even our kindness and charitable compassion 
are rewarded with black ingratitude - ingratitude that cries to heaven for vengeance. It was 
only a short time ago that, after visiting the plague-stricken haunts of a certain city, and 
restoring the sick to perfect health by means of my miraculous medicine, I found myself 
surrounded by a yelling mob, who demanded that I should give to them my Elixir of the 
Sages; and it was only by changing my dress and my name, by shaving off my beard and 
putting on a wig, that I was enabled to save my life ... an anonymous writer, quoted in Gilchrist 
pages 63-4. Given this, it is hardly surprising that the thought of the alchemist intellectuals 
shows a routine preoccupation with contradictions and other aspects of dialectical thinking. 
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Lindsay's Origins of Alchemy (1970) points out that the alchemists' preoccupation with 
precious metals began in the ancient world. The Egyptians referred to gold as the "flesh of the 
gods" and associated it with royalty, whilst later alchemic texts refer to the Egyptian Nun, or 
"darknese', and the god Thoth. Lindsay goes on to trace the developments in Greek thought 
which influenced alchemic formulations. As well as the pre-Socratics, Aristotle and Plato, he 
points to the contradictory social reality and the corresponding thought of the Stoics. In their 
struggle against social isolation the Stoics "produced a new conception of the unity of process 
and of the interrelation of objects or beings inside if', page 20. When applied to alchemy this 
led to the notion of four successive stages involving a increased specification of an object, 
"each stage including those that had happened before if', page 20. This mode of thought was, 
mediated by mystics such as Boehme, to have a profound influence on Hegel. 
Gilchrist points out that alchemy tended to synthesise knowledge from a variety of sources in 
its goal of transmuting base metals into gold: "it is, physically, spiritually, and psychically, a 
science manifesting throughout all form and all life", Cockren, quoted in Gilchrist page 8. The 
oppositions in the life of the alchemist were sublimated into the oppositions in the imagery of 
their literature and art. The famous double headed-dragon combines opposition and synthesis 
because it contains two vital dualites in alchemy: the sun and moon from astrology, and the 
male and female opposition of biology. Gilchrist explains the totalising methodology: 
The work of the alchemist is to bring about succeeding changes in the material he operates 
on, transforming itfrom a gross, unrefined state to a perfect andpurifiedform ... Mainstream 
alchemy is a discipline involving physical, psychological and spiritual work, and if any one 
of these elements is taken out of context and said to represent the alchemical tradition, then 
the wholeness and true quality of alchemy is lost, page 1. 
We note here not only the familiar theme of totalisation, but also the further elaboration of 
successive stages of transformation which was typical of Stoic thought: "golden vessels, for 
instance, were thought to transfonn the quality of the drink they contained", page 12. Thomas 
Vaughan, an 18th century alchemist, wrote: 
Truth calls to man: 'Be ye transmuted .. be ye transmuted from dead stones into living 
philosophical stones. I am the true Medicine, rectifying and transmuting that which is no 
more into that which it was before corruption, and into something better by far, and that 
which is not into that which it ought to be', quoted in Gilchrist, page 91. 
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Whilst the following shows how the alchemist begins with primal material and then destroys 
its outward form, it also hints at a totalising link between the natural and the social : 
Thus the male andjemale principles of the matter are released and can he reunited in a stage 
often depicted as the marriage of the King and Queen. Arough initial conj7ict and division 
enerAy hecomes availahle, a source offuelfor the entire operation. Further treatment of the 
suhstance in the vessel hy heat leads to its 'death... But the 'soul' of the matter still lingers in 
the hermetically sealed vessel... With the right food and heat it grows until it 'whitens', 
indicating that the Elixir isperfected in itsfirst degree-It is thefemale tincture, equated with 
the moon. To gain the gold-giving tincture, the sun, further treatment is necessary until the 
Elixir reddens .. Terms such as 
hirth, death and resurrection are not used as mere 
associations hut as indications of real states through which the matter and the soul of the 
alchemist must pass, Gilchrist pages 9-10. 
With reference to the primal matter, with its "apparent unity", alchemy both retained its 
dialectical aspects and superseded the Aristotelian cosmology, anticipating modem physics 
and chemistry, by saying matter is that: 
from which all natural oh/ects take their origin. Its properties are of a singular kind; for, in 
addition to its marvellous nature ýndjbrm, it is neither hot and dry like fire, nor cold and wet 
like water, nor cold and dry like earth, hut a perfect preparation of all the elements .. With 
respect to its appearance, figure, form, and shape, they call it a stone, and not a stone ... It is 
found potentially everywhere, and in eve? ything, hut in all its perfection andfullness only in 
one thing, anonymous, quoted on page 42 of Gilchrist. 
Similarly Muslim alchemists labelled the stages, which were often undertaken at times guided 
by astrological considerations, in the transformation process. Geber, or Abu Musa Jabir of the 
8th century, calls the stages: "sublimation, descension, distillation, calcination, solution, 
coagulation, fixation and ceration. These involve processes we would recognise in physical 
terms as heating, condensation, evaporation, and so oný', Gilchrist, page 40. Lindsay points 
out that Ibn Umail was aware that "alchemic combination is not just the union of any two 
substances; the latter must have a living relationship to one another, a dialectical unity, before 
their coming-together can be productive of a qualitative change", page 187. Chemistry, with 
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its positivistic search for objective 'facts' concentrated only on these physical aspects, it 
neglected the 'metaphysical' aspects such as emblems, symbolism, astrology, myth and the 
importance of the personal involvement and commitment of the alchemist. For our purposes 
these aspects remain valuable because they hint at the idea of an essence, "'Venus unveiled' in 
her chambee' Lindsay page 49, behind the appearance of nature. Despite the positivists, from 
earliest tribal society it has been clear that nature is composed of an interpenetrating dualism 
of what is immediately available to the senses and what is not. The gender reference in this 
quote is significant because some alchemists believed that the female principle could be 
awakened by the participation of a women in the transmutation process because this allowed it 
to go on to "higher levels". However, in reality only ancient Egypt came anywhere near 
according women the kind of status that this alchemic belief implies. 
Gilchrist points out that the alchemists' theory of transformation differed from that contained 
in Aristotle's Physics, which he probably took from Egyptian priests. The alchemists believed 
that the four elements existed in a pure form at the heart of matter, "and were seen more as 
forces, or agencies, rather than as detectable substances", page 18. The different types of 
matter were formed by changes in the proportions of the pure elements, but the actual 
transformation of one matter to another could only be effected with the aid of a pure element, 
normally specially prepared water. The process also required the appropriate totalising natural 
conditions, such as the heat of the sun, synthesised by the heat of the furnace, and the position 
of the planets in conjunction with astrological charts. Zosimos, a fourth century A. D. 
alchemist, sums up transformation: "when all things are brought to agreement by division and 
union, without neglecting the process, nature is transformed; for nature, returning to herself, 
transforms herself, and this concerns the quality and the bond of virtue throughout the whole 
universe", quoted in Gilchrist page 26. That alchemy was concerned not with substances but 
stages in processes is made clear by Charles Nicholl when he states that: "Each stage of this 
self-devouring, self-generating process bears the name 'Mercury'. Mercury, in short is 
alchemy itself', quoted on page 43. 
The Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus is a key alchemic text, probably dating from the 
2nd or 3rd century A. D.. The following selected lines contain some dialectical aspects of 
alchemic thought: 
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7hat which is above is like to that which is below, and that which is below is like to that 
which is above, to accomplish the miracles of one thing. 
And as all things were by the contemplation of one, so all things arose from this one thing by 
a single act of adaptation. 
It is the father of all works throughout the whole world 
If it be cast on to Earth, it will separate the element of Earth from that of Fire, the subtle 
from the gross. 
Again it doth descend to Earth, and uniteth in itself the force from things superior and things 
inferior. 
7hus thou will Possess the glory of the brightness of the whole world, and all obscurity will 
flyfrom thee. 
Ais thing is the strongfortitude of all strength, for it overcometh every subtle thing and doth 
penetrate every solid substance. 
Mus was this world created 
Quoted in Gilchrist, pages 38-39. 
Another Heremetic text adopts a totalising vantage point which is reminiscent of the 
"indescribable" of Jain logic: 
7hink that for you too nothing is impossible; deem that you too are immortal, and that you 
are able to grasp all things in your thought, to know every craft and science; find your home 
in the haunts o every living creature; make yourself higher than all heights and lower than )f 
all depths, bring together in yourself all opposites of quality, heat and cold, dryness and 
fluidity think that you are everywhere at once, on land, at sea, in heaven; think that you are 
not yet begotten, that you are in the womb, that you are young, that you are old, that you 
have died, that you are in the world beyond the grave; grasp in your thought all this at once, 
all times and places, all substances and qualities and magnitudes together; then you can 
apprehend God, quoted in Gilchrist, page 93. 
Another aspect of alchemy mentioned in Gilchrist's book is its link with Baroque music. She 
argues that "One of the radical innovations in Baroque music was that it deliberately employed 
the use of sharp successive contrasts, to increase tension and heighten the drama of a piece", 
page 78. Stressing the links between alchemic transformation and final resolution in music she 
quotes Monteverdi, who studied both alchemy and Neo-Platonism, on the need to provoke 
181 
conflict: I was aware that it is contraries that greatly move our mind, and ... this 
is the purpose 
which all good music should have", page 79. She goes on to link the alchemic triad of salt, 
mercury and sulphur, which correspond to body, soul and spirit, and the double triangles 
pointing up and down, to the music of Monteverdi. He compares the human passions of anger, 
moderation and humility with the high, low and middle registers of the voice. These are 
compared by Gilchrist to triads in other esoteric systems such as the Christian trinity, Neo- 
Platonism and the Cabbala, which no doubt influenced Fichte, Hegel and other German 
philosophers for whom the triad was central. 
The paradoxical concept of nothingness is mentioned by the metaphysical poet John Donne, 
who practiced alchemy, in the following: 
Study me then, you who shall lovers bee 
At the next world, that is, at the next Spring. * 
For I am every dead thing, 
In whom love wrought new Alchimie. 
For his art did expresse 
A quintessence evenfrom nothingnesse, 
From dull privations, and leane emptinesse 
He ruind mee, and I am re-begot 
Of absence, darknesse, death; things which are not. 
Quoted on page III of Gilchrist. 
This section concludes with a detailed example of alchemic dialectics: 
By the philosophers I am named Mercurius; my spouse is the (philosophic) gold; I am the old 
dragon, found everywhere on the globe of the earth, father and mother, young and old, very 
strong and very weak, death and resurrection, visihle and invisihle, hard and soft; I descend 
into the earth and ascend to the heavens, I am the highest and the lowest, the lightest and 
heaviest; often the order of nature is reversed in me, as regards colour, number, weight and 
measure; I contain the light of nature; I am dark and light; I come forth from heaven and 
earth; I am known andyet do not exist at all,, hy virtue of the sun's rays all colours shine in 
me and all metals. I am the carhuncle of the sun, the most nohle purified earth, through 
which you may change copper, iron, tin, and lead into gold. 
Quoted in Gilchrist, page 45. 
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The Medieval Dialectic 
Christianity encouraged intolerance, bigotry, and religious persecution. It destroyed all 
conflicting cults with an incredible ferocity. Peasant and scientist, literate and illiterate, all 
had to share, willingly or not, the same basic beliefs. Nothing less than rigorous conformity 
was demanded, Barnes (1965) page 3 07. 
After the collapse of the western half of the Roman empire much of Europe went into what is 
often called the Dark Ages; this involved a move from the towns back to the country, and 
some centuries later the rise of feudalism. Much of northern Europe was ruled by the Holy 
Roman Empire which, despite its grand title, was by and large an amalgamation of small local 
rulers. To the extent that the rulers of the Dark Ages and the middle ages entertained thoughts 
of imperial expansion and the Roman Catholic Church was the only institution which united 
the various states of northern Europe, the rulers of the Empire generally aligned themselves 
with the Church. For around a thousand years an uneasy system of 'dual power' existed 
between the papacy and the Empire. There was alternate accord and struggle between these 
two polarities, as between local rulers and their aristocracy, and between lords and peasants. 
The threat of excommunication was the Church's main weapon in the struggle, it had to be 
taken seriously by the monarchs because this would relieve their vassals of their oaths of 
allegiance and undermine feudal rule. Similarly the attention of the Inquisition had a chastening 
effect on the intelligentsia, merchants, small manufacturers and others who might challenge 
papal authority. 
As the quote at the beginning of this section suggests, the Church of Rome had many 
ideological rivals during this long period, and it routinely allied itself with the Empire and 
brutally suppressed other religions, including Judaism and Islam. The power of the early 
Church increased with the move by the Roman Emperor from Rome to Constantinople, the 
resulting political and ideological vacuum being filled by the Bishop of Rome. The thinking of 
the Roman Catholic priest class developed in the course of its early battles against "pagarf' 
rivals and its own "heretics". The Church won these early battles, according to Barries (1965), 
because of the priest class's organization, its roots in the urban masses and middle classes, and 
its strict discipline. The key Catholic doctrine was a static version of the more dialectical 
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Zoroastrian duality between good and evil; with its counterparts God and the Devil, and 
heaven and hell. There developed a synthesis composed of the arbitrary jealous war God of the 
Old Testament writings and the God of love of the abbreviated New Testament canon. 
However, it was clear to the scholars, especially those educated in the liberal atmosphere of 
the schools, that the texts, beginning with the creation account in Genesis, contains numerous 
contradictions. Evans (1990) paraphrases Aristotle when she says of the medieval view: "In a 
contradiction one premise signifies what is as it is, and the other signifies what is not as though 
it were", page 79. The mass of doctrinal contradictions are captured well in the following 
extract from Mark Twain's 7he Mysterious Stranger, quoted in Barnes page 312: 
A God who could make good children as easily as bad, yet preferred to make had ones; who 
could have made every one of them happy, yet never made a single happy one; who made 
them prize their hitter life, yet stingily cut it short, who gave His angels eternal happiness 
unearned, yet required His other children to earn it, who gave His angels painless lives, yet 
cursed His other children with hiting miseries and maladies of mind and body, - who mouths 
justice and invented hell; who mouths mercy - and invented hell; who mouths morals to other 
people and has none Himsetf; who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all, who created 
man without invitation, then tried to shuffle the responsibility for man's acts upon man, 
instead of honourahly placing it where it belonged, upon Himsetf, and, finally, with 
altogether divine obtuseness, invites this poor, abused slave to worship Him. 
As Evans (1990) points out, the mediation of literal biblical meaning by allegory and 
symbolism, notably, for example, in the anthropomorphic garden of Eden myth in the early 
chapters of Genesis, along with problems of translation and errors in copying, only served to 
compound the contradictions. Religious suffering, such as the fear of hell fire and eternal 
damnation, and the threat of excommunication, torture and death, tempered the views of most, 
but by no means all, of the critics and maintained the Church's social control. The radical 
intellectuals of the Church by and large sublimated their struggle to overcome the dead hand 
of the papacy. Some thinkers adopted Neo-Platonist ideas of asceticism and withdrawal, 
introduced by Augustine in the 4th century. Greek Stoicism, which stressed the annihilation of 
self, suppression of desire and its replacement by duty to the Church, was adopted by others. 
An important ideological weapon used by the Church was canon law, based simultaneously on 
Roman pragmatic and universal ideas of justice, which legitimated the power of the Church 
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against secular rulers, although the latter used the same Roman law for their own ends. The 
Church also adopted a stultifying Aristotelian science, with its atomising static mode of 
classification, dogmatic cosmology, and its claim to finality and definiteness. This in part 
explains the general backwardness of the Dark Ages and of medieval Christian Europe, 
especially when compared to the learning of the Islamic world which surrounded it. The 
formality of, and lack of progress in, the subjects of the quadriviurn (geometry, arithmetic, 
astronomy and music), lasted in Europe until the 15th and 16th century. 
Chadwick (1990) notes that dialectic was a concept which in medieval times became rather 
ambiguous. It was usually more or less interchangeable with the term logic, and combined 
with grammar and rhetoric to form the medieval trivium. This and the quadrivium formed the 
seven liberal arts, the curriculum of the priest class who largely monopolised northern 
European learning. The medieval dialectic was taken from Greek thought via Boethius' 
commentaries. Boethius pioneered the static dialectic's reduction to symbolic form, but also 
commented on both its limitations and misuses. He was aware of the interpenetration of the 
"knowing mind and the object of knowledge", Chadwick page 144. Boethius also showed his 
awareness of the complexity of Aristotle's arguments on contradiction, and applied them to 
theological contradictions. He quotes Proclus: "If there is a god, whence comes evil? But if 
there is not, whence comes good? ", Chadwick page 129. 
The medieval dialectic was used for a number of purposes, including the 'proofs' of God's 
existence. It was based on both the Socratic form used in Plato's dialogues which, as we have 
seen, sought after truth in a question and answer style, and on the formal linguistic logic of 
Aristotle. This technique, along with the rest of the trivium, was taught to pupils in the 
conservative monastries, the more liberal schools, and later in the emerging universities at 
Paris, Oxford, Bologna, and elsewhere. It was used by both sides in the bitter debate between 
conservative realists and the radical nominalists. The debate was a classic example of social 
struggle taking place in the sublimated form of logic, metaphysics and theology. Realism, 
which asserted the real existence of static Platonic forms, was defended by the papal orthodox, 
who aligned themselves with those class interests wanting to maintain their feudal privileges. 
In contrast the nominalists, who rejected the forms, separated reason and faith and anticipating 
the rise of empiricism, represented the liberal intelligentsia, scientists and other social forces 
which were later to form the basis of the capitalist revolution. 
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Peter Abelard 
Peter Abelard (1079-1142), who came from the Breton minor nobility, learned his dialectic 
from Latin commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and De Interprelatione in the lively 
atmosphere of the cathedral schools. From an early age Abelard: 
preferred the weapons of dialectic to all the other teachings of philosophy, and armed with 
these I chose the conflicts of disputation instead of the trophies of war. I began to travel 
about in several provinces, disputing like a true peripatetic philosopher wherever I had heard 
there was keen interest in the art of dialectic, quoted from the Historia calamitatum, 
reproduced in Abelard and Heloise (1974) page 58. 
Abelard's decision to become one of a number of paid wandering independent philosophers, 
dialecticians, disputants and teachers of the wealthy, rather like the Greek Sophists, led to 
conflicts with the church authorities. 1-fis newly found wealth and fame, his public humiliation 
of his orthodox rivals, his attacks on church corruption and immorality, and his heterodox 
views, led to some of his work being burned, whilst his reputation and life were threatened by 
agents of the Inquisition. 
Though he knew little Greek, Abelard antagonised the Inquisition by using what he believed 
to be the divine gifts of logic, or the Greek logos, as "weapons of dialectic". He used his 
dialectic to crush his theological rivals in debates held in the presence of students, a technique 
pioneered in written form by Erigena. Abelard was aware of Aristotle's three "laws of 
thoughf', using them in his disputes and written work to equate theological contradiction with 
error. His Sic et Non controversially set out 158 contradictions in theological texts, and 
suggested methods for the resolution of just a few of these "sentences", leaving the rest to 
students. The preface to the work states: 
some sayings of the saints seem not only to show discrepancy but even contradiction ... 
We 
ourselves, again, speaking by the perception of our eyes, call the heavens starry at one 
moment, and not at another; sometimes we say that the sun is warm, and sometimes not; or, 
again, that the moon is shining more or less, or even that she hath no light whatsoever, yet 
these things, in themselves, remain perpetually equal, albeit they appear not equally unto 
us .. Although, in the whole world, there be not an place completely void, notfilled with air y 
186 
or with any corporeal substance, yet we call a chest utterly void when our eye findest nought 
therein .. What wonder, then, if the holy Fathers themselves have sometimes said, or even 
written, some things according to opinion rather than to truth? ... Therefore this present 
collection is made, as a basisfor discussion in the schools, after the fashion recommended by 
Aristotle to all serious students. For by doubting we come to enquiry, and through enquiry we 
grasp the truth, as the Truth HimseY'hath said: 'Seek and you shallfind, knock and it shall 
be opened unto you', Quoted in Coulton (1940), pages 118-120. 
One of Abelard's many rivals, Bernard of Clairvaux, responded with the charge that "the 
secrets of God are ripped open ... The Fathers are 
insulted by men who, instead of 
understanding them, treat them as contradictories to be reconciled. (Abelard) sees nothing 
through a glass darkly, but stares at every thing face to face", quoted in Coulton page 113. In 
short, Bernard argued that Abelard's brand of dialectic was unable to articulate the precise 
content of the various doctrines. Nye (1990) sums up the Church's response to Abelard when 
she asks rhetorically: 
Wasn't there a grave danger that the substance of faith would be lost in this collection of 
contradictions on which the logicians would proceed to operate? Might not theological 
meaning and truth instead depend on depth, nuance, metaphor, continuity of interpretation, 
all of which were abstracted out of A belard's opposing propositions? Didn't logic threaten to 
take away the content offaith and leave only emptyforms to be bandied back andforth in a 
profane contest of wits?, page 8 8. 
Nye draws attention to Abelard's attempt to steer a middle course in the realist-nominalist 
debate. Whilst his critical instincts made him reject the realist view on universals, he realised 
that nominalism made the link between words and things, which was vital for his dialectic of 
form, rather problematic. Abelard's answer to the debate was to go back to something akin to 
an ancient Egyptian, or Platonic, view which had its origins in tribal thought. It held that that 
words, such as the universal 'man', had inherent, institutional, or divine meanings linked to the 
Forms. As Abelard was aware, this position, known as sprachlogik, led to the so-called 
terminist criticism, i. e. that words meant different things in different propositions, according to 
context, and therefore 'fallacies' were often generated in syllogisms because of the ambiguity 
of the nouns, or terms. The issue of the relationship between language, or thought, and being 
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was an important medieval theme, and one that we shall return to in the next section on 
Ockham, and in later chapters. 
The specific case of the universal term man referred to a being who, unlike the merely human 
woman, contained within it the image of God. Abelard's abstract views on the universal man 
are explored by Nye when she relates them to the social struggles of the period, in particular 
the struggle between men and women. She refers to the tragic romantic relationship between 
Abelard and his young, and very able, pupil Heloise. After she became pregnant, Heloise at 
first refused to accept marriage, arguing that it would damage Abelard's career. Breaking with 
the conventions of her class, she said that she wanted to be his "mistress" or "whore". 
Whether men of the cloth should "take a wife or not" was another medieval paradox, only 
later did the Church absolutely insist on celibacy. Whilst this sort of scandal was a 
commonplace, the attitude of Heloise was not; her letters to Abelard make it clear that she had 
no taste for the life of a nun, and later for her life as an abbess. She was more or less forced 
into this life by Abelard, after his castration by her outraged guardian uncle. Heloise's open 
acceptance of her love, and sexual desire, for Abelard strikes at the foundations of the 
Church's attitude to women and marriage. 
We can learn more about Abelard's dialectic by studying the correspondence which took 
place between the separated lovers. She wrote to Abelard in order to discover his true motives 
in beginning their relationship, in particular she wanted to know whether he felt only lust for 
her. Lust was an important medieval religious theme, since most men, including the priest 
class, had difficulty in relating to women in any other way. Abelard at first ignores her specific 
questions, but later answers her with an example of his dialectic which, though evasive and 
insulting to Heloise, is revealing of contradictory male medieval attitudes to women and race. 
In comparing black women to nuns, and using sexual metaphors, Abelard tells us something of 
his views on these matters and their relationship with religious doctrine. Abelard's first 
relevant letter begins patronisingly: 
I have decided to answer you on each point in turn, not so much in self-justification as for 
your own enlightenment and encouragement, so that you will more willingly grant my own 
requests when you understand that they have a basis of reason, Abelard and Heloise, page 
137. 
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His reference to the medieval debate on the relationship between the 'inward' and 'outward' 
in his discussion of sex, race and God is revealing: 
7he Ethiopian woman is Rack in the outer part of her flesh and as regards exterior 
appearances looks less lovely than other women; yet she is not unlike them within, hut in 
several respects she is whiter and lovelier, in her hones, for instance, or her teeth ... for she is 
h1ackened outside in the flesh hecause in this life she suffers hoddy affliction through the 
repeated trihulations of adversity, according to the sayings of the Apostle: 'Persecution will 
come to all who want to live a godly life as Christians'As prosperity is marked hy white, so 
adversity may properly he indicated hy h1ack, pages 13 8-9. 
The 'deductions' which he makes from these 'axioms' involve comparisons between sexual 
love and Christ's "spiritual bride" and the "self denial" of "foolish virgins". I-Es conclusion is 
more sober, demanding that Heloise accept her place in the male dominated order of church 
and state: 
Such blackness of bodily tribulation easily turns the minds of the faithful away from love of 
earthly things and attaches them to the desire for eternal life, often leading them from the 
stormy life of the world to retirementfor contemplation, page 14 1. 
Most of Aristotle's work on logic, and other topics, was unknown during this period within 
the Christian world, the rest only becoming available, partly via Muslim sources, after 
Abelard's death. As the orthodox Church intellectuals learned more of Aristotle's logic, they 
decided to suppress Abelard's more heretical ideas and make Aristotle's propositional logic 
the basis for the Church's orthodox 'dialectic'. This new 'dialectic' was highly formal, robbed 
of any real historical content and context it was used to rationalise and justify papal decrees, 
and the wider interests of the Church in the lawcourt, debating chamber and elsewhere. It is 
ironic that Sic et Non eventually became the means by which the Church sought to articulate 
and resolve the contradictions pointed out by Biblical exegetes. lEstory is replete with 
examples of dominant social classes assuaging the views of their critics and integrating them 
into their own ideology. 
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William of Ockham and the Coming of Abstract Logic 
Aristotelianism, though apparently well-assimilated within the ftamework of Christian 
concepts and safeguarded against the exhorbitant pretensions of a bolder and holder Reason, 
would not fail to create the same peril it was supposed to stave off, it was to become an 
intellectual vehicle whereby Christianity slipped down the path towards secularity and thus 
towards oblivion, Kolakowski (1982), page 126. 
Nye (1990) describes the fourteenth century as a time of 
catastrophe: war, economic upheaval, extremist religious and political views, .. the terror of 
the Inquisition .. An emerging capitalist economy 
faltered with uncontrolled inflation and 
bank failures. Crop harvests caused famine and disease. Workers, both agricultural and 
urban, staged strikes and sometimes openly revolted in the cities, with populations doubling 
and tripling, poor sanitation, poverty, and plague took a daily toll of life, and institutional 
piety was often rejectedfor ecstatic experiences induced by spellbinding but unauthorfized 
preachers .. killing ofJews, persecution of women, pages 
102-3 and 118. 
The dual power impasse, referred to earlier, was being resolved in favour of the Emperor. 
Ockham. (1285-1349) and other radicals supported the Emperor in his dispute with the papal 
establishment, a crime for which Ockham was duly denied his degree at Oxford and charged 
with heresy. Eventually he was excommunicated and fled to the safe haven of Bavaria. 
Knowles describes these events as "a decisive moment in the history of European thought, 
comparable to the secret despatch of Lenin from Switzerland to Petrograd in a sealed train in 
1917: 'Protect me with your sword, and I will defend you with my pen"', page 320. Ockham 
was a thinker who, 300 years before Descartes, anticipated the revolutionary ideas of 
capitalism: the dualistic separation of church and state, radical individualism, and the rise of a 
scientific managerial class to serve the interests of the merchant and manufacturer. 
Ockham defined logic as being about "mental contents that stand for mental contents", 
quoted in Nye page 103. He set in motion a movement which believed logic was to be the 
handmaiden of the first order sciences. This moveme4t anticipated Locke's uniderlabouring 
thesis, claiming that logic was to be used to resolve contradictions and expose fallacies caused 
by the incorrect use of language. Ockhain wanted to "exhibit the general formulae in which 
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truths can be stated, and lay out the proper form of arguments", Nye, page 105. The 
movement was part of the genesis of 20th century formal logic, and the closely related 
linguistic philosophy, with its use of symbols, positivistic insistence of the singularity of things, 
and rejection of "essentialist metaphysics". Crucial to this genesis was Ockham's anti- 
metaphysical nominalist stance and his famous "razoe', which involved using only the 
minimum number of terms demanded for a proposition, equation or model. His supporters, 
such as Robert Holcot of Cambridge, took these ideas further, and drew the empiricist 
conclusion that all human knowledge is based on sense-experience. Despite this, Holcot 
insisted that God could do anything, including the pervese idea that He could command us to 
hate him. Another follower, Nicholas of Autrecourt, anticipated Hume in stating that cause 
and effect relationships were no more than generalisations of sense experience. 
Ockharn tried to resolve some of the classical philosophical problems concerning, for 
example, universals, opposites and the relation between the concrete and the abstract. We see 
his static, and symbolic, approach in the following extracts from Bosely and Tweedale (1997): 
nenever one of a pair of opposites really belongs to something in such a way that that 
something is really characterized by it, whether it belongs to it of ifseý( or through something 
else, as long as this state of affairs persists unchanged, the other opposite will not really 
belong to it, but rather will be absolutely denied of it ... there is not really any unity besides 
the unity of singularity, page 419. Every A is B. C is not B. 7herefore, C is not A ... 
Every 
human being is per se an animal No white item is an animal. Aerefore, no white is a human 
being ... No difference is common. 7he nature is common. Yherefore, the nature is not a 
difference, pages 336-8. 
Anticipating Protestant thought Ockham, proposed a radical separation between, on the one 
hand, the world of sense experience, which once created by God is an empirical given and 
subject to the "laws of thoughf', and on the other, the world of God, in which any 
contradiction is possible because God is absolutely free from the laws of the natural and social 
world. Nye explains this dualist argument by stating that there is an order and logic to God's 
actual creation, although it could have been ordered differently. She explains that "although 
God cannot make a black thing white, a black thing can be made white by God. That thing 
which we are referring to as black could have been made white by God, or could be made 
white by God in the future", page 112. The idea was anticipated by the eleventh century 
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thinker Damian who claimed that God's omnipotence enabled IEm to "make the past not to 
have been" and "make contraries (eg being and not-being) true at one and the same time and 
aspect ... though 
impossible in nature and to man's reason7', Knowles pages 96-7. 
Ockham anticipates AI Ayer in his claim that "God cannot be known by us at all. Hence no 
demonstrative proof can be given of God's existence ... we must be satisfied with what faith and 
revelation tell ue', Knowles page 323. The effect was to curb Papal authority, because it broke 
with the idea of a totalising all inclusive theology with its "inaccessible, arcane tangles caused 
by uncontrolled metaphysical speculation! ', Nye page I 10. Ockham rejected medieval realism, 
because its notion of universals involved the contradiction of a divine creation as recorded in 
Genesis, alongside a pre-existing Platonic form of man which was eternal. He adopted the 
modem form of realism which insists "that the universe of being existed, altogether apart from 
the mind that comes into contact with it", Knowles page 324. 
These ideas gradually came to dominate the increasingly secular world of the European 
intelligentsia. The Catholic writer Knowles is right but one-sided in his estimate of the 
development of logic: 
7hought divorcedfrom life must always wither, and the philosopher of the fourteenth century 
withdrew more and more into his own world, in which definitions and conclusions were no 
longer controlled by all other kinds of human experience. Ideas andprinciples were strained 
to the limit, and ultimately thought preyed upon itself, and suffered fragmentation, pages 
339-40. 
The other side, which eludes Knowles, but not Nye, is the historical context of these 
developments. Specifically it was part of a movement, at the vanguard of which were the 
Franciscans, to undermine the Papal 'dialectic'. Papal Realpolilik sought to justify the 
Church's vast wealth from taxes, banking, land, licensing of prostitution, selling of penances 
and indulgences, and other sources, all of which were the antithesis of Christ's poverty and 
morality. It set the scene for the rise of an independent intelligentsia, and a Protestantism 
which, consistent with the needs of the rising capitalist class, restricted the church to preaching 
Sunday sermons. These intellectuals called for the secular state to be given the sole right to 
maintain an order expressed in terms of a logic consistent with the needs of this new mode of 
production: 
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nat was not covered in scripture, what was not a matter of faith, what involved men's 
political and economic life, there expediency and secular powers could rule ... If God can rule 
a contingent world, then so can his surrogate, Man, rule under him. 7here is no natural 
order that is necessary or that man in the image of God cannot interrupt, there is no natural 
law he cannot manipulate. He can create industrial complexes where women and men are 
worked to death. If Ockham's logic is the logic of a world in which God's will is supreme, it 
can also become the logic of a world willed by men .. in which the last vestiges of spoken 
words have disappeared, leaving only the formulae of manipulation, Nye pages 120- 1. 
Mysticism and the dialectic 
The numinous quality of the experience - in which the radiance of the world is revealed as 
never before - transforms ordinary subject-object duality into a new dimension of being, so 
that there appears to be an absence of seff or Pfor as long as the experience lasts. Ais is 
the state ofpoverty and emptiness described by the mystics of all religions, and to attain this 
state of being is to discover the meaning of one's own existence, to find one's true place in 
theflux of life, to identify oneseý'with, and love, everything that exists. 
Bancroft (1979), page 10. 
Medieval Christian thought developed a dualist split between what was to become formal 
logic on the one hand, and a more dialectical mystical approach on the other. As religion's 
ideological power declined with the rise of capitalism, dialectical analysis normally took 
second place to a new atomised mode of thought, centred round observation and 
measurement. The development of the dialectic shifted away from the mainstream in the form 
of mysticism, which was generally heretical to both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy. The 
Mystery cults, which as we have seen date back to the Egyptian priests, formed the prototype 
of the medieval mystics. Masters and their novices developed their radical criticisms of 
orthodoxy amongst the intellectual dlites of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. 
Origen was an important third century precursor of Christian mysticism. 11is work, like that of 
many mystics, was 'doctored' for its heretical views, and he was formally declared a heretic in 
the sixth century. Origen believed that the Bible had both an esoteric and allegorical meaning: 
its real purpose was to show how humans become God by going through stages of 
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contemplation, an approach which owed much to tribal and ancient dialectical thought. The 
"Scriptures were written by the Spirit of God ... they have not only an obvious meaning but 
also another meaning which escapes the notice of most people", Origen, First Principles, 
quoted in Lane (1984) page 23. 
A sixth century Syrian monk, the Pseudo-Dionysius, was also important in the development 
of mystical dialectics with his notion of the negative way, in opposition to the positive way, a 
system which came to be known as negative theology. He claimed that God was "impossible 
to conceive in Its ultimate nature ... 
(Mystics) can find no more fitting method to celebrate Its 
praises than to deny It every manner of attribute", from Divine Names, quoted in Lane page 
59. Dyonysius' main work was Ae Mystical Theology, which makes it clear that the text is 
not intended for the "uninitiated". He speaks of the "negative method of abstractiorf', by 
which he means "abstracting all attributes in order that without veil, we may know that 
Unknowing, which is enshrouded under all that is known and all that can be known, and that 
we may begin to contemplate the superessential Darkness which is hidden by all 
, 
the light that 
is in existing things", quoted in Happold page 215. He states that God "possesses all the 
positive attributes of the universe (being the Universal Cause), yet, in a more strict sense, He 
does not possess them, since He transcends them all. There is no contradiction between the 
affirmations and the negations, inasmuch as He infinitely precedes all conceptions of 
deprivation, being beyond all positive and negative distinctions" quoted in Happold page 213. 
Dionysius' concept of nothingness as the path to God, influenced John Scotus Erigena, who 
translated his works into Latin in the ninth century. Erigena believed in something akin to 
pantheism, being accused of holding the mystical doctrine that eventually humanity will be 
absorbed into God from whence it emanated. He also believed in a doctrine, which will be 
expanded on later, that God created the world because He grew tired of contemplating himself 
in his nothingness: "And what, 0 Lord, is that coming of yours but an ascent through the 
infinite steps of your contemplation? ... not what you are, but what you are not, and that you 
are", from Division of Nature, quoted in Lane page 87. 
Having examined some of doctrines of the early Christian mystics we can now analyse the 
social struggles and dialectical thought of the most important mystics in more depth. 
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Meister Eckhart 
all time is contained in the present Now-moment. Eckhart (194 1) page 212. 
777e soul has two eyes - one looking inwards and the other looking outwards. It is the inner 
eye of the soul that looks into essence and takes being directly ftom God. nat is its true 
function. Ae soul's external outward eye is directed toward creatures and perceives their 
externalforms .. Eckhart (1941), page 216. 
All creatures are pure nothing. I do not say that they are a trifle or they are anything. - they 
are pure nothing. All creatures have no being, for their being consists in the presence of 
God, Eckhart, quoted in Smith (1987) page 68. 
Being is God. This proposition is obvious, in the first place, because if being is something 
differentfrom God, God does not exist and there is no God For how can he exist, or how can 
anything exist, if there is another existence foreign and distinct from being? ... Beyond being 
and before being there is nothing. Aerefore, if being is other than God or foreign to God, 
God would be nothing. Eckhart, quoted in Kolakowski page 29. 
It seemed to a man as in a dream - it was a waking dream - that he became pregnant with 
Nothing, like a woman with child. And in the Nothing God was born: He was the fruit of 
Nothing. Eckhart, quoted in Snfith page 11. 
(God is) the negation of the negation, Eckhart, quoted in Smith page 121. 
Eckhart (0260-1328) was a Dominican monk who rose through the ranks of the Order, 
becoming known for his administrative and preaching skills. Studying in Paris, hence his title 
Meister, he learned much from Muslim thinkers and the representatives of the various heretical 
movements of his day. Eckhart became a renowned disputer, and therefore was aware of the 
bitter debates on dialectics, considered earlier. At the height of his fame he returned to 
Cologne, a centre of dissent where he possessed a large following. However, the humanist, 
pantheist, alchemic transmutationist, magical and bold paradoxical Neo-Platonist aspects of his 
preaching angered the Franciscan Archbishop of Cologne. The latter called on the services of 
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the famous Franciscan debater John Duns Scotus to inveigh against Eckhart in his own 
college. When this failed to stop Eckhart, the Archbishop decided to charge him with heresy, 
because he "incited ignorant and undisciplined people to wild and dangerous excessee', 
quoted on page xxii of Blakney's introduction to Meister Eckhart (1941). In response to 
Eckhart's contradictory ideas, such as the line in his 28th Sermon: "Therefore I pray God that 
he may quit me of god", Blakney remarks that the masses listening to this "shook their heads, 
for they did not understand, or perhaps they understood only too well", page x)dii. Blakney 
explains that: 
Theology was, to the medieval man, what politics is to us today. The issues involved were of 
immediate, heated, and personal interest and just as people today may be punished for 
political views and propaganda believed inimical to some government or state, wrong 
theological views, considered inimical to the church, could be punished then. A Franciscan 
would be only too glad to lend himseý( to the punishment of a Dominican, as Meister Eckhart 
discovered, page xviii. 
Blakney is correct but one-sided in his assessment of medieval theology; as we saw at the 
beginning of the chapter theological struggles relate to concrete struggles, albeit often in a 
complex way. Several commentators noted how Papal excesses, those of John YXII in this 
case, were not commented upon directly by Eckhart but are implicit in his mystical thought. 
The poverty of Christ and the apostles was in sharp contradiction to the wealth of the papacy, 
which was a major issue for the dissidents, 114 of whom were burned during John's papacy 
for pointing out this contradiction. John, who was "more worldly than a pimp", De Rosa 
(1989), page 296, was reckoned to spend 70% of his large income from simony on 
armaments: "The blood he shed would have incarnadined (stained - S. S. ) the waters of Lake 
Constance, and the bodies of the slain would have bridged it from shore to shore", page 296. 
John "burned the poorest of Christ's poor and died the richest man in the world", page 301. 
Kolakowski (1982) explains that despite Eckhart's rise up the church bureaucracy, such a 
mystic "does not need human intermediaries, his communication with the Lord is direct and 
therefore he may imagine - as many did - that he is free to dispense with the aid of ministers. 
For a radical mystic who believes that the only proper way to God is to search for Him in 
one's own heart and to 'taste' Him in unmediated encounter, priests and indeed the entire 
ecclesiastical organism are a matter of indifference, or may even be regarded as a hindrance to 
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real contacf', page 104. Eckhart conducted his own defence against the charge of heresy, 
recorded in The Defence, and appealed to the Pope, which led to a second trial at Avignon, 
the home of the alternative papacy. The death of Eckhart came before John NMI issued his 
condemnation; only for the Pope himself to be condemned by his successor. Hebblethwaite 
sums up the situation: "Thus we have a heretical Pope who denounces as a heretic Eckhart, 
whose work he had not read and whose defence he had not heard", quoted in Smith page 9. 
The Benedictine monk and Catholic apologist Cyprian Smith fails to realise the extent of the 
corruption of the Church during the 13th and 14th centuries, and its importance to the trial of 
Eckhart. However, Smith, as is clear from the title of his book The Way of Paradox, is aware 
that dialectics is an important aspect of the Christian mystical tradition, of which Eckhart is a 
key figure. He describes Eckhart's writings as being "many sided", using "daring paradoxes! ', 
containing a vision which is based on "a tension of opposites ... culminating 
in the figure of 
Christ, in whom the tension reaches its maximum point and achieves its reconciliation, both in 
history and the human heart ... 
When we say 'tension', again we are talking the language of 
power, for tension generates energy", pages ix-x and 55. As an example, Eckhart says: "the 
one is always in the other: that which embraces is that which is embraced, for it embraces 
nothing but itself', quoted on page 61 of Smith. 
The profound impulses to exercise virtue and the contradictory ones to commit sin are 
considered by Eckhart in his Talks of Instruction. This is the theological language which he 
uses to articulate the conflicting impulses which are experienced by all in a mode of 
production based on exploitation. Eckhart says: 
Because of the impulse to evil and the excitement of it, both virtue and its rewards are in 
travail born. Ae impulse to wrong makes us the more diligent in the exercise of virtue, 
driving us to it with a strong hand, like a hard taskmaster, forcing us to take shelter in doing 
well. 7he weaker one is, the more he is warned to strength and set(-conquest; for virtue, like 
vice, is a matter of the will, Eckhart (1942) page 12. 
Eckhart's German Sermons are often cited as examples of his dialectical thought, and Sermon 
16 contains the passage: 
Heaven itself is eternal in its course and knows nothing about time. That means that the soul, 
too, consists of pure Being - but then, too, there are opposites in the soul. "at are these 
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opposites? Good and evil, while and black are such opposites, which, however, are not part 
of Being .. the soul is purified in the practice of virtues by which we climb to a life of unity. 
7hat is the way the soul is made pure - by being purged of much divided life and by entering 
upon a life that is (focused to) unity. The whole scattered world of lower things is gathered 
up to oneness when the soul climhs up to that life in which there are no opposites. Entering 
the life of reason, opposites areforgotten, hut where this light does notfall, thingsfall away 
to death and destruction, pages 172-3 of Eckhart. 
Smith further explains Eckhart's dialectics: 
Having made a statement, Eckhart will often go on to deny it, hut the truth lies neither in the 
affirmation nor in the denial, hut in the tug-of-war hetween the two. Ais is hafflingfor the 
normal human mind, which works on the logical Principle of Contradiction, according to 
which a proposition cannot he hoth true andfalse at one and the same time. But, according 
to Eckhart, that is exactly what the highest truth is. It transcends the Principle of 
Contradiction, and can he grasped only through paradox .. it is not to deny or destroy the 
human mind with nonsense hut to hring the normal human intellect to the awareness o its ?f 
own limitations, and thus open it up to the possihility of a higher kind of knowing, page 27. 
To illustrate this on pages 3940 Smith takes examples from Eckhart's work which attracted 
the Church's attention: 
If I say that God is good, that is not true. God is not good, I am good And if I say that God 
is wise, that is not true. I am wiser than He is... Therefore Ipray God, that He may rid me of 
God 
Smith is aware that for Eckhart "the question of God is at the same time a question about 
Man", page 4. However, for his own reasons Smith avoids the full extent of the humanist 
basis of Eckhart's theology; despite the fact that he is aware that spiritual knowledge "catches 
God off his guard, naked, 'in his dressing-room' as Eckhart puts it" page 23. 
The dialectic between the inner and outer is even more important for Eckhart than it was for 
Abelard, for as Smith explains: 
If, as we penetrate further towards the centre, images and symbols arise, promises of new 
desires and new possibilities, they are to be ignored andpassed by, until the Central Core is 
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reached, where we can become rooted and grounded in God Then, strengthened and 
enlightened by that, we can ascend slowly to the light, unlocking caverns and treasures on 
our way, if that seems right. But the first prerequisite is to find God in the deepest core of 
ourselves, and this is done by detachment, by letting go of all in us that is not God, until a 
spark of awareness awakens in us, which Eckhart calls 'the Birth of God in the soul'... As this 
process goes on, the spark of consciousness steadily grows until it gradually illuminates the 
whole mind. It is the work of a lifetime, pages 12-13. 
As we shaU see, Hegel learned much from this "cool, radiant, light and airy", Smith page 15, 
mystical explanation of the search for what Eckhart calls "unmediated spiritual knowledge" - It 
is clear from the quotes at the start of the section, that Eckhart was interested in the dialectic 
of being and nothingness, and of the subject-object relationship; in particular, each side of 
these polarities presumes the other. Smith provides the following final example of Eckhart's 
thought: 
Aere can be no Word without a Silence from which it emerges, which it expresses and to 
which it returns. It is precisely this Silence, this Depth which makes it 'true' and able to 
communicate ... Silence is one of the most 
dreaded realities in a world of empty, false words, 
because silence leads us into the depths of ourselves. Yet no word, however eloquent it may 
seem, can have real depth, truth, or power to communicate, unless it arises from silence - 
unless it expresses, rather than obliterates that silence, page 59. 
Mysticism, dialectics and logic 
Warner (1992) contains two readings, under the title of The Logic ofMysticism, which reveal 
analytical philosophers' outrage at the dialectics of mysticism. McCabe's article begins with 
the following: 
Ais title represents, I suppose, a kind of challenge; for there seems at first sight some 
incompatibility between the practice of logic and mysticism, a contrast between the rational 
and the intuitive, the tough minded and the tender-minded, page 45. 
Barrett's article is stronger in its tone: 
To talk of a logic of mysticism may sound distinctly odd. If anything, mysticism is alogical; it 
would be uncharitable if not false, on mature consideration, to call it illogical - though 
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man without due deliberation, might be tempted to use that term. Wittgenstein comes close 
to calling it illogicaL. he does not accuse the mystics or prophets or religious teachers of 
contradicting themselves or of invalid reasoning. What he accuses them of may be something 
worse, namely, talking nonsense, of not giving sense to the words they use or the expressions 
they utter. Russell andAyer come to much the same conclusion but by a different route, page 
61. 
Commenting on Jesus' dialectical remark, in Matthew x: 39, that "He that findeth his life shall 
lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find if', Barrett says: 
Aese statements are written off as paradoxes, modes of speech or tropes which appear to he 
contradictory but in fact are not, since the meanings of words change in midstream. This in 
itsel( is not logically very nice, hut it wil/just about pass, since finding and losing life does 
not mean dying and being restored to mortal life. It is a close thing, page 6 1. 
Similarly in response to Eckhart's claim that "all creatures are pure nothing" Barrett states: 
Surely here is a contradiction. A creature, to be a creature, must be something. A non- 
existent creature is no creature at all.... But what it amounts to saying is that Eckhart was 
trying to express the inexpressible. 7his led him to saying what, on the face of it, was absurd 
and nonsensical, verging on, if not over the edge of, the illogical, page 62. 
Barrett, like most analytical philosophers, is unable to contemplate the existence of real, or 
internal, contradiction. He claims that contradictions can be explained as either the result of 
figurative or exaggerated language, that is the rhetorical devices of trope or hyperbole, or of 
giving a word different meanings and moving from one meaning to the other. Whilst 
dialecticians use rhetorical devices, analogies and shifting meanings, they do so in an attempt 
to articulate what analytical philosophy cannot accept: i. e. the existence of real contradictions 
in the social and natural world. 
Although Kolakowski (1982) neglects to point out the social context of Eckhart's thought, he 
rightly claims that Cusa, whose work will be examined in the next chapter, learned much from 
him. In contrast to the claims of the analytical philosophers, they both: 
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speak of a higher cognitive faculty, Reason or Intellect, which affords us insight into the 
divine infinity and which is guided hy principles of its own, principles which, on closer 
inspection, turn out to he opposed to, rather than to supplement, the rules of common logic, 
whether or not this contradiction is explicitly stated.... knowledge ahout God, whether gained 
in contemplation or through speculative effort, lies heyond the power of language and 
appears paradoxical... the Oneness of Being confronted with a created world consisting of 
many ohjects .. 
I cannot think of God withoutfalling into contradiction, consequently I cannot 
think of God without denying His existence ... We are tempted to escape the contradiction 
hy 
denying not God's existence hut the existence of the world: many is One ... mystics knew they 
were challenging common logic and impertinently refused to surrender .. They helieve they 
have really lived 'temporarily in eternity'... it is possible to achieve identity with God without 
forfeiting one's own personal life, pages 13 8-43. 
At the core of mysticism is an occult doctrine which profoundly influenced Hegel's 
formulation of the dialectic. It attempts to resolve the major theological contradictions by 
rejecting the prima facie omnipotence of God. Kolakowski quotes Origen: "God himself 
cannot be called 'omnipotent' without the existence of subjects over which he may exercise his 
power; and therefore in order that God may be displayed as 'omnipotent' it is essential that 
everything should subsist", page 146. There is an implied radical interpretation of Eckhart 
when Kolakowski quotes Sebastian Franck: "Properly speaking, God in himself is nothing. He 
is without will, effects, without time, place, person and names. He becomes something in 
creatures, so that only through them does he receive existence", page 149. In other words, 
explains Kolakowski, God 
is not at the beginning what He will be at the end of the greatjourney. He begets the world in 
order to ripen it in its body, as it were; he has to make something alien to Himself and to see 
Himself in the mirror offinite minds and when He reabsorbs again His alienated products 
He grows richer; the magnificent and terrifying history of the world is God's own 
history .. the mystery of man and the mystery of 
God are blended they have, as it were, a 
common itinerary and a common destiny, they need each other in the voyage towards the 
ultimate reconciliation .. original sin ... had heen committedfirst 
by God, who tore Himself 
asunder in emanating the universe ... its substance was taken up in the grandiose panorama of 
Hegel's historical ontology: the drama of an Absolute Being which, not satisfied with its 
empty self-identity, alienates itself and, through the struggles and tragedies of human history, 
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matures to a perfect setf-consciousness, re-assimilates its products and eventually abolishes 
the distinction of suhject and ohject without destroying the wealth offorms which emerged on 
the way, pages 146-7. 
Sufism and dialectics 
The mystic call is as a rule the result of an inner rebellion of the conscience against social 
injustices, Louis Massignon, quoted in Armstrong (1994) page 260. 
The East is in the West and the West is in the East - there are no points in the compass of the 
soul, Soichi Saito, quoted in the Foreward to Barnmate (1962). 
For the idea in Muslim art is not to idolise images, but to go beyond, to the One who makes 
them move as in a magic lantern or a shadow play, towards the only One who endures, Watt 
and Cachia (1965) page 75. 
In God alone dofreedom, action and truth coincide, Burckhardt (199 1) page 52. 
During the middle ages Moorish Spain, al-Andalus, was the most technically and culturally 
advanced nation in what is today called Europe. The magnificent architectural remains bear 
witness to the diverse cultures, including a major Jewish input, which contributed to this 
achievement. "The scientific renown of the Muslims had spread far and wide, and attracted the 
intellectual elite of the Western World", Barnmate page 17; even the future Pope Sylvester II 
studied in Toledo for 3 years. It was in this atmosphere that heretical Islamic, and Judaic, 
mysticism developed, nominally as a reaction against religious orthodoxy, but in reality as an 
attack on the totality of social relations from the vantage point of the radical intellectual. 
Watt and Cachia (1965) offer an explanation of the purpose of the Muslim expansion from 
the small state of Medina in the 630s, which later led to the colonisation of most of North 
Africa and Spain. The expansion was an attempt at resolving the contradiction of the strain on 
food supplies for the nomadic Arabs, who lived by moving their animals to areas of the desert 
where pasture was possible after rain. The contradiction intensified during the period of Arab 
unity, a unity central to the Islamic project, because the loss of life, which occurred as a result 
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of tribal and other fighting over scarce resources, largely ended upon unification. This meant 
that as the population grew the meagre resources of the desert became inadequate for the 
Arabs' subsistence needs. Thefihad, or holy war, was therefore a religious sublimation of the 
need for resources, which were at first obtained by occasional raids into Syria and Iraq. As the 
fthad spread westwards towards Spain, conquered peoples, who included Arabs, Berber 
tribes, Christians and Jews, were in some cases forced to convert. Many Berbers refused to 
convert and were killed, but those who did convert enjoyed a tense relationship with the 
Muslim Arabs; tensions also existed amongst the different Arab tribes. 
Muslims believed they were the rejuvenators of a corrupted Judeo-Christian tradition, from 
which they took the Jewish idea of prophethood and Christian proselytising, adding aspects of 
Gnosticism and other cults. Monotheist subjects of the empire were in many cases allowed to 
become "protected groups", and were granted limited autonomy in return for payment of taxes 
and tributes. The income thus generated provided stipends for Muslim soldiers, who later 
became a military caste, to garrison invaded territories and continue their expansion through 
North Africa and into Spain. The masses of Spain suffered a worse life under Visigoth rule 
than they previously experienced under the Romans. Therefore they, along with the Jewish 
traders, supported the Muslim invasion, with its superior culture and technology. Because 
Muslims were not subject to taxes and levies the pressure for conversion to Islam ceased, as 
the more converts the greater the loss of revenue for the Muslim authorities. 
Although it continued to possess links with the rest of the Muslim world, al Adalus became a 
separate emirate in the 8th century. It was dominated by southern traders and merchants and 
protected by a largely slave and mercenary army. The army was fully occupied quelling 
frequent rebellions, which later led to the division of the emirate, and to raids into France, that 
protected its northern borders. The south of the country was gradually urbanised and 
developed a complex class structure, whereas the north was based on the feudal system which 
was developing in Christian Europe. The religious struggles in the urbanised south, which, 
with its advanced division of labour was the envy of Europe, were in reality social struggles, at 
the centre of which was the court, the merchants and competing groups ofjurists. 
From the eleventh century, which saw the rise of Berber dynasties, there was a gradual 
weakening of the Muslim state of al Andalus, and its eventual collapse in the mid 13th 
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century. However, during its heyday the various jurists, particularly those based in Cordova 
with its famous library, dominated intellectual life. They strengthened their power base by 
supportingfihad, so as to increase the standing of the local ruler, claiming the right to control 
the penal system, civil society, and political society. This claim was based on their particular 
interpretation of the Quran and Sharia, or revealed law, in "the Islamic world politics was 
carried on wholly within the framework of religious ideas", Watt page 89. Jurists travelled to 
all parts of the empire as students and teachers, and some were profoundly interested in 
philosophy. The various philosophies were synthesised with their respective views on 
jurisprudence, ethics and theology. 
Of the various groups of jurists and other groups of intellectuals the most radical were the 
mystics, the most famous of whom were the Sufis. AI-Ghazali was an early famous Sufi, who, 
long before Eckhart, propagated the idea of direct union with God. According to the 
orthodox; mystic union had to be limited to what Baldick (1989) calls "togetherness" or 
49 conjunctiorf', because anthropomorphism and pantheism were declared heretical, though 
many Sufis were charged with this crime. Sufi culture, which was the model for later Jewish 
mysticism, is one of esoteric knowledge, secrecy and initiation. Some Sufis displayed elements 
of monasticism and Freemasonry, whilst others engaged in practices in bold contradiction 
with Muslim orthodoxy. 
When the Islamic expansion reached Alexandria in 641, Neo-Platonist philosophy, which 
dominated the intelligentsia of the city, was acknowledged as the most advanced form of 
thought. Along with various Greek systems, including that of the dialectician Empedocles, a 
synthesis of Jewish, Christian, Gnostic, Shamanist and other religious ideas spread amongst 
Muslim thinkers, and later became the basis for the Sufi, interpretation of the Quran. Sufis 
tended to be limited to small groups, because they were, like the Neo-Platonists, usually 
scornful of and separate from the labouring masses, although there were notable exceptions. 
The renowned Sunni philosopher Ibn Rushd engaged in a bitter polemic with the Sufl, 
Mohammad al-Ghazali, during which each had their books burned. Typically the protagonists 
in these debates openly sought a power base by supporting the emir or religio-political leaders, 
the imams. As the fortunes of the leaders rose and fell so did those of the jurists and 
philosophers, and Ibn Rushd went from court philosopher to exile and back to court again. 
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The Sufis usually opted for a Neo-Platonist life of contemplative withdrawal in Cordova, 
away from the court intrigues, conspicuous consumption and growing disorder which marked 
the south of al Andalus. However, Sufi mysticism covers a wide range of theories and 
practices, including the heretical humanist views of the Salimiyya who "allegedly taught that 
God would be seen in human form by men (even the unbelievers) and in animal form by 
animals", Baldick page 52. Love, and the inter-subjectivity which it involves is another 
controversial Sufi theme: "The lovers of God reach either unitive fusion with him ... or the 
'station' of experiencing God's Uniqueness ... which means reaching 
him, so that he seems both 
to be and not be in and through everything7, Baldick page 57. In the work of Ahmed al 
Ghazali, not to be confused with his more famous brother Mohammad, there unfolds a 
dialectical relationship between the triad Love, Lover and Beloved, in which the last two are 
derived from the first: "Audacious paradoxes arise. The lover is closer to the Beloved's beauty 
than the Beloved is, and even thinks that he himself is the Beloved. When one passes away 
from one's self, one can go beyond a famous black light which tells the mystic that his journey 
is almost at an end", Baldick pages 66-67. 
Ibn 'Arabi 
Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) moved to the city of Seville during the final period of Islamic Spain. 
He learned all he could from the jurists, alchemists, magicians, astrologers and philsophers of 
al Andalus before travelling to North Africa. But increasing political and social chaos made 
him travel East to Mecca in his mid thirties, and then to Cairo "where his teachings 
encountered much hostility and his life was threatened", Baldick page 83. His vast output of 
writing, notably the Meccan Revelations, synthesised the works of the earlier Sufis, and he 
became acknowledged as their greatest thinker. Ibn 'Arabi, who is compared to Hegel and 
Spinoza by Baldick, takes up a number of Sufi themes which later proved important to the 
dialectical formulations of Christian and Jewish mystics. 
The much discussed distinction between stages and stations, which are recognisable as 
Hegelian moments, are terms taken from alchemy. "Passing away and survivar', perhaps 
influenced by early Christian ideas on "annihilation", is a final station, where in some versions 
the lower soul disappears giving way to the heart. The lower soul is part of a Neo-Platonist 
triad of moments, along with the intellect and the heart, and the latter negates itself into Spirit. 
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Baldick explains how in this mode of thought, which influenced Sufi poetry and later turned 
up in the sermons of Meister Eckhart, "man first realises, both intellectually and in experience, 
that his apparent, individual and temporal existence is really non-existence (since it is 
borrowed from God and not really owned by man), and then turns away, abandoning this 
negation of his existence, to the positive apprehending of real existence in God. In this one can 
see the celebrated 'negation of the negation'... Muhammad is credited with the saying 'Die 
before you die! ' ", page 45. 
The extent to which Ibn 'Arabi's dialectical thought influenced Sufis down to the present is 
clear in the work of the orthodox Burckhardt (1991), who constantly uses both his own 
dialectical prose and metaphors, and quotes that of the master. We read of the dialectic 
between the One and the many, essence and appearance, form (archetype) and matter, positive 
and negative, quantitative and qualitative, potential and actual, interpenetrating polarities, 
alchemic moments and the microcosm as the macrocosm in miniature. The metaphors of 
'Arabi include the prism, or miffor, radiating light from the One to the many, and the hub of a 
wheel as the One radiating the spokes of the many, and similarly with eagles, peacocks and 
white doves. The adoption, and development, of Neo-Platonism by Ibn 'Arabi means "that 
reality is regarded according to different orders of continuity depending upon the point of 
view adopted or imposed on us by the very nature of things, and metaphysic alone can 
embrace all these various perspectives and give to each its proper place in that web of visions, 
the universe", Burckhardt page 35. Similarly dialectical thinking is displayed on page 40: 
"Now any reflection implies a certain inversion in relation to its source: spiritual poverty ... 
is, 
for example, the inverse reflection of the Plenitude of the Spirit ... In these 'positive' virtues the 
inversion lies in the mode and not in the content, which means that they are, as it were, 
saturated with humility while their prototypes are made of majesty and glory". As we shall see, 
Feuerbach and Marx were to make use of inversion analogies in their dialectical approach to 
religion. 
As we have seen, there is an heretical essence in all forms of mysticism, and Ibn Arabi's views 
are no exception. His more heretical ideas were suppressed by the authorities, such as his call 
for a coming together of all religious faiths, which he believed were merely different paths to 
God. Important to the history of dialectics was his mystical interpretation of the statement in 
the Koran (2: 32) that "God had created Adam in his own image so that he could contemplate 
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himself as in a mirror", Armstrong (1994), page 264, which may have influenced the Kabbalah 
mystics. Most mystics have given a central place to the idea of nothing in their systems: 
"Human beings are the only animals who have the capacity to envisage something that is not 
present or something that does not yet exist but which is merely possible ... The 
idea of God, 
however it is defined, is perhaps the prime example- of an absent reality which, despite its 
inbuilt problems, has continued to inspire men and women for thousands of years", Armstrong 
page 269. Whilst this is a useful observation, it is difficult to agree with Armstrong's implied 
claim that animals are unaware of absence; pets, for example, being profoundly aware of their 
owner's absence. The concepts of nothingness, identity and emptiness which for mystics are 
expressions of God, made a profound impression on Ibn 'Arabi who "imagined the solitary 
God sighing with longing but this sigh was not an expression of maudlin self-pity. It had an 
active, creative force which brought the whole of our cosmos into existence; it also exhaled 
human beings, who became logoi, words that express God to himself', Armstrong pages 273- 
4. 
Rumi's dialectic 
.. the purpose of the five senses is to induce the individual to seek this 
hidden wisdom ... God 
has made the outer worlds appear real; and he has made the inner worlds seem unreal. But 
these are disguises, since the opposite is true, Run-d (1998) page 23. 
The accumulation of wealth, which resulted from the vast Muslim empire, caused a reaction 
whereby spiritual teachers advocated the renunciation of wealth and a return to a simple 
existence devoted to the attainment of wisdom. One Sufi explained that people should "detach 
themselves from things, and attach themselves to the Lord of things"; and another said 
"Sufism is to possess nothing and to be possessed by nothing", both quotes from van der 
Weyer's introduction to Rumi (1998) page 9. These principles underpinned the formation of 
Sufi lodges in Persia in order to provide free food and shelter to those in need. Out of this 
movement sprang the 13'h century poet-philosopher Jalal al-Din al-Rumi, who came from a 
family of well-born orthodox scholars. Rumi was disturbed the excessive wealth and lack of 
spirituality in Baghdad, the ancient capital of the Muslim empire. Under the influence of the 
Sufi teacher Shams, Rumi rejected orthodox Islam and became a mystic, often participating in 
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ecstatic skipping and dancing. This unorthodox behaviour became central to the faith of the 
Whirling Dervishes, a form of Sufism which survives today in Persia and Turkey. 
Rumi's work was collected in a tome, the Masnavi, which features much dialectical thinking, 
including the unorthodox doctrine that God possesses two contradictory characteristics mercy 
and anger. These forces are in constant tension, though mercy normally triumphs. Rumi takes 
up the essence-appearance dialectic when he says: "there is the inner world which many people 
deny, and is invisible to the senses, and yet is real and eternal ... How 
long will you be besotted 
with the shape of the jug? Look inside for the water. How long will you stare at the shell? 
Look inside, and pick out the pearr, page 21. "The external is at war with the internal - as if 
the shell were at war with the pearl it contains. The external says: 'I am this and no more. ' The 
internal says: 'Look closely, and you will find me. ' The external says: 'The internal is an 
illusion. ' The internal says: 'Just wait, and I shall reveal myself"', page 22. 
On strife and contradiction, which due to the activities of Genghis Khan's army was never far 
from his life, Rumi says: "The task of life is to bring harmony between opposites. Strife 
between opposites is destructive; harmony between opposites is creative. God wants the sheep 
and the lion to live in peace ... 
Opposites may seem to be in conflict; but in truth opposites 
depend on one another ... You cannot recognise evil as evil until you 
have experienced 
goodness, You discern something through its opposite", pages 42-4. He continues by 
sublimating social struggle into natural struggle: "Nation is set against nation in the pursuit of 
power and wealth ... To understand the conflict with 
God's creation, look at the four elements. 
The four elements are like four sturdy pillars holding up the roof of heaven. Yet each pillar 
tries to destroy another - such as water, puts out fire. So creation is built on opposites; and 
these inevitably are at war-the existence of harmony presupposes the possibility of conflict", 
pages 66-7. 
Jewish Mystical Thought 
But when we reach the number nine we cannot progress farther without returning to the 
unity, or the number one, for the number ten is but a repetition of unityfreshly derivedfrom 
the negative, as is evident from a glance at its ordinary representation in Arabic 
numerals .. In this number are the other nine hidden. It is indivisible, it is also incapable of 
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multiplication; &vide I by itself and it still remains 1, multiply I by itselfand it is still I and 
unchanged Aus it is afitting representative of the great unchangeable Father of all-and 
thusforms, as it were, the link between the negative and the positive ... Thus, then, we obtain 
a duad composed of I and its reflection Now also we have the commencement of a 
vibration established, for the number I vibrates alternatively from changelessness to 
definition, and hack to changelessness again. Aus, then, is it thefather of all numbers, and a 
fitting type of the Father ofall things, McGregor Mathers (199 1) pages 20-23. 
The pure flame of monotheism may of course be kept alive in an unsuccessful tribe which is 
not completely extinguished Aus the Jews, situated on the main trade route of early 
civilisation and harried and battered on all sides, were compressed into a proud, prickly, 
bigoted society whose difficult economic life is rej7ected in their religion. But this very 
battering toughened them; and made of Judaism a consciousness which, as events proved, 
was to possess great survival value in the maelstrom of social relations of the East, Caudwell 
page 39. 
It is a commonplace to comment upon the social struggles and profound contradictions of the 
Jewish people. This can be traced from their tribal beginnings, through the destruction of 
Jerusalem, their achievements in Spain from where they were exiled by Christians in 1492, the 
many pogroms, the holocaust to the present situation in Israel, a Middle East local superpower 
dependent on U. S. patronage. Marx's famous 1843 article Ott the Jewish Question, contained 
in Marx (1975), is very dialectical, if lacking in historical detail, in its style of presentation, and 
contains some useful material on the social contradictions of the Jewish people. Marx's 
ancestors had originally come from Spain, hence his nickname Moor. He had Rabbis in his 
family, although his father converted to Christianity for economic reasons. Throughout most 
of the medieval period European Jews had been marginalised; many converted to avoid 
persecution or to improve their economic prospects, but the rest were largely restricted to 
money lending and trade. As Halevi (1979) explains: "A person is born into and under the 
laws of a very tough physical existence, where he has to learn the arts and sciences of survival 
before he is ready to study Kabbalalf', page 20. "How can you expect me to be perfect ... when 
I am full of contradictions? " asks one Spanish Jewish mystic, quoted on page 22. 
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Scholern (197 1) argues that after the fall, in which social exclusion is idealised as Adam's sin, 
the Kabbalists sought an "inward home" via the ladder of descent and ascent. He says 
anthropocentrically: "The primal flaw must be mended so that all things can return to their 
proper place, to their original posture. Man and God are partners in this enterprise. After the 
original breaking God began the process of reparation, but He left its completion to marf', 
page 46. This contrasts with a more secular Russian Kabbalist who points out that "If one can 
think of business during prayer, then one can pray whilst doing business", Halevi page 25. 
Jewish mystics from Maimonides of the twelth century to Don Baer of Lubavich of the 19th 
century constantly refer to business. Jacobs (1990) points out that masters of the Kabbalah 
make it clear that initiates were supposed to have been successful in business before turning to 
the esoteric path to God. But to truly understand the "Jewish questiow' requires a study of the 
concrete circumstances of a given historical period with a dialectical mode of presentation: 
Me form in which the Jewish question is posed differs according to the state in which the Jew 
finds himself In Germany, where there is no political state, no state as such, the Jewish 
question is a purely theological question. Me Jew is in religious opposition to the state, 
which acknowledges Christianity as itsfoundation .. In France in the constitutional state ... the 
relationship of the Jew to the state also retains the appearance of a religious theological 
opposition ... Civil society ceaselessly 
hegets the Jew from its own entrails. nal was the 
essential basis o the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism. Me monotheism of the Jew is !f 
therefore in reality the polytheism of the many needs, a polytheism that makes even the 
lavatory an o1ject of divine law .. Me god of the Jews has been secularized and become the 
god of the world Exchange is the true god of the Jew. His god is nothing more than 
illusionary exchange. Me view of nature which has grown up under the regime of private 
property and of money is an actual contemptfor and practical degradation of nature which 
does exist in the Jewish religion hut only in an imaginaryform ... the chimerical nationality of 
the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of money in generaL.. As soon as 
society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism - the market and the 
conditions which give rise to it - the Jew will have become impossible, for his consciousness 
will no longer have an o1ject, the subjective basis of Judaism - practical need - will have 
become humanized and the conflict between man's individual existence and his species- 
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existence will have been superseded 7he social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation 
of societyfrom Judaism, Marx (1975), pages 216 and 23 8-24 1. 
Through 'Throne Mysticism', which developed in the 2nd and 3rd century, Jews expressed 
their desire "to turn away from a world in which they were persecuted and marginalised to a 
more powerful divine realm ... 
it was finally incorporated into Kabbalah, the new Jewish 
mysticism, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries", Armstrong (1994) page 245. It was 
perhaps Jewish mystics of the middle ages who reflected most profoundly, albeit in a 
'fantastic' way, on the marginal and highly contradictory social position of the Jew. Such a 
position is clear in an I Ith century Spanish mystical text which speaks of the man "Whose 
divided heart wrestles with itself', quoted in Halevi, page 19. The written work of the mystics 
was read by Jews in the ghettos, and by intellectuals of all faiths and none. Because of its 
advanced cultural level during the early, or Muslim, part of the medieval period, it is no 
surprise that Spanish Jews were at the forefront of the development of the Zohar and other 
writings which formed the esoteric tradition, or "reception", called the Kabbalah. 
The Kabbalah developed dialectics to a higher level than any other form of mystical thought, 
using a synthesis of Egyptian mystery, Hebrew tribal religion, Christian and Muslim mystical 
ideas, neo-Platonism, Zoroastrianism, astrology, alchemy, Pythogorean numerology and other 
traditions. The Book of Concealed Mystery is a key text in the Zohar, and illustrates perfectly 
the synthesis of these diverse elements to produce profoundly dialectical passages. The text 
speaks of "the equilibrium of contraries", which as McGregor Mathers' introduction explains, 
represents the balance which forms the third part of a triad where the other two parts are 
opposing forces, such as light and shade. The introduction sounds very Hegelian, but is faithful 
to the spirit of the text when stating that: 
To define negative existence clearly is impossible, for when it is distinctly defined it ceases 
to be negative existence; it is then negative existence passing into static condition ... Therefore 
negative subsistence cannot be at all; it never has existed, it never does exist, it never will 
exist. But negative existence bears hidden in itself, positive life; for in the limitless depths of 
the abyss of its negativity lies hidden the power of standing forth from itset( .. between two 
ideas so different as those of negative and positive existence a certain nexus, or connecting- 
link, is required, and hence we arrive at the form which is called potential existence, which 
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while more nearly approachingpositive existence, will scarcely admit of clear definition. It is 
existence in its possible form. For example, in a seed, the tree which may spring from it is 
hidden; it is in a condition of potential existence; is there; but it will not admit of 
definition .. But, on the other 
hand, positive existence is always capable of definition; it is 
dynamic; it has certain evidentpowers, and it is therefore the antithesis of negative existence, 
and still more so of negative subsistence. It is the tree, no longer hidden in the seed, but 
developed into the outer. But positive existence has a beginning and an end, and it therefore 
requires anotherform from which to depend, for without this other concealed negative ideal 
behind it, it is unstable and unsatisfactory, McGregor Mathers (199 1) pages 16-19. 
The Kabbalah is heretical as far as orthodox Judaism is concerned because humanity, 
according to the initiate, seeks the divine essence within himself or herself by discovering 
nothingness, a sign of God's nearness. Halevi explains that God is AYIN, or Absolute 
Nothingness, and therefore the identity God is God, is, to use Hegelian language, an empty 
identity. But AYIN is opposed to AYIN SOF, or the One, as the number zero is opposed to 
the number one. The reason for the creation of the universe is that God was dissatisfied with 
this empty identity and bare opposition: "Face did not gaze on face ... God wished to behold 
God", page 5. At the end of time when all obstacles are overcome, God and His creation will 
come together again in a higher identity. As the Zohar explains: "Man contains all that is in 
heaven above and on earth below, both heavenly and earthly creatures ... The identification of 
passion and desire is accomplished. The soul of the just man transforms the dry place; love and 
passion are awakened above, and all is Unity", quoted in Nataf (1994) pages 21 and 24. 
The universe came into being through ten stages which correspond to God's attributes, or 
Sefirot. The ten Sefirot are related to each other by a Tree of Life consisting of a triad of Will, 
Mercy and Rigour; in which Will holds the balance, Mercy expands and Rigour constrains life. 
This triad links to a series of other triads and dualities in a multi-dimensional interpenetrating 
whole, which is, through its complements and oppositions, expansions and contractions, in a 
constant state of becoming. Each stage reached in the Sefirah contains within it all the 
experience and knowledge of the previous stages of creation. Halevi explains that "Four 
Worlds interpenetrate the whole of existence. Schematically they may be seen as a 'Jacob's 
Ladder', with the Tree of one World growing out the structure of the last ... no picture of 
existence shall become a fixed image that might be considered the ultimate. Alas, orthodoxy 
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has never understood this principle and often takes authority from redundant formulatione', 
page 11. 
Halevi uses a couple of dialectical quotes from the Zohar to demonstrate further: 
nen the Holy One who created the Universe wished to reveal its hidden aspect, the light 
within darkness, He showed how things were intermingled Thus out of darkness comes light 
and the concealed comes the revealed In the same manner does good emerge from evil and 
Mercyftom Justice, since they too are intertwined.. An individual does not know that he is 
calledfor assessment before entering this World as well as after leaving it. He does not know 
how many transformations and esoteric trials he has to pass through, pages 28 and 29. 
Concluding remarks 
It is clear that by the end of the medieval period dialectical thought had become highly 
sophisticated, especially amongst alchemists and mystics. However, these thinkers continued 
to be preoccupied with mere sublimations of their respective societies' struggles. They 
expressed these struggles in the form of religious or natural metaphors, and failed to apply the 
dialectic itself to society. In the next chapter we see how the decline of feudal society in 
Europe, and the slow genesis of capitalism, led to the direct application of dialectics to 
specifically social themes. 
213 
Chapter Five 
The Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Capitalism 
Scholastic methods of supporting religious truth with rational arguments were progressively 
losing credibility and efficacy, and although the masters of the mediaeval schools never 
stopped exercising their semantic and logical skills, they were soon to be regarded as 
uninteresting remnants of a past age, incapable of competing with, let alone of matching, 
new intellectual trends either of the empiricist or the rationalist kind, all of them contributing 
to the merciless corrosion offaith, Makowski (1982), page 127. 
The Florentine Renaissance 
This combination of commerce, culture and enlightened despotism made Florence the 
Renaissance equivalent ofAthens in classical antiquity, Curry and Zarate (1995), page 7. 
And it happened in Florence ... (where) Platonic learning was recalledfrom darkness into 
light, Ficino, quoted in Copenhaver and Schmitt (1992) page 163. 
77ie tension between past and future imparts to the Renaissance, more than to any other 
period, a peculiar Janus-like quality. Like the two-headed god himsetf, it stands at the same 
time for the divide, the boundary and the gate. 7he only clarity that it can attain is thus 
poetic and artistic. As it looks backward, its aspect is that of humanism, passionately 
absorbed in the prototypes set by the past; as it gazes ahead, it projects a Faustian vision of 
undefined but unlimitedpower, the new anthropological myth of Man the Explorer, bent on 
an endless quest, de Santillana. (1956) page 21. 
The 14th to the 16th centuries, in which there was said to be a rebirth of ancient Greek 
knowledge and culture, largely from Byzantine sources, and a revival of some aspects of 
Roman civilisation, came to be known as the Renaissance. The social changes which coincided 
with these intellectual developments were centred around the rise of a burgher civilisation, i. e. 
a European merchant and banking class, which took political power away from the knights 
and aristocrats, who were often either reduced to the role of hangers-on at new 'princely' 
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courts or joined the professions. The practical needs of the new ruling class led to 
developments in mathematics, astrology/astronomy, physics, alchemy/chemistry, and 
geography, so that industry, and ever more distant trade and colonisation, could develop. The 
spread of printing revolutionised industry and scholarship in the 15th century. At first these 
developments only affected the walled cities and towns, which had grown out of the burgher 
communes, whereas the country-side was hardly affected. Eventually, as war began to affect 
their lives, more and more peasants revolted against their lords or 'princes', whilst their priests 
attacked the wealth and corruption of the papacy. 
Renaissance Florence was one of a number of independent city states in what was later to 
become Italy. In the 13th century it had been involved in a brutal war between the armies of 
the Pope and those of the Holy Roman Empire. However, the factions on either side were 
constantly at war with each other, so that in the next century civil war broke out. In periods of 
relative stability Florence's mass of artisans, labourers and urban poor were ruled by a large 
elected council, and a number of smaller councils. Its wealthy merchant class traded far and 
wide in commodities including wool and silk; and its most famous banking family, the Medicis, 
became the Papal bankers, ruling the city with Papal support from 1434 to 1737. 
During the late 15th century Medici rule was interrupted by those most intense contradictions 
war and revolt during an 18 year period of alternate republicanism, French invasion, religious 
demagoguery and riots by the disenfranchised masses. The Medicis routinely rigged the 
councils and snuffed out any real democracy, whilst they played their full part in the war and 
intrigue which continued throughout Renaissance Italy, as merchant 'princes', the Papacy and 
local aristocrats vied for power. Niccolo Machiavelli (1961) was the first in a line of thinkers, 
including Hobbes, Mandeville and Rousseau, who wrote openly and honestly about the deep 
contradictions of their societies. Machiavelli, like Mandeville, was reviled by those offended by 
his frankness, and Vie Prince was said to have been written by someone both depraved and 
inspired by the devil. In speaking about that most contradictory aspect of human life, the 
brutal warfare that marked his life and times, Machiavelli says: 
So it should he noted that when he seizes a state the new ruler ought to determine all the 
injuries that he will need to inflict. He should inflict them once for all, and not have to renew 
them every day, and in that way he will he able to set men's minds at rest and win them over 
to him when he confers. benefits. "oever acts otherwise, either through timidity or had 
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advice, is ahvays forced to have the knife ready in his hand and he can never depend on his 
subjects because they, suffering fresh and continuous violence, can never feel secure with 
regard to him, Machiavelli (196 1) page 66. 
It is useful to note that Machiavelli anticipates an Hegelian theme, which was to prove helpful 
in the development of the idea of abstraction as a means of explaining the existence of 
ideology: the many-sided nature of reality. He says of critics of the present that "it is 
impossible that things should look the same to them seeing that they have other appetites, 
other interests, other standpoints", quoted in Larrain page 18. We shall return to this 
important dialectical theme in later chapters. 
As enlightened despots, the Medicis gave generously to the arts and humanities. During the 
15th century Florence was acknowledged as the centre of European artistic and scientific 
creativity, with Alberti, Botticelli, da Vinci, Michelangelo and others working there. Most 
Renaissance scholars, typical of whom are Kristeller (1972) and de Santillana (1956), take a 
largely ahistorical and asocial perspective in their discussion of the thought of the period. In 
order to understand the thinkers of this period in more depth, it is necessary to ground their 
work socially. We can link, for example, Renaissance humanism, which stresses the value of 
the individual, with the freedom and individualism associated with the Florentine merchants 
and bankers. Humanist philosophy and classical republicanism became important themes in 
Florentine thought, and the education of the wealthy ruling class, including the humanities, 
embraced these ideals, although a minority opposed them. The more rebellious intellectuals 
felt stultified in the declining universities, they preferred subversive works, such as the social 
satires of the ancient Roman Lucian. An important dialectical source for humanism was the 
revival of the ancient thought contained in Hermetic and other esoteric texts. Such texts 
bolstered the idea of an immortal humanity as a microcosm of the relationship between heaven 
and earth. It supported an optimistic individualism, which contrasted sharply with medieval 
pessimism in which humanity as a whole was a hopeless victim of the fall, relying only on the 
grace of God for salvation. As Kristeller notes, even the Christian Aristotelians, such as 
Pomponazzi, were affected by the new intellectual climate and engaged in speculation 
concerning a residual or secular immortality "that does not depend on an infinite extension in 
time, but is fully realised in the actual experience of the present moment ... 
(which) anticipates 
Spinoza and, perhaps, Hegel", page 41. 
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Marsillo Ficino 
because his publishing career corresponded with the ... new print technology, (Ficino) was the 
first major European philosopher whose works could spread widely and swiftly in his own 
lifetime, Copenhaver and Schmitt page 163. 
Ficino, born near Florence in 1433 the son of doctor, was the finest product of that city's 
humanist education. His brand of neo-Platonist dialectics was inevitably mediated by the 
socio-economic conditions of the time. Renaissance Florence was a city state in which the rule 
of the merchant bankers was to varying degrees guaranteed by the Papacy. Ficino, as an 
ordained priest, had to tread a careful path embracing the needs of both these groups, as well 
as those of the various sections of the middle classes, to which he belonged. His Platonism, 
with its strict hierarchy of being and advocacy of a quiet life of contemplation, suited the 
religious authorities. However, in order to legitimate the activities of the merchants and 
bankers, like Plotinus and the Kabbalists before him, he had to interpret such activities as the 
fitting end of an active life, a link between heaven and earth. Various vested interests 
disapproved of Plato's magic, his homosexuality and his "paganism", whilst his anti-trade 
polemics did not endear him to the Florentine merchants. Therefore Ficino's neo-Platonism, 
was a synthesis of a number of the master's ideas and those of other thinkers. His philosophy 
was built round the "pagan" dialectics of Plotinus, with his oppositions such as the One and 
the many, being and non-being and macrocosm and microcosm, as contained in the Enneads, 
translated and interpreted by Ficino. 
In Five Questions Concerning the Mind Ficino anticipates Hegel by alluding to the 
companion of Minerva, saying that "In this common order of the whole, all things, no matter 
how diverse, are brought back to unity according to a single determined harmony and rational 
plan ... the common end of the whole to which the single ends are led must also be prescribed 
by that mind", quoted in Cassirer et al (1948), page 195. He also anticipates Marx by pointing 
out that workmen must possess the architect's plan or "by no means will they be moved to 
their prescribed occupations by anyone who does not first possess the common prescribed end 
of the whole work", page 198. On vantage points he says that it is necessary to see "the form 
of the whole itself, and which, from any point, beholds the limits of the whole, and the 
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gradations through which it extende', page 200. Ficino's ultimate loyalty was to the vantage 
point of the humanist merchant class, he was often at odds with the Church. He insisted on the 
important role of the disparate members of the middle classes: "Ficino believed that Platonic 
texts contained mysteries of Christian doctrine that could be comprehended and 
communicated only by special interpreters - lovers, poets, priests, and prophets - rapt in an 
ecstasy that unites them with God", Copenhaver page 154. 
Kristeller discusses Ficino's dialectical humanism: 
if I am not mistaken, he reconstructs the Neoplatonic hierarchy of heing in such a way that 
the rational soul which stands for man comes to occupy the place in the center, helow God 
and the angels and ahove qualities and hodies. Moreover, Ficino insists on the universality 
of the human mind and sees in this its hasic affinity with God Ae soul tends to know all 
truth and to attain all goodness; it tries to hecome all things and is capahle of living the life 
of all heings higher and lower. In this way the soul tries to hecome God, and this is its 
divinity 
.. man is to 
dominate all elements and all animals, and thus is the horn lord and ruler 
of nature, and man the astronomer .. is virtually endowed with a mind similar to that of 
God 
who constructed the spheres themselves, pages 10- 11. 
The late medieval period had left a philosophical dualism, or double truth theory, separating 
faith and reason, most notably in the work of Ockham, Pomponazzi and the Latin followers of 
Ibn Rush'd. This was part of an and Christian Aristotelianism, which rejected the use of 
mathematics and experiments in science. The double truth was a view which sublimated the 
dual power between the Church and the merchants/bankers. Ficino was the leading member of 
the Florentine Academy, a centre set up by the Medicis for the revival of Platonic philosophy, 
and he attempted to overcome the dualism by reuniting faith and reason as different 
expressions of the same truth. In this intellectual endeavour he was saying that philosophy and 
theology were of equal status, hence the title of his main work: Platonic Theology. When 
speaking of theology, he meant not only Christianity but a synthesis of this with Judaism, 
Egyptian and Chaldean theology, philosophy, magic, Zoroastrianism, and other doctrines. For 
Ficino the history of philosophy was to be thought of "not just as a linear transmission of 
ideas but also as a recurring struggle in which wisdom or faith, philosophy or theology, reason 
or eloquence might rise or fall as lights of the human spirit", Copenhaver and Schmitt page 
148. 
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statements and that the presence of these true statements makes the philosopher worth 
studying, Kristeller page 59. 
Pico, the younger friend of Ficino, spent some of his short life studying in Padua and Paris, 
later learning Arabic, Hebrew and Aramiac. He went further than Ficino in his humanist 
synthesis of Christianity and other systems, including a revived Aristotelianism, neo-Platonism, 
Averroism, Kabbalist dialectics and Hermeticism. Pico went so far in this direction as to be 
referred to as a "neo-pagan" in his attempt to overcome the crushing orthodoxy of the 
Aristotelian-Christians. He called the supporters of late medieval orthodoxy "dull, rude, 
uncultured barbarians", taunting them with statements like: "There is no science that gives us 
more certainty of Christ's divinity than magic and the Kabbalah", quoted in Copenhaver page 
169. However, it is important to note that Pico attacked the determinism of predictive 
astrology. His brave defence of humanism against Catholicism is an example to contemporary 
humanists, who face the attacks of structuralists and postmodernists with their philosophy of 
hyperreal dehumanised images, seemingly all pervasive and blind forces of contemporary 
global capitalism, which they believe have crushed individual initiative and creativity, or the 
"death of the subject". Pico reveals his open critical approach when he says: "I have ranged 
through all the masters of philosophy, investigated all books, and come to know all 
schools ... There 
has been nobody in the past, and there will be nobody after us, to whom truth 
has given itself to be understood in its entirety. Its immensity is too great for human capacity 
to be equal to it", quoted on page 58 of Kristeller. 
Not surprisingly Pico's Oration of 1486, a prelude to the planned Conclusiones, was 
condemned by Pope Innocent VIII, and he had to flee, only to be arrested later. According to 
Kristeller, his thought included the view that humanity, as the microcosm, had the potential to 
become a plant, an animal, a celestial being, an angel, or he may even be united with God 
Himself.. I should like to go even further and suggest that it was Pico's passionate concern 
withfi-eedoin ... which made the notion of afixed though centralposition of man unacceptable 
to him and compelled him to place man outside the hierarchy. Ais is a rather bold view, and 
it may be considered as one of the first steps in dissolving the notion of the great chain of 
being that had dominated Western thought for so many centuries .. Man's excellence is 
realized only when he chooses the higherforms of moral and intellectual life that are open to 
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him, and this excellence belongs to his given nature only in so far as this nature includes 
among its potentialities those higherforms of life, pages 12-14. 
Pico (1998) contains a translation of the famous On the Dignity ofMan, in which he develops 
the theme of human potentiality: "At man's birth the Father placed in him every sort of seed 
and sprouts of every kind of life. The seeds that each man cultivates will grow and bear their 
fruit in him. If he cultivates vegetable seeds, he will become a plant. If the seeds of sensation, 
he will grow into brute. If rational, he will come out a heavenly animal. If intellectual, he will 
be an angel, and a son of God. And if he is not contented with the lot of any creature but takes 
himself up into the center of his own unity, then, made one spirit with God and settled in the 
solitary darkness of the Father, who is above all things, he will stand ahead of all things. Who 
does not wonder at this chameleon which we are? ", page 5. Such ideas on potentiality which, 
in opposition to Aristotle, include freedom and the power to reason, are important dialectical 
ideas which were to influence Bruno. Similarly the idea that "the opposed views of different 
philosophical schools may be reconciled and that there is some truth in the teachings of all 
major philosophers and theologiane', quoted in Kristeller page 15, anticipates Hegel by 300 
years. Pico's view that "man combines and unites all things, not only through his thought, but 
also in reality", page 16, is reminiscent of Marx. 
He speaks of the role of dialectic: "by shaking off the mist of reason by means of dialectic, as 
if washing off the filth of ignorance and vice, let us purge the soul, that the affections may not 
audaciously run riot, nor an imprudent reason sometime rave ... philosophizing along the rungs 
of the ladder of nature, and penetrating through everything from center to center, we shall at 
one time be descending, tearing apart, like Osiris, the one into many by a titanic force; and we 
shall at another time be ascending and gathering into one the many ... Dialectic will calm the 
turmoils of a reason shoved about between the fist fights of oratory and the deceits of the 
syllogism ... Natural philosophy will 
bring calm in such a way as to command us to remember 
that, according to Heraclitus, our nature is bom of war", Pico (1998), pages 9-11. 
The dialectic of Lorenzo Valla 
No man is a stone; some man is an animal, therefore, some animal is not a stone. I can 
hardly keep myselffrom screaming. 0 you family of Peripatetics, in love with trifles! Have 
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you ever heard anyone arguing like this, you nation of madmen? ". Valla, rejecting the trivia 
of Aristotelian logic, quoted in Copenhaver pages 226-7. 
Do I say that ftee will is annulled by the will of God? ... Haw is God good if He takes away 
ftee will?, Valla, in Cassirer et al (1948) pages 174 and 177. 
Does not Paul say thatftom the same lump of clay one vessel was made unto honor and the 
other indeed unto dishonor? Nor ought it to be said that vessels of honor were made of 
polluted matter, Valla, page 178. 
Lorenzo Valla (1405-1457) is anther important humanist thinker, and Papal critic, whose 
Dialogue on Free Will is a Platonic-style dialectic on the subject of determinism and free will. 
He takes up knotty problems, subjecting them to many-sided investigation: "I said it was 
necessary for Judas to betray, unless we entirely annul providence, because God foresaw it 
would be thus. So if it was possible for something to happen otherwise than it was foreseen, 
providence is destroyed, but if it is impossible, free will is destroyed, a thing no less unworthy 
to God than if we should cancel His providence. I, in what concerns me, would prefer Him to 
be less wise rather than less good. The latter would injure mankind; the other would 
not ... 
know that it is not to be conceded that whatever is possible will likewise happen. It is 
possible for you to do otherwise than God foreknows, nevertheless you will not do otherwise, 
nor will you therefore deceive Him7', Cassirer et al (1948), pages 168-9. 
A number of Renaissance natural philosophers, most notably Galileo, wrote treatises on 
Aristotelian logic, the most important being by Valla. lEs Dialectical Disputations argued for 
dialectic to become overtly rhetorical, more suited to verbal demonstrations of the solutions to 
ethical, religious or political problems. Exposing the futility of the attempt to construct a 
formal logical language, an enterprise still engaging contemporary logicians, Valla noted that 
different languages, such as Latin, Greek or a vernacular language, required different rules of 
logic because different languages relate to different cultures, or ways of life. Such ideas 
marked Valla as the most astute of a number of humanists who rejected attempts to construct 
the formal languages used to demonstrate logical validity in the universities. These languages 
were based on Peter of Spain's codification of Aristotle, which humanists like Valla saw as 
"barbaric, inelegant, hypertechnical, and ultimately devoid of any truly human purpose", 
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Copenhaver page 29. Valla informs us about both logic and Renaissance gender relations 
when he says: "foolish women sometimes know the meaning of words better than great 
philosophers. Women put words to use; philosophers play with thenf', quoted in Copenhaver 
page 219. In rejecting alphabetical and other forms of symbolic notation, and the a priori 
identification of certain logical fallacies, Valla showed that his thought was in advance of not 
only Renaissance, but also contemporary, formal logicians. 
Renaissance developments in dialectic, rhetoric and the critique of logic 
Using the example of late Renaissance natural philosophy, specifically astronomy, Moss 
(1993) attempts to identify the attitudes of important philosophers of the period to logic, 
dialectic and rhetoric. Logic was understood as demonstrative syllogistic reasoning, capable of 
attaining certainty. In contrast, dialectic was defined as argument which, because no certain 
premises were agreed, could yield only probable conclusions. Rhetoric attempted to induce 
assent using both methods, with the addition of induction, but in a less formal way. Typically 
rhetoric used vivid examples, and made use of "ethos, the character of the speaker, and 
pathos, the emotions of the audience" Moss page 11. In practice, despite Moss's distinctions, 
the interchangeability of the terms rhetoric, logic and dialectic, established in the medieval 
period, continued during the Renaissance. Humanists began to use the term dialectic to cover 
both dialectic and logic, axioms often being expressed in the form of a rhetorical question. 
Moss treats the thought of the period as a mere interplay of ideas, detached from their socio- 
economic context. The new merchants, soon to be colonialists, needed theory which brought 
reliable practical results, so where no immediate practical applications were available, theories 
remained speculative and all the techniques available to the philosopher were brought into 
play. Routine experiment, which began with Newton, was either unavailable, as in astronomy, 
simply not used, or performed in secret, especially where alchemy or natural magic was 
involved. Copernicus, argues Moss failing to acknowledge the quote's Hermetic allusion, 
typically used much rhetoric when arguing for a heliocentric universe: 
At rest, however, in the middle of everything is the sun. For in this most beautiful temple, who 
would place this lamp in another or better position than that from which it can light up the 
whole thing at the same time? For, the sun is not inappropriately called by some people the 
lantern of the universe, its mind by others, and its ruled by others. (Hermes) the Arice 
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Greatest lahels it a visihle god, and Sophocles' Electra, the all seeing. Thus indeed, as 
though seated on a royal throne, the sun governs the family of planets revolving around it, 
from the De revolutionibus, quoted in Moss page 1. 
Quoting the views of the 20th century writer Marcello Pera on scientific logic, Moss appears 
to accept that even today, despite its reified positivism, rhetoric is crucial to natural science: 
to he rational is to accept those theories, to work out those problems, to take those decisions 
that are supported by good reasons, 'good' in the sense that they won a victory in a concrete 
debate conducted according to a concrete configuration of the basis of scientific 
dialectics 
.. scientific rhetoric 
(is) the set of those persuasive, argumentative techniques 
scientists use in order to reach their conclusions, quoted in Moss page 22 (my emphasis). 
In his Remarks on Aristotle Ramus developed a simplified system of logic for students, based 
mainly on the Platonic dialectical method of division. This method was at odds with the overly 
elaborate Aristotelian system base on the syllogism, associated with Papal orthodoxy. 
Protestantism warmed to the new approach, which spread around Europe through the medium 
of the printed textbook. Eventually Aristotelians took the sting out of the approach, 
synthesising the chart based methods of Ramus into their own texts. Similarly Luther, says de 
Santillana (1956), considered himself an Ockhamist of sorts, or 'terminist', as the name was, 
for it provides good means for calling a spade a spade, but in his Table Talk he rues the 
time spent 'on philosophy all that devil's muck, when I could have been busy with poetry and 
legend and so many good things', page 17. 
Nicholas of Cusa and the 'science of the infinite' 
In his meWhysics each particular heing is nothing hut a particular mant/estation or contraction 
of the one infinite and divine principle, and, in the same way, each human doctrine is hut a special 
expression of the universal truth that can never he expressed in one particular statement. On this 
hasis, it is possihIe for Cusanus to find a partial truth in a variety ofphilosophical and religious 
doctrines, includingMohammedanis; m, Kristefler pages 534. 
Yhe Truth is simple, it speaks aloud in the marketplace, Cusa, quoted in de Santillana page 48. 
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77iough we neitherperceive it nor understand it, we knowfor afact that all things stand in some 
sort of relation to one another; that, in virtue of this inter-relation, all the individuals constitute 
one universe and that in the one Absolute the multiplicity of being is unity itse#' Every image is an 
approximate reproduction of the exemplar, Cusa, quoted in de Santiflana page 59. 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) signals the beginning of both German Renaissance thought and 
German idealist philosophy. Visits to Basle and Constantinople made him aware of the humanist 
movement, whilst his early studies at Padua alerted him to the social changes taking place in the 
Italian cities due to tension between the new 'princes' and republican movements, mediated by the 
growth of trade and industry. Cusa became an ordained priest, and later bishop and cardinal. He 
was initially a strong advocate of reform in Papal politics, supporting the conciliar movement. 
When the Church triumphed over the various heterodox tendencies, he switched sides and 
supported Papal authority. However, until his death there remained an ambivalence about Cusa's 
views, detectable, in a sublimated form, in his dialectics. For example, Cusa was affected by the 
Muslim capture of Constantinople in 1453, fearing that it presaged the end of the Christian faith, he 
responded in one of his last books, which outraged his orthodox contemporaries, by calling for a 
synthesis of all religious doctrines into one new totalising faith, a call which had been made 250 
years earlier by the Sufi Ibn 'Arabi. 
On Learned Ignorance, title of Cusa's most famous work, is a chiasmus he counterposed to the 
Ignorant Learnedness of the Aristotelians. The work makes clear Cusa's interest in mathematics 
and numerology, including Pythagorean symbolism of number and geometrical form. Meister 
Eckhart's mysticism and the dialectical religious language of Pseudo-Dionysius were also major 
influences on Cusa; using them as the basis for what he called his negative theoloSy, which rejected 
both Aristotelian reasoning and the static language typical of late medieval religious debates. In On 
Learned Ignorance Cusa says of negative theology: "negative propositions are true and afflumative 
ones inadequate; and that of the negative ones those are truer which eliminate greater imperfections 
from the infinitely Perfect. It is truer, for example, to deny that God is a stone than to deny that He 
is life or intelligence ... In affirmative propositions the contrary 
holds good; It is truer to assert that 
He is intelligence and life than to assert that He is earth, stone or anything material", quoted in de 
Santillana page 62. On the following page de Santillana quotes from Cusa's richly dialectical work: 
"there is not a being in the universe which is not a unity composed of potency, act and the 
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movement connecting them, and that none of these three is capable of absolute subsistence without 
the others". 
Central to Cusa! s dialectical method was the synthesis of a combination of silences, symbols, 
metaphors and contradictions taken from mathematics, proto-physics, mysticism and esotericism. 
Mathematical figures and ideas were very important in the thought of the period; the poet Donne 
used a mathematical analogy which was to be developed in later dialectical thought: "Thy firmness 
draws my circle just, And makes me end, where I begurf', quoted in de Santillana page 25. The 
central mathematical term used by Cusa was the infinite, known to us in its various modem 
mathematical meanings, but its romantic poetic uses had been developed by Ficino. He called it "the 
chain that links the world together", whilst Pascal was to write that "the silence of infinite space 
frightens me", de Santillana page 14. Cusa's cosmology, according to de Santillana, anticipates 
Einstein's general relativity theory, "since there is no absolute space or firame of reference, and 
motion and rest depend from the point of observation: the condition being that the cosmos must be 
symmetrical to all of its parts, i. e. at each point it must appear as if this were the centre ... motion 
is 
everywhere; the only real 'rest' would be infinite velocity, since maximum and minimum coincide", 
page 53. Whilst de Santillanal this is too speculative and abstract to be of any practical value, 
Lindsay, in his Introduction to Bruno (1962), disagrees, noting that Cusa engaged in some 
important scientific work. Cusa's pioneering mode of thought, coupled with the practice of 
alchemy and the non-determinist aspects of astrology, led to considerable progress in the work of 
later scientists, including Kepler and Newton. 
For Cusa infinity was not about the "more or less', but expressed the ineffable incomprehensible 
idea of God, compared to which all other forms of being are lower, since they are to varying 
degrees separated from the infinite: "Now it is between God and Nothingness that we have to think 
that all creatures take their place. The upper world as you see it is not without darkness ... In the 
lower world darkness reigns, yet light is not absenf' Cusa, employing the Gnostic interpenetration 
of opposites, quoted by de Santillana page 54. However, humanity, described by Cusa as like "owls 
trying to look at the surf' page 55, is exceptional because of its ability to conjecture: "man is a 
microcosm ... Man can 
be a human God, then, and as God in a human manner he can be a human 
angel, a human beast ... or whatever else. Within man's potency all things exist in their way", quoted 
in Copenhaver page 181. Cusa uses the term "science of the infinite" to describe his dialectical 
mode of thought, though claiming this is ultimately inadequate to the task of describing the infinite. 
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However, existence is marked by paradox, since the infinite is constantly opposed by the finite in a 
relationship which Cusa calls the "coincidence of opposites", a term used to distinguish him from 
the empty "being" of the "Aristotelian secf'. The infinite is the point, he says, where all 
potentialities become actual, circles are straight lines and spheres are "generated by the rotation of 
the circle", de Santillana page 5 1. As in his version of the ancient theory of the microcosm, all finite 
things contain infinity within them, it is their very being. Whilst accepting Platonic dialectics of the 
One and the many, he rejected the theory of the forms, preferring his numerical and geometrical 
analogies to articulate the relation between the infinite and the finite, God and things. Cusa speaks 
in similar fashion about the relationship between the maximum and the minimum, between learning 
and ignorance. 
Cusa is similarly dialectical in his discussion of the unattainability of absolute truth: "Therefore the 
quiddity of things, which is ontological truth, is unattainable in its entirety; and though it has 
been the objective of all philosophers, by none has it been found as it really is. The more 
profoundly we learn this lesson of ignorance, the closer we draw to truth itself', quoted in de 
Santillana page 57. Rejecting the idea of absolute knowledge, he insists on the uniqueness of things 
and thereby rejects the notion of absolute identity, for as everyjoiner knows no two pieces of wood 
can ever be exactly the same size: "No matter, then, how equal the measure and the thing measured 
are, they will remain for ever differenf', page 57. An example of his identification of real 
contradiction is: "the top that boys play with ... The stronger the boy's arm, the quicker the top 
spins, so that it seems to stand and rest while it moves the mor6", quoted on page 183 of 
Copenhaver. Speaking of Cusa's view of perception, de Santillana, says: "Thus the conquest of the 
sensible consists in weaving far out beyond it a net of abstract relations which gradually enclose it 
and tend to a firnit", page 52. 
Barrett, in Martin (1992), presents the reaction of analytical philosophy to Cusa's dialectical 
"synthesis of oppositee'. The simultaneous e3dstence of opposites is "incomprehensible" and 
"inexpressible" says Barret, revealing his preference for the law of non-contradiction and fixed 
symbols of formal logic. Quoting Wittgenstein's famous remark: "About that of which we cannot 
speak we must be silent", on page 63, Barrett seems unaware that this sentiment accords with 
Cusa's own views. Barrett displays the 'common sense' of analytical philosophy: 
Of the speculative mystics with whom we are dealing here, the one that went closest to the edge, if 
not over it, was Nicholas of Cusa.. He helieved.. that .. features that are as opposed as h1ack is 
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ftom while, good and evil, tmth ftom falsehood, in some miraculous and mystical way come 
together and become reconciled genuinely - not in some fudged manner as black and while can 
become grey, or good and bad can become moderate behaviour, or truth andfalsity are presented 
as possibilities or probabilities. nether these would be the opposites reconciled in God or what 
the opposites are we are not told What we are told is that in the case of wiy feature God is both 
the maximum and the minimum, the greatest and the least. Ihis is a real stinker .. It may be hcwsh 
to say that in talking about God we do not know what we are talking about (or not much), that we 
are trying to express the inexpressible and are banging our heads against the boundaries of what 
can be said But is that not preferable to thinking we know what we are talking about when we do 
not?, pages 62 and 69. 
Barrett's annoyance at Cusa's paradoxes results in part from his refusal to consider the existence 
of real contradictions, thus preventing him from realising that Cusa is adopting a religious or 
mystical solution, the only 'solution' available, to the real social problems, or "synthesis of 
opposites7' of mid 15th century Europe. 
Paracelsus 
To learn and to do nothing is little. To learn and to do is great and whole, Paracelsus (19 8 8), 
page 105. 
But just as the cosmos dissolves into a thousand contradictions when we focus our attention 
on its individual manifestations, so a great personality will break down into seemingly 
irreconcilable and irreducible contradictions as soon as one attempts to define it by 
successively describing its different facets... Paracelsus unites all the antinomies of a 
paganizing mysticism of nature and a pious Christian faith, Jolande Jacobi in the preface to 
Paracelsus (1988), page xxv-xxvi. 
The 16th century writer and medic Paracelsus, son of an impoverished noble father and a 
bondswoman mother, was initiated into the mysteries of alchemy, and learned natural and 
medical science at a number of universities. Paracelsus' approach to medicine was 
revolutionary, he was called the Luther of the physicians, and totalising: "in the great 
integrated totality in which all created things are interrelated, nothing has a life that is 
228 
absolutely its own: man, the earth, and the cosmos are only meaningful parts of an organic 
whole, which down to its last particles is ruled by God and lEs order. Treatment of the plague, 
of wounds, of syphilis, gout, epilepsy, or any other disease, is a 'Mission', and so is the 
preparation of herb juices, the smelting of metals, or the analysis of mineral water; for god has 
created all of these to serve man, the highest of creatures, the beloved by God. But they can 
serve him only if he works toward his aim in the right way, this is, in a way pleasing to God", 
Jacobi in Paracelsus (1988), pages xlv-xlvi. 
Paracelsus' metaphysic is based on the four elements which contain "all the forces and faculties of 
perishable things. In them there are day and night, warmth and coldness, stone and fruit, and 
everything else, still unformed. In a piece of wood... there he concealed the forms of animals, the 
forms of plants of every description, the forms of all instruments; and he who can carve them out 
finds them ... The 
limbus is the primordial stuff of man ... He who 
knows the nature of the limbus 
knows also what man is ... Now, the 
limbus is heaven and earth, the upper and lower sphere of the 
cosmos, the four elements, and everything they comprise; therefore it is just to identify it with the 
microcosm, for it too is the whole world", Paracelsus (1988), pages 14-17. Humanist 
anthropocentrism predominates when Paracelsus says "The body attracts heaven ... and this takes 
place in accordance with the great divine order ... In 
(man) there fies the 'young heaven', that is to 
say, all the planets are part of man's structure and they are the children of the 'great heaven' which 
is their father. For man was created from heaven and earth, and is therefore Eke them! ... 
he can be 
understood only as an image of the macrocosm, of the Great Creature. Only then does it become 
manifest what is in hirn. For what is outside is also inside; and what is not outside man is not inside. 
The outer and the inner are one thing, one constellation, one influence, one concordance, one 
duration 
... one 
fruif', page 2 1. 
Paracelsus was attracted to the ideology of peasants and gypsies, having to leave Saltzburg 
because of his support for the masses in the Peasant War. He rejected the academic orthodoxy 
of his day, quitting a teaching post at Basel University after a warrant for his arrest was issued. 
The marginalised Paracelsus became a Faustian figure: "badly dressed, frequently drunk, and 
always ready to quarrel ... 
(he refused) to worship at the shrine of Galen, Avicenna and 
Aristotle, whose writings were accorded the authority of Scriptures by the medical 
practitioners of the day. He even burnt some of the sacred volumes in public and insulted the 
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unquestioning physicians of his time in almost everything he wrote, calling them 'sausage- 
stuffers', 'clownish concocters', 'imposters' and 'ignorant sprouts"', Gilchrist page 101-2. 
It was in political theory and economics, however, that Paracelsus made small but significant 
contribution to our study. Revealing his egalitarianism and his understanding of the dialectic of 
potentiality and actuality he said "you should not judge people according to their stature, but 
honour them all equally. What is in you is in all. Each has what you also have within you; and the 
poor grows the same plants in his garden as the rich. In man, the ability to practise all crafts and arts 
is innate, but not all these arts have been brought to the fight of day ... The child 
is still an uncertain 
being, and he receives his form according to the potentialities that you awaken in him. If you 
awaken his ability to make shoes, he will be a shoemaker; if you awaken the stonecutter in him, he 
will. be a stonecutter, and if you summon forth the scholar in him, he will be a scholar. And this can 
be so because all potentialities are inherent in him; what you awaken in him comes forth from him; 
the rest remains unawakened, absorbed in sleep. We are born to be awake, not to be asleep! ", page 
105. He adds: it is "more blessed to speak of miners under the earth than of tournaments and 
chivalry. For in the former the spirit deals in divine works, while in the latter it is busied in worldly 
things, to please the world in vanity and purity", page 109. An anthropocentric approach to nature 
is apparent in the following: "It is God's will that nothing remain unknown to man as he walks in 
the fight of nature; for all things belonging to nature exist for the sake of man. And since they have 
been created for his sake, and since it is he who needs them, he must explore everything that Res in 
nature", page 109. 
Paracelsus introduces an early version of the labour theory of value when he notes that in order to 
be used or enjoyed raw materials man "must expend labour upon them ... Let us not 
be idlers or 
dreamers, but always at work, both physically and spiritually, so that no part of us remains inactive. 
Such work in the sweat of our brow may even drive away the devil and his pack, for where man is 
at work none of them can abide", page I 11. 
Giordano Bruno 
Hence it is that liberty, will, necessity, are identical; andfurther, action is identical with will- 
power and being, Bruno in Of the Infinite, the Universe and the Worlds, quoted in de SantiHana 
(1956), page 266. 
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.. refigion is neededfor restraining rude populations, Bruno, quoted in de SanfiRana page 248. 
Burchio: Oh, why not turn the world upside down and have done with it! 
Fracastoro: with a world downside up as it stands, that would not be such a bad idea. 
Cicada: Yes, it is well said that the kingdom of God is within us and that divinity dwells within our 
souls through virtue of the regenerate intellect and will 
Bruno reveafing his understanding of inversion, which was to become an important metaphor for 
Marx, quoted on pages 267 and 272 of de Santiflana. 
Let those who contribute to progress be honoured and rewarded, and let those do no work, and 
the misers enslaved to property, be despised and held as beings of no value whatever, Bruno, 
echoing the views of Paracelsus, in Yhe Fxpulsion, Bruno (1962), page 8. 
Bruno, the first truly Italian philosopher, was bom near Naples in 1548, reluctantly becoming a 
Dominican friar and later a priest. Learning "logic and dialectie', he later obtained a doctorate in 
theology. As is well known, Bruno was burned at the stake for the crime of heresy in 1600 and, as 
is clear from his writings, led a tortured life due to his inability to obtain the intellectual freedom he 
craved. Bruno's dialogues, with their display of wide learning, are a religious sublimation of his 
rejection, fiustration and anger. I-Es attacks on the Papacy, including its more enlightened wings, 
forced him to leave Italy, discard his religious clothes and teach in France. The stridency of his 
views meant that, like Paracelsus, Bruno had to keep on the move around Europe, leading to his 
ironic self description as "Academician of no academy", quoted in de Santillana. page 244. 
Although Bruno admired the Protestant critique of the landowning-Papal establishment, which 
"binds and deceives in countless ways" Bruno page 9, he was equally scathing in his views on 
Protestant theology. Like the other Renaissance dialecticians, Bruno's thought was a synthesis, 
including what he knew of ancient Egyptian thought, the pre-Socratics, Cusa's dialectics, natural 
magic, astrology, alchemy, numerology, Lucretian materialism and the Kabbalah. From these 
sources, he created a complex system based around a divine finite-infinite unity. Though he uses 
some of its metaphysical formulations, Bruno argues against the Aristotelian orthodoxy, or as he 
called it "the three-headed hellhound of Aristotle, Ptolemy and dogma! ' de Santillana page 245, 
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with its mechanist geo-centric cosomology and empty logic chopping. Bruno claimed that a unity, 
formed from an infinity of moving particles and animated by a universal soul, persisted whilst 
perishable particulars, with their ambiguities and contradictions, came and went. The following 
extracts from Bruno (1962) reveal the pre-Socratic monist aspect of his dialectical thought which 
he refers to as "magic! '. Although he uses dialectical formulations, unlike Mandeville and Rousseau, 
here they are not used in his social criticisms: 
On this diversity and opposition depend order symmetry, complexion peace concord, 
composition and life So that the world is composed of contraries, of which some, such as earth 
and water, live and grow by help of their contraries, such as the fiery suns. 7his I think was the 
meaning of the sage who declared that God creates harmony out of the sublime contraries; and of 
that other who believed this whole universe to owe existence to the strife of the concor&wt and the 
love of the opposed, page 33. The beginning, middle, and end of the birth, growth, andperfection 
of whatever we behold is ftom contraries, by contraries, and to contraries; and wherever 
contrariety is, there is action and reaction, there is motion, diversity, multitude, and order, there 
are degrees, succession and vicissitude, page 34. Nature appears as a vast ocean. Its inner energv 
begets life as the waters of the sea take various shapes under theforce that constrains them, page 
35. 
Although he soaked up the dialectical techniques of his predecessors, both Christian and Muslim, 
Bruno was particularly influenced by Cusa, who would "have equalled Pythagoras if his genius had 
not been stifled under priestly garments" Bruno (1962) page 9. Cusa, along with Copernicus, 
believed that infinity refers only to God, whereas Bruno, answering the questions of the Inquisition 
with courage, explained his pantheistic view that infinity also refers to a plurality of worlds within 
the universe, all of which were both dependent on and independent of God. Of great importance, 
since it anticipates Hegel and Marx, is Bruno's simultaneous advocacy of observation, experiment 
and the inductive science, as methods of analysis, along with a method of presentation, which, 
typical of the later Italian Renaissance, is dialectical. As a bridge between these methods Bruno 
explains the limits of knowledge gained empirically, he says that the infinite: 
cannot be the object of sense; and a person who asks to obtain an idea of it through the senses 
might as well expect to see substance and essence with his eyes. If he wished to deny it for the 
reason that it is not sensible, visible to the senses, he would be obliged to deny also his own 
substance and being, quoted in de Santillana page 26 1. 
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Bruno's threat to the Pacacy concerned his monist, yet dialectical, view of nature, which at times 
he extended to society, particularly to the strife-tom. population centres of Europe. His courage in 
expressing his views so openly led to some brutal treatment including exile, imprisonment and 
finally execution. De Santillana cites Bruno's dialogue Ash Wednes&ry, which, unlike most other 
Renaissance thinkers who concealed their social criticisms in their natural philosophy, partially 
anticipates Mandeville by the use of comic description of typical members of the various social 
classes in London, a city he had visited. I-Es satires reveal comic skills, allegorical techniques, 
knowledge of myth, courage, moral and political purpose and attacks the Pope and his retinue. In 
his Introduction to Bruno (1962) Lindsay, despite a tendency to discuss Bruno's rich synthesis 
from the perspective of the materialist-idealist straightjacket notes that his social thought was 
revolutionary. Although scathing of the thieves and beggars of London, Bruno rejected the new 
colonialist adventures of the period because they enslaved native populations. In the Dgmision we 
read: 
7he usurpers are worse than grubs, caterpillars, or destroying locusts, and should be treated 
accordingly .. No institution or law ought to be approved or accepted which 
does not tend to the 
highest end. - the direction of our minds and reform of our natures so that they produce fiwit 
necessmy or usefulfor human intercourse, quoted in Bruno page 39. 
Poetry inspired Bruno's often tormented philosophy, and de Santillana quotes the following 
dialectical extract from Bruno: 
It is the One which wins in love; the One that gives me fteedom in my bondage, peace in my y 
torment, wealth in inypoverty, life in my death, page 246. 
Such verse can be compared with Marx's dialectical literary style, developed from the poetry 
written in his youth, where the chiasmus was a common device. An early example in the Paris 
Manuscripts, Marx (1959), refers to the overwhelming power of money in capitalist society. Marx 
says: 
It transformsfidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, 
servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intelligence and intelligence into idiocy, page 
141. 
The Church's execution of Bruno, for his daring thought acted as a brake on later thinkers, and 
although succeeding scientists and philosophers knew of his work, only Kepler openly 
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acknowledged his contribution. However, Lindsay claims that his dialectical method influenced 
scientists, including Bacon, and the philosopher Spinoza. Without doubt Bruno exerted 
considerable influence upon Schelling and Hegel, as will become clear in the next chapter. 
Jacob Boehme 
I know that without me God could not live a second - Turned ifI were to nothing, He'd give up the 
ghost in despair, Angelus Silesius, often finked with Boehme, quoted in de Santillana page 194. 
his thought foreshadow(s) the advent of all the logical systems of the new philosophy, S cheRfing 
spealdng of Boehme, quoted in de Santiffana page 209. 
(Roehme) was persecuted all his life by the local Lutheran pastors with abuse which today would 
be unprintable, de Santillana page 209. 
a lute that lies still, and is indeed a dumb thing that is neither heard nor understood; but if it be 
p4ed upon, then Jisform is understood, in whatform and tune it stands, and according to what 
note it is set, from Boemhe's Yhe Signature ofAII 7hings, quoted in de SantiHana page 219. 
Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), self-educated cobbler and contemporary of Galileo, Kepler and 
Bacon, could not accept the Christian doctrine of "the fall". As a result of airing his views in an 
unpublished manuscript, the "mere cobbler", as his critics referred to him, Boehme was imprisoned, 
and released on the promise that he would write no more books. As one of a number of 
intellectuals with heterodox views in various parts of what is today Germany, Boehme continued to 
be persecuted, his grave even being desecrated. The "cobblee' could not accept that the God of the 
new Protestantism, having already established its own equivalent of Papal orthodoxy, could commit 
such a cruel act as to knowingly create a race where the masses were destined to be overwhelmed 
by suffering and evil, whilst the predestined few prospered. Iiis speculations, and the influence of 
Copernicus and Paracelsus, led Boehme to seek divine wisdom, and drew the dialectical conclusion 
that "Nothing can reveal itself without resistance7', quoted in de Santillana page 212, concluding 
that God was both good and evil, "God against God", all and nothing, the yes and the no Which 
opposes it. As an alchemist Boehme formed his theology and natural philosophy from its 
vocabulary of moments and contradictions: 
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Boehme saw that the conflict induced between the warring elements in the alchemical vessel was 
an emblem of the activity of nature itse#' Without conflict there could be no movement, no 
difference between created beings, and no motivation to bring about change and improvement, 
explains Gilchrist, page 90, failing to note social "conflicte'. 
Boehme speaks of God being in constant movement, starting with the desire of dark Nothingness 
(Ungrund) striving towards Being, a process of becoming or development. De Santillana says this: 
"'development' has entered the philosophical language here for the first time, not in the old sense of 
'unwinding' but in the new sense implied by our own idea of 'evolution'. Difference, impulse and 
growth are expressed in the coming to the fore of different qualitieS7, page 213. He notes 
Boehme's remark that "Quality is the mobility or impulse of a thing7, adding that: "Here, as in 
Bruno, the dynamic element of Renaissance thought has broken loose from the prison of formal 
systems and is moving towards new possibilities. Two laws have been suggested, if only as 
psychological experiences; the law of contrast, and the law of development as progressive 
unfolding of difference", page 213. Boehme uses anthropocentric terms like anxiousness, hunger 
and attraction when he speaks of nature or "the nothing in the something". He explains: "For in the 
nothing the will would not be manifest to itself, wherefore we know that the will seeks itselt and 
finds itself in itself, and its seeking is a desire, and its finding is the essence of the desire, wherein the 
will finds itself' quoted by de Santillana on page 22 1. 
Waterfield, in his introduction to Boehme (1989), observes that his thought takes into account the 
notion of the sej( , 
in the context of self-realization and self-revelation, terms which became central 
to German idealist dialectics. Particularly influential on Hegel was the idea that there are seven 
successive stages, or Forms of Nature, in Boehme's cosmology: Harshness, Attraction, Bitterness, 
Fire, Light Sound and Figure, each of which enters into an opposition with the previous moment 
from which arises a synthesis which resolves the opposition and in turn forms the next one. 
Boehme is a religious mystic in the tradition of Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, replacing 
the mathematical vocabulary of the latter with the symbolism of alchemy. As a devout Lutheran, 
Boehme's work is also influenced by Protestant individualism, with its emphasis on freedom and 
choice. He believes the individual, or consciousness, possesses the potential for good or evil, love 
or anger, rather like the fiuit tree which "though it has blossoms they fall off, also frost and snow 
235 
and many a cold wind beat upon it before it comes to any growth and bearing of fiuif', from Yhe 
Confessions, quoted in de SantiUana page 218. 
Boehme's work was to prove influential on the thinking of the poets Milton and Blake, the 
philosophers Schopenhauer, Scheffing and Hegel, and, it has occasionally been argued, the scientist 
Newton. 
Renaissance and Enlightenment dialectics and scientific progress 
Robert Fludd: I behold the internal and essential impulses that issue ftom nature hersej(. - he has 
hold of the tail, I grasp the head; Iperceive thefirst cause, he its effects. 
Kepler: I hold the tail, but I hold it in my hand, you may grasp the head mentally, though only I 
fear, in your dreams. 
Quoted in de Santillana pages 206-7. 
Twentieth century positivists, and their Leninist cousins, have described Renaissance history as a 
period in which mechanistic atomistic science gradually triumphed over religious superstition and 
the "black arte' of alchemy, astrology and magic. Rebel thinkers of the period are presented as 
proto-atheists or materialists, on the Enlightenment path to "rationar' thought and "the scientific 
method". In fact, despite orthodox accusations, most Renaissance humanists possessed a deep 
totalising religious commitment, in which all aspects of nature interpenetrated as signs of God's 
glorious being. Tribal and ancient dialectical thought, the ultimate source of the thinking of 
Renaissance humanists, eventually became the preserve of an occult aristocracy, whose mode of 
thought was, like Aristotelianism, by and large too poetic, one-sidedly qualitative and abstract to be 
of much use in expanding natural science. The fife of the intellectual who turned his, or very 
occasionally her, back on the Church was financially insecure, and marginalised thinkers found 
themselves in the company of charlatans, who made a living by peddling quack remedies, telling 
fortunes and the like. 
However, during the Renaissance a small number of humanist yet profoundly religious, proto- 
scientists employed a dialectical mode of thought based on natural magic, alchemy and crucially 
Pythagorean numerology, and applied this to natural phenomem. Coupled with alchemic theory, 
gained partly from observation and early forms of experiment their totalising world view allowed 
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them to make progress with astronomical, chemical and problems which the Aristotelian approach 
failed to solve. Rejecting the mechanistic world view, Galileo insisted on life and growth: 
It is my opinion that the Earth is very noble and ackirable by reason of the many and different 
alterations, mutations, and generations which incessantly occur in it, quoted on page 229 of de 
Santillana. 
Boas (1970), despite her positivist leanings, acknowledges that humanists like Pico attacked those 
occult practices, such as determinist astrology, which were methodologically suspect and brought 
no practical results. She admits that alchemists, particularly the followers of Paracelsus, sought 
practical results and brought developments in calcination, distillation, sublimation, digestion and the 
preparation of drugs for medical purposes. Paracelsus "has been called the first systematiser in 
chemistry", page 164, and his rejection of determinist astrology is clear in the following, which 
captures the new humanist spirit perfectly: 
Starsforce us to nothing, they influence not, nor do they incline us; they arefree on their own wd 
so are we, quoted on page 195 of de Santillana. 
The new natural magicians responded to the exTanding needs of the merchants, artisans and 
manufacturers, who required knowledge for all manner of practical purposes, by developing an 
empirically-based experimental approach. The totalising animist theory included "sympathies, and 
antipathies, signatures, magnetic attractions, the virtues of stones and herbs, mechanical arts, 
optical illusions - all strange by-lanes of nature over which the natural magician alone had contror, 
Boas page 172. Natural magic and certain other occult practices eventually proved enabling for 
developments in mathematics and the physical sciences. Most notably were the discoveries of the 
alchemists and magicians Tycho, Kepler, Newton, the natural magician Gilbert and the Rosicrucian 
Leibniz. 
Francis Bacon, whose views on "the idols" are an early example of an understanding of the 
concept of ideology, described natural magic as: "the science which applies the knowledge of 
hidden forms to production of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with 
passives, displays the wonderful works of nature', quoted in Boas page 173. Paracelsus similarly 
spoke about "the invisible", which he saw as at one with "the visible", anticipating the 
contemporary view that these invisible natural forces, such as magnetism, electricity and gravity, 
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are theoretical entities. One is reminded of the oppositions which these forces contain, in another 
example of the occasionally dialectical thinking of Bacon: 
It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception: for 
when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is 
agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate; mid whether the body be alterant or 
altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all boches would be alike one to 
another, quoted in de Santillana page 36. 
Descartes' method as the antithesis of dialectics 
as tofalse doctrines, I thought that I already knew well enough what they were worth to he suh/ect 
to deception neither hy the promises of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the 
impostures of a magician, the artifices or the empty hoastings of any of those who make a 
profession of knowing that of which they are ignorant, Descartes (1997) Discourse on Method, 
page 76. 
Descartes rejected mysticism and the occult in his writings and visualised the universe as a 
machine. Every action involving matter was purely mechanistic, and matter had no contact with 
spirit To Descartes, all animals - including humans - were also machines, Humans had a 
spiritual aspect, a soul, but this hadno fink- with ourphysical selves, VvUte (1997) page 39. 
Ren6 Descartes, 1596-1650, rejected his father's wish for him to join the legal profession. Because 
of his inherited property he was able to become a travelling soldier, mathematician, natural 
philosopher and gentleman. The rejection of medieval thought led him to adopt the kind of analysis 
which prefigured the rational individualism of the Enlightenment. Although he experienced 
fashionable Parisian society, becoming bored Descartes moved to Holland, known for its liberal 
intellectual atmosphere and its distance from the watchful eye of the Inquisition, which arrested 
Galileo and burned Bruno. During Descartes' youthful years Europe slid into the Thirty Years War, 
and this, coupled with a personality which showed signs of isolation and insecurity, could, 
according to some commentators, have stimulated his adoption of a philosophy based on an 
obsession for certainty. The need for certainty was best falfilled by a retreat to the abstract entities 
and deductive logic of mathematics. As prefigured in his famous dream, Descartes believed that 
scientific experiment could be eschewed and natural philosophy could be reduced to a description 
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of the universe by a combination of a machine metaphor and a system of interlocking vortices. 
Though his mathematics is stiU used today, Descartes' scientific theories are of interest only as 
historical curios. 
Instead of embracing the Renaissance humanist synthesis, Descartes combined a mechanist- 
mathematical view of nature, including its highest manifestation the human body, with an orthodox, 
yet liberal, Catholicism. However, his view of matter, influenced by the work of the Renaissance 
astronomers, was notable for its lack of a role for God, and as a result Descartes was accused of 
atheism, a lesser charge than heresy. He sublimated the reality of his contradictory dualistic 
relationship with the Papacy and the Dutch authorities on the one hand, and a growing materialist 
and increasingly secular, natural philosophy on the other. Specifically, Descartes developed the idea 
of another world, the indivisible, unextended world of mind, paralleling the world of divisible, 
extended matter. Although he was reputed to have become a Rosicrucian, it made little impression 
on either his metaphysical dualism or his deductive approach to logic. Unlike Plato's dualism, in 
which the material world was fleeting and inferior, for Descartes both sides of the polar opposition 
had equal status, however, he could find no adequate linking mechanism between the two. 
The formulation of the Cartesian Method, based on the application of mathematical a)doms and 
inferences, began in his earliest important work, Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind. The book 
with its search for "perfect knowledge", begins by stressing the importance of trusting "only what is 
completely known and incapable of doubt ... there are more of these than they think - truths which 
suffice to give a rigorous demonstration of innumerable propositione', Descartes (1997) page 5. 
How little Descartes understood the work of the Sophist Protagoras is clear in a quote from the 
same page: "whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter one of them at 
least must certainly be in the wrong'. He says that the two "most certain routes to knowledge" are 
intuition, which is "not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, not the misleading judgment that 
proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded 
and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that 
which we understand", page 9; and deduction, which is "necessary inference from other facts that 
are known with certainty", page 10. Though, no doubt in fear of the Inquisition, he adds: "But all 
this does not prevent us from believing matters that have been divinely revealed as being more 
certain than our surest knowledge", page 11. 
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Despite this thoroughly undialectical method, which proved to be of little use in terms of 
Descartes' contribution to natural science, Cottingham, in Vesey (1986), has surprisingly argued 
for Descartes as a dialectician in the Meditations. Cottingham. argues: 
Ihis twisting and turning of argument and counter-argument - the setting up of one position which 
is immediately knocked down the reaching of a conclusion which immediately needs 
modifying. -A proposition or a definition is put forward only to be attacked; as a result of the 
attack, it is revised, and then the revision is in turn criticised and subsequently modified In 
Plato's writings, this cut and thrust of refutation and counter-refutation is especially vivig 
because the train of the argument is presented in &alogue form .. But although the Meditations 
themselves are not exphcitly cast in dialogue form, the presentation of successive arguments and 
counter-arguments is highly 'dialectical I .. it is often disastrous to lift a given proposition or 
conclusion out of the Meditations and quote it as if it represented Descartes'final and considered 
philosophical view .. 7he work, as its name implies, is not a set offinished doctrines, but a series of 
mental exercises which have to be worked through, pages 79-80. 
In response to this view, an upbeat approach to the "twisting and turning" of the Meditations does 
have some basis, but is generally unwarranted. The work is written in a rather pedestrian style and 
the arguments rarely, if ever, come to life. To the extent that the text is an implicit dialogue, the 
arguments, outlined in the third chapter, against Plato's explicit dialogues are germane, but a more 
productive way of understanding Descartes' method, which does contain contradictions, is to relate 
his method to both his biography and the socio-economic conditions of his time. Robinson (1953) 
points out that Descartes' method does not stand up well to a comparison with Plato's dialectic, 
because Descartes claims that the correct logical method is "something plain and obvious", and 
takes the view that: 
By such a method I understand sure and easy rules such that, if anyone follows them exactly, he 
will neverfalsely take anythingfor true, and, without any useless expenchture of mental effort, 
gradually and continuously increasing his knowledge, will attain a true apprehension of 
everything of which he is capable, quoted on page 73 of Robinson. 
It seems hard to believe that Plato, whatever the debate about his dialectical method, would have 
agreed with this. To suggest that the secrets of nature, or indeed those of the capitalist mode of 
production, can be uncovered by the dogmatic application of "sure and easy rulee', or even the less 
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rigid method of the Discourse on Method, which comes closest to a "dialectical" method, is a view 
which is difficult to sustain. Nature and capitalist society are extremely complex processes, and are 
therefore hardly likely to be understood by the universal application of Descartes' method. It is a 
key claim of this text, and one which cannot be stressed too much, that the study of complex 
objects such as these, requires the application of a method of presentation adequate to their level of 
complexity, and only dialectics is appropriate to the task. 
The "horrible heresies" of Baruch Spinoza 
I do not separate Godftom nature, Spinoza quoted in Mever page 25. 
Nothing human is alien to me, Spinoza, quoted in Mever page 44. 
those things which have connections with other things, as do all things that exist in Nature which 
are intelligible and their objective essences have the smne connections, that is other ideas are 
deducedfrom them which again have connections with others, and so instrumentsfor procee&ng 
further increase, Spinoza, quoted in Harfis (1995) page 6. 
His philosophy was not a kind of "armchair philosophy "I for away from the center of natural 
science On the contrwy, he conceived andpractised a type ofphilosophy which was continuous 
with what we call today "natural science ", Mever page 28. 
The discussion in Spinoza's life mid works by Klever, GarTett (1996), uncovers usefid new material 
bearing upon the dialectical method of the Dutch thinker. YClever begins by linking Spinoza to his 
Jewish forbears who had originated from the relatively liberal environment of Islamic Spain. The 
young Baruch rejected training for the rabbinate, opting instead for a career in his father's business, 
thus exposing him to the liberal attitudes of some of the merchants. Spinoza learned Latin, adopted 
a secular republican political philosophy and was particularly attracted to the new, fashionable 
views of Descartes, whose ideas seemed to challenge religious orthodoxy. However, a physical 
assault by one of the business's debtors seems to be one reason for his decision to leave the 
commercial world, rýject both an academic appointment and all claims on his inheritance, and to 
five instead by grinding lenses. Soon after this, Spinoza began to turn his back on the Jewish faith 
and challenge the local rabbis. As his interest in natural philosophy developed, the rabbis 
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excommunicated Spinoza because of his "wrong opinions and behaviour ... the horrible heresies 
which he practiced and taught, and of the monstrous actions which he performed", 10ever page 16. 
Overtures by Christians were rejected by Spinoza, and he was soon to be branded as an atheistic 
overthrower of all doctrines contained in the New and Old Testaments. Eventually rejecting 
Cartesianism, he came to believe in a monist approach to nature in which mind, including the mind 
of God, and matter were at one. Despite the fact that before the French invasion of the mid 17th 
century, Holland enjoyed the reputation of being the most liberal country in Europe, freethinkers 
were arrested, executed or hounded to suicide for their views. Because of the hatred of the 
theologians who tried to mobilise the political authorities against him, Spinoza was cautious about 
putting his views in print. It is likely that Spinoza, like Bruno before him, subscribed to esoteric 
doctrines, but was even more secretive about these views than, as we shall see, Newton was to be. 
According to contemporary accounts Spinoza "behaves quite sincerely and fives without doing 
harm to other people; and he occupies himself with the construction of telescopes and 
microscopes ... They don't preach openly atheism, because they often speak about God, but by God 
they do understand nothing else than this whole universe", quoted in Klever page 24. Eventually 
Spinoza went into print with his 7heological-Polifical Treatise which, because of its call for 
religious freedom and moral relativism, was immediately condemned as "the vilest and most 
sacrilegious book the world has ever seee', page 40. Fear of persecution led Spinoza to heed 
advice from friends not to publish his other finished work, the Ethics, which only appeared after his 
death in 1677. 
Spinoza's Correspondence (1966) contains an exchange of letters with Blyenbergh, in which the 
latter exposes a number of contradictions in the theological views of Spinoza. These contradictions 
occur in the debates on God's perfection, His relationship with human evil and freedom and 
determinism, and anticipate Kant's antinomies. Despite its rather scholastic flavour, the discussion 
contains the distinctions between essence and appearance, positive and negative, and in particular 
raises the question put by Blydenbergh: "what you really mean by a Negation in God", page 171. 
Spinoza's reply admits that he does "not understand Holy Scripture although I have spent some 
years in the study of if', page 172. He distinguishes between privation, which is "only a simple and 
mere lack ... 
for example, that a blind man is deprived of sight because we easily imagine him as 
seeing ... 
(it) is nothing else than denying of a thing something which we judge to pertain to its 
nature", pages 174-5, and negation, which "is nothing else than denying something of a thing 
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because it does not belong to its nature7, page 175. In a letter to Hudde, page 224, Spinoza 
anticipates Hegel when he says that "extension negates thought of itselý this in itself is no 
perfection in if'. But it is in his famous reply to JeRes that Spinoza is most forthcoming on the 
subject of negation: 
.. he who calls 
God one or single has no true idea of God, or is speaking of Him inappropriately. 
As regards this, thatfigure is a negation, and not somethingpositive, it is clearly evident that the 
totah ty of matter, considered without himiation, can have no figure and that figure has a place 
only infinite and limited bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure wants to express 
thereby nothing else than that he is apprehending a limited thing, and how it is limited Yhe 
limitation, therefore, does not belong to the thing in virtue of its being, but, on the contrwy, it is 
its not-being. Since, then, figure is nothing but limitation and limitation is negation, therefore, as 
has been saig it can be nothing but negation, page 270. 
We may note here that the verb to limit is better translated as to determine, and in this context 
Marx makes the following point: 7his identity of production and consumption amounts to 
Spinoza's thesis., "detenninatio est negatio", Marx (1973) page 90. The editor's footnote to this 
says ... Determination is negation', i. e., given the undifferentiated self-identity of the universal world 
substance, to attempt to introduce particular determinations is to negate this self-identity. (Spinoza, 
Letters, No 50, to I Jelles, 2 June 1674. )". 
It is notable that the way in which Spinoza articulates his monist dialectical doctrine of substance, 
which came to be known as pantheism, owes more to the metaphysical categories of medieval 
Aristotelianism and the ontological argument for the existence of God, than it does to either neo- 
Platonism, or the Kabbalah, which Spinoza claimed to have rejected. Fischer (193 1) explains that 
whilst Spinoza's system is abstract and obscure, it is superior to that of Descartes, in that the 
former adopts a totalising view of reality, explaining everything as part of an interdependent whole 
or substance, i. e. God, whereas for Descartes there exists a fixed duality between mind and nature. 
The defining characteristics of substance for Spinoza are logical independence and, though he gives 
no explanation of this, a sense of "in itself'. He opposes Cartesian dualism with two 
interpenetrating aspects of substance which he calls thought and extension. "Looked at from the 
one side everything simultaneously is thought and, from the other side, body. Thus the 
uncompromising substantial cleavage has been removed: thought and extension, soul and body, are 
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now two entities each of which is the condition of the other, and they are both completely absorbed 
in one Whole, while at the same time they are completely contrary", Fischer page 228. 
In his introduction to the Ethics, in Spinoza (undated) Gregory, along with Harris (1995), show 
that despite Spinoza' claim that his method is "geometricar', i. e. following the mathematical system 
of axiorn and inference, this is clearly not the case. Spinoza actually uses an interlocking network of 
tautologies, as each circular argument develops the truth of each axiom and deduction is confirmed 
in the expanding interlocking circles. The approach rejects the separation between subject and 
object, or thought and extension, from which was to come the positivist corTespondence theory of 
truth. Desire, love and will, as well as cause and effect, are what link the attributes of Spinoza's 
substance. Rather than using conventional deduction or induction, about which he has strong 
rnisgivings, Spinoza begins instead by identifying the essence of an attribute, what it truly is. Harris 
explains that the connections between attributes, which in turn form systematic concrete wholes, or 
what later dialecticians called "concrete universals", are identified. The method develops by use of 
interpenetrating oppositions between the whole and the part, antecedent and consequent and the 
hifinite and the finite, in what Harris calls a "cryto-dialectical development", page 13. He adds: 
"The argument will unfold 'in fuller degree as it proceeds' the implications of the ordered whole", 
page 18. 
Harris sums up Spinoza's "crypto-dialectical developmerif ': 
Because of Spinoza's preference for the geometrical manner of exposition, the dialectical 
character of this development is ohscured and remains hWen, hut it requires not much 
perspicacity to recognize it Because the whole and its sep'-specification is the wellspring of 
dialectic, Spinoza's insistence on Suhstance as his starting point, and his specification of it into 
attrihutes and modes as he explicates its structural order, supply the ftalnework of a dialectical 
system that ftom time to time hecomes evident, hreaking through the geometrical disguise, as in 
the passages to which affention has heen drawn, page 19. 
Explaining the purpose of his Ethics, Spinoza wants to know "as much of the nature of things as is 
necessary ... to 
infer rightly from it the differences, agreements and oppositions of thinge' quoted in 
Mever page 53. The Ethics, especially the totalising idea of Substance, had a major effect on the 
development of German idealist philosophy, affecting Lessing, Fichte, and Hegel amongst others. 
However, Engels, who called Spinoza "the splendid representative of dialectics" in the Anfi- 
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Duhring, inspired Russian philosophers to systematically distort his views. Plekhanov, for example, 
treated Spinoza's substance as a precursor of his brand of vulgar materialism Spinoza's idea that 
God exists in everything is interpreted by Leninists, as by Spinoza's orthodox religious 
contemporaries, as atheism. However, whilst this tells us much about Leninist atheism, it conveys 
little of Spinoza's beliefs: "in the USSR of the twenties, the different philosopl-&al camps 
(mechanists and dialecticians) each constructed an image of Spinozism and its place in the history 
of thought that brought comfort to their own positione', Moreau, in Garrett (1996) page 427. 
Spinoza himself stated that: "Those who think that the argument of the Tractatus rests on the 
identification of God with nature, taking nature in the sense of a certain mass of corporeal matter, 
are entirely wrong7, quoted by Gregory, without a source, in Spinoza (undated), page viii. 
Gregory is persuasive when he explains the meaning of God for Spinoza: 
"ereas in common speech, the word God ranks as a noun so that theologians will make Him the 
subject or object of quite ordinary predicates with astonishing facility, Spinoza thinks of G6d 
rather as a verb and of all existent things as modes of the activity. Yhe world is not a collection of 
things but a conflagration of. Act whose innumerable flames are but onefire .. We are not names 
but acts, not spectators but part of the game, and we exist as we play it. We do not think from 
noun to noun forging a chain of logical or mechanical connections between each Nor are we 
blank entities waiting to befirnisheg nor sepc-contained objects that collide with one another. We 
are acts of God or modes of an eternal intellection whose activity knows no limit, in Spinoza 
(undated) pages x and xii. 
Negri (199 1) provides an unusual interpretation of Spinoza. The manuscript was written whilst the 
author was undergoing the burden of imprisonment and, perhaps as a result the text is wordy and 
opaque. As was fashionable amongst the radical intelligentsia at the time, the book is peppered with 
structuralist buzzwords, such as problematic, superstructure and overdetermine, whiIst the word 
dialectic often seems to be little more than an ornament. Negri fails to see the Aristotelian influence 
on Spinoza, instead wrongly suggesting a neo-Platonist lineage. Nonetheless it is clear that Negri is 
presenting Spinoza as an important thinker who anticipates the revolutionary dialectic: 
All of the antagonisticforce of innovative thought in the Modem age, the popular andproletarian 
origins of its revolutions and the enfire arc of repubhccm positionsfrom Machiavelli to the young 
Marx, is concentrated in this exemplary Spinozan experience. no can deny that, also in this 
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sense, Spinoza remains in the middle of contemporwy philosophical debates, almost like a young 
Jesus in the Temple ofderusalem? page xzx. 
However, Negri is simply wrong to equate dialectics with bourgeois thought when he claims, in an 
exaggerated style, that: 
7he paradox of Spinoza's thought can he seen in this aspect. - his philosophy is presented to us as 
posthourgeoisphilosophy. Machery calls it apost-dialecticalphilosophy. And so it is, because the 
dialectic is the form in which bourgeois ideoloSy is ahvays presented to us in all of its variants - 
even in those of the purely negative dialectic of crisis and war. 7he materialistic transfiguration 
that Spinoza accomplishes on the revolutioncay contents of humanism pushes his philosophy 
beyond any dialecticalform, beyond any overdetermined mediation - that is to say, beyond the 
concept of the bourgeoisie as it has come to be formed in a hegemonic way in recent centuries, 
page 20. 
Gottfried Leibniz, dialectics and the sterile synthesis of logic and mathematics 
all hodies eve in a perpetual flux hke rivers, and parts are passing in and out of them 
continually, Leibniz (1973), paraphrasing Herachtus, page 190. 
Leibniz, who was born in the middle of the 17th century, came from an academic German family. 
As Germany was a relative backwater at this time, its philosophical language being similarly 
underdeveloped, his fmiily did its best to see that their son acquired its relative privileges by 
learning Latin, Greek, theology and logic. However, despite his classical learning, Leibniz was 
never able to obtain an academic post and with it the freedom to study at will. Consequently, he 
had to be content with the frustration of working in the legal profession, or for wealthy patrons. 
Yet Leibniz became a polyrnath and devised lots of ambitious research schemes, such as using 
deductive logic to solve the issue of the Polish succession. 
His interest in logic was apparent from "the age of thirteen (when) he was already trying to 
improve on the Aristotelian theory of the categories", MacDonald Ross (1984) page 3. Leibniz 
held liberal religious views and was interested in the theory of alchemy, although he probably did no 
experiments. However, in contrast to Newton, the dialectical aspects of his alchemic thought were 
kept separate from his orthodox logical methods. The main influence of alchemy was on his 
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metaphysical ideas on monads, which were limited microcosms of the universe at large. Neo- 
Pythagoreanism seems to have been important to his thought, in that he considered number as 
fundamental to the universe; whilst, like Descartes, he believed that the most efficient logical 
method was to apply the mathematical approach of a? dom and inference. 
There are occasional passages in Leibniz (1973) which either show the influence of esoteric 
thought, or are overtly dialectical, such as the following from Monadology which implicitly 
describes internal contradiction: 
.. every monad must be differentftom every other. For there are never in nature two beings which 
are precisely alike, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or 
based on some intrinsic denomination I also take it as granted that every created thing, and 
consequently the created monad also, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is 
continual in each one Itfollowsftom what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads 
come ftom an internal principle, since an external cause would be unable to influence their inner 
being ... Ihis differentiation must involve a plurality within the unity or the simple. For since every 
natural change takesplace by degrees, something changes, and something remains, page 18 0. 
Leibniz consolidates this view, and anticipates Hegel, when he explains that monads contain "a 
self-sufficiency in them which makes them the sources of their internal actions ... every state of a 
simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, so that the present state of it is big 
with the future", pages 181-2. On the dialectical theme of vantage point Leibniz says: "what is 
active in certain aspects is passive from another point of view: acfive in so far as what is distinctly 
known in it explains what occurs in another, andpassive in so far as the reason for what occurs in it 
is found in what is distinctly known in another ... Now this connexion or adaptation of all created 
things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which 
express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe ... 
(there 
is) universal harmony, which causes each substance exactly to express all the others through the 
relations which it has with them ... each created monad represents the whole universe! ', page 187-9. 
In his approach to natural philosophy Leibniz was in some ways closer to Descartes than to 
Newton. However, although his theories were more detailed than Newton's he lacked the latter's 
power of abstraction: 
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it was this very ambition that prevented him ftom matching the achievement of Newton Newton 
succeeded in producing a comprehensive theory of kinematics precisely because he avoided 
'inventing hypotheses'about dynamics, or the powers and mechanisms underlying the kinematics. 
It was only by simpliffing the issues in this way, that Newton succeeded in reducing them to 
manageable proportions, MacDonald Ross, page 44. 
From the perspective of contemporary formal logic, Leibniz anticipated 19th and 20th century 
contributions to mathematicising symbolic logical relationships. Leibniz was aware that Aristotelian 
logic had become sterile compared to the more pragmatic approaches to method being pioneered 
by the later Renaissance natural philosophers, which were delivering practical results. Leibniz, like 
Descartes, tried in vain to find a water-tight logic of discovery, based on his idea that logical 
problems would all eventually be solved because, he believed, language was gradually developing 
to a state of perfection. The growing success in data classification techniques caused Leibniz to 
develop the method of division, based on that used by Plato and Aristotle. This led to the Principle 
of the Identity of Indiscernables, or Leibniz's Law as it is known today. The Principle uses division 
to try to identify the most basic species, reasoning that "a lowest species could not have more than 
one member: if two things were distinct individuals, there had to be something that was true of the 
one but not true of the other, thereby making them of different speciee', MacDonald Ross, page 
53. 
Leibniz never ffilly overcame scholastic thought he seemed to be rehearsing the medieval realism- 
nominalism debate in his discussion of the problems arising from the lack of distinction between 
existing things and imaginary things, such as unicorns. This led to a discussion of the distinction 
between necessary and contingent truths. Truths were necessary if they could not be otherwise 
without contradiction, which for Leibniz meant logical error. These are contrasted with contingent 
truths, where things could be otherwise without contradiction. The distinction was to prove 
important in the later work of Hume, and Kant used the terms analytic and synthetic as an 
equivalent for Leibniz's two categories. Leibniz developed a mechanical method for showing that 
necessary truths, or other relevant propositions, could be shown to be identities. The static side of 
his thinking is apparent when Leibniz says: 
Me only proposition of which the contrary implies a contradiction without one's being able to 
demonstrate it, is one offormal identity. 7he identity isformulated explicitly in the proposition, so 
it cannot be demonstrated - demonstrated, that is, made evident by reason and inferences. Here 
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the identity can be made visible to the eye, so in this case it cannot be demonstrated Yhe senses 
make it evident that a is a is a proposition of which the opposite, a is not-a, formally implies a 
contradiction. But that which the senses make evident is indemonstrable. So the real, 
indemonstrable axioms are identicalpropositions, quoted in MacDonald Ross page 63. 
Given Leibniz's preoccupation with number, it is no surprise that he developed a system of 
analysing the terms of propositions, using positive and negative numbers then multiplying them 
together. This "clumsy", to use MacDonald Ross's term, piece of Pythagorean numerology was 
apparently simplified, yet actually compounded, by the use of a binary system, using 0 and 1, for 
similar tasks, including the analysis of syllogisms. Although he anticipated both the use of Venn 
diagrams in logic and the ideas of mathematical logicians like Frege and Boole, even the 
hagiogragher MacDonald Ross has to admit that "Leibniz did not in fact get very far with his 
logical calculus! ', page 70. 
Isaac Newton's dialectical method of presentation 
(Truth is) the offspring of silence and unhroken meditation. Isaac Newton, quoted in White (1997) 
page 43. 
Mercury is not, finally, a substance, or even many substances. it is a process .. A 11 these 
(alchemical wrifings) point to one crucial idea. - that transformation is something intrinsic and 
contained inside matter-Each stage of this sepýdevouring, seý(-generating process bears the 
name 'mercury. Mercury, in short, is alchemy i1seff, Charles Nicholl in 7he Chemical 7heatre, 
quoted in White page 14 1. 
Gog beingpresent everywhere by His will, moves all bodies in His infinite, uniform sensoriuH4 
wd so shapes and reshapes according to His pleasure all parts of the universe, much more than 
our soul by its will is able to move the limbs of our body, Newton Opticks, quoted in Walker 
(1972) pages 255-6. 
(Newton) had spent more of his life intensely involved with alchemy than he had delving into the 
clear blue waters of pure science It also confirmed what a few of Newton's close ftiends had 
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known during his lifetime: that he had expended a vast cunount of his time studying the 
chronoloýy of the Bible, excumning prophecy, investigating natural magic, ang most of all, 
attempting to unravel the hermetic secrets - the prisca sapientia, VV%ite, page 2, commenting on 
information found in Newton's library. 
(Newton) was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians, the last great 
mind which looked out on the visible and the intellectual world with the same eyes as those who 
began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago, John Maynard 
Keynes, quoted in White page 3. 
Yhe ftllows of the Royal Society during the seventeenth century were almost all gentlemen 
scholars and academics ftom Oxford and Cambridge This was an age racked by plague and 
constant petty weys between European states, an era during which 90 per cent of the population 
lived in what we would now consider abjectpoverty while the lucky remainder dabbled in business 
affairs and intellectualpursuits. White page 17 1. 
We must remember that Newton discovered the concept of gravitation and also its laws by taking 
into account three groups of phenomena which are entirely unrelated to the merely perceptive 
observer: fteely falling objects, the movements of the planets, and the alternation of the tides, 
Frankfort (1946), page 15, illustrating both Newtods totalising method and his distinction between 
the empirical and the occult. 
Isaac Newton (1642-1.727), as White (1997) points out is presented by positivistic science as the 
paradigm for theory- and value-independent observation, "the model for the scientific method", 
page 2. The reality is very different partly because Newton was a supporter of the Arian religion, 
which rejected the Holy Trinity doctrine and believed that Christ, as the first creature created by 
God, controlled the forces of nature. Since Newton believed that the aether was Christ's body, it is 
no surprise that Arianism, along with the related Socinianism, was declared to be heretical by 
orthodox Christianity. However, he synthesised Arianism with the practice of alchemy, which was 
illegal in England from 1404-1689, a belief in natural magic, Hermeticism (note the term 
hermetically sealed from alchemy), and other esoteric ideas. He was aware of ancient Egyptian 
thought, but attributed it to Moses and Solomon, thereby giving it the sanction of the Old 
Testament and making it more consistent with Christianity. Although Newton showed great 
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caution in revealing his true beliefs, it is clear from his writing that they included the tribal and 
ancient idea of hidden 'forces' or 'spirits', which profoundly affected his work: "the influence of 
Newton's researches in alchemy was the key to his world-changing discoveries in science. 11is 
alchemical work and his science were inextricably linked ... he was interested in a synthesis of all 
knowledge and was a devout seeker of some form of unified theory of the principles of the 
universe", White pages 5 and 106. 
Newton (1955) contains extracts from some of his texts on alchemy, which he contrasts with 
"vulgar chemistry", including the following dialectical method of presentation from his Of Natures 
Obvious Laws and Processes in Vegetation He speaks of earth as resembling "a great animaU or 
rather inanimate vegetable, draws in aethereall breath for its dayly refreshment and vital 
ferment 
... This 
is the subtil spirit which searches the most hiden recesses of all grosser matter which 
enters their smallest pores and divides them more subtly then any other materiall power what ever 
(not after the way of common menstruums by rending them violently assunder etc) this is Natures 
universal agent, her secret fire, the onely ferment and principle of all vegetation (or animation-S. S). 
The material soule of all matter which being constantly inspired from above pervades and concretes 
with it into one form ... 
heate mites fight and fight exites heat heat excites the vegetable principle 
and that increaseth heat. Noe substance soe indifferently, subtily and swffUy pervades all things as 
fight and noe spirit searches bodys so subtily percingly and quickly as the vegetable spirit ... 
Nothing 
can be changed from what it is without putrefaction (the tendency to return to chaos or the 
Egyptian nun - S. S. ), no putrefaction can be without alienating the thing putrefyed from what 
wa! e', pages 304-5. 
Keynes' remarked that Newton "regarded the universe as a cryptogram set by the Almighty - just 
as he himself wrapt the discovery of the calculus in a cryptogram when he communicated with 
Leibnii', in Newton page 315. Here Keynes is implicitly acknowledging that alchemy in effect 
provided Newton with a dialectical method of presentation, which contrasted with, and 
complemented, a more orthodox empirical method of analysis. In this way Newton used occult 
explanations, such as the existence of magnetic and gravitational forces, to explain the observed 
movements and cohesion of particles. In the following chiasmus from the Opficks Newton hints at 
alchemy: "The changing of bodies into fight and fight into bodies, is very comfortable to the course 
of Nature, which seems delighted with transmutations", quoted in White page 104. The production 
by Newton of the Star Regulus of Antimony in 1670, with its suggested lines of force, "was 
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probably one step along this road -a subconscious contribution to the slow process of realisation 
firstly of attraction and then of universal gravitation! ', White page 146. Speaking of alchemy late in 
his He Newton said: "That study (is) fruitful of experiments", quoted on page 121. "(Newton) was 
gaining an instinctive awareness of possible forces at work in the universe for which conventional 
mechanical theory (still dominated by Descartes' notion of matter and spirit) had no explanation. 
He was seeing things in the crucible that could not be explained by Descartes or by an orthodox 
appraisal of simplistic atomisnY', White page 149. 
WUte realises alchemy's contribution to the development of technology, laboratory techniques and 
equipment, but is altemately enthusiastic and dismissive of the subject. He does not perceive the 
dialectical aspects of alchemic thought claiming instead that "the alchemical tradition is so 
illogicar', page 122. Fortunately Newton did not accept such a view of alchemy; he used it to take 
a totalising approach to natural philosophy, claiming that all natural phenomena were part of an 
observable interconnecting process. Newton believed that this process possessed a deeper reality, 
which he called the Absolute that emanated from God. He gives a clue to his beliefs in one of the 
ways in which he uses the word hypothesis, i. e. where a hypothesis refers to a phenomenon whose 
qualities are unmeasurable, they are defined as "occult qualities". Leibniz, who was to be involved 
in a bitter dispute with Newton over invention of the calculus, spoke of a "rebirth in England of a 
theology that is more than papist and a philosophy entirely scholastic since Nk Newton and his 
partisans have revived the occult qualities of the school with the idea of attractiorf', quoted in 
White page 303. White fin-ther explains: 
Without his in-akpth knowledge of alchemy (which he practised during the 1670s and '80s), he 
would almost certainly never have expanded the limited notion ofplanekvy motion as he saw it in 
166516 into the grand concepts of universal gravitation, of attraction and repuhdon, and of action 
at a distance Finally, if the experimental evidence had not been gathered, then Newton Is theories, 
even if substantiated by mathematics, would not have carried the weight they did in his Pýincipia, 
nor would they have so readily inspired the practical application of mechanics and the laws of 
motion which led, a century later, to the Industrial Revolution, page 93. 
Losee (1993) shows that Newton was keen to refute the mechanistic natural philosophy of 
Descartes and his. followers, because it had no place for God's omnipotence. Cartesianism, like 
Aristotelianism, was for Newton based on dogmatic metaphysical principles rather than provable 
theory. Newton makes his totalising approach clearer in naming it the "Method of Analysis and 
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Synthesis". Losee explains that the Method of Analysis, when applied to Newton's famous one- 
prism fight experiment was not naYve atomistic induction, which would produce the general 
statement that "all prisms under similar circumstances would produce spectra similar to those he 
had observed", page 86. Rather his Method involved an "inductive leap" by Newton, which 
according to Losee, involved knowledge about the fundamental nature of fight specifically: 
that sunlight is made up of rays which have different reyý-actjve properties. After all, other 
interpretations of the evidence are possible Newton could have concluded, for instance, that 
sunlight is indivisible, and that the spectral colours are produced instead by some sort of 
secon&uy radiation within the prism, page 86. 
Losee goes on to explain Newton's Method of Synthesis, by which the latter meant generalising 
results, whilst, using this property of fight to examine other phenomena, also using deduction: 
He noted that if his theory were correct, then passing light of a particular colour through a prism 
should result in a deflection of the beam through the angle characteristic of that colour, but no 
resolution of the beam into other colours. Newton confirmed this consequence of his theory of 
colours bypassing fightfirom one small bad of the specirtim through a secondprism, page 86. 
Newton's theory of colour mixing is summarised in a diagram, presented on page 91 of Losee, 
which looks very týuch like an astrological chart. Clearly Newton's two "Methode' do not refer to 
naive induction and syllogistic deduction respectively, both are complex and involve a network of 
interlocking theory, observation and experiment and far from being mutually exclusive, both 
Methods interpenetrate. Losee shows how far the Method of Analysis is from naive induction using 
the law of inertia, which shows how a body behaves when not being influenced by any external 
force. Newton formulated his first law using abstraction, a theoretical method which will be 
discussed in later chapters, because he saw that observation of this law was by definition 
impossible. Speaking of inert bodies, Newton knew that: 
no such bodies exist. And even if such a body did exist, we could have no knowledge of it 
Observation of a body requires the presence of an observer or some recording apparatus. But on 
Newton's own view, every body in the universe exerts a gravitational attractive force on every 
other boc64 An observed body cannot beftee of impressedforces. Consequently, the law of inertia 
is not a generalisation about the observed motions of particular bodfes, It is, rather, an 
abstraction ftom such notions-Moreover, Newton maintained that the three laws of absolute 
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motion specify how bodies move in Absolute Space and Absolute Time. 7his is a further 
ahstraction on Newton'spart, Losee, page 87-8, (my emphasis). 
Losee gets to the heart of the matter as he continues: 
Newton contrastedAbsolute Space and Time with their "sensible measures" which are determined 
experimentally. Newton's distinction between the "true motions " of bodies in Absolute Space and 
Time and the "sensible measures " of these motions has a Platonic ring that suggests a dichotomy 
of reality and appearance On Newton's view, Absolute Space ad Absolute Time tire 
ontologically prior to individual substances and their interactions. He believed, moreover, that an 
understanding of sensible motions can he achieved in terms of true motions in Absolute 
Space .. Newton was convinced that A bsolute Space must exist, and he advanced both theological 
arguments andphysical argumentsfor its existence, but he was less certain that bodies could he 
located in this space .. He suggested that Absolute Space is an 
"emanent effect" of the Creator, a 
"disposition of all being" which is neither an attribute of God nor a suhstance coeternal with 
God, pages 88-9. 
Such an approach to natural philosophy, or science as it later came to be known, owes much to 
neo-Platonism with its opposition between an unchanging timeless being and the fleeting world of 
appearances. As we shall see, the theme was to be developed further in the German Enlightenment. 
The following remarks from Losee's book suggest that Newton thought about the microcosm- 
macrocosm relationship in the context of the qualities of matter: 
In Query 31 of the Opticks, he selforth a research programme to uncover the forces that govern 
the interactions of the minute part of hodfes. Newton expressed the hope that the stuaý of short- 
rangeforces would achieve an integration ofphysico-chemicalphenomena-It is true that Newton 
&d suggest that if we could know the forces that operate on the minute particles of matter, we 
could understand why macroscopicprocesses occur in the ways they do, page 98. 
A number of writers, starting with William Law, argued that Jacob Boehme influenced Newton's 
laws of gravity, based on simultaneous attraction and the "secret principle of unsociablenese', as 
Newton called repulsion, of planets. Although there is no clear evidence for these claims, Newton's 
totalising approach, as we have seen, owed much to his studies of esoteric thought. It could equally 
be argued that Newton's synthesis of atomism and neo-Platonism was influenced by Bruno's 
pantheism. White claims that Newton was influenced by the English alchemist and Rosicrucian 
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Robert Fludd, whereas Walker (1972) mentions Newton's universal thought in discussing the work 
of the early 18th century Scottish mystic Ramsay, who refers to Newton's changes of mind about 
the esoteric aether-based, or spiritual, theory of gravitation. Ramsay rejected the orthodox idea that 
Newton was a mechanist claiming instead that his philosophy of nature contains an interplay 
between freedom and necessity: 
Newton is used to confirm Zoroaster's argument that thefirst cause of the universe cannot be 'the 
mere laws of matter and motion, but is the work of Gocl who governs it by general laws, which 
are nevertheless free, arbiftwy and even diversi . 
fy'd in the different regions of immensity 
according to the effects he would there produce... ' Yhe passage quoted herefrom the 1717 edition 
of the Optics, while affirming that thefirst cause of naturalphenomena is not mechanical but an 
'incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent Being, again introduces Newton's theory of infinite 
space being God's sensorium. -Newton is again praised 
for opposing Descartes' strictly 
mechanical universe, Walker pages 256-7. 
VVIite quotes the following, complete with chiasmi, to summarise what we can see is Newton's 
dialectical attitude to nature: 
For nature is a perpetual circulatory worker, generating fluids out of solids, and solids out of 
fluids, fixed things out of volatile, & volatile out offixeg subtle out of gross, & gross out of subtle, 
some things to ascend & make the upper terrestrial juices, rivers and the atmosphere; & by 
consequence other to descendfor a requital to theformer, Newton, quoted on pages 208-9. 
Newton was aware of the ancient distinction between the microcosm, which he had explored by 
means of the alchemic crucible, and the macrocosm, but attempted to integrate the two in what is 
today called a "theory of everything": 
Whatever reasoning holds for greater motions, should holdfor lesser ones as well. 7he former 
depends on the greater attractiveforces of larger bodies, and I suspect that the latter depend upon 
the lesser forces, as yet unobserveg of insensible particles. For, ftom the forces of gravity, of 
magnetism and of electricity it is manifest that there are various kinds of naturalforces, and that 
there may be still more kinds is not to be rashly denied It is very well known that greater bo&es 
act mutually upon each other by those forces, and I do not clearly see why lesser ones should not 
act on one another by similarforces, Newton, quoted in White page 225. 
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I end this section by pointing out an important contradiction noted by White: 
Ironically, although Newton was largely responsible for the development of the scientific 
enlightenment which swept away the common belief in magic and mysticism, he created the 
origins of empirical science and modem, 'rational'world in part by immersing himseffin these 
verypractices, pages 105-6. 
Bernard Mandeville's articulation of the contradictions of capitalism 
the seeming Paradox, the Substance of which is adývncld in the Title Page; that Private Vices by 
the dextrous Management of a skit&I Politician may be turnd into Publick Benefits, MandeviHe 
(1989) page 34. 
Religion is one thing and Trade is another, Mandeviffe page 23. 
7hus thousands give Money to Beggars from the same motive as they pay their Corn-cutter, to 
walk EaV .. (the) Conftudiction in the Frwne of Man (in whom) the Yheory of Pirtue is so well 
understood, and the Practice of it so rarely to be met with, Mandevik page 29. 
the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor .. the only thing, .. that can render the 
labouring man industrious, is a moderate quantity of money, for as too little will, accor&ng as his 
temper is either dispirit or make him desperate, so too much will make him insolent and Ja2y .. the 
greatest part of the poor should almost never be idle, and yet continually spend what they get.. it 
isprudence to relieve, butfolly to cure (their wants), MandeviHe, quoted in Cofletti page 205. 
VyThite points out that within thirty years after the 1666 great fire, London had become the largest 
city in Europe. As the balance of military and economic power shifted from Holland to England, 
London became Europe's banking and commercial centre. He explains: 
It was a city of brutal contrasts. - Yhe entire metropolis was sustained by an underclass of labourers 
and servants most of whom lived in the liberties to the east of the city. 7he liberties were no-go 
areasfor the authorities and lay la-gely beyond theJurisdiction of the LordMayor of London. Yhe 
Liberty of the Fleet, a ghetto built around the infamous Fleet Prison, was a lawless hellhole, the 
last area to be touched by the great reconstruction scheme, the home of countless whores and 
thieves who thrived on the rich pickings to be had a few miles away in the wealthier districts. By 
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night the lawless worked 'up west; by day they slept in windowless hovels lining streets awash 
with human waste and flood waters ftom the unclerground river Fleet A few miles ftom the 
liberties stood the elegant homes of wealthy bankers and merchants, the open parks and the fields 
of Kensington and Knighishridge, the rarefied atmosphere of the coffee-houses, where the idle 
rich spent long lunches in genteel chatter.... Shopkeepers could no longer rely upon the cash of the 
purchasers, and so prices became inflated to compensate for the risk of accepting counterfeit 
coins. Workers were finding their weekly pay made up of tin coins or money clipped beyond 
recognition, andnots were becoming almost a daily occurrence, White pages 256 and 258. 
Lux (1990) describes Queen Elizabeth's famous comment on the growth of "the poor" in her 
queendom: "Paupers are everywhere! ". This led to the passing of the Poor Laws Act of 1601, 
which encoded the feudal paternalistic attitude to poor relief During and after the Civil War the 
Act fell into disuse and was in practice replaced by the dreaded workhouses, which were in effect 
prisons for "the poor". It was against this backdrop that a qualified medical doctor from Holland, 
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), came to London and soon achieved notoriety. Mandeville was 
influenced by the Jansenist view that man, after the fA was utterly depraved and self-interested, a 
view he picked up from the Protestant Pierre Bayle, who had to flee to Holland from Catholic 
France. That Jansenist thought used dialectical formulations is clear from the following quotes from 
Pascal, who was a believer: 
(After showing how vile and how great man is) ... Let 
him both hate and love 
himself .. wretchedness and greatness can be concluded each from the other .. 
Everything that 
could be said by one side as proof of greatness has only served as an argumentfor the others 
to conclude he is wretched .. All is one, all is diversity .. Know then, proud man, what a 
paradox you are to yourself.. We perceive an image of the truth and possess nothing but 
falsehood, being equally incapable of absolute ignorance and certain knowledge, Pascal 
(1966), pages 60-66, the section is entitled Contradictions. 
Unity added to infinity does not increase it at all, any more than afoot added to an, infinite 
measurement: the finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite and becomes pure 
nothingness, Pascal, page 411, beginning 7he Wager. 
In London, earning a living by practising medicine, Mandeville began to write irregular rhyming, or 
doggerel, poems and other miscellaneous notes. The works were thinly veiled social, political and 
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economic satires, and the enlarged 1723 second edition of 7he Fable of the Bees attracted so much 
adverse comment that Mandeville was declared to be "Who Vice commends, MAN-DEVIL be his 
Name", quoted in Mandeville (1989), page 8. Famous philosophers, like Berkeley and Hutcheson, 
and apologists for the rapidly developing capitalist mode of production, despised Mandeville's 
openness and honesty in attacking the pride and hypocrisy he saw all round him. He also attacked 
the Merchantile orthodoxy, which advocated the virtue of frugality. Soon his book was translated 
into other European languages, and Mandeville became the most hated man in both France, where 
copies of the book were burned, and Germany. 
Mandeville looked at early 18th century London, with its mass of half-starved workers, beggars 
and thieves on the one hand and rich polite society on the other, and linked these two contrasting 
social groups together. His famous paradox, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, which was the subtitle 
of Ae Fable of the Bees, drew attention to the profound social inequalities of "a trading Country", 
as opposed to "a fi-ugal and honest Society". Mandeville not only highlighted the crimes of the 
pimps, pickpockets and others of the urban poor, but also the crimes of the wealthy lawyers, 
doctors, merchants and clergy. However, Mandeville was no vulgar moraliser, contrasting the vices 
of the many with the virtues of the few good citizens. Rather, he anticipated Adam Smith's invisible 
hand by showing that these vices were organically linked to the prosperity of the rich: "Thus every 
Part was ffill of Vice, Yet the whole Mass a Paradise", Mandeville page 16. As Harth's 
introduction to the text explains, far from moralising about vice Mandeville shocked polite society 
by pointing out that: 
7he commission of crime, for example, is responsible for keeping whole multitudes at work. - 
lavsyers gaolers, turnkeys sergeants, bailiffs, tipstaffs, locksmiths, "and all those Officers, 7hat 
squeeze a Living out of Tears". Asfor the vices of luxury, avarice, prodigality, pride, emy, and 
vanity displayed by the more respectable members of the community, these promote trade by 
creating wants which it is the business of merchants, tradesmen, and manufacturers to 
supply .. With the ensuing absence of crimes that create employment and of vices thatfoster trade, 
the professions decay, commerce dwindles thousands of unemployed emigrate and the hive's 
pros perity comes to an end.. even highwaymen encourage trade by spending lavishly what they 
have stolen, pages 17 and 19. 
It is often claimed that the two major influence on Mandeville's method, that of openly stating 
contradictions, were Machiavelli and Hobbes. Machiavelli had said that "it will be found that some 
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things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear 
vices result in one's greater security and wellbeing", quoted in Lux page 113, Similarly Thomas 
Hobbes (1962) wrote about the "state of nature! ', a key component of which is "competitiorf', 
which as Rousseau was to point out was really an idealisation of the social struggles leading to the 
English civil war. Hobbes, who had to flee to France for his own safety, states in the famous 
chapter )dii of the Leviathan: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the 
same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own 
strength, and their own invention shallfirnish them withal, In such condition, there is no placefor 
industry; because the fiwit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth, no 
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may he imported by sea, no commodious bwlding, ý no 
instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the 
face of the earth, no account of time; no arts; no letters- no society; and which is worst of all, 
confinualfear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, sobia7y, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short, page 143. Yhe notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. "ere 
there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force andfraug tire in 
war the two cardinal virtues, .. there he no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but 
only that to be every man's, that he can get, andfor so long as he am keep it, page 145. 
Mandeville not only anticipated Malthusian demand theory and the Keynesian multiplier, but went 
firrther, beyond most economists today, by exposing the hypocrisy and folly of extending charity to 
the poorest sections of the emerging working class, or "the Enthusiastick Passion for Charity- 
Schools! ' which had become a popular pastime for the middle classes in late 17th century Britain. 
The children of the most wretched parents were taken into the Schools, taught to read the Bible, 
given a trade apprenticeship or became servants to the rich, one journalist called this publick Spirit 
"the glory of the age we five irf', quoted in Mandeville, page 36. Mandeville could not have 
disagreed more, because he claimed that the people making their petty donat ions to the Schools 
were self-satisfied hypocrites who were courting economic disaster in the name of morality and 
religion. Mandeville's attitude to the growing number of urban poor reveals his rejection of the last 
traces of the theory of rights and duties of paternalistic feudalism. Anticipating Smith, Mandeville 
said that "Pride and Vanity have built more Hospitals than all the Virtues together", page 37. The 
fact was that the wealth of 18th century Britain, of which the middle classes enjoyed a 
disproportionate share, was obtained by exploiting the labour of as large a number of unskilled 
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workers as possible. Anything that interfered with this process was detrimental to "the 
Community". Mandeville explained that "In a Free Nation where Slaves are not allow'd the surest 
wealth consists in a multitude of Labourious Poor", he wanted to discourage "Idleness" and exploit 
workers by "bringing them up in Ignorance", page 3 8. 
The great merit of Mandeville's thought was that he accepted the contradictions that were already 
apparent in 18th century proto-capitalist society. The wealth of the new capitalists, and the comfort 
of the middles classes, depended entirely on expanding the mass of urban proletarians. Mandeville 
scandalised London's virtuous moralisers by pointing out with his usual bitter satire, that no 
amount of self-denial could change this state of affairs: "Oh! the mighty Prize we have in view for 
all our Self-denial! can any Man be so serious as to abstain from Laughter? ", Mandeville page 40. 
Although he possessed little or no knowledge of the philosophical, alchemic, or mystical concept of 
contradiction, the development of which we have noted, Mandeville broke away from the study of 
nature and sought contradictions in that most complex phenomenon: emerging capitalist society. 
Despite occasional discussions of society by Paracelsus, Bruno and others, no previous writer 
equalled Mandeville's focusing of the combination of previously unknown wealth on the one hand, 
and grinding squalor on the other, that was to be the hallmark of capitalist social relations. 
Rousseau: paradox and alienation 
it was iron and com, whichfirst civilised men and ruined humanity, Rousseau, quoted in CoHetti 
page 156. 
whatparticular interests have in common is so little that it never counter-balances what they have 
in opposition, Rousseau, quoted in Coffetti page 168. 
instead of all moving toward the general goog they draw closer together only in moving away 
ftom it, quoted on page 172. 
the privilegedJew should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitude are in 
wcml of the hare necessities of life, quoted on page 190. 
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Partly because 18th century France was so feudal compared to Britain, Rousseau's political 
economy is crude compared to that of Adam Smith. Even compared with Physiocrat laissez-faire 
theory, his economic thought is naYve. However, although he fails to match Smith's understanding 
of the contradictory and uneven development of capitalist productive power, Rousseau has a 
comprehensive understanding of the contradictions of historical development. He cites the 
constantly increasing amount of work performed by the masses since the end of hunting and 
gathering society, which we noted in the first chapter. This, and his political theory represents a 
considerable advance on that of Hobbes and Locke, not to mention Kant who came after him. 
Smith, and later Marx, noted Rousseau's use of contradiction in his criticisms of civil society, a 
view developed out of his experiences of Paris. Although his French contemporaries mockingly 
referred to Rousseau, who acknowledged his debt to Mandeville, as un homme paradoxe, sophiste, 
or someone displaying 1esprit de contradiction, these descriptions are quite correct. 
In the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, in Rousseau (1979), there is a discussion of 
discontentment, which anticipates the term alienation, and "this feeling should be a panegyric on 
your first ancestors, a criticism of your contemporaries, and a terror to those who have the 
misfortune to come after you", page 54. He says that as man "becomes sociable and a slave he 
grows weak, timid and servile", from his perfectibility comes "in different ages his discoveries and 
his errors, his vices and his virtues, makes him at length a tyrant both over himself and over nature", 
pages 55-6. Rousseau continues: "the original man having vanished by degrees, society offers to us 
only an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions, which are the work of all these new 
relations, and without any real foundation in nature ... Civilized man, on the other hand, 
is always 
moving, sweating, worrying, and tormenting himself to find still more laborious occupations; he 
works himself to death, and even hurries on towards it, to put himself in a position to live, or he 
renounces He to acquire immortality ... 
Always asking others what we are, and never daring to ask 
ourselves ... we 
have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour 
without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness ... Let us reflect what must 
be the state of things where all men are forced mutually to caress and destroy one another, and 
where they are born enemies by duty and swindlers by interesf', pages 66-7. 
On the underlying principle of capitalism, self interest he says it "is purely a relative and factitious 
feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of 
any other, (and) causes all the mutual damage men inflict on one another ... you are undone if you 
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once forget that the fiuits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody", pages 56 and 
59. On the same subject Rousseau says: "all subsequent advances have been in appearance so many 
steps towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the decrepitude of the 
species ... It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem 
became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating 
trickery with all the numerous vices that go in their train .. There arose rivalry and competition on 
the one hand, and conflicting interest on the other, together with a secret desire on both of profiting 
at the expense of others. All these evils were the first effects of property and the inseparable 
attendant of growing inequality', pages 60-6 1. 
The new political institutions of bourgeois society generate yet more paradoxes, as Rousseau 
explains: "All ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty ... 
for the advantage of a 
few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and 
wretchedness ... the magistrates 
fomenting everything that might weaken men united in society, by 
promoting dissension among them ; everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual division, 
while it gave society the air of harmony; everything that might injure the different ranks of people 
with mutual hatred and distrust by setting the rights and interests of one against those of another, 
and so strengthen the power which comprehended them air,, pages 62 and 65. 
Rousseau rejected social contract theory, because, with the aid of Christianity, it merely attempts 
to legitimate and consolidate antagonistic capitalist social relations, in which there is civil equality 
but inequality of property. He concludes that: 
it is an astonishing thing to have made it impossible for men to live together without being 
constantly on their guard, usurping each other'splaces, deceiving, beftWing and destroying each 
otherL where two men have common interests, a hundred thousand may be opposed to them, and 
the only way to succeed is to deceive or ruin them all, Such is the unhappy source of violence, 
betrayals, and all the horrors compelled by a state of things in which every man who pretends to 
workfor thefortune or reputation of others, is trying only to lift his above theirs, at their expense, 
quoted in Colletti pages 160- 1. 
Rousseau speaks of the alienation of bourgeois man of civil society who: 
does not know what he wants. Forever in conftWiction with himse#, forever veering between his 
inclination and his duty, he can never be either man or cifizen He can be no good to himse#, ' or 
262 
to others. He will he a man of our times. - a Frenchman; an Englishman, a Bourgeois. He will be 
nothing, from tMile, quoted in CoUetti page 172. 
On the workings of the labour market, Rousseau says that the capitalist tries to make the workers 
see: 
either in reality or in appearance, their advantage in labouringfor hi(m). It is this which renders 
him false and artificial with some, imperious and unfeeling with others, and lays him under a 
necessity of deceiving all those for whom he has occasion, when he cannot terrify them, and does 
notfind it in his interest to serve them in reafity... (7he capitalist) often assumes the mask of good 
will; in short, with concurrence and rivalship on one side; on the other, opposition of interest, and 
ahvays with concealed desire of makingprofits at the expense of some other person. All these evils 
are the first effects of property, and the inseparable attendants of beginning 
inequality... accumulated wealth ahvays affords the means for accumulating still more, and it is 
impossible for him who has nothing to acquire anything; where the good man has no means for 
rising out ofpoveny, where the greatest cheats a7e the most honoured, quoted on pages 196 and 
198 of Cofletti. 
Diderot and Rameau's Nephew 
.. bear in mind that in a matter as variable as behaviour there is no such thing as the absolutely, 
essentially, universally true orfalse, unless it is that one must be what sey-inferest dictates - good 
or bad, wise orfoofish, serious or ridiculous, virtuous or vicious ... "en I say vicious,; it is by way 
of speakingyour language, for ifwe came to a clear understancfing it might turn out that what you 
call vice I call virtue, and that what I call viceyou call virtue, Diderot (1966) pages 834. 
Usually greatness of character comesftom a natural balance between several opposing qualities, 
page 94. 
Diderot's (1966) social satire, the Platonic-style dialogue Remneau's Nephew, has attracted much 
comment, most notably from Hegel. The text aims at establishing truth about pre-revolutionary 
French society by means of a discussion between a philosopher and Rameau's down and out 
nephew, who is compared to the Greek ascetic philosopher Diogenes, with an extra voice given to 
the philosopher, who Re Hegel's Owl of Minerva, reflects on the conversation at a later date. The 
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form suggests the Sophists' philosophical stance which takes truth to be the sum of the partial 
truths represented by each social vantage point hence Hegel's admiration for the text. The 
philosopher's views are a reflection of the dominant morals and mores of French bourgeois society, 
whereas those of the nephew are at first selfish and decadent. However, as the dialogue develops 
the nephew begins to expose the contradictions and hypocrisy of the French upper classes, and the 
philosopher's views begin to seem nalve and ineffectual. 
The social contradictions generated by the nephew are revealed in the following passages, which 
owe much to Rousseau: "he demonstrated as clearly as one and one make two that nothing was 
more useful to nations than Hes and nothing more harmful than truth ... That 
is the final outcome of 
fife in every sphere. At the last day all are equally rich, whether it is Samuel Barnard (a financier to 
the French King - S. S. ) who, thanks to thefts, pillagings and bankruptcies, leaves seven millions in 
gold, or Rameau who will leave nothing, Rameau whose hessian shroud will be provided by 
charity ... In nature all the species feed on each other, and all classes prey on each other in society. 
We mete out justice to each other without the law taking a hand ... For long ages there was an 
official King's Jester, but at no time has there been an official King's Wise Marf, pages 38,52,63 
and 83. 
Adam Ferguson and the Scottish Enlightenment 
18th century Scottish intellectuals, particularly Ferguson, Millar and Smith, enjoyed a degree of 
intellectual freedom as capitalism overcame the vestiges of feudalism. However, they were aware of 
the capitalist contradictions, as the Lowlands industrialised, to which Mandeville had drawn 
attention to south of the border. Mandeville's turning upside down of respectable middle class 
thinking, by showing that vice leads to virtue and virtue to vice, was a hammer blow to their 
attempts to develop a new moral philosophy. Ferguson (1966) was obviously talking about 
Mandeville when he said that there were men who in talking about morals "give loose to ridicule, 
indignation, and scorrf', page 33. Although he displayed the kind of morality mocked by 
Mandeville, readily indulged his Hellenomania, and knew little of occult dialectics, Ferguson 
directly confronted the contradictions generated in civil society. In the 18'h century Glasgow and 
Edinburgh were notable for the amount of workshop production, a growing number of factories, 
and a sharp division of labour. However, Ferguson is famous for noting the contradictions 
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associated with what came to be known as alienation, or as he put the matter "dismemberment of 
the human character" page 23 0, caused by an advancing division of labour: 
In every commercial state, notwithstanding anypretension to equal rights, the exaltation of afew 
must depress the many In this arrangement, we think that the extreme meanness of some classes 
must arise chiej7yftom the defect of knowledge, and of liberal education .. But weforget haw mmiy 
circumstances, especially in populous cities , tend to corrupt the lowest orders of men. An 
acbniration of wealth unpossesseg becoming aprinciple of emy, or of servihty, a habit of acting 
perpetually with a view to profit, and under a sense of suhjection, the crimes to which they are 
allured, in order tojeed their debauch, or to gratify their avarice, are examples, not of Jgnorcmce, 
hut of corruption and baseness .. under the disparities of condition, and the unequal cultivation of 
the mind which attend the variety of pursuits, and apphcations, that separate mankind in the 
advanced state of commercial arts, pages 186-7. 
The following passage shows that Ferguson is not only disturbed that people come to be judged 
not by what they are, but by what they possess, but also that he has learned from Mandeville: 
We judge of entire nations. hy the productions of afew mechanical arls, and think we are talking 
of men, while we me boasting of their estates, their dess, and theirpalaces. Yhe sense in which 
we apply the terms, great, and nohle, high rank, and high life, shew, that we have, on such 
occasions, transferred the idea of perfection ftom the character to the equipage; and that 
excellence itseý'Js, in our esteem, a merepageant, adorned at a great expense, by the labours of 
many workmen, pages 252-3. 
Adam Smith and social forces 
Me workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible, Adam Smith 
Hghlighting a central contradiction of capitalism, quoted in Lux page 100. 
those who labour most get least, Smith in the'&v-1y Draft, quoted in Colletti page 15 6. 
"erever there is great property, there is great mequality. For one very rich man, there must be 
at leastfive hund-edpoor, and the affluence of theftw supposes the indigence of the many, Smith, 
quoted on page 171 of CoHetti. 
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Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities .. It is, as it 
were, a certain quantity of Jahour stocked and stored up to he employed, if necessmy, upon some 
other occasion, Adam Snýth, quoted in Raphael (1985) pages 63 and 67. 
The greatest discovery that was ever made by man, Smith speaking of Newton's laws, quoted in 
Lux (1990) page 14. 
The key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment for our purposes is Adam Smith, who came from an 
intellectual background, his father being a lawyer and civil servant. At first sight Smith shows no 
evidence of the use of occult or mystical dialectics, but he was, as we shall see, profoundly affected 
by Newton's ideas on occult forces. Like his atheist friend Hume, Smith was a secular humanist. 
An intellectual high flyer in his youth, Smith attended Glasgow University at the age of fourteen 
before going to Oxford. His influences included Rousseau, the Physiocrats, Lucian's satires and 
crucially Mandeville, of whose work Smith said that it could not "have occasioned so general an 
alarin among those who are the friends of better principles, had it not in some respects borTowed 
upon the truth", quoted in Colletti page 211. Smith struggled with the disturbing effect which 
Mandeville exerted on his humanism. Whereas Mandeville states the contradiction that vice leads to 
benefit and sees no need of a resolution, Smith's 'resolution' partly consists of asserting that the 
vices of lying and cheating are really just the working out of "self-interest". Raphael (1985) explains 
the problem: 
the Moral Sentiments as a whole gives so much prominence to the effect of sympathy in human 
fife. Aptni ftom the 'economic'passage, Smith writes as if sympathy played the major parl in 
binding society together. How, then .. can this be reconciled with the view of the Wealth of 
Nations, which is surely that selPhterest is the mainspring of social activity and that benevolence 
(or sympathy) countsfor nothing? Yhis was 'the Adam Smith problem, over which much ink was 
spilled in the nineteenth century, especially by German scholars, pages 87-8. 
Raphael explains that for Smith all 'philosophers or men of speculation', terms which correspond 
to our natural or social scientist, "make connections which would not occur to others ... make 
connections between diverse phenomena! ', page 104. Although he saw it as provisional and likely 
to be superseded, Smith speaks of Newton's system as "an immense chain of the most important 
and sublime truths, all closely connected together", quoted on page III of Raphael. Similarly his 
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view of the existence of four stages of human history, though not as original or sophisticated as 
Rousseau's, is finiher evidence of Smith's totalising, implicitly dialectical approach to political 
economy. For example, in the Early Draft to the Wealth of Nations he says: "In a Civilised Society 
the poor provide both for themselves and for the enormous luxury of their Superiors. The rent 
which goes to support the vanity of the slothful Landlord, is all earned by the industry of the 
peasant ... Among savages, on the contrary, every individual enjoys the whole produce of his own 
industry. There are among them, no Landlords, no usurers, no tax-gatherers", quoted on page 156 
of Colletti. In common with other commentators on the then new and apparently atomistic mode of 
production, he was apt to speak of individuals living outside of society; yet he understood all too 
well the web of social relationships in civil society caused by division of labour: 
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solita7y place, without 
any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character- than of 
the beauty or deformity of his own face .. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided 
with the mirror which he wanted before, from Me Yheory ofMoral Sentiments, quoted in Raphael 
page 34. In reality the &fference of natural talents in different men isperhaps much less than we 
tire aware of, and the very different genius which appears to &sfinguish men of different 
professions when grown up to maturity, is not, perhcps, so much the cause as the effect of the 
division of Jabour, quoted in Colletti page 155. 
One paradox with the legacy of Smith's thought similar to that of Newton, is its intellectual 
colonisation by neo-classical economists, most notably by members of 7he Adwn Smith Institute. 
This involves a distortion of Smith's views, by ignoring certain aspects of his system, such as his 
labour theory of value, in order to present him as merely the advocate of the "self-interesf' of the 
emerging Scottish capitalist class. VVhilst Smith does align himself with that class in its struggle 
against the remnants of feudalism and sees the progressive aspects of laissez-faire capitalism, he is 
also aware of the destructive manifestations of the bourgeois revolution. 7he Wealth of Alations, 
particularly its early draft, is full of examples of Smith pointing to the contradictions engendered by 
the rise of capitalist society and his sympathy with "the poor": 
Civil government, sofar as it is insfitutedfor the security oftroperty, is in reality institutedfor the 
defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have 
none at all. -No society can surely he 
flourishing and happy, of which the far greater Part of the 
memhers are poor and miserahle. It is hut equity, hesides, that they whojeed, cloath and lodge the 
whole hody of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own Jahour as to he 
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themselves tolerably wellfeg cloathed and lodged.. some have great wealth and others nothing, it 
is necessary that the arm of authority should be continually stretchedforth, andpermanent laws 
or regulations made which may ascertain (I e secure) the property of the rich ftom the inroads of 
thepoor .. Laws and government may be considered ... as a combination of the rich to oppress the 
poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods which would otherwise be soon 
destroyed by the attacks of thepoor, quoted in Raphael (1985) pages 2,58 and 95-6. 
Although neither writer used dialectical idioms, Smith, Eke Ferguson, perceived clearly the 
contradictions engendered by the division of labour. In the Wealth of Nations, he notes the 
tremendous boost to productivity which results from this division, because in capitalism the 
common labourers have more wealth and goods than "the most respected and active savage7 
quoted in Colletti page 157. However, he is also aware of the effect on the worker who "has no 
occasion to exert his understanding ... and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible 
for a human creature to become", quoted in Raphael page 52. In the Lectures on Jurisprudence he 
repeats the contradiction of capitalism when he says: "So it may very justly be said that the people 
who cloath the whole world are in rags themselves", also quoted in Raphael page 52. 
It should be noted that Smith wrote an essay on the history of astronomy, in which he praised 
Newton's discoveries on gravity. The essay influenced his economic thought, for example he used 
the term the "invisible hand of Jupiter" in reference to pagan religion. Although his views on 
"natural price" demonstrate Smith's tendency to naturalist reductionism, specifically in reducing a 
social phenomenon to a natural one, his application of Newton's idea of an occult force to society 
is profound. In explaining natural price as a centre of gravity for actual market prices, the 
equilibrium between the effects of supply and demand are implicitly being compared to the stable 
orbit of a planet due to the simultaneous effect of the centrifugal and centripetal forces explained by 
Newton. It is worth adding that Smith similarly explains that the struggle over wages, with workers 
trying to raise them and employers reduce them, tends to towards equilibrium at the level of 
subsistence or "the lowest which is consistent with humanity", quoted in Raphael page 57. Raphael 
himself says: "Of course, it is not the natural price as such which exerts a quasi-gravitational force. 
The force is that of self-interest in the tension between supply and demand. However, the effect is 
an equilibrium which, Smith felt, could properly be compared with the equilibrium that the force of 
gravity can produce for moving bodies", page 55. Comparing this to Smith's ideas of an invisible 
hand and labour commanded, his attempt to differentiate the empirical phenomena of the market 
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from the hidden, or essential social forces which are the real causes of both equilibrium and change 
is evident and profound. Although astronomical analogy proved crucial to Marx's formulation of 
the labour theory of value, and in particular to the so called transformation problem, in the hands 
of neo-classical economists both the physics and the political economy sides of the analogy were 
debased into a crude mechanistic determinism. 
Political economy and 'resolutions' to the contradictions of capital 
I owe the public nothing, J. P. Morgan quoted in Lux page 89. 
any preoccupation with fairness andjustice is uncongenial to a science in which these concepts 
have no established meaning, George Stigler, quoted in Lux page 16 1. 
7he political economists in Church and State are the real high priests of the realm. 7hey have set 
us the golden caý'- -Impious, dissatisfied people, say they, you men without propeny, mob and 
scum of the earth, with minds born to inferiority and hands made for our service. 91hy if you are 
still discontented do you not seek to accumulate wealth and so become respectable like ourselves?, 
from an early 19th century journal Ae Crisis, quoted in Lux page 5 1. 
As the industrial revolution intensified and the number of urban poor continued to grow, the 
paternalistic capitalists, led by Whitebread, tried to reintroduce poor relief in 1782. They sought to 
abolish workhouses and provide a minimum wage, but there was much opposition to the proposed 
Act from the laissez-faire capitalists, and it was defeated and watered down. However, because 
even this help for "the pooe' was seen as excessive by the political economists and the capitalist 
class, there was much talk of the vice, folly and degeneracy of the "mobs! ' of urban poor. The 
Reverend Thomas Malthus, in his Essay on the Principle of Population, called for an end to all 
relief for the poor and tight control over the growth of the working class. As Ricardo pointed out, 
the squire Malthus adopted a rather different attitude to his own landowning class by supporting 
the Corn Laws, which maintained their incomes by restricting cheaper imports. These Laws 
brought into sharp focus the contradictory needs of the landowners and those of the industrial 
capitalists who wanted cheap food. Malthus also argued that the purchasing power of the middle 
classes as a whole was the means of resolving the by then well recognised contradiction of 
capitalism, the crisis of overproduction. 
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Ricardo, who agreed with Malthus on the need to reduce the rising bill for poor relief, implied the 
influence of Newton when he argued that it was linked to the current Act like the "principle of 
gravitation7'. He added his influential voice to those of Malthus and others and eventuaUy, in 1834, 
poor relief was abolished and the workhouses returned. However, far from restraining the growth 
of the poor, or of the population in general, the abolition of poor relief saw a continued, and 
increasing, growth in both: between 1700 and 1750 the British population grew by 8%, whereas 
between 1800 and 1850 it grew by a staggering 100%. Engels' Condition of the Working Class in 
England, written in the 1840s in Manchester, remains the most graphic description of the filth, 
pollution and squalor ofurban working class fife in the period. 
After the American Civil War the centre of gravity of world capitalism moved from Britain to the 
United States. The principle of laissez-faire came into sharp contradiction with the needs of the new 
American capitalist class, which added to its ranks some famous names who had parado)dcally 
made their fortunes from the Civil War. The class needed capital to build up an adequate 
infrastructure, in particular a coast to coast railway. The history of the building of the railway, with 
the aid of a mass of government money, revealed a latent state-capitalism, which reads like a 
paradigm of the lying and cheating in Mandeville's Fable. It brought to thd fore the crucial 
contradiction of where the capitalist's self-interest ends and where the state, which mediates the 
conflicting interests of different classes, decides that criminality begins. Adam Smith had noted that 
where economies were increasingly dominated by monopolies, their interests were diametrically 
opposed to those of everyone else, be they consumers, workers, the middle classes, or small 
businesses. 
Most political economists reacted to this state of affairs by ignoring, or apologising for, the 
contradictions engendered by the power of the monopolies, and the question of what is today 
euphemistically called "business ethics! '. The economists saved their polemics for the growing trade 
union, and the later co-operative, movements. We may also note in passing that even today, it is 
rarely the case that dialectical analysis is applied to trade unions, which are marked by fundamental 
contradictions. The realisation that total utility, a term equivalent to use-value which became 
fashionable amongst the political economists, would be increased if income differentials were 
narrowed, was another contradiction that had to be suppressed. Similarly the "free-rider" 
contradiction, and other instances of "market failure", where people would be able to obtain certain 
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services without paying for them, were pushed into the background. Not surprisingly the fact that 
much of the wealth of Europe was based on "laundered" money from the slave trade, piracy and 
colonial practices was yet another contradiction about which most political economists remained 
silent. 
Such analysis sets the stage for Hegel and Marx, both of whom read the work of earlier political 
economists. The crucial difference between Marx and these writers is that he explicitly used 
Hegelian dialectics which, as we shall see in the next chapter, was the synthesis of all previous 
dialectical thought applied to the study of capitalism. According to Marx, it was the only method 
capable of coping with both the contradictions and comple)d ty of this mode of production. It thus 
enabled him to sublate, or progress beyond, the work of these political economists, whilst ret 
what was valuable in their work, particularly that of Smith and Ricardo. 
William Blake's dark satanic mills 
But most thro'midnight streets I hear 
How the youthful Harlot's curse 
Blasts the new born Infants tear, 
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse. 
From London, quoted in Blake (1976) page 12. 
Opposition is tmeftiendship, Blake (1976), page 25. 
Do whatyou will, this life's afiction 
And is mack up of conftWiction. 
Blake page 47. 
This chapter nears its conclusion with a brief discussion of the dialectics of the 18th century poet 
William Blake. It is the case that poetry and prose from all parts of the globe is replete with 
dialectical formulations. Although there are occasional allusions to these in this teA their detailed 
study is beyond the scope of the work. Blake, who was a marginalised artisan living the fife of 
lower middle class poverty, is important because he used the ideas of the mystics, Kabbalists and 
alchemists, particularly Paracelsus. His work was heavily influences by their dialectical methods, 
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which he employed in his quest to free humanity from its "mind-forg'd manaclee'. Despite his 
fiustration that the American and French Revolution exerted little practical effect in Britain, Blake 
persevered with his sympathy for the masses of capitalism and turned mysticism on its head by 
suggesting that its end was humanity, not God. Blake's experiences of the brutal effects of 
capitalism in London led him to a view which was the antithesis of political economy. In opposition 
to Malthus, he advocated the fulfilling, rather than denial, of desire, a vision of a world beyond the 
factory system. 
Ihe Marriage of Heaven and Hell is the dialectical tide of one of Blake's most famous poems, 
which Kazin in his Introduction to Blake (1976) says concerns the attempt to "wed the 
contraries ... Blake's conception of union and of the infiniteness of union has no physical status. For 
him infinity is in man's passions and his will to know; it is a state of being", page 20. Whatever the 
reality of his practical politics, the following extracts from the poem show the dialectical mode of 
Blake's thought: 
Without Contraries is no progression Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and EneqD,, Love and 
Hate, are necessary to Human existence From these contraries spring what the religious call 
Good and Evil Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing om er fir En ýy 
(page 250) ... Prisons are built with stones of Law, Brothels with bricks of Religion (page 
253) ... Till a system was formeg which some took advantage of, & enslavd the vulgar by 
attempting to realize or abstract the mental deitiesfirom their ohjects. - thus began the Priesthood 
(page 255) ... but my senses discovered the infinite in everything (page 256). 
A note on Fourier's dialectic 
The early 19'h century French writer Charles Fourier described a landscape in which factory 
production had not yet become generalised. His political economy therefore lacked the penetrating 
insights of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, and his romantic utopian political vision had no means of 
realisation. However, his ironic commentary on the contradictions of emerging capitalist society 
was original, and influential on the generation of workers and intellectuals who fought in the 
revolutions of 1848. Marx and Engels spoke of Fourier's "remorseless unbearing of the material 
and moral misery of bourgeois society", Fourier (1972), page 69. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the explicitly, and implicitly, dialectical thinking of a large number of 
writers, but has omitted, or only made passing references to, others. Considerations of space have 
determined that Ricardo, for example, has not been examined in more depth; however, in terms of 
the discussion of contradiction his views are largely an elaboration of those of Adam Smith. 
On the specific content to which the dialectical form is applied, we have seen that several of the 
writers in this chapter, particularly Rousseau and Mandeville, have, at least implicitly, applied 
dialectics to society, rather than exclusively to natural processes, as was the case in previous 
chapters. The complexities of capitalist society were such that more established modes of thought 
were simply not able to capture the contradictions inherent in this mode of production. The critical 
remarks of Valla, and others, on formal logic were symptomatic of the final break with medieval 
thought and set the scene for Hegel's dialectical system. 
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